Some sixty years ago, the British social scientist, Thomas H. Marshall articulated what has since become the paradigmatic conceptual framework for describing the relationship between social rights and citizenship. Until the twentieth century, Marshall thought, the expansion of citizenship rested on the achievement of political and civil rights. But in the twentieth century, the progress of citizenship began to depend on the diminution of inequality. This end, he believed, would be achieved by “incorporating social rights in the status of citizenship and thus creating a universal right to real income.”

In the course of the century, Western industrial countries have struggled to expand the meaning of real income and to re-distribute it more equally. Education, health care, access to employment, pensions, food, shelter, child and elderly care are counted among the resources citizens expect as a matter of entitlement. These goods have, as Marshall put it, modified “the whole pattern of social inequality.” The new social edifice, he thought, would accommodate far more voices and, ultimately, a more inclusionary polity.

Marshall’s expectations have been only partially fulfilled. Over the course of the century, social rights have been extended in ways that have equalized material resources among individuals. Yet they have not necessarily led to enhanced social citizenship. In many places, the poor and minority groups have no greater voice in the polity than in the past. The relationship of social rights to democracy now appears to be far less certain than it did in Marshall’s day.

The essays in this volume help us to understand how in many European countries the extension of social rights acted as a counterweight to the worst predations of capitalism. In the United States the battle has been harder fought and social rights have been provided in such a way that they have yielded little voice for ordinary folk. The advent of neo-liberalism in the 1980s seemed to suggest that the limit had been reached in both America and Western Europe. And yet, the current disarray of neo-liberalism is far from reassuring. As nationality, and ethnic origin become criteria for the distribution of rights, and global streams of migration continue unabated, questions about who is entitled to the perquisites of citizenship pervade political discourse and the rights that accrue to citizens seem to narrow visibly. The war that Marshall declared goes on. It has simply taken another form.

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Democracy and Social Rights in the “Two Wests”

edited by Alice Kessler-Harris and
Maurizio Vaudagna
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# Table of Contents

Alice Kessler-Harris and Maurizio Vaudagna

Preface  
1

Alice Kessler-Harris

Democracy, Liberty and Social Rights: An Introduction  
3

Maurizio Vaudagna

Social Rights and Changing Definitions of Liberty:  
America, Europe and the Dictators  
19

## ISSUES AND THEMES

Ruth Lister

Poor Citizenship: Social Rights, Poverty and Democracy in the Late Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Centuries  
43

Volker R. Berghahn

American Social Scientists and the European-American Dialogue on Social Rights, 1930-1970  
67

Pat Thane

Women, Democracy and Social Rights in the Twentieth Century  
91

Michael Freeden

Democracy and Paternalism:  
The Struggle Over Shaping British Liberal Welfare Thinking  
107
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marco Mariano</td>
<td>The Liberal Dilemma. Social Rights, Civil Rights, and the Cold War in “Vital Center” Liberalism</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilfried Loth</td>
<td>Social Rights and Democracy in European Catholic Thought</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robin Blackburn</td>
<td>Pension Rights and Pension Finance in the Ageing Society</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcus Gräser</td>
<td>The German Welfare State and Its Transformation, 1900-1945</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bo Stråth</td>
<td>Social Rights and the Social State in Democratic Countries during the Interwar Years: The Case of Sweden</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gro Hagemann</td>
<td>The Value of Domestic Work: Economic Citizenship in Early Postwar Norway and Sweden</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danielle Tartakowsky</td>
<td>In the Name of Liberty: Foreign Influence on the French Popular Front</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Béla Tomka</td>
<td>Social Security in Postwar East Central Europe</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiara Giorgi</td>
<td>The Origins and Development of the Welfare State: Democracies and Totalitarianisms Compared</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biographical Sketches</td>
<td></td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

“All history is contemporary history” famously said Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce as he hinted at the present concerns and dreams that guide historians in focussing their scholarly interests and selecting subjects of research. The history of social rights aptly responds to Croce’s maxim. Different from earlier decades when the subject was mainly treated by sociologists and political scientists, historians have entered the field in the last twenty-five years. They have given much more attention to the twentieth-century development of what is alternately called social provision, the welfare state, the social service state, or the social rights of citizenship. An abundant crop of new books has appeared in the historical literature, many of them written from a comparative or international perspective.

Two trends best explain the new historical focus. On the one hand the blooming of women’s history has generated interest in previously marginalized subjects such as the perpetuation of family and community; the meaning of household work; the nature of paid and unpaid “caring” duties; and the provision of services for the poor, the elderly, children and the sick. Women’s historians have also fostered a debate over the role of the state in relationship to these social issues. On the other hand the so called “crisis of the welfare state” that emerged in the late seventies, has led historians to take a new look at the political and economic sources of modern social rights. While, in different degrees, these had been seen as givens for most Western industrial countries in the post-World-War-II years, they are increasingly in jeopardy.

To find out why, social scientists, including historians, have turned to the past, looking for the development of a sometimes contradictory, but definitely relevant, achievement of the otherwise troubled twentieth century. Their search should lead to proposals for how best to rethink the place and the nature of social rights in the context of new demands for democratic participation. This book takes its place in that literature.

Institutionally this book is born out of the cooperation between the Department of History of Columbia University and CISPEA, the consortium of Italian Americanist historians at the Universities of Bologna, Florence, Triest and Eastern Piedmont.
The papers presented here are the products of a conference held in Vercelli and Torino in the spring of 2008. That conference was the third in a series on the history of social rights held in New York and Italy in 2006 and dealing first with the transatlantic welfare states between democracy and totalitarianism and then with the history and the future of social justice.

We are grateful to the sponsors and contributors that have supported our conferences: at Columbia University we thank the Office of the Provost, the Department of History, the Herbert H. Lehman Center for American History and the Italian Academy for Advanced Studies in America; in Italy, in addition to CISPEA, the University of Eastern Piedmont and its Department of Human Studies, and the “Piero Bairati” Center for American and European-American Studies.

We are equally grateful to colleagues from many transatlantic countries for the wide range of issues and nations that their essays have covered. The large scholarly terrain considered in this book responds to the civic concern that is so visible in this area of historical studies. At the same time we intend this publication as an intermediate step. We hope that our joint efforts will continue to produce an enriching exchange of ideas and continuing scholarly work. We dedicate this book to new cooperative efforts.

Alice Kessler-Harris and Maurizio Vaudagna
Some sixty years ago, the British social scientist, T. H. Marshall articulated what has since become the paradigmatic conceptual framework for describing the relationship between social rights and citizenship. Until the twentieth century, Marshall thought, the expansion of citizenship rested on the achievement of political and civil rights. But in the twentieth century, the progress of citizenship began to depend on the diminution of inequality, or what Marshall called “class abatement.” These ends, he believed, would be achieved by “incorporating social rights in the status of citizenship and thus creating a universal right to real income which is not proportionate to the market value of the claimant.”

In the course of the century, Western industrial countries have struggled in various ways and in varying degrees to expand the meaning of real income and to re-distribute it more equally. Education, health care, access to employment, pensions, food, shelter, infant, child care, and elderly care, even access to legal resources, are counted among the material resources that citizens expect as a matter of right. Though the quality of these goods and services expand or contract with economic fluctuations and political will, accessibility to them has, as Marshall put it, modified “the whole pattern of social inequality.” Social rights, in Marshall’s words, no longer aim to “raise the floor-level in the basement of the social edifice.” Rather, they have “begun to remodel the whole building.”

The new edifice, he thought, would accommodate far more voices and, ultimately, a more inclusionary polity.

The notion that expanded social rights would usher in an expanded polity was not self-evident to Marshall’s contemporaries. They had observed Bismarck’s introduction of such rights in late nineteenth-century Germany as a way to silence the discontent of ordinary workers: as a means to enhance loyalty to the state rather than to provide a vehicle for workers to participate within it. By the 1930s, the Fascist governments of Italy, Spain and Germany, like the Communist government of the Soviet Union had honed the tools of social rights encouraging ordinary people to believe that a benevolent and all-seeing State could speak for them. The provision of health care, housing, lucrative employment, and a safe environment became mechanisms for stifling voices, not enhancing them.
And yet in the Western democracy’s Marshall’s expectations have been partially fulfilled. Over the course of the twentieth century, social rights have been extended within many national borders in ways that have equalized material resources among individuals. Until the rise of neo-liberalism in the 1980s, new social compacts came to recognize the value of preventing destitution and diminishing differences in status and resources among individuals. Britain, France, the Scandinavian countries, and the United States, among others, moved some distance towards enhancing equality and producing a more participatory civic and political life. To be sure, the poor, immigrants, and minority groups have found themselves with no greater voice in the polity than in the past; the well-off still dominate parliamentary elections and play leadership roles. Yet since the 1980s, even as social rights have narrowed, some groups – women, African-Americans in the United States, for example – have enjoyed greater access to the polity. This poses something of a puzzle. What is the relationship of social rights to democracy? Can we continue to expect, as Marshall did, that their expansion will produce more democratic results? Should we fear that a narrowing of social benefits will bring with it a narrower political sphere?

The research of a generation of students of social policy in Europe and the U.S., among them the scholars represented in this book, affirms the complexity of the relationship between social rights and democracy. Policy makers disagree about how to define social rights and how to measure their successes and failures. They quarrel about what kinds of social rights affirm liberty and freedom, and whether some rights might undermine individual liberty even as they preserve social order. Disputes still reign over such seemingly simple questions as what constitutes a social right, and what is merely an “entitlement.” Questions about how rights are conceived, who is eligible for them, and under what circumstances, still govern the field. And there is little question that expanding social rights over the course of the twentieth century have served different social purposes. As Michael Freeden notes, in his essay in this collection, in some cases an expansion of social rights aimed to underpin political stability; in others, the distribution of social rights promoted individual development, built up human resources, and encouraged social flourishing.

But the problems of how to think about the relationship of social rights to democratic practice don’t stop there. The industrial world of the early twentieth century tried to resolve problems of social inequality within the boundaries of nation-states that encompassed more or less homogeneous populations. Within that context class differences constituted the major focal points of tension, and resolving them by redistributing resources provided a logical way to create solidarity and allow for democratic voice. Trade unions spearheaded many demands for social rights and provided vehicles through which the voices of the disadvantaged could be heard.

By the end of the twentieth century, demographic, political, and social changes had played havoc with all of the categories through which Marshall and others conceived social rights. The idea of nation, the definition of class, the function of trade unions, have each
come into question. And new challenges pose mounting barriers to democratic practice. An increase in global migration has confronted homogeneous national self-images, fostering popular concern about the relationship of race and ethnicity to national purpose and citizens’ rights. Questions of inclusion and exclusion have led to debates about who counts as a citizen with access to resources. Women’s demands for equality have altered the shape of families and family life permeating the boundaries of public and private. We have gone to war in Afghanistan, ostensibly to support gender-encompassing claims to democratic voice. As capital flows shift, and manufacturing moves from older industrial countries and into the developing world, the voice of trade unions has diminished. Occupational shifts promote new patterns of education, employment, unemployment and poverty; they challenge the power of male breadwinners to sustain long standing patriarchal value systems. They shake the roots of hierarchical political belief systems.4

Like measures of social rights, measures of participation vary. Some scholars count as more democratic the capacity of women, immigrants and people of color to exercise greater influence through informal politics or non-governmental groups. Others search for influence in the expanded access of these groups to administrative structures. Still others measure increased democratic voice in terms of electoral representation. And finally, a fourth group views with approbation formal measures of economic equality like an Equal Rights Amendment that prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or religion, or the equity of social provision for men and women, immigrants and the native born.

Several of the essays in this volume frame their questions about how and whether social rights advance or constrain human freedom within the context of changing notions of liberalism. In the nineteenth-century classical liberal thought assumed that men of reason and economic stature deserved a voice in the polity independent of government or other intervention. The advance of industry suggested that, without economic security and opportunity, participation would be a mere illusion. Twentieth-century liberal thought assumed that a more capacious and interventionist government could break down some of the barriers to individual achievement. But as Maurizio Vaudagna tells us, the advent of a more generous government posed a conundrum for since no government could “enjoy a unanimous public” the only way “for the government to succeed would be to coerce dissenters and restrain their liberty.” The liberal government that exhibited greater tolerance for individual and special interests simultaneously undermined a general consensus as to what constituted the “good.”

Marshall, like many of his generation, assumed that extending the capacity for personal growth by removing economic and social (often class) barriers would necessarily foster democratic participation. The United States, in the last half of the twentieth century, challenges this assumption. There, the form taken by expanded social rights has resulted in a diminution of democratic participation while it has exacerbated the power of special
interest groups. Yet the essays in this volume reveal that a transformed liberal ideology could promote as well as restrain social participation. How individual nations, and communities of nations, coped with this tension has been one of the great dilemmas of twentieth century social policy.

Each of the essays in this volume explores some aspect of these intersecting issues. Rooted in the empirical data of a range of twentieth century experience, they speak to whether and how an expansion of social rights (or what Marshall would call social citizenship) necessarily leads to greater democratic participation. They also enable us to ask and answer questions about why women, blacks, immigrants, and the poor are so frequently not taken into account in debates about the expansion of democracy. In this introductory essay I draw on the empirical and theoretical material generated by our authors to illuminate the conflicting and contradictory impact of expanding social rights on the exercise of political voice. Individually, these essays present intriguing case studies; they neither provide answers nor mediate between and among the various points of view. Yet, considered collectively and with a focus on additional material from the U.S., they suggest that a comparative perspective might shed light on how and under what circumstances an expansion of social rights seems to have led some citizens and groups of citizens to greater or lesser degrees of democratic participation.

My own perspective is that of an American historian, specifically that of a historian of women and gender, who has come to conclude that it is not the expansion of social rights per se that contributes to democratic participation, but how those rights are offered. This essay draws upon evidence from the U.S. case as well as that of other authors in this volume to suggest that democratic participation is rooted not in the existence of social rights, but in the circumstances through which social rights are imagined, acquired, and distributed.

I begin with a story: in early fall of 1967, the United States Senate considered a revision of the then thirty year old rules under which Aid to Families of Dependent Children, (AFDC) commonly known in the U.S. as “welfare” payments would be made available to the states to distribute to the poor. These welfare payments, part of the original Social Security Act of 1935, had been intended to provide economic security for children in poor families that lacked a family breadwinner (most often a father). In a period when family stability seemed to be the core of successful social reproduction, and most mothers of young children were not expected to spend their days earning wages, welfare payments were expected to allow the children of the poor the same good start in life as those from more prosperous families. They were offered to mothers on the explicit condition that they relegate their individual needs (whether for wages, for satisfying and supportive male companionship, or for education) to the background in the service of rearing responsible and appropriately educated children who could take their place in
the labor force. The legislation was a great victory, offering women and their children a new and important social right.

In the beginning, many worthy widows and deserted wives took advantage of what was then called Aid to Dependent Children. Funds were administered and distributed by the separate states, which generally matched federal contributions. Little stigma attached to the women and children who benefited from the legislation. As the Depression passed, and the state found other ways to support the offspring of living and dead husbands and fathers, a revised program, Aid to Families of Dependent Children, or AFDC, came increasingly to incorporate only the children of mothers who had never had stable male partners. Their numbers (and the stigma attached to them) grew as the meaning of family shifted in the fifties and sixties, and as wage work became more and more the norm among married as well as unmarried women, the mothers of children among them. At the same time, a growing women's movement began to insist on equal individual rights of women to economic opportunity, educational resources, divorce, marital property, and control over their own bodies. The proportion of women in the labor force climbed, and the number of wage-earning mothers expanded geometrically. State and federal legislatures now re-visited the bargain they had made. Legislative conversations turned from the rights of children to good parenting and adequate support to questions of why mothers in receipt of welfare should not work for their benefits.

In the fall of 1967, Senator Russell Long invited policy makers and legislators to testify at hearings designed to alter the circumstances under which lone mothers and their children would receive support. He did not invite any recipients of welfare to testify, so a group of female welfare recipients from New York took a bus to the hearings and sat in the galleries where they noisily protested their exclusion and begged to be heard. Long refused. Far from acknowledging their right to speak, Long defended his position the following day in harsh terms. “Yesterday,” he raged “this whole room was filled with mothers who sat around this committee room all day and refused to go home. Why can't those people be told that if they can find time to impede the work of the Congress they can find time to pick up some beer cans in front of their house?”

Long made clear that his stance was rooted in his contempt for women who chose not to enter the labor market. “Other mothers are supporting their families,” he insisted “and it seems to me those welfare mothers could strive to do the same thing.” Nor did Long disguise the fact that he no longer shared a previously common conception of the value of mothering. Labeling mothers on welfare “female broodmares” and “riffraff,” he told the committee hearing: “I am frank to say that I am not impressed with the idea that those welfare mothers are doing something constructive sitting around those homes.”

The episode captures several facets of how the distribution of social rights affects the capacity of beneficiaries to exercise citizenship. It also returns us to the New Deal debate over the meaning of individual and social liberty that Maurizio Vaudagna elucidates in
his paper. Long’s vituperative attacks vitiated the implied contract between mothers and
the state in which the state guaranteed a minimal level of support in return for child rear-
ing and family maintenance. This was part of a much larger debate, which, as Vaudagna
suggests, rotated around the question of whether liberty might be collectively, rather
than individually construed. To sustain the concept of “individual” responsibility, Long
denigrated and rendered negligible the tasks of housework and child care, refusing the
claims of the women who engaged in these tasks to the status of participants. He also
revealed contempt for those who claimed the political right to speak on behalf of financial
support for household work, dismissing the women who desperately wanted to be heard
by his committee as simply impeding the work of Congress. Finally, Long assumed that
providing social support would undermine individual responsibility (to earn a living, to
clean up one’s neighborhood, even to be good mothers); the assumption, as it turned out,
deprived women of the resources they needed to be effective citizens. Lacking support to
remain vigilant mothers, they were pushed into exhausting labor, doing two or sometimes
three jobs, failing to police their own neighborhoods, and neglecting their children.

In almost every respect, Long’s assumptions, and those that finally led the U.S. to
abandon its commitment to federal funding for the poor, vitiates understandings that
most industrial states adopted early in the twentieth century. The experience of Britain,
for example, departs from that of the United States in the second part of the century.
Michael Freeden suggests that British theoreticians in the early part of the century
seized on a notion of “individual rights” that would advance “some notion or other of
the social good.” Although widely contested and sometimes politically unpalatable, the
notion translated into a “soft paternalism” in which some notion of community and the
preparation of individuals for participation in the democratic process held sway. This
model fostered a more generous conception of social rights which were seen as enhancing
public well-being even as they benefited individuals.

Robin Blackburn’s description of the transition in European pension benefits illustrates
Freeden’s point. Early pensions, Blackburn tells us, were granted as political privileges
not as economic rights: they were conceived as gifts from a monarch or an appreciative
nation. In the early twentieth century, they were offered in Germany, under Bismarckian
principles, to forestall complaint by critics of the monarchy. In a parallel incarnation
they were designed to relieve some of the burden on younger workers. At that point,
they carried the stigma of poverty. By the first decade of the twentieth century, however,
the advent of contributory pensions signaled what Blackburn describes as a transition to
“strong pensions” – earned as a right. These, says Blackburn, performed a dual function:
they “confirmed patriarchy and the social hierarchy” while at the same expanding national
loyalty by providing status and voice for recipients.

Similar patterns can be observed in Sweden, as we learn from the essay of Bo Stråth.
Even as early as mid-twentieth century leaders debated whether expanded social rights
would serve the interests of authoritarian or social democratic tendencies, and they shared the conviction that expanding social rights would sustain social stability. One side argued that fostering national identity through patriotism would provide a quick path to national unity. But the victory went, finally, to the social democrats who, in the 1930s, argued for the value of investing in social programs to maximize human potential in order to foster loyalty to what they called the volkhem.

U.S., policy makers in the early part of the twentieth century drew on a contrasting range of ideas that pitted individual interests against the community good, and that, in the end, prepared the way for a view of social rights divided by class and by self-interest. To be sure, this did not happen without debate. In the early twentieth century, the leaders of the Progressive period put forward a set of ideas, often led by female reformers, to put into place what Freeden calls an “organicist” conception of rights: one that enhances individual security while sustaining a larger national purpose. But unlike the European case, the United States at first reserved these rights (including restrictions on working hours, sanitary and safe work places and minimum wages) to those who held jobs that affected public safety (like railroad engineers), and to women and children. Because their distribution was limited, it is difficult to imagine them as social rights at all. In the oft-quoted words of a 1908 Supreme Court decision they placed women, like children, in the position of “wards of the state.”

And yet there were gains. Legislation to compensate workers for work-place accidents found their way into law in many states; unemployment insurance and health insurance reached the public agenda, though with little success. As in the European countries that Pat Thane discusses in this volume, the Progressives also drew attention to such issues as poverty, poor housing, overcrowding, malnutrition, and high infant mortality. After women won the vote in 1919, they divided sharply over whether they should change their tactics. Influential groups demanded that women use their new-found political power to demand egalitarian social rights for women as opposed to special rights. But by far the strongest group – sometimes called “social feminists” – persisted in formulating such rights around traditional conceptions of the family. Historians still dispute whether, in the United States, the price of social rights for women came at too high a cost: such rights not only limited women’s labor force options, but expanded the privileges of male bread-winners and their families in ways that fostered the continuing political subservience of women. They also set the stage for a continuing distribution of rights rooted in the workplace rather than in birth or residence, and funded by employers rather than by general taxation.

In this respect the U.S. was not typical. Pat Thane’s essay in this volume reveals that in many European countries and in Australia, women used their newly acquired political power to produce a more expansive set of social rights. In the interwar years, in Britain, Germany, France, and Sweden, these included such varied benefits as paid maternity
services for women; family allowances paid to mothers; subsidized crèches for infants of working mothers; and pensions for widows and orphans. Yet, as Thane suggests, while women used their expanded political rights to engage in party politics and speak on international questions of peace, the achievement of a limited set of social rights for women did not translate into greater opportunities or rewards in the market place.

The key to the differences lies, as Volker Berghahn demonstrates, in whether social rights were funded by the increased distribution made possible by mass production (the American model), or whether they are funded by a redistribution of wealth through taxation (the most prevalent European model – and the one most likely where Freedens's conception of an organicist liberalism took root). Berghahn is quick to point out that both models could be found on both sides of the Atlantic, and persuasive as to his argument that in the years before World War II, ideas that found little purchase on the European side, migrated across the Atlantic along with some of their proponents. The expanded corporate influence made possible by the privately funded formulation and distribution of social rights in the United States, enabled the development of what is commonly known as the “two track” welfare state. A significant group of rights, including unemployment and old age insurance, generally the product of government/employer cooperation, became the prerogatives of male, generally white, workers. Instituted in the 1920s by a few trade union and corporate welfare programs, these rights adhered to those who contributed to them through their wages. They included pensions, paid vacations, and educational entitlements (generally available to skilled workers of good standing and long service) as well as recreational sports and summer camps for workers and their families.9

Often initially funded by private charities and increasingly supported by the separate states, non-earned benefits (or welfare) came to be imagined not as a right at all, but as the largesse conferred by a benevolent and prosperous state on those among the unfortunate poor who complied with stringent criteria of behavior and morality. Mothers pensions, for example, widely adopted by the states after 1911 went only to those who could demonstrate such virtues as thrift, cleanliness, piety, and sexual purity.10 They were imagined less as rights than as mechanisms for contributing to a safer and more prosperous society. Offered grudgingly, they spoke to the failure of individuals rather than concern for their participatory potential. A brief experiment with publicly-funded clinics for mothers and infants lasted from 1921 to 1927 before it was eliminated by pressure from the medical establishment.

These programs expanded during the Depression years of the 1930s which fostered doubts about the viability of a self-regulating market and strengthened support for the state’s role in providing economic security for individuals. Designed both to forestall economic distress and to ensure political stability, New Deal programs such as old age assistance and poor relief successfully picked up the threads of an interventionist and compassionate liberalism introduced by an earlier generation of Progressives. They provide
Alice Kessler-Harris

Credence to Maurizio Vaudagna’s argument that the New Deal witnessed a shift from the conception of liberty as an individual right to that of the community’s welfare. Placed in the light of the rise of the European dictatorships, this was a bold move for, like the new authoritarian governments in Italy, Germany and Spain, President Roosevelt risked trading access to expanded social and economic rights for a curtailed and exclusionary form of political liberty. If the U.S. never succumbed to an authoritarian dictatorship some of the explanation may lie in the way that work-related rights were conceived.

Work-related benefits held a different place in the American popular imagination than those derived from the general revenues. Imagined as individual rights, in Marshall’s terms, rights accrued through work, including work-accident compensation, unemployment insurance, old age pensions, and, later, health care, carried with them a modicum of dignity and greater political voice than those derived from charity or need and described as assistance. Their features shaped by an increasingly powerful trade union movement, their advocates repeatedly fell back on the vocabulary of honor to shape legislative initiatives. As they were designed in 1935, and amended thereafter, neither the old age insurance system that now survives as Social Security nor the newly-initiated unemployment insurance program relied on general revenues to sustain themselves. Though both programs rhetorically appealed to a shared social spirit, neither covered as much as half of all employed workers and only a tiny fraction of women and African-Americans. Both relied on contributions from workers and their employers to pay for benefits. A proposed national health insurance program that would have required tax subsidies never made it out of Congress.

Despite the significance of trade unions in shaping the social rights programs of the 1930s, and their central role in developing health insurance for the aged and the poor in the 1960s, trade unions play a marginal role in these essays, their voices receding as corporate interests re-asserted their power during and after World War II. Elsewhere this was not the case. Danielle Tartakowsky notes that in France, a politics that deferred to organized workers and tried to mediate between them and the interests of corporations produced a generous and widely distributed set of benefits for workers and for families. It also produced a lively politics in which political parties deployed social benefits to attract and keep voters.

In Germany and Italy, where trade unions allied with corporations, social rights granted by the state affirmed the needs of the business world. Italian fascism, according to Chiara Giorgi, put in place a kind of “applied corporatism.” The distribution of social benefits became the province of corporations whose interests were represented in political institutions. “In the nineteenth century,” Giorgi writes, “there had been institutions of social protection which were mainly conceived as public charities. In the twentieth century, on the contrary, as the lower classes came to be vested with a share of power, the notion of social protection was then redefined in new terms.” Like Germany in the
1930s, however, the appeal to communitarian principles, channeled as it was through a corporate voice, never engaged the voices of the masses.

Germany developed a somewhat different relationship to corporate partnerships in determining social rights. In the twenties, as Marcus Gräser tells us, the Weimar state assumed responsibility for the well-being of its citizens. The National Socialist Party took over that responsibility without allowing the democratic voice that had characterized Weimar. Yet it played, as Gräser puts it, a decisive role in the lives of ordinary people. Finally, though, the West German Republic designed a democratic state that comprehended both that “a certain amount of social security seems to be necessary to being a responsible and active citizen” and that a welfare state could be “a bulwark to authoritarian rule.” Corporate and labor partnerships in welfare benefits were decisive: Gräser attributes to them a large part of the survival and prosperity of the post 1945 democratic regime, as well as the social legitimacy of the post-war state, and the successful reintegration of East Germany into West Germany after 1990.

The Catholic Church, according to Wilfried Loth, played a significant role both in legitimizing the social rights of the poor and in supporting authoritarian qualities of mind. Most of its leaders wedded to an ambivalent anti-modernism, the church lent its support to political parties in Italy and Germany that supported corporate integration into authoritarian rule. Not until the 1960s under John XXIII did the church commit itself “explicitly to the principle of equality as well as its political consequences.” Included in John XXIII’s platform, Loth tells us, were such democracy-enhancing notions as “the inviolability of human rights, especially the right to social welfare, the demand for the equality of men and women, the elimination of racial discrimination, the protection of national minorities, and assistance for developing countries.”

My favorite example of the “voice” granted by an enhanced distribution of social rights appears in Simone Cinotto’s contribution to this volume. Cinotto describes how an East Harlem, New York community of Italian immigrants and their children, inspired by the New Deal’s promise of “decent housing” organized itself to demand public housing in their community. Often led by mothers, and dismissive of “the idea of home as an object of consumption and of home-ownership as the leading social value,” immigrants paraded, marched, and persuaded federal, state, and local legislators to provide the social benefits to which they thought they were entitled. Cinotto notes that their exercise in democracy simultaneously empowered the community of Italian immigrants and fostered their cooperation with other ethnic groups, creating a grassroots political force, rather than silencing it.

Central and Eastern European states, under the influence of communism, differed as to the sources and means of distribution of benefits from their Western European counterparts. Until World War II, Czechoslovakia and Hungary followed what Béla Tomka calls Bismarckian principles that involved providing economic security in return for
silencing political protest. After the war, Béla Tomka tells us, these central European states distributed social rights in accordance with a strict sense of obligation. The state guaranteed full employment (through a centralized allocation of resources), and the right to work (though not always at an occupation of one’s choice). In return for meeting the obligation to work individuals received a high level of economic security, including housing, health care and family benefits, though not always of the standard they would have liked. The bargain effectively silenced public protest.

But a bargain that seemed to work during the years before World War II reversed itself after the war years. Volker Berghahn describes this change as the result of a reversal of the flow of ideas. Before the war, he argues, social democratic as well as Marxist and psychoanalytic ideas travelled across the ocean to the United States. After the war, “the flow of these ideas” reversed itself. What returned to Europe, however, were theories of modernization rooted in economic growth fuelled by expanded production. Berghahn suggests that the influence of modernization theory in the post-war years shifted an early European emphasis from an extension of social rights through the redistribution of wealth to a greater reliance on social rights funded by mass production. Marco Mariano provides an intriguing sidelight to this process. In the post-war years, he tells us, the U.S. responded to pressures from Europe (particularly the threat of communism), by re-configuring its commitment to liberalism. Informed by intellectuals like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and the concept of the “vital center,” the U.S. focused on issues of racial and economic justice even where these required greater government investment. Arguably, in the 1960s, and in the vision of the Great Society, the U.S. came closer to achieving the goal of fostering individual social rights that would strengthen community than it ever has before or since.

And yet the 1960s could not reverse the successful effort by corporations to restore faith in the rhetoric of “free enterprise” that had suffused the post-war years. Axel Schäfer notes that American defense spending and faith in continued economic growth overshadowed welfare spending as engines of prosperity. “The politics of growth,” he suggests, “privileged market solutions over public control and established the primacy of economic expansion over social solidarity.” Poverty came to be understood as “a problem of insufficient economic growth and the lack of employment opportunities.” The resulting policies undermined the self esteem and political voice of those who benefited from them, helping to disempower poor and underprivileged groups. Benefits acquired as a result of need, including public assistance to the elderly and to children and their families as well as health care acquired through the state, have generally accrued little respect and their recipients have been devoid of voice. Schäfer attributes this to the effect of depicting the poor as “morally deficient,” an image that led to mean-spirited enforcement of welfare provisions including stringent means-testing; behavioral requirements for mothers and their children; and increasing expectations of wage work.
At the same time, corporate and government policies discouraged labor union organizing, turning a once powerful movement into just another interest group. Trade unions attempted to retain loyalty by turning inward – negotiating better benefits and higher wages for their members while neglecting to campaign for publicly-funded, solidaristic, benefits for the working and non-working poor. From the 1950s on, with only occasional relief in the mid 1960s, government provided less generous tax breaks for families, persistently rejected full-employment policies, adopted minimum wage levels that failed to keep up with a rising cost of living, and permitted unemployment insurance benefits to erode. While trade unions fought for and sometimes won paid maternity benefits, leisure time, retirement and health benefits for their members, benefits for the majority remained outside the category of social rights, distributed, with little regulation, at the discretion of employers.

When these policies exacerbated wage and wealth inequalities, and failed to reduce poverty, efforts to describe the poor as individually responsible for their plight accelerated. In the U.S. welfare came to be a derogatory term, connoting, as Ruth Lister points out, laziness and lack of willpower, as well as abject failure. Lister joins Axel Schäfer in deploring the effect of depicting the poor as morally deficient, a notion crudely affirmed by Senator Russell Long who accused female beneficiaries of welfare payments of “sucking at the nation’s teat.” By the 1970s, the U.S. was moving back in the direction of individual rights, developing a neo-liberal ideology that placed greater faith in markets and less in government. Much of Europe followed, cautiously mitigating the perceived effects on the market and on incentives to work of granting too much in the way of social rights. In Volker Berghahn’s felicitous formulation, neo-liberalism slowly pushed back the state’s presence in the economy.

Britain, under Margaret Thatcher, led the way. Like the administration of Ronald Reagan, the Thatcher government insisted that welfare payments be re-directed not towards alleviating poverty but to provide incentives to become self supporting. “The narrower welfare contract,” as Ruth Lister has noted, “focuses primarily on the obligation to seek and to take paid work.” This modified contract, Lister calls it “conditionality,” “embodies the principle that aspects of state support, usually financial or practical, are dependent on citizens meeting certain conditions which are invariably behavioral.” Without stretching a point, to the American observer, this sounds much like the restricted social right to which American recipients of welfare have historically been subject. It contains a new notion of fairness – one that changes the expectations of beneficiaries of some social rights from a reciprocal obligation to support for doing a good job as mothers and home makers to the demand to earn wages as well. It resonates in a different key from that still accepted in the Scandinavian countries. And yet, Lister, like Michael Freeden, notes that such policies are consistent with the notion that individuals who derive financial support from the national purse should simultaneously do their bit for their country.
The trade-off of work for benefits (or rights) is now wide-spread. Britain’s Minister of Housing, Lister tells us, has made job seeking a condition of the right to housing. The United States has reduced eligibility for welfare to a lifetime total of five years and made wage work (even for the mothers of infants) its precondition. Sweden has abandoned its commitment to public housing and reduced the amount of government funded pensions available to old people. In New York the current mayoral administration has proposed charging “rent” to homeless people who find refuge in municipal shelters for more than a night or two. As I write, the U.S. Congress has proposed a health insurance bill that proposes to tax, as income, employers’ contributions to the cost of health insurance.

And yet, these “employment friendly” or “adult worker” welfare systems may mitigate against a politically involved citizenship? Lister cites the experiences of several countries to support both possibilities. Denmark and the Netherlands, she argues, continue to provide a range of social rights to all who reside within their borders; civic participation in these countries remains high. France and Germany have chosen to invest in human capital, spending significant sums on vocational training and job re-training programs. These non-earned benefits are not available to immigrants who are not permanent residents, and who therefore succumb more often to violent means of making their voices heard. The U.S. exemplifies the confusing set of dilemmas inherent in exchanging social rights for employment. When Senator Russell Long successfully engineered legislation that required the mothers of infants to “earn” their entitlement to shelter, clothing and food, he did not anticipate for such services as inexpensive or subsidized child care, non-discriminatory labor markets, appropriate public schooling, and public transportation. As states have been unwilling to bear these costs and courts unable to enforce their provision, the poor have become poorer, their voices in the political process muted. In the presidential election that voted Barack Obama into office, the campaign focused on the distress of the middle class, not that of the poor or even of the working class.

Has this neglect led the language of human rights to creep into the discourse of social rights in the post-war years? Or does the introduction of this language signal a turn in the meaning of social rights itself? The 1948 declaration of human rights included among its provisions a range of social rights such as the right to social security, to employment, to the social protection of motherhood. Wilfred Loth suggests that the agenda of social rights has now moved beyond the scope of nations to provide them. Pope John XXIII, as Loth reminds us, called for the “inviolability of human rights.” Increasingly, Lister tells us, poverty activists insist that “lack of adequate income – poverty – represents the denial of human rights.” And this provides a measure of hope, for involvement of the poor and of poverty activists in protests against their condition suggests a greater participation and voice – an expansion of the democratic promise of social citizenship. As Lister notes “the right of participation represents an important means of recognizing the dignity of people living in poverty because it is saying that their voices count, that they have something
important to contribute.” Yet optimism is tempered by our knowledge that immigrants are widely consigned to the poorest jobs and that, lacking in political outlets, they have recently taken to violence.

Finally, then, the essays in this collection suggest that the reciprocal play of responsibilities and obligations deeply influences the capacity of individuals who reap social rights to engage actively in the polity. Wage work (sometimes compulsory and often not) seems to determine who gets the best benefits and the most secure social rights. Yet explicit and implicit restrictions on racial, gender, ethnic, religious, and migrant access to wage work continue to silence political voice.

In a dramatic and moving counter example, Gro Hagemann illustrates how the social democratic model adopted by the Scandinavian countries provided a voice for unpaid housewives. Pre-war models of gender equality, she argues, along with a strong state and regulated labor markets attempted to offer families the choice of keeping one partner (generally the wife) at home. Governments deliberately expanded the social rights of housewives in order to “make housework less time-consuming and strenuous.” In the minds of the proponents, supporting house work would add “to the time span available for participation in community and politics.” In Norway, plans included better housing, electricity, and water supplies as well as social benefits like tax allowances for stay-at-home housewives, short-term day care and babysitters. The expectation was that these benefits would allow women to “participate in the democratic process, as voters, representatives, and participants.” This notion, originally embedded in the 1935 Social Security Act in the United States was exactly what Russell Long rebelled against thirty years later. Hagemann tells us that the plans were not universally implemented, and that everywhere they vied with efforts to encourage married women into the labor force. Still, elements were everywhere adopted. The most intriguing revelation in Hagemann’s conclusions is the sense that Scandinavian men and women understood that the redistribution of obligations to incorporate women’s caring functions would contribute to their participatory potential. Her conclusion sustains Michael Freeden’s sense that the best social rights are provided in a society that embeds individual rights in a sense of national well-being, and may well be one source of the relative power of Scandinavian women in both formal and informal political arenas.

“Citizenship and the capitalist class system have been at war” wrote T. H. Marshall in the middle of the twentieth century. In his view, and from a British perspective, this war would soon be settled in an uneasy truce in which citizenship would expand by dint of increasing reliance on social rights to which every individual would feel entitled and which would enhance his or her status. But Senator Long’s treatment of New York’s welfare recipients tells a different story. Long clearly believed that rights to education, housing, and especially to employment carried with them no access to democracy. Rather they contained a natural limit imposed by individual capacities and will. Social rights
could therefore restrict capitalism only to a certain point. If the essays in this collection are any guide, ideological commitment and political will, as well as individual capacity, have been responsible for restricting social rights. The essays reveal how citizenship and social rights exist in uneasy tension. We observe that social rights have been distributed and constrained in accordance with larger national and economic visions of desirable citizens and optimal levels of engagement.

As we read through the essays before us, we note that the war between citizenship and capitalism has many layers and is not yet over. Social rights are not abstract concepts, but concrete manifestations of the value systems that undergird social relationships. They have not, in the past, been imagined as human rights so much as mechanisms for preserving and maintaining particular state structures and systems of political economy. Viewed that way, they involve a measure of compromise and negotiation, a trade-off of reciprocal obligations and responsibilities against guarantees of social well-being and security. The capacity to earn; the value of the home and parenting; conceptions of contributory versus tax-subsidized benefits, all these and more suggest the importance of democratic voice in the decision-making process.

The essays in this volume help us to understand how in many European countries, until the rise and spread of the neo-liberalism of the 1980s, the extension of social rights acted as a counterweight to the worst predations of capitalism. In the United States the battle to extend citizenship and restrain capitalism has been harder fought. Social rights have been provided, to be sure, but provided in such a way that they have yielded little voice for ordinary folk and failed to reign in the power of the capitalist class in the political process. The advent of neo-liberalism, as Ruth Lister argues, seemed to suggest that the limit had been reached not only in the United States, but in all of Western Europe as well. And yet, the current disarray of neo-liberalism is far from reassuring. As nationality, and ethnic origin become criteria for the distribution of rights, and global streams of migration continue unabated, questions about who is entitled to the perquisites of citizenship pervade political discourse and the rights that accrue to citizens seem to narrow visibly. The war that Marshall declared goes on. It has simply taken another form.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. One could add to the list of expectations such things as safety, leisure time, children’s allowances or mothers’ pensions, economic security, and public amenities.

4. For a more complex discussion of these issues, see Gro Hagemann, ed., Reciprocity and Distribution: Work and Welfare Reconsidered (Pisa: Plus, Pisa University Press, 2007); see also Nancy Fraser, “Feminism, Capitalism and the Cunning of History,” New Left Review, 56 (March-April 2009), 97-117.

5. The quotations are from U.S. Senate, Hearings on Social Security Amendments of 1967, part 3 (September 20, 1967), 1662; Long continued: “If they are able to work, have work right in front of them, but can’t find time so much as catch the rats in their own house, I don’t see why we ought to have them on the public payroll.” And again: “I don’t see why we ought to pay them when there is work, honorable, good decent work available to them, but they won’t take it.”


8. For a brief presentation of these issues, see Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work: A History of Wage-Earning Women in the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), chap. 7.


The fundamental values of *liberty* and *freedom* run uninterrupted throughout American history. Never-ending wars have been waged to control them as essential political categories of public language, aiming either to bring them on one’s side or to change their meaning to suit a certain political alignment and vision of America. The story of American political language has witnessed numerous attempts to reformulate the meaning of cherished traditional words and values, with liberty and freedom ranking prominently in the perpetual redefinition process.¹

The history of appropriations and redefinitions has been so complicated that more than one scholar has despaired of the possibility of pinpointing any specific meaning. When Isaiah Berlin delivered his noted inaugural lecture at Oxford in 1958 on *Two Concepts of Liberty*, he was trying to both summarize and clarify the complicated changes of meaning, political uses and perceptions that the words liberty and freedom had been subjected to during the Depression, the war and the early Cold War years. Indeed, his famous distinction between “negative” and “positive” liberty was a summary of thirty years of change in its meaning. For Berlin, *negative liberty* “identified and demarcated the sphere of the individual from the sphere of political authority,” while *positive liberty* “linked the idea of freedom with the concept of self-realization. The individual or group was to be considered free if he/she could realize its potentialities.”² The former recalled the traditional definition of “freedom from unwarranted restrictions of belief, action or movement,” while the latter stressed “the right to pursue happiness as a person thinks best. This right involves guarantees that no person is denied opportunities on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity or creed.”³ The distinction is vested with great scholarly authority that has continued to this day.

There are two main historical interpretations of the meaning and relevance of the term *freedom* during the New Deal years. Historian Daniel Rodgers advanced one in his 1987 book, *Contested Truths: Keywords in American Politics since Independence*, which is shared by memoirs and other history texts. This opinion has stressed that in the 1930s, freedom
and liberty were the sign posts of conservatives who tried to paint the New Deal as “un-American” because it allegedly violated the tradition of American freedom. As Rodgers explains, Roosevelt and the New Dealers tended to avoid the term, either because they were realists, used the language of pragmatism and disliked abstractions in political discourse, or because they preferred different “condensation symbols” like democracy, liberalism, justice, cooperation and security. “Freedom,” said progressive journalist Dorothy Thompson at the time, “has not been the word of our generation. We talked instead of prosperity, of high standards of living, of recovery… In the name of Freedom every sort of injustice has been practiced.”

The second opinion, advanced by historians Michael Kammen (in his Spheres of Liberty: Changing Perceptions of Liberty in American Culture of 1986) and especially Eric Foner (in his distinguished The Story of American Freedom of 1998), among others, have stressed how “liberty” not only ranked prominently in the New Dealers’ public language, especially that of the president, but also, and even more importantly, underwent a fundamental change in its meaning in American public life during the Depression. The New Deal moved the understanding of liberty from the area of individual rights of personal safety, political participation and economic initiative to the social level. If the shift is to be expressed in terms of British sociologist T. H. Marshall’s famous tripartite distinction between the different rights of citizenship, then it could be said that the 1930s moved the definition of liberty towards the third category of socio-economic rights, even if only partially implemented de facto. Both Kammen and Foner think that freedom was therefore subjected to a pivotal redefinition in the 1930s, which presided over the “New Deal Coalition” that dominated American politics until the late 1960s. There is no doubt that New Dealers were forced to discuss their programs in terms of freedom because of attacks by republicans, conservatives, classical liberals and “New Freedom” progressives who were using the term as a strategic weapon against the government. However, other fundamental factors support the interpretation that the 1930s witnessed a fundamental change and an all-important public conversation about the notion of liberty in America.

The history of freedom is understood through that of its associations with other values and principles to a significant extent. In different historical circumstances, liberty has gone together with concepts like rights (often individual), private property, contracts, public order, free enterprise and personal development. It has also been frequently contrasted with authority, anarchy, slavery, statism, oppressive powers (whether public or private), monopolies, poverty and racism. As Foner has stressed, after the Fourteenth Amendment was accepted, the main issue regarding liberty became economic freedom. The problem was whether an individual should “be allowed to pursue economic self-interest without outside restraint or should economic freedom come to mean economic security, a living wage and a safety net.” Such polarized interpretations were at the heart of the Progressives’ understanding of liberty at the turn of the century, though because
of the anxieties of the new urban, industrial and immigrant society, they also added the insisted-upon association between freedom and order. These political and social issues grew increasingly important during the Depression, and the New Deal’s interpretation of liberty emphasized its association with social justice, economic security, national cohesion and racial and gender reaffirmation.

The purpose of this essay is to try to enrich Kammen’s and Foner’s interpretations with some additional perspectives. Its focus falls on international factors, such as the systemic confrontation between democracy and dictatorship taking place at the time, as well as the transnational cultural and political conversation about issues of liberty, planning, the welfare state and the organized society, which was involving the public and intellectual leaders of various liberal countries in a significant circulation and exchange of ideas. The purpose is to analyze how these international dimensions came to impact on American domestic politics, how freedom related to issues of economic security, so relevant in the 1930s, and how relevant political tensions marked the shift towards new meanings of liberty in the process.

The Controversy Over Liberty in the Transatlantic Scenario

In the 1930s, the controversy over the new meaning of liberty and the potential limitations it might be subject to in the context of modern society and the welfare state was not limited to the United States. On the contrary, the important place that the redefinition of liberty came to occupy in Roosevelt’s America is demonstrated by the fact that U.S. intellectual and political voices were part of a much larger, transatlantic exchange of ideas that involved their liberal, socialist, labourite and Christian counterparts in democratic countries. The 1930s were characterized by political “experiments” that drew the attention of thinkers and political leaders to the supranational scenario and asked them to take a side among the prevailing political and social alternatives. The Depression, the “great internationalizer,” was a common problem. Because of the lack of proven instruments to deal with it, leaders often resorted to looking abroad. The “experiments” that occupied the global center stage – Russian communism and its five-year plans; German and Italian interventionist nationalism and corporatism; the American New Deal with its liberal culture of community and cooperation; Scandinavian welfare and its social democratic egalitarianism – together with the interaction between domestic intellectual and political currents on the one hand and international “teachings” on the other, loomed large in the public life and conversation of liberal (and often non-liberal) countries.

There were two sides to the “Atlantic crossings.” First was the question as to whether it was even possible, considering the bold social and economic policies embraced by the dictators and the long tradition of contrast between civil rights and social protection that
from Bismarck to the Nazi “aryan welfare state” had often been associated with political despotism, to think of “a third way” in which civil liberties and economic security would be harmoniously matched. Second, how would one redefine liberty when associated with statism, public intervention, planning, social security and a welfare state?

The credibility of a “third way” between dictatorial statism and laissez-faire liberalism was far from established in the 1930s. More often than not, classical liberalism was critical of government inroads in economic matters and policies of social protection that “distorted” market mechanisms. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, reformist and revolutionary socialism, post-World-War-I communism and rising fascist ideologies, all defined the social issue as central to the twentieth-century agenda. As dictators vindicated their leadership in promoting employment and security with some success, they portrayed civil rights and liberties as the exclusive property of the well-to-do, which went counter to the need for centralization in order to manage a twentieth-century mass society. As a result, the international 1930s were dotted with question marks emerging from the very ranks of the reformers regarding the possibility of matching an active government and social security on the one hand with the liberties of democratic citizenship on the other. Even earlier, libertarian socialists suspicious of “big government” and best represented in Britain by G.D.H. Cole had stressed a decentralized socialism based on cooperatives as a way to merge individual autonomy and social solidarity.8 However, titanic efforts were made by political leaders and prominent intellectuals to make the new synthesis of liberty and public activism acceptable. As Roosevelt said, Americans were to keep “the clear hope that government within community, government within the separate states, and government of the United States can do the things the time requires, without yielding its democracy.”9

A vocabulary for the new synthesis was not even fully available or generally shared. Historian Josè Harris, the biographer of William Beveridge, the intellectual father of the post-War-World-II British welfare state, has recalled the search for a “third “ or a “middle way” in the 1930s using terms like “liberal collectivism,” “halfway house” or “liberal via media” – a linguistic fluctuation that signified the lack of any established terminology.10 In America, John Dewey, the most distinguished intellectual of New Deal democracy, developed a language to merge liberty, individualism and cooperation. He talked of “the freedom of cooperative individuals,” “cooperative democratic freedom” and “effective freedom” as “the actual ability to carry out a course of action,” against the notion of freedom as removing obstacles.11 The order of the day, explained New Republic editor George Soule, was not the “old shibboleth” of “freedom of private enterprise” but “socialized liberty based on an equitable shared abundance.”12

In France, the notion of liberty in an “emergency,” a term that came to play important imaginary, political and legal roles in Depression-stricken liberal countries, had a special urgency because of the impending political crisis. As rightwing supporters rioted in Paris
on February 6, 1934, the possibility that France could follow the German and Italian paths became a distinct danger. Consequently, “the political side of the crisis,” as historian Danielle Tartakowsky stresses in this volume “came to take priority over its economic aspects.” Though a trade union, the CGT (General Confederation of Labor) was the first organization to meet the threat to democracy by calling for a general strike on February 12 in order to bring together “all those who reject force as the source of the law and want the 1789 Charter on human rights to remain a basic law for all free men.” The rhetoric of Léon Blum, the socialist head of the Popular Front (often called “Blum’s New Deal”) closely associated the notion of _démocratie_ with the idea of liberty. His words contained a frequent appeal to “democratic liberties,” understood as political freedoms that went together with participatory democracy and social solidarity. As Blum repeated, this was France’s great historical legacy, threatened by fascist aggression: “The popular masses of this country will never allow their democratic liberties, which have been their treasure and their achievement, to be touched.”

If Blum’s rhetoric is compared with that of Franklin Roosevelt, considering both leaders were under the threat of the Depression and the rampant expansion of dictators, with France having the additional danger of impending fascism, we can see that they converged in their efforts to rationalize the interdependence of social security and public liberty. In Blum’s words, the interaction between liberties and social support drew added strength from the threats of both the Nazis beyond the border and the French fascists domestically, which made the value of liberty even more essential. Similarly, Roosevelt stressed that his country was to shift from “negative” to “positive” liberty, from liberty “of” to liberty “from.” Americans would therefore continue being free individuals and a free people and would rescue those very “negative” liberties that were in jeopardy in Europe and around the world. Democracy would have to “match dictatorship in giving this generation the things it wants from government.”

However, was the merging of individual, public liberties, the interventionist state and social security even possible in the first place? In his _Freedom and Culture_, John Dewey formulated the issue as a straightforward polarity: “whether governmental action is necessarily hostile to the maintenance of personal freedom, or whether the latter becomes an empty shell if it is without organized political backing.” In Britain, Beveridge was highly skeptical that a “third way” that could maintain political liberties was even imaginable. “I see the dangers and difficulties alike,” he said in March 1933, “of complete socialism and complete laissez-faire and at the same time I am not sure there is any practicable halfway between the two.” Throughout the 1930s, he was very ambiguous in his opinion on the New Deal. Since democratic planning for maximum employment required a wage cut, as he clarified in a report on the Roosevelt administration given at the Rockefeller
Foundation in 1933, he thought Roosevelt’s minimum-wage policy would weaken the American corporation, thereby threatening liberal capitalism and eventually liberal democracy. In countering the opinions on the Soviet Union of his good friends Beatrice and Sidney Webb after their celebratory book *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?* was published in 1935, Beveridge said, “It is impossible for me… irrespective of my views that I may hold upon their economic policy, to appear to condone the attitude of the Russian government in regard to liberty of thought and speech.” However, he did come to accept a larger measure of public action as the 1930s wore on, as revealed in his celebrated Report of 1942.¹⁸

The fear that the socio-economic statism (*dirigisme*) necessitated by the Depression would weaken or destroy civil liberties and possibly move even solid democracies like Britain or the United States towards a fascism of sorts lurked as a danger behind the reformers’ words. Socio-economic programs and the defense of political and individual liberties were closely related in the union leaders’ rhetoric in France. They stressed that “by bringing together the healthy, democratic actors of French society,” the general strike¹⁹ would be replaced by a battle for “liberty.” They also defined their organization as a “movement of free men” and considered France to be “one of the last bastions of liberty” from both a political and an economic point of view. Jean Duret, one of the authors of the economic plan publicized by the CGT in April 1934, called it the “project of economic and social organization through liberty.”²⁰

There were also some concerns about freedom and social policy in solidly democratic Sweden, which started a welfare experiment in 1937 that it would develop over the next forty years. The issue did emerge at times among the noted economists and government advisors of the Stockholm School of Economics, which expanded on many of the ideas that grounded the social democratic program. When Bertil Ohlin, one of its most prominent members, presented the Swedish experiment to the learned American public in a thematic issue of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* of May 1938, he concluded his introduction in these terms:

> It remains to be seen whether such an organization of society will succeed in retaining the advantages of the nineteenth-century economic system – its dynamic character due to the utilization of private enterprise as well as its political freedom – while providing a higher standard of health, safety and efficiency.²¹

### Rethinking Liberty in the 1930s

If, however, the “third way” and “democratic freedoms” were concepts whose practice was still largely a question mark in the 1930s, then how would liberty be redefined in relation to the changed landscape of the Depression and in turn the drastic renewal of
actors and policies this had caused in all aspects of public life? Considering the fact that, as mentioned above, meanings of liberty are elucidated through its associations with other values, then in the 1930s it was often paired with liberalism, security, planning and, perhaps most importantly, democracy. Social freedom was also stressed as a condition to preserve liberty’s individualist and political aspects.

The proximity of the words “liberalism” and “liberty” caused the reformulation of the latter to also amount to a debate over the former. The 1930s witnessed a tense political battle over the language of politics because, as Rodgers said, “every effort to alter the root metaphors of politics inaugurated a furiously intense struggle over the control of words… It is this recurrent struggle over a relatively small number of words that has shaped political talk in America.” In the end, Roosevelt succeeded in reaching what historian David Green has called “the supreme achievement” in the arena of political discourse, i.e., “to make what is partisan and temporary seem universal and timeless.” The term “liberalism” was “confiscated” by Roosevelt from the so-called “real,” “laissez-faire” or “classical” liberals. This was much to their irritation, since they continued to define themselves as “liberals” in the old, sanctified sense of supporting individualism and government restraint.

The 1930s saw the merging of the notion of liberalism as generosity/liberality, which went back to Woodrow Wilson and even earlier, with the notion of active government. Liberalism then became government generosity to guarantee resources for a dignified socio-economic life as a right of citizenship. In Roosevelt’s vision, this redefinition of liberalism did not amount to an increase in coercion. He had a keen sense of liberty as a limit to governmental discretion; the primacy of the law over political decisions; and the defense of minority groups and ideas in line with the notion advanced by John Stuart Mill in his *On Liberty* of 1859 that freedom consists of the amount of unorthodoxy a society allows. At the same time, however, he felt very strongly that liberty was also government by consent and that America would be free if the will and the basic common sense of the majority were implemented in a government program and enacted in bold policies. “Paternalism,” a definition of public and private generosity that stressed the passivity of the beneficiary and the superior power of the donor, was to be replaced by “fraternalism,” a notion based on the reciprocal independence and equality of the parties.

Rethinking the notion of liberalism in light of the new meaning of liberty with which it was indissolubly connected was among the central concerns of John Dewey’s writings of the 1930s, especially *Liberalism and Social Action* of 1935 and important articles like “The Meaning of Liberalism” of 1935 and “Liberalism and Equality” of 1936. In the former, Dewey stressed that freedom is not a given but, rather, must always be achieved. “Effective liberty is a function of the social conditions existing at any time.” It is therefore also aimed at enhancing equality and renewing individuality, which in turn helps individuals develop intelligence and participation. Liberalism was therefore the set of political and social instrumentalities, like free public education, that was needed for
citizens to conquer liberty. At its core were the instruments of social action to encourage individuals to participate in cooperative undertakings, since “shared experience is the greatest of human goods” and “no man and no mind… was ever emancipated merely by being left alone.”

But could government-inspired liberalism, as the program to make cooperative freedom real, pursue a public action that did not need to coerce opponents to be successful? The issue was very delicate because the impossibility of reaching a general consensus and therefore the need to restrain opponents was an important argument expounded by New Deal critics. It was given the clearest statement in *The Road to Serfdom* by Friedrich von Hayek, the eminent Austrian émigré economist, published in 1944. During the 1930s, two main themes emerged from the rhetoric of Roosevelt’s opponents. The first was the defense of “economic freedom,” which was understood as the possibility for an individual to pursue his economic self-interest with minimum outside restraint. The second was the opinion that government inroads were doomed to inefficiency and disruption because the socio-economic fabric was so delicate and complex that any action aimed to substitute its “natural” laws was bound to failure. In his 1939 book on freedom, Dewey cited with disapproval a famous statement made by Herbert Spencer, the social Darwinist thinker who had exercised an enormous influence on American laissez-faire and anti-statist liberals: “the economic situation is so complex, so intricate in the interdependence of delicately balanced factors, that planned policies initiated by public authority are sure to have consequences totally unforeseeable, often the contrary of what was intended.”

However, Hayek launched a new critical argument first hinted at in an article of 1938, “Freedom and the Economic System,” then fully developed in the *Road to Serfdom* and radicalized in *The Constitution of Liberty* of 1960. He argued that there was no identifiable notion of “common good” or “common interest” in public life. As he implied, “the price we have to pay for a democratic system is the restriction of state action to those fields where agreement can be obtained.” “Freedom,” he added, “is critically threatened when the government is given exclusive power to provide certain services – power which, in order to achieve its purpose, it must use for the discretionary coercion of individuals.” Since no government could enjoy a unanimous public and there would always be dissenting interests, groups and individuals who would oppose the prevailing policy choices, then the only way for a government to succeed would be to coerce dissenters and restrain their liberty. If a free society, as Stuart Mill said, depended on the amount of dissent it permitted, an activist government was bound to make it un-free.

The argument ran counter to the core beliefs of many New Dealers and international progressives, for example British Fabians and Labourites, against whom the *Road to Serfdom* had first been directed. The same issue was at the center of the rebuttals published in both Britain, such as the book by Labourite economist Barbara Wootton, and the United States, especially that of social scientist Herman Finer. Both Fabians and New Dealers
were very critical of the “economicist” foundations of Hayek’s view of public behavior guided purely by direct, individualist economic interest. In their view, public life could not simply be identified with the aggregate calculations of individual gains. Instead, the public could share policy goals and ideals independent of an immediate economic profit, which sometimes even went against them. Fabians like Barbara Wootton and Harold Laski, who had written *Liberty in the Modern State* in 1930 and was such an eminent protagonist of the transatlantic circulation of ideas that he was assigned the entry “Liberty” in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* of 1933, were very jealous of individual freedoms. However, in the tradition established by George Bernard Shaw, the Webbs and Richard Tawney (who had published the critical *The Acquisitive Society* in 1920), they thought that the “common good” could be identified in a set of social policies that would bring about rights to medical care, housing, a decent education, work and support for the weak and elderly. A program of fundamental social rights was, in the Fabian-Labourite view, the meeting ground of the public in its entirety, thereby removing the need for the government to discipline dissenters. Translated in the populist language that lied at the core of many New Dealers’ vision, including the president, such an opinion meant a program for “the people.” “There can be no real freedom for the common man,” said Roosevelt just before the attack on Pearl Harbor, “without enlightened social policies.” He also summarized the meeting of the traditions of individual freedom and national interest in the following terms: “In every land there always are at work forces that drive men apart and forces that drive them together. In our personal ambitions we are individualists, but in our seeking for economic and political progress as a nation we all go up or else we all go down as one people.”

In 1935, John Dewey said that “today, [freedom] signifies liberation from material insecurity.” The government-sponsored socio-economic security program seemed exactly the one that could appeal to the whole population and become a guarantor of liberty. Very widespread opinions converged on the need for security, including those of many republicans like 1936 presidential candidate Alf Landon and business people like Thomas Watson of IBM, Gerard Swope of General Electric and the Rockefellers, even if there was disagreement over how to achieve it. An equally varied amount of individuals considered the search for security to be the prime impulse of international political developments. As related in a 1933 editorial in The Nation:

> The New Deal in the United States, the new forms of economic organization in Germany and Italy and the planned economy of the Soviet Union are merely the latest and most extreme manifestations of a tendency which had been apparent for the greater part of the century – for nations and groups, capital as well as labor, demand a larger measure of security than can be provided by a system of free competition.

In the 1930s, the traditional notion of security was reformulated in terms of economic security, a living wage and a safety net. “It is security,” proclaimed Alfred Bingham,
“security of income, security for home and family, security for old age, security of position that the middle-class type craves.” For Roosevelt, freedom, especially economic freedom, was the right of every person “to make a living,” which had important political and individual consequences. “Necessitous men,” he added, “are not free men,” since they have no freedom of choice vis-à-vis the powerful. On the British side, the Webbs interpreted the principle of security in an everyday, somewhat materialistic way. As they said, “personal freedom means, in fact, the power of the individual to buy sufficient food, shelter and clothing.” According to political scientist Ralph Barton Perry, such an opinion meant that “the distinction between liberty and welfare breaks down altogether.” This also lent an economic tinge to Laski’s notion of liberty as “self-realization” and an attitude to behave independently. In the characteristic “humanization” that loomed so large in the president’s rhetoric and consisted in using bodily, medical and daily-life metaphors to describe socio-economic entities, the psychological meaning of security was interpreted as a product of its economic side. As the traditional vision of feminine dependency went, if the man’s income and job were secure, “the worker and his family” would in turn feel secure.

The resulting insistence on a social program was criticized by former President Herbert Hoover, the leader of the uncompromising anti-New Deal spirit among republicans, as the new, more impoverished vision of New Deal liberalism than its classical predecessor. “It is the sole voice of liberalism,” he said “that devotion to social programs is its field alone.” During the very days when the Social Security Bill was being considered by the Senate in 1935, Hoover told the students of Stanford University that “universal social security cannot be had by sudden inspiration of panaceas [understood as the New Deal legislation],” which would result in illiberal regimentation. Citing a criticism that has accompanied modern social protection since its beginnings in the nineteenth century to this day, Hoover added that bureaucratic, “regimented” social security would make Americans “lazy parasites” on the payroll of the government, like in authoritarian countries. Social security, in the classic language of individualist economic freedom, would eventually result from the “constants” of socio-economic practice, i.e. sanctity of contracts, currency stability, legitimate competition and government by the law, “not administrative fiats.” This line of attack was reaffirmed by Hayek, who in turn said that “policies which are now followed everywhere, which hand out the privilege of security now to this group and now to that, are… rapidly creating conditions in which the striving for security tends to become stronger than the love of freedom.”

As the decade wore on and the European dictators became an increasing threat to international peace, the word “security” came to be vested with a new meaning, that of international security as the defense of the American home and lifestyle – against foreign enemies. The two “freedoms from” – “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” in the “Four Freedoms Address” of 1941 – expressed the merging of an international/
military and a domestic/economic meaning of security, and American liberty could be
maintained if both securities were simultaneously achieved. Roosevelt was well aware of
the challenge coming from the fascist dictators: if the competition moved steadily closer
to the ground of national and military security with the advancing decade, economic
security was also all important for democracy to survive and win the fight against the
dictators. In 1935, Walter Lippmann, at the time very critical of the New Deal, wrote
that the “responsibility for the successful operation of a nation’s economy is now just as
much a function of government as is the national defense…” He did not particularly like
it but added that “the tendency seems to me world-wide, cumulative and irresistible.”
As a consequence, the competition between liberty and despotism would be decided on
the basis of security: “The issue [in recent times],” he said, “has turned upon whether
the western democracies, adhering to their way of life, could demonstrate that they were
better able than the eastern despotisms to restore security to the people.”

All the associations between liberty and liberalism, common good and security converge
in the most overarching of them all in the New Deal and the international progressive
language of the 1930s: that between freedom and democracy in what Dewey has called
“cooperative democratic freedom.” Wayne Fields, a historian of presidential rhetoric,
has said that in the early years of the New Deal, the language of democracy was heard
more than that of liberty. However, as had been the case in France under the most
dramatic circumstances, comparing democracy and liberty with dictatorship made the
former closely interdependent. Since the denial of individual and group freedoms was the
distinguishing feature of dictatorial countries, the contrast on the terrain of democracy
could only become one on that of liberty as well. As a result, the public conversation
about democracy was one of a set of political discussions that all implied a contrast to
and a redefinition of the meaning of liberty.

On the other hand, democracy was associated with the ideal and the program of
liberalism in the metaphor “liberal democracy.” America was a free country, went the
reformers’ rationale, but its freedom was characterized by its association with the tradi-
tion of American democracy. Its meaning was understood not in procedural terms, as a
set of regulations dealing with elections and the rule of law, but as a commitment to the
welfare of the vast lower rungs of the country. It was also understood as a policy and a
government aimed at bettering their lot, even if the actual achievement of the New Deal
had more to do with the creation of a safety net and the stabilization of the social order
than with any forceful effort to redistribute highly unequal incomes. As Arthur Altmeyer
said of old age insurance, and could be extended to New Deal social policy in general, the
purpose was “to protect and promote the economic and social well-being of the workers
and their families,” not to try and create the conditions for “a fundamental reconstruction
of economic and social institutions.” Yet, “what was especially distinctive about democ-

racy in the 1930s,” added historian Alan Dawley, “is that it came with a social twist.”
The theme of the New Deal commitment to general welfare, especially that of the needy, was pivotal to the New Dealers’ public message. The president’s role as a consensus builder was particularly important because, as former Labor Secretary Frances Perkins has said, “the rhetorical skill of F. D. Roosevelt raised enthusiasm among the audience because it emphasized the traditional American values of tolerance, freedom and democracy.”

“The liberty of a democracy,” said the president in 1938, “is safe if its citizens are in the position to ‘sustain an acceptable standard of living.’”

As a result, both democracy and freedom were closely tied to notions of social justice and increasing equality in the 1930s. Needy, desperate men and women were much more exposed to being trapped by the dictators’ sirens than dignified citizens, “common men” in Rooseveltian language, whose modest but secure well-being would also allow for independent judgment and self-government. “The test of our progress,” said Roosevelt, “is not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have much; it is whether we provide enough to those who have too little.”

Laski, who was a frequent guest at the White House, maintained in Deweyan terms that liberty could only be obtained “in concert with others similarly placed in the society” and according to the idea of justice, especially economic justice, of which “the state is the facilitator and the guarantor.” Equality was the great forward-looking value of modern life and “liberty is unattainable until the passion for equality has been satisfied.”

In his article of 1936, “Liberalism and Equality,” Dewey refuted the belief that these two ideals were incompatible, even if the actual “equality of the New Deal” was altogether very limited. Racial and gender discriminations continued to plague his social policy, which excluded farm and domestic workers, categories in which many blacks and women were clustered. Nonetheless, Dewey invoked Thomas Jefferson’s philosophy as one that simultaneously embraced liberal freedom and democratic equality.

Neither was freedom the opposite of social control in Dewey’s search for a constructed, conscious notion of liberty and democratic participation. In his 1935 article “Liberty and Social Control,” Dewey not only said that freedom and restraint were not necessarily opposites, but he also contended that liberty for some could mean its lack for many while social control could result in liberty for all. “These changes [those engendered in the socio-economic order by the impact of the Depression] are necessary in order that social control of forces and agencies socially created may accrue to the liberation of all individuals associated together in the great undertaking of building a life that expresses and promotes human liberty.”

Neither is liberty opposed to organization, he said as he continued to argue against the Spencerian objection. In the third chapter of *Liberty and Culture*, he asked whether freedom could survive in a highly organized world and criticized the notion of classical liberals whereby organization, for example labor unions modifying the free market-based principle of individual contract, was inimical to liberty. Dewey held that, on the contrary, freedom was totally void and abstract if it did not
affirm itself through organizational institutions and government support. The real issue, he added, was to build a flexible and democratic civil service that would avoid being rigidified in an immobile, eternal bureaucracy. In the final analysis, concluded Roosevelt as he looked back on the New Deal program, “our tasks in the last four years did not force democracy to take a holiday.”

Due to the Depression and the industrial features of modernity, democracy, security and liberalism tended to be stressed in terms of their economic aspects and were associated with production, industry and planning. Dewey’s message was particularly insistent about the merging of liberty, democracy and production. Since his notion of “liberal democracy” (democracy, liberty and generosity) was based on cooperative participation and industry was also a cooperative enterprise, then a worker’s freedom was his cooperative participation in the productive process. The struggle for a cooperative economic system was aimed at bringing about a wider “distribution of liberties.” Liberal democracy also became “industrial democracy,” and liberty became responsible participation in cooperative undertakings aimed at the public interest, which allowed more room for the development of individual intelligence and creativity than when the profit motive commanded production and industry. It was a basic change in what individual liberty had meant in the traditional definition of industrial life. Classical liberalism, stressed Dewey, “regarded the separate and competing action of individuals as the means to social well-being as the end,” while the new individualism consisted in a “socialized economy [that] is the means of free individual development as the end.” From the point of view of the industrial worker, around the turn of the century “liberty of contract” in the factory had mainly meant “free labor.” The liberty and dignity of the male laborer (women were either seen as economically dependent or protected by a special legislation that diminished their rights of citizenship) was his ability to stay on the labor market, get a job and act as the breadwinner in his family. It was an individualist, gender-biased notion of citizenship in an urban-industrial setting very much deriving from craft labor and unionism. In the 1930s, this notion was abandoned even if not without tensions and sorrows for workers whose unemployment was felt as a loss of dignity, citizenship and freedom. Contrary to the old, individualist definition of “free labor,” as Dewey said in “The Meaning of Liberalism” of 1935, now socializing production was the means for increasing liberty:

The ends which liberalism has always professed can be attained only as control of the means of production and distribution is taken out of the hands of individuals who exercise powers created socially for narrow individual interests. The ends remain valid. But the means of attaining them demand a radical change in economic institutions and the political arrangements based upon them.

Unlike many social critics of the 1930s who saw American individualism as a burden that opposed the widespread acceptance of a new collective, socialized order of the society and the economy, Dewey did not give up on the individual. His effort was instead to
develop a mutually beneficial interdependence between a cooperative society and a mature individual that would feed each other’s welfare. Individual freedom continued to be a relevant feature of American life, especially at a time when dictators traded individual civil rights for social protection. Contrary to the absolutism of the dictatorships and orthodox Marxism, liberalism was to find a way “in which the new forces of productivity are cooperatively controlled and used in the interest of the effective liberty and the cultural development of the individuals that constitute society.” This new meaning of “economic freedom” went against that of classical liberals, and the Temporary National Economic Committee proclaimed in 1941 that “political freedom cannot survive if economic freedom is lost.”

In many countries of the 1930s the magic word to redress the socio-economic system was “planning.” Conservative pessimism stressed that there was no way that reform and human reason could control and shape society and the economy without disruption, inefficiency, declining growth and decreasing liberty, and former Secretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills had held that “there exists… no man or group of men who can visualize, much less direct, the [complexities] … of American economic life.” Instead, planning was the idea that the socio-economic order had to be managed by conscious, rational actors that would develop an integrated, cooperative program of recovery and would replace the destructive fables of the “hidden hand” and the “natural laws of the market” that had led the world to the disaster of the Depression. Roosevelt had given public voice to the rationalist optimism as he expounded “the truth that democratic government has an innate capacity to protect its people against disasters once considered inevitable, to solve problems once considered unsolvable… We refused to leave the problems of our common welfare to be solved by the winds of chance and the hurricanes of disaster.”

In the United States, “planning” was not new and had been experimented with in different forms: regional planning, of which the Tennessee Valley Authority and other resource development plans were among the New Deal’s crowning original ideas; urban planning, embodied in the “greenbelt towns” program of the 1930s; voluntary business planning as a coordinated, anti-competitive, cartel-oriented approach to issues of production and commercialization, favored by associationalist “business statesmen” like Henry I. Harriman of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Gerard Swope of General Electric and “tried” in the “scarcity-oriented” National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933; and finally, land- and forest-use planning as developed by the Department of Agriculture under Henry A. Wallace, a prominent farmers’ intellectual, and “tried” in agencies like the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the Resettlement Administration.

However, even if the New Deal was eventually more successful in implementing local, piecemeal planning than any nationwide blueprint, the intellectual trend during the Depression years was still definitely toward “national planning.” As historian Otis L. Graham, Jr. has said, this “assumes that modern industrial society requires public
intervention to achieve national goals." The precedent was the economic coordination of World War I. For the first time in its history, “America's War-Time Socialism” had required the federal government to apportion and regulate a whole set of economic, financial, productive, labor, consumer, communicative, mineral and natural resources of the nation in order to face the war emergency and create a complicated institutional framework, like the War Industries Board, for the implementation of such a gigantic national effort. Many different kinds of planners – everyone from business spokesmen, to labor leaders like John L. Lewis and Sidney Hillman, to members of Congress like Senator La Follette, to members of the government like Rexford G. Tugwell, to intellectuals like Charles A. Beard and George Soule (who published a vision of a new America in his book *A Planned Society* of 1934) – all looked at the World War I experiment with great interest, even enthusiasm. The precedent did not however bode well for the encounter between liberty and planning, since the war emergency had limited free speech, public discussion and the independence of consumers and businesses. But, after all, the Depression was also considered an “emergency” similar to war, as the new president proclaimed in his First Inaugural of 1933. Even more importantly: “liberal planners tended to think… of businesses not as private property but as public utilities and… [tended to stress] cooperation between business and labor, agriculture and consumer, with government both as a mediator and special friend of the non-business groups.”

On the global scene, planning was in no way exclusively an American phenomenon. On the contrary, it was a principle and a practice that, while considerably vague, circulated widely in intellectual and political circles in both liberal and authoritarian countries. As was the case with social policy, dictators were in the lead when it came to experiments in socio-economic planning. American and European thinkers, government officials and public leaders flocked to the Soviet Union to see how Stalin’s Five Year Plan had set in motion a stupendous process of industrialization whose achievements were often celebrated and the human costs forgotten. Thanks to land reclamation, highway and infrastructure programs, “new towns” planning, urban and rural renovation and apportionment of human and natural resources in quasi-war economies through vast programs of government spending, dictators seemed much bolder that liberal governments in experimenting with plans of all kinds. “Why should the Russians,” said national planner Stuart Chase in 1932, “have all the fun of remaking the world?” If “remaking America” was the dream of at least the most radical of the national planners who were stressing social discipline, centralization and were ready to accept an amount of “government dictation,” the proximity to the dictators and their bold actions in “coordinating” economies made the issue of “liberal” planning and freedom even more relevant. For example, according to his biographer José Harris, Beveridge was convinced that as a last resort the merits and demerits of planning would have to be judged according to political criteria, with reference not to economic efficiency but to the “the problem of the Constitution and the power of the supreme authority in the State.” Beveridge’s attention was therefore focused on the political price...
of economic collectivism in the tradition that held that planning, social protection and political and civil liberties most likely contrasted one another.

To make planning and freedom compatible, the latter had once again to be reformulated as a cooperative, collective notion in a societal context. One of the best definitions came from a German émigré. In 1935, the distinguished sociologist in exile Karl Mannheim published his groundbreaking *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (translated into English in 1940), in which he defined the new notion of liberty in a planned society. Perhaps laissez-faire freedom was conceivable in a world of individuals and small units, but modern society was one of major political, economic and social actors with powerful technologies that could distort social life and throw it off balance. Rational planning was therefore inevitable, and liberty could only exist as long as it was embodied in the planning itself. In a later essay of 1937, Mannheim clearly defined what he meant by freedom in planning:

Planning… means planning for freedom. This means to control those fields of social growth on the security of which depends the smooth functioning of the apparatus of society, but at the same time consciously to leave free those areas that contain the greatest opportunity for creative development and individualization. This freedom, however, is not the freedom of laissez-faire, laissez-aller, which can no longer exist today. It is the freedom of a society which, disposing of the entire coordinated social technology, has itself under control, guarding itself by its own free will against the dictatorial suppression of certain areas of life, and incorporating the guarantees of these free areas into its structure and constitution.69

If the lenses of Isaiah Berlin’s distinction are now reconsidered, then the 1930s was the decade when the accent shifted from “negative” to “positive” liberties without repudiating the former. In framing his dichotomy, Berlin was recognizing that the notion of liberty had changed in the 1930s and 1940s. His effort to stress that “negative,” individual liberties were still all important, especially in the context of the Cold War and the confrontation with Stalinist Russia, was also a recognition of how central “positive” freedom had been in the previous twenty-five years. Throughout the 1930s, the need to defend liberty against dictators, answer domestic accusations of violating American freedom and redefine liberty in terms of the modern condition and the global Depression, as well as the impact of the international situation on the domestic scene, all made the issue of liberty a central public theme in the American context.

However, despite all the effort to give them new intellectual and political meaning, the terms “democratic” and “cooperative freedom” had not yet won their day in the liberal countries of the 1930s and were waging a robust confrontation with more traditional definitions. This was true both in the United States and elsewhere, but the conflict in America was particularly intense. Even public battles that were not openly waged in the name of freedom still had very much to do with it. Many of the Supreme Court’s sentences that
invalidated pivotal segments of New Deal legislation were based on a defense of traditional understandings of liberty as a lack of impediment applied to the field of free enterprise. The controversy over the Constitution that peaked in the presidential elections of 1936 was mainly one of freedom, when republicans and conservative democrats counted on the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court to make the campaign a great confrontation about the meaning of American liberty.

Roosevelt took sides in the controversy. In his second Fireside Chat, he contrasted liberty as “greater security for the average man” with the older idea of “freedom of contract,” which served the interests of the “privileged few.” In the following years, Roosevelt would always relate the notion of liberty to that of economic security and would point to economic inequality as liberty’s worst enemy.70 In his words, the real enemy of liberty was not the government but the disruptions of the Depression, which would deprive desperate Americans of the sense of personal autonomy that is a fundamental feature of freedom and democracy, in turn making them more willing to follow demagogues. As a result, the notion of free enterprise, free market or freedom from impediment was too limited and self-destructive because it could not meet the needs of the day. “Negative liberty” was insufficient by itself to save American freedom under the conditions of the Depression. In 1932-1933, the relief resources of local governments and private actors had dried up quickly vis-à-vis universal need and stringent poverty. The federal government had stepped in almost by default to sustain democracy, security, patriotism and education – all necessary for saving American freedoms.

The High Time of the Welfare State and the Ebbing of the Controversy

In many ways, the approach of the war changed the whole scene. The need for government support against the disruptions and sorrows of the war, be they financial payments to the families of G.I.’s or medical services for Londoners subjected to German bombs, caused the war to emerge as a moment of social, political and national solidarity in need. This was when many of the experiences and ideas that would preside over the great expansion of welfare in postwar Europe were first conceived and tried. For example, Richard Titmuss, a prominent student of the British welfare state, reported that his enthusiasm for its universalistic, public and egalitarian nature had matured during the war, especially when Britain was under direct German attack in 1941. Even Hayek accepted the fact that the war required a state-sponsored minimum sustenance for all, a position he would abandon in the postwar years.71

Yet, the effort made throughout the 1930s to redefine the meaning of liberty and merge its individual, collective, political and social aspects turned out to act as a sort of early preparation of the themes through which the war could be justified and a better postwar
period designed. Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms Address” of January 6, 1941 was, then, a coherent synthesis of and unifying force for both the domestic and the international scenes. New understandings of liberty that had matured in the 1930s became a banner of both the war effort and the world the United States promised to help create upon the war’s successful conclusion. The Address brilliantly merged both T.H. Marshall’s three categories of citizenship rights, and “negative” and “positive” liberties. It also provided an outstanding formulation of the unity of liberties “of” and liberties “from.” Its resounding impact at home and abroad was due not only to the war emergency, the strength of the United States as a superpower and Roosevelt’s skill in communicating complicated concepts in plain language, but also to the maturity attained by the rethinking of freedom during the 1930s.

By the end of the 1950s, public opinion in the West had become convinced that the expanded social welfare legislation introduced in most countries after the war had not only made an important contribution to economic growth and the control of the business cycle but had strengthened social peace and democracy as well. As the elections of 1945 neared in Britain, Winston Churchill said on the radio that if the Labour Party were to win, what would follow would be “some form of Gestapo,” hinting at its activist social policy. However, “Attlee went on the radio the next day and spoke in measured and reassuring terms about freedom and social policy and he, not Churchill, captured the sympathy of middle class voters.”

By the 1950s, social policy had replaced nationalization and physical controls as centerpieces of the Labour program, which was basically accepted by conservatives. The consensus was well described by Richard Titmuss who wrote in 1958: “Since [1948] successive Governments, Conservative and Labour... have claimed the maintenance of ‘the Welfare State’ as an article of faith.” As historian Alan Brinkley has shown, in the U.S., between the slump of 1938 and the Truman administration, a new liberalism based on public spending, government activism, a social “safety net” and the expansion of individual and group rights replaced the early New Deal’s insistence on structural reform of American capitalism. It would also be accepted by the moderate republicans of the Eisenhower administration and would become part of America’s public mainstream until the “Reagan revolution.” As a result, until the mid-1960s, “the dominant view,” said Albert Hirschman, “was that democratic governance, Keynesian macroeconomic management which assured economic stability and growth, and the Welfare State are not only compatible, but almost providentially reinforce one another.” The famous lectures given by T.H. Marshall in 1949 on “Citizenship and Social Class,” in which the three noted categories of the rights of democratic citizenship were first formulated, consecrated the welfare state as the crowning accomplishment of western society, since it complemented individual liberty and democratic participation with a set of social and economic entitlements. When Hayek would utter in 1960 that the welfare state was a threat to liberty and democracy, his comment would fall on deaf ears.


7. Daniel T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings. Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998). Rodgers shows how the interest in measures of social betterment and reform was so transnational that the profound political differences between liberal and autocratic countries were sometimes “forgotten” or marginalized.


39. Ibid., 556, 558.


42. Green, Ibid., 121; “Ex-President Asserts Social Security Can Be Won Only with Liberty” was the title of the report in the *Los Angeles Times*, June 17, 1935, 54, part. 1, page 1 (front page). On the same front page was an article about a conference of Herbert Hoover’s, “Graduates Hear Hoover Ask Freedom,” ibid.

43. Ibid.


47. Wayne Fields, *Union of Words*.


52. Fields, *Union of Words*, 158.


64. Fields, *Union of Words*, 158.


Issues and Themes
Poor Citizenship: Social Rights, Poverty and Democracy in the Late Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Centuries

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The focus of this essay is the changing nature of social citizenship with particular reference to poverty. It is in three main sections. The first, contextual, section discusses the notion of social citizenship, different approaches to it and the links, if any, to attitudes towards poverty. The second section provides an overview of the changing texture of social citizenship, mainly as embodied in financial support for people of working age and their children. This is then contrasted, in the final section, with an emergent human rights counter discourse among poverty activists in both “the Wests,” which also links social rights to democratic participation. The time-frame is broadly the last thirty-fourty years, with particular emphasis on contemporary developments. The essay is written from a British perspective but draws on comparative material also.

Social Citizenship

It’s difficult not to begin an essay on social citizenship without reference to T. H. Marshall. In the post-World War II era, Marshall articulated a potentially expansive notion of the social element of citizenship, which embraced not just “the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security” but also “the whole range… to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society.”1 His, disputed, historicization of the evolution of civil, political and social rights is less important than his articulation of their inter-relationship: the “three-legged stool of citizenship.”2 Activists and theorists have since refined the stool, adding new legs such as cultural, reproductive and economic rights,3 but the key point remains that the different domains of rights are inter-dependent. Marshall also saw rights, including social rights, as pivotal to a “sense of community membership”4 and as an integrative force. Although sometimes overlooked, he acknowledged that social citizenship
Poor citizenship involves duties as well as rights. However, it was more of a reciprocal than a contractual relationship between the two, which he evoked.

Drawing on the work of David Miller, Johansson and Hvinden have proposed a post-Marshallian framework for the analysis of social citizenship today. They identify three main understandings. First is the *socio-liberal*, in which social citizenship represents “a relationship between the individual and the state, involving encompassing sets of mutual rights and obligations.” This could imply that the state requires the fulfilment of specific obligations in return for social rights. Second is what might be called a *market-consumerist* model (but they dub *libertarian*) in which “the relationship between state and individual is conceived more narrowly, with the emphasis on the self-responsibility and the autonomy of the individual.” As part of this model, “a turn towards active citizenship could mean that citizens have greater scope for exercising individual choice and foresight, as knowledgeable consumers in a mixed welfare market.”

The third is the *republican* model, which “focuses on the citizen’s participation in the affairs of his or her community, and the expectation that the individual is committed to acknowledging and promoting the well-being of the community as a whole.” This is a more horizontal model than one which focuses on the relationship between the individual and the state but it also would include, for example, user-involvement in social programmes on both an individual and collective basis.

Elements of each of these models of social citizenship can be discerned in the evolution of social citizenship in recent decades. In addition, we might identify a fourth model which is that of a more *universalistic, unconditional* understanding of social citizenship. This is reflected, for instance, in demands for a citizen’s income (supported in particular by greens in the political arena) and in the human rights conceptualization of poverty, which will be discussed in the final section of the essay.

Marshall’s formulation of social citizenship as “creating a universal right to real income which is not proportionate to the market value of the claimant” underlies the idea of de-commodification, developed by Gøsta Esping-Andersen and others (and critiqued by feminist scholars). As is well known, the nature and extent of de-commodification was one of the key variables used to identify different kinds of welfare regime. Without rehearsing the various regimes here, it is worth noting that at one extreme of the “two Wests” stand the social democratic Nordic countries. These come closest to having made a reality of Marshall’s formulation of a “universal right to real income which is not proportionate to the market value of the claimant.” The values of equality of status (in both class and gender terms) and solidarity underpin the Nordic model of social citizenship. Social citizenship rights, as embodied in social transfers, play a more significant role in reducing the risk of poverty than in the European Union as a whole.

At the other extreme stands the liberal United States where, according to Fraser and Gordon, “social provision remains largely outside the aura of dignity surrounding
“citizenship” Receipt of “welfare” is usually considered grounds for disrespect, a threat to, rather than a realization of citizenship,” which is understood in primarily civil terms. Zoelle and Josephson echo this argument: “long-standing conceptions of the nature of citizenship” in the United States see “citizenship as resting primarily on civil and political rights, not on rights with respect to economic, social, and cultural matters.” One result has been extremely high levels of poverty.

An international comparison of popular explanations of poverty in 1976 and 1990 found no relationship between them and the typology of welfare regimes. However, within Western Europe its findings did suggest that a broad public recognition of “the social” being responsible for poverty is reflected in governments paying for generous welfare levels, while in cases where individual or collective actors are deemed responsible, they should themselves take care of poverty protection by paying in contributions or otherwise. In this case the responsibility of “the social” is barely recognized, resulting in low social expenditure by the state.

The authors, Van Oorschot and Halman, hypothesize that there might be a clearer relationship between popular explanations of poverty and the more specific types of anti-poverty strategies. Certainly in the United Kingdom there is a sense that ministers are very conscious of public attitudes in their formulation of anti-poverty policies, elements of which are typically framed by a discourse of “toughness,” supposedly to reassure the wider public. In its latest statement of its child poverty strategy it warns that “the task of tackling child poverty faces the challenge of low public awareness of the existence and meaning of child poverty in the UK.”

A number of recent studies in the United Kingdom have indeed demonstrated scepticism about the existence of poverty and a lack of empathy towards those experiencing it. Analysis by Eurobarometer shows that the British public are more likely than the wider EU public to ascribe poverty to individualistic causes (especially laziness and lack of willpower) and less likely to cite social causes (especially injustice). In both the United Kingdom and the wider pre-accession European Union individualistic explanations became rather more dominant between 2002 and 2007.

The Changing Texture of Social Citizenship

The Triumph of Neo-Liberalism

In the United Kingdom in the late twentieth century, the model of social citizenship enshrined in the postwar social settlement came under challenge. It was increasingly criticised from the left and by marginalized groups no longer content to play the role of deferential welfare subject in a paternalistic, oppressive top down welfare state. More
significantly, though, the New Right government of Margaret Thatcher skilfully exploited these pressures and the United Kingdom in effect acted as a conduit for New Right ideas as they travelled from the United States to Europe on the back of broader global trends.

The validity of the very notion of social rights of citizenship was questioned by New Right thinkers and the restriction of such rights was a central aim of the New Right’s project of reducing expectations of what the state should provide. The New Right’s ideological assault on the postwar social settlement’s model of social citizenship reshaped the mainstream parameters of the politically possible. Thus when Labour returned to power in the United Kingdom it was as *New* Labour, espousing the “third way,” again a transatlantic import, and what is sometimes described as “post-neo-liberalism.”

Under post-neo-liberalism the place of social citizenship rights is once again acknowledged but instead of standing as a bulwark against the market they are being re-defined so as to support the market in the name of economic competitiveness. This reflects a broader characteristic of post-neo-liberalism, identified by Alan Finlayson: “All social action is identified by its function in terms of furthering economic/instrumental ends.” This process can be identified at EU level also where, under the relaunched Lisbon Process, according to Mary Daly, social policy represents “a handmaiden of economic and labour policy, harnessing a social idea to an economic cause.”

*The “Social Investment State”*

This economic instrumentalism animates the notion of a “social investment state,” the key tenet of which is, according to Anthony Giddens, who coined the term, “investment in human capital wherever possible, rather than direct provision of economic maintenance.” The social investment perspective has been translated into policy most clearly in the United Kingdom and in Canada under the previous Liberal government. It has been promoted by the European Commission. And, according to Jane Jenson, it is now possible to identify a growing “convergence around the key ideas of a social investment citizenship regime that is comparable to the convergence that occurred in the post-1945 years.”

Jenson argues that “the social investment perspective represents ‘a way of doing’ poverty reduction and social citizenship that is different from the social protection logic of the social state as well as the safety-net stance of neoliberals.” The future-oriented nature of the social investment perspective makes children the key units of investment and tackling child poverty a number one policy goal and it prioritizes equality of opportunity over so-called equality of outcome.

The European Union Social Protection Committee notes that, following a call from the European Commission, “the vast majority of Member States [have] prioritised the need to develop a strategic, integrated and long-term approach to preventing and alleviating poverty and social exclusion among children.” It points to child poverty’s “damaging
effects on the future life opportunities of children, and on their future capacity to contribute to tomorrow’s society” and to integrate within the labour market as one reason for prioritising child poverty.22

The Social Protection Committee quotes the then British Chancellor, Gordon Brown: “Children are 20 percent of the population, but they are 100 percent of the future.”23 It holds the United Kingdom up as an example. Having inherited shockingly high levels of child poverty, New Labour’s child poverty strategy has had a real impact, even if it has failed to meet its own targets. This strategy has frequently been justified as investment in the future; indeed one official report explained that “support for today’s disadvantaged children will therefore help to ensure a more flexible economy tomorrow.”24 Considerable emphasis is placed on investment in human capital through early years programmes, child care, education and training and strengthened maternity benefits.25 For the first time, the United Kingdom has a national child care strategy. While child care is not yet represented as an enforceable social right, as in the Nordics,26 a new responsibility has been placed on local authorities to ensure sufficient child care is available in their area. According to the Children’s Minister, child care is “not an absolute guarantee in law to every parent of what you want when you want it, but it’s a right.”27 In addition, although philosophically New Labour is averse to measures that might, in its view, promote “welfare dependency,” it has improved benefit levels for children in families out of work as well as in work (although not for adults, so that the number of childless adults of working age in poverty has actually risen during its time in office).

The preoccupation with child poverty has therefore meant the strengthening of social citizenship to some extent in the United Kingdom. However, the accommodation with neo-liberalism has also meant a deterioration in the quality of some social citizenship rights, associated with the growing influence of the socio-liberal model of social citizenship. The latter is occurring in three main ways: greater conditionality; increased selectivity and greater exclusivity at the expense of non-citizens. The rest of this section will discuss each of these trends, which can also be found, to a greater or lesser extent, in other western welfare states.

Conditionality

A central theme in New Labour’s re-casting of social citizenship in line with the socio-liberal model has been the “third way” motto: “no rights without responsibilities.” The government has propounded an explicitly contractual relationship between rights and obligations in terms of, first, a “new welfare contract”28 and, more recently, a more general “contract out of poverty.” Under the latter: “all parts of society will do their bit to tackle the blight on children, communities and future prosperity;”29 “the Government will provide all families with a clear route out of poverty;” and “on the other side of this
contract, the Government looks to families to make a commitment to improve their situations where they can and to take advantage of the opportunities on offer.”

The narrower welfare contract focuses primarily on the obligation to seek and take paid work, although increasingly the government is attaching obligations to (sometimes new) social citizenship rights in an attempt to influence behaviour more generally: encouraging desirable and discouraging undesirable behaviour. This approach is encapsulated in the principle of “conditionality,” as spelled out in a government discussion paper:

Over the past two decades, the concept of conditionality has become central to welfare policy in the major economies. Conditionality embodies the principle that aspects of state support, usually financial or practical, are dependent on citizens meeting certain conditions which are invariably behavioural. This aims to encourage people to engage in actions and activities that help themselves. It also draws on the notion that the welfare system rests on a fair bargain of mutual obligations between citizen and state, in simple terms: “something for something.” The structure and operation of conditionality policy is principally aimed at fostering positive outcomes for individuals and helping to prevent negative ones… The purpose of conditionality is to play a part in achieving the objectives of the welfare system – helping people to find work and escape poverty – whilst underpinning a sense of fairness and shared responsibility.

Stuart White rejects the view that “contractualism” necessarily marks a break with the social democratic tradition, pointing to the functionalist theory of social justice expounded by the likes of Hobhouse and Tawney in the early twentieth century. Nevertheless, he also points out how New Labour’s contractualism lacks the egalitarian impetus that animated the earlier functionalist theory of social justice: where the former focuses on the obligations of people living on benefit, the latter was concerned with the rich able to live off the proceeds of private property. While the extent to which conditionality and active labour market policies are new is contested, there has been a clear shift of emphasis in the dominant philosophy of social citizenship towards what has been dubbed “the conditional welfare state.” As Gerhard et al. argue in an essay on contractualization as a gendered concept, “what is new for the UK is the stress on a ‘contract’ that puts as much or more stress on the responsibilities as on the rights of citizens in respect of their relations with government.”

Again the contractualization of welfare echoes earlier developments in the United States where, a decade or so ago, Fraser and Gordon wrote, “the claims of the poor… are being weakened by a resurgence of the rhetoric of contract.” In both the United States and the United Kingdom the underlying model “is that of the adult worker who makes a contract with the state in respect of his or her rights and responsibilities.” Hartley Dean contrasts these individualistic “contractarian repertoires” of responsibility with “solidaristic repertoires… premised on a collectivist view of the social order in which the priority is to sustain cooperative solidarity.” He suggests that:
contractarian understandings will focus on the competitive nature of labour markets and the responsibility of the individual to compete, while solidaristic understandings will focus on the inclusive potential of labour processes and the shared responsibilities or loyalties associated with labour participation.39

In the United Kingdom, “the responsibility of the individual to compete” explicitly frames welfare policies. An example is provided in the prime minister’s foreword to a consultation document on welfare reform:

In a globalised world, we simply cannot afford the high price of large numbers of people on benefits. Instead, we need people in work, making the best use of their talents and helping us compete… We will only create lasting prosperity by ensuring that the talents of our country are fully employed – and that rights are met with tough responsibilities that respect taxpayers as well as those claiming benefits.40

The promotion of “tough responsibilities” in this context has involved both an intensification of the terms of conditionality and a gradual broadening of the population affected beyond the unemployed to include many of those classified as “workless,” notably disabled people, lone parents of older children and partners of unemployed claimants. There has even been a suggestion from the former Minister for Housing that the right to social housing should be made conditional on job-seeking. Among the issues raised by critics of this creeping conditionality41 are the failure to address adequately the barriers faced by disabled people in the labour market and the apparent devalorisation of unpaid care work. On its side of the contract, the government has introduced a variety of measures to “make work pay” and to facilitate the move into paid work.

While conditionality and contractualization embody the social-liberal model of citizenship, the simultaneous emergence of “a more personalised conditionality regime”42 bears the mark also of the market consumerist model of social citizenship. A “passive one-size-fits-all model” is contrasted with “an active, enabling system, where tailored support to help people back into work is matched by personal responsibility for people to help themselves.”43 The “service logic” of activation is different from that of benefit administration, thus:

providers of activation services need opportunities for making services tailor-made, in order to take individual and local circumstances into account. This asks for flexible rather than standardised, strictly regulated policy programmes that leave little room for manoeuvre in the actual service provision process.44

Personalization typically goes hand in hand with the contracting out of service delivery (or elements of it) to the private and voluntary sectors. In a cross-national study of “inter-agency co-operation in activation,” Lindsay and McQuaid observe that “the stated aim is to increase the range of specialist, individualised support available to clients, and improve the efficiency and responsiveness of delivery.” However, they question the capacity of
contracting-out “to deliver the innovation and responsiveness sought from multi-agency approaches.” Service users are increasingly expected to enter “(quasi-)markets of competing service providers as individual customers or consumers.” Nevertheless, as van Berkel and Borghi point out, “they do not enter the market of activation services as customers who select their own services and service provider; they have little or no choice, control or purchasing power.”

Personalization is promoted in the name of flexibility and stands at the heart of what the Institute for Public Policy Research (a left-leaning think tank close to the British government) has called a “citizen-centred approach to welfare-to-work.” The British government-appointed Social Security Advisory Committee has counselled that “the extent to which ‘flexibility’ for individual customers can be achieved without sacrificing the transparency and equity of outcome that are the foundations of a regulated benefits system merits particular attention.” In similar vein, Kate Green, the chief executive of the Child Poverty Action Group, a leading anti-poverty organization, has warned that the consequent increased reliance on discretion erodes rights and increases the risk of discrimination. She cautions that the contracting out of delivery weakens accountability and, in the case of the voluntary sector, weakens their “independent advocacy role… by drawing them right into the welfare provision landscape.” This reflects a wider concern “about the capacity of third sector and community organisations to pursue advocacy and activist roles as they are drawn into new roles as service providers.”

Such policy shifts were identified in European welfare states a decade ago by Robert Henry Cox who maintains that “the notion of citizenship as the basis of an individual claim to support is changing.” As well as increased emphasis on obligations he observes “a desire to review situations on a case-by-case basis, not according to uniform rules. These changes” he argues, “have introduced a more discursive view of rights, one where the formal legal conditions once thought to be the hallmark of progressive social policy are now seen to be inflexible and impersonal.”

New Labour’s “active/passive” welfare dichotomy underlies the turn to activation in many western welfare states. While the “passivity” of earlier benefit regimes is often exaggerated and the idea that benefits and those relying on them are “passive” can be contested, there is no mistaking the general direction of policy towards increased activation. The character of the broad approaches (supportive or punitive to differing degrees) and policy details may vary, reflecting in part whether policy is shaped by contractarian or solidaristic “repertoires of responsibility.” What is nevertheless striking is the extent to which “an ‘activation’ rationale has increasingly informed not only labour market policies, but more broadly the reforms of the national systems of social protection.” Moreover, welfare states learn from each other (although the extent to which they do so is disputed). For example, in its discussion document on conditionality, the British government draws on evidence from “international conditionality regimes” and concludes
that “we can learn more from countries, like Denmark and the Netherlands, about how best to support people on the journey from inactive to active benefits and then ultimately into work.”

The “quality of citizenship” consequent on activation, Jean-Claude Barbier argues, depends in part on the quality of the jobs available. It also depends on the nature of the activation and on what is being activated. In Italy, for instance, where, according to Bifulco et al, activation is “a key feature of the development of local welfare,” welfare to work policies are weak, reflecting the weakness of traditional unemployment protection. Instead, activation is more about promoting active participatory citizenship, voice and wellbeing in the context of local welfare, which is in tune with the republican model of social citizenship.

Although the activation of social citizenship has, in its different forms, been associated up until now with liberal and social democratic welfare states, a collection on “reforming the Bismarckian welfare systems” suggests that various incremental changes may “signify a general paradigmatic change for the continental welfare states, evincing a shift away from systems aimed at income and status maintenance towards activated and employment-friendly welfare systems.” In Germany, although the analytical concept of social citizenship does not have much purchase, the actuality of social citizenship rights is changing in line with this more general trend. And the idea of a contract was explicitly embedded in the French RMI safety net benefit, introduced in 1988, albeit this embodied a broader contract of inclusion rather than a narrow work-related one and was influenced by France's solidaristic tradition.

Selectivity

Alongside greater conditionality of social citizenship rights, in many countries there has also been increased selectivity through means-testing, which many would argue represents a diminution in the quality of social citizenship, especially for women in couples who are less likely to be able to claim independent social rights in means-tested schemes. Cox concluded that in Europe “there is a move away from the idea that the welfare state should provide an optimal level of assistance. Instead, there is increasing acceptance of the idea that the welfare state should do no more than guarantee a minimum level of support.” He identified the growing use of “targeting” (not only by income) as a means of narrowing entitlement and encouraging personal responsibility through private welfare. Around the same time, Jochen Clasen observed that “in many European countries means testing has become more rather than less important, while the role of social insurance is being seriously questioned.” More recent analysis confirms the trend including in the Bismarckian welfare states where, Palier and Martin observe, “in all cases, the coverage by social insurance (in terms both of its generosity and its universality) is diminishing, leaving room for other types of social policy instruments – and also goals.” A study by
Kenneth Nelson of universalism vs. targeting between 1990 and 2002 concludes tentatively that, nevertheless, universal forms of social protection remain rather more resilient than means-tested benefits to retrenchment, particularly in countries with stronger social insurance systems.

From the perspective of tackling child poverty in the European Union, an overview of reports from independent experts found a continuum between “a more universal and preventative approach” and “a more targeted approach aimed primarily at alleviating poverty and social exclusion.” The United Kingdom comes somewhere in the middle of that continuum. Although New Labour has continued the overall shift in the balance between more universal and targeted forms of support set in train under the previous Conservative governments, it has also pursued a policy of what it calls “progressive universalism.” In the context of child poverty this has meant that the real value of the universal child benefit has been maintained (and improved for the first child) and although more additional money has been invested in new income-tested tax credits, which complement child benefit, than in child benefit itself, child tax credits go quite a long way up the income scale.

The authors of the European overview point out that “it is clear that the majority of countries with a highly targeted approach tend to be countries with high levels and intensity of child poverty and social exclusion.” They recognize the dilemma facing such countries but argue nevertheless that “the structural nature of the phenomenon makes it urgent to combat poverty and social exclusion under a more preventative approach.”

Exclusivity

As well as being increasingly conditional and selective, social rights have been made increasingly exclusive of non-citizens, as part of a wider attempt to exclude outsiders from many western welfare states. A battery of exclusionary rules has been added to existing residence tests in a number of European countries so as to limit immigrants’ access to welfare. Asylum seekers and refugees have been the target of restrictive policies through the systematic erosion of social rights and a process of “differential exclusion.” Bloch and Schuster point to “a levelling down of support for asylum seekers throughout Europe.” They argue that “by removing asylum seekers from mainstream welfare provisions, [this strategy] also excludes them from society.”

One example is Denmark, where the Liberal-Conservative coalition government, supported by the anti-immigration Danish People’s Party, has introduced “start aid” as a tool to integrate refugees into the labour market. Start aid is paid at a lower rate than social assistance and “refugees only gain the right to full and equal social benefits after seven years’ residence.”

In the United Kingdom, since 2002, asylum seekers have been denied the civil or economic right to work. Marshall described the right to work as “the basic civil right” in
the economic field.72 Alice Kessler-Harris has recategorized “the right to work at the occupation of one’s choice” as a right of “economic citizenship.”73 As a campaign launched by the Trades Union Congress and the Refugee Council points out, it is a right for which trade unionists have fought through the centuries and across the world. At the same time, asylum seekers have been afforded reduced, or in the case of those refused asylum any, social rights to income or housing support. This has led to evidence of “widespread destitution” and reliance on friends, charities and churches for their most basic needs.74 Indeed, the Parliamentary Human Rights Committee has accused the government of “practising a deliberate policy of destitution” and refers in its report to instances where the treatment of “asylum seekers and refused asylum seekers falls below the requirements of the common law of humanity and of international human rights law.”75 Moreover, there have been various attempts to limit rights to health care.

The government has announced an extension of its contractual construction of social citizenship to immigrants in the form of “earned citizenship.”76 The proposal is “to defer full access to benefits and services until migrants have successfully completed the probationary citizenship phase (a new stage in the immigration system), so that they are expected to contribute economically and support themselves and their dependants until such time as they become British citizens or permanent residents. It is at that point that they will have full access to our benefits and services.”77 The minimum time period involved will be six years. Until then “migrants in the temporary residence and probationary citizenship categories will have no access to non-contributory benefits, social assistance, local authority housing or homelessness assistance.”78 It is also proposed that during this period, immigrants will “be required to contribute to a new fund to help finance the transitional impact of migration on public services,” with smaller payments for workers and “larger contributions for dependent children and elderly relatives, who make a greater claim on public services.”79

To sum up the argument so far: despite increased emphasis on social investment, particularly through tackling child poverty, social citizenship rights in European welfare states are typically increasingly conditional, selective and exclusive. In the United Kingdom, the more strenuous disciplining of “the poor” and circumscribing of their social rights are part and parcel of the anti-poverty strategy, justified in part with reference to the need to placate a sceptical and hostile public.

An Emergent Human Rights Counter Discourse

The story so far tells us what has happened to social citizenship “from above.” In contrast a very different picture emerges “from below” in the emergent human rights counter discourse articulated by a growing number of poverty activists in both “the Wests,”
influenced in part by developments in the global South, the UN and the field of international development. Translated into models of social citizenship, this human rights discourse is closer to the republican and the universalistic models than to the dominant socio-liberal and market consumerist models.

In the United Kingdom, a number of anti-poverty organizations are linking with human rights organizations to develop a human rights approach to poverty. The deployment of human rights principles is being encouraged by the influential Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF), which has published a paper entitled “Is poverty in the UK a denial of people’s human rights?.” Together with Oxfam, Amnesty International and the British Institute of Human Rights, JRF organized a roundtable meeting in 2008 to explore the potential of human rights for poverty eradication in the United Kingdom. The report of the meeting states that:

Explicit links are not often made between human rights and poverty in the UK. Important government documents on social exclusion and poverty rarely mention human rights, and key human rights documents are equally silent about social exclusion or poverty. Despite these poor linkages in public policy there is a growing interest amongst anti-poverty actors in what human rights frameworks and approaches can contribute to the eradication of poverty in the UK. In addition, a number of third sector poverty organisations have begun to develop practice and initiatives that draw on human rights both explicitly and implicitly.

In the wider European Union, the language of human rights underpins the anti-poverty and social exclusion strategy propounded by the European Anti-Poverty Network. The EAPN has repeatedly called for “a strong commitment to fundamental rights,” including to “an adequate minimum income, capable of ensuring a dignified life.”

In the United States it is possible to identify a growing “domestic human rights movement,” which, according to Dorothy Thomas, “has been fuelled in no small measure by the work of anti-poverty activists determined to challenge fundamental misconceptions about people living in poverty and about poverty itself, and to do so by communicating and carrying out their work in terms of human rights.” Pivotal has been the Kensington Welfare Rights Union, which was formed in Philadelphia in the early 1990s. The KWRU has developed a Poor People’s Economic Human Rights Campaign “to raise the issue of poverty as a human rights violation.” Zoelle and Josephson report that it has also “staked out a strong position in the broader pantheon of groups arguing for women’s rights as human rights.” Campaign methods have included marches and other forms of public protest, public testimony at a tribunal and legal challenge.

The emergence of this human rights counter discourse represents “a mode of discursive struggle.” As such it can be interpreted as contributing to “a new poverty knowledge,” as called for by Alice O’ Connor at the end of her book on poverty knowledge in twentieth-

54
century U.S. history. It does so in three ways, in terms of: thinking about poverty; talking about poverty; and articulating concrete demands.

A Way of Thinking about Poverty

First, it has been suggested that one way of thinking about rights is that they “construct relationships: relationships of power, responsibility and accountability. In other words” that they are “tools for giving expression to the types of relationship between individuals and groups that we value.” Human rights, with their foundational commitment to the recognition of human dignity and flourishing, offer a way of thinking about poverty that goes beyond the material to embrace the relational and counteract the dominant construction of poverty as a shameful social relation.

The relational dimension of poverty has emerged in particular through participatory action research in the global South and North. This has highlighted the psychological pain all too often associated with poverty: disrespect, humiliation and an assault on dignity and self-esteem; shame and stigma; and also powerlessness, lack of voice, and denial of full human rights and diminished citizenship. These stem in part from a process of “othering” by which people in poverty are treated as “other” i.e. different and inferior to the rest of us. It is a process of differentiation and demarcation by which social distance is established and maintained. As Thomas writes, in the context of the United States, the language of human rights communicates a very different picture to the “dehumanization and even demonization” of people living in poverty encouraged by “the rhetoric of personal responsibility.”

A Way of Talking about Poverty

Thomas describes the use of human rights by anti-poverty activists as an “affirmative communications strategy,” designed not just to change perceptions of poverty and of people living in poverty but also to mobilize them to act. It offers people in poverty an alternative, more affirming discourse than dominant discourses which are often demeaning and disrespectful. It is as if the language of human rights is here being used to counter the negative associations that identifying as “poor” typically provokes. At present many people in poverty do not want to be associated with what is perceived as a stigmatising term: “Proud to be poor” is not a banner under which many want to march. But marching under the banner of human rights makes it easier to stand up and be counted as poor, as has happened in the United States.

The language of human rights counters the process of othering because it is about what we share and have in common as human beings rather than about what separates us. At the heart of the idea of human rights is respect for the fundamental dignity of all human beings, which is so important when many people living in poverty feel that they
are denied this respect. Here the language of human rights and of citizenship sometimes overlaps. Uma Narayan, for instance, has put forward as a feminist citizenship ideal “a society that is responsive to the social dignity and worth of all who are members.”

A Way of Articulating Concrete Demands

The counter discourse of human rights has also been important in framing demands for social rights. If respect for the dignity of all is one key tenet of a human rights approach to poverty, the other is the indivisibility or interdependence of the different forms of rights – a principle which is enshrined in the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and which reflects the same thinking as Marshall’s “three-legged stool.”

The specific principle of the right to an adequate income, sufficient to enable people to live decently and with their human dignity respected, is enshrined in various conventions, declarations and treaties (though, of course, how one measures such “adequacy” is a difficult question). Thus the argument of some poverty activists is that lack of an adequate income – poverty – represents the denial of human rights. In the United States, the KWRU has also used Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, regarding a minimum standard of living, to promote the claims of homeless people. In the United Kingdom, the Parliamentary Human Rights Committee has recommended the inclusion of certain social and economic rights, including the right “to an adequate standard of living” in a planned Bill of Rights.

Recognition of economic and social rights as human rights is particularly valuable for the most marginalized groups such as travellers and asylum seekers, the latter in particular because they lack the citizenship rights enjoyed by others and as observed earlier their social rights have been eroded. Relevant here too is another important dimension of a human rights conceptualization: that it builds in the principle of non-discrimination, which is particularly important when poverty interacts with social divisions such as gender, “race” and disability.

While demands for stronger social and economic rights have traditionally been understood as a politics of redistribution, increasingly poverty activists are also framing their demands in terms of a “politics of recognition & respect” (to adapt the vocabulary deployed by Nancy Fraser). This has implications for how social rights are delivered and developed, which represents also one aspect of procedural citizenship rights, described by Anna Coote as a “hybrid between civil and political rights.”

One set of demands relates to everyday interactions with the state, which by and large looms larger in the life of people living in poverty than the rest of the population. As the British government’s Social Exclusion Unit notes in a report on services for disadvantaged groups, “lack of respect is a recurring issue” and “being treated with dignity and respect is
key to a positive… experience.” Participants living in poverty, in a discussion organized by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation,

described a range of experiences at the hands of the public and public services, including health, education and the police, where they were convinced that perceptions of their poverty had led to them being treated differently from others. In some cases, this had led to them feeling shame and guilt for seeking help.

In contrast an evaluation of Sure Start local programmes found that one of the keys to the “empowerment” of the parents involved in the programmes was respectful treatment by service providers: “empowerment has grown where staff across all professional disciplines and at all levels, have worked and engaged with parents in an open, accessible, informal, non-judgemental way, listening, respecting and learning from parents’ own experiences.”

In Britain, the introduction of a Human Rights Act in 1998 and the establishment of an Equality and Human Rights Commission in 2007 provide the context for calls for the development of a human rights culture in public bodies. Poverty activists argue that this must involve an understanding of what poverty means and the crucial importance of respectful treatment of people living in poverty. One tool is training of professionals and officials and the involvement of people with experience of poverty in that training. So, for instance, participants at the Fourth European Meeting of People Experiencing Poverty recommended “training by ‘experiential experts,’ as is starting to be done in Belgium.” In Britain, a project brought together social service users with experience of poverty, social work practitioners and academics in order to develop a training module on poverty for social work students that would be delivered by people with experience of poverty. One of the participants summed it up: “it is about how we are treated, we just want them to treat us the same way they want us to treat them – with respect.”

The involvement of people in poverty is indicative of another key demand of poverty activists in recent years concerning participation and voice, which can also be interpreted in terms of the republican model of social citizenship. EAPN notes that “participation by people experiencing poverty and social exclusion is a challenge that has grown over the years since EAPN was founded.” According to the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights “a human rights approach to poverty reduction… requires active and informed participation by the poor in the formulation, implementation and monitoring of poverty reduction strategies.”

Participation is theorized as central to a human rights based approach because it underpins the effective realization of other rights. It acknowledges the agency of rights-bearers and their potential to play a role in the development of rights and services. In strengthening that agency it enables people with experience of poverty to act more effectively as democratic citizens and bearers of human rights. The right of participation represents
an important means of recognising the dignity of people living in poverty because it is saying that their voices count, that they have something important to contribute. It acknowledges the validity and value of the expertise borne of experience. Annual European meetings of people experiencing poverty, under the auspices of the European Union since 2001, have helped to drive the participation agenda at European level. A report from the 2007 meeting commented on how it “showed that participatory processes are contributing to empowerment;” an Italian participant wrote: “I saw people who for the first time understood what it meant to have the right to dignity.”

An independent Commission, established to explore the barriers to such participation, was constituted in the United Kingdom with half of its members with direct experience of poverty. It called itself the Commission on Poverty, Participation and Power. Lack of respect and lack of voice were key intertwined messages that it received. It also learned that “people experiencing poverty see consultation without commitment and phoney participation without power to bring about change as the ultimate disrespect.” The sub-title of the Commission’s report was “the right to be heard,” reflecting the central argument that participation is a human right.

One barrier, identified by the Commission, is the benefits system itself. In effect, some of the conditions attached to social rights can serve to undermine democratic participation and active citizenship. In the United Kingdom the benefit rules can discourage people claiming benefit from getting involved in the very community initiatives and service development that the government is encouraging. A discussion paper, published by the official Commission for Social Care Inspection, describes the ways in which “benefit barriers to involvement” discourage or prevent the involvement of people in receipt of benefits, with damaging implications for “active citizenship.” This is an example of a wider point made by Janet Newman who suggests that “active citizenship,” directed towards “improving the quality of life in deprived communities” may “be in tension with ‘activated citizenship’,” particularly in the case of women’s capacity “to play multiple roles – as empowered workers and as caring and active community members.”

Moreover, the activation policies discussed earlier do not translate into the promotion of active citizenship through user-involvement in the delivery of benefits and employment services. A study of these services in the United Kingdom concludes that “there is little evidence of the experiments in forms of user participation evident in other social policy domains, such as the health sector.” This reflects a tension, identified by van Berkel and Borghi,
Conclusion

A key theme in this collection of essays is the contested nature of the place of socio-economic rights in democracy in “the two Wests” of the United States and Europe. In this essay, I have tried to throw some light on the nature of this contestation, including its discursive elements, from the particular perspective of people living in poverty. With echoes perhaps of the welfare rights and claimants’ movements of the late 1960s and early 70s in the United States and United Kingdom, poverty activists are playing an increasingly important role in democratic anti-poverty politics in both the United States and Europe. Under the banner of human rights they are making the link between democracy and socio-economic rights at a time when in many countries those rights are becoming weaker. What has emerged is a combined politics of redistribution and “recognition&respect,” which re-emphasizes Marshall’s three-legged stool of civil, political and social rights but with the addition of a fourth leg of cultural rights to recognition.


6. Ibid.


20. Ibid., 3.


23. Ibid.


27. The Observer, August 10, 2008.


30. Ibid., 3, 55.


39. Ibid., 583.


90. Ibid.


92. Ibid., 28.

93. Lister, Poverty.


95. It should be acknowledged here that there are also more sceptical voices. Some commentators point to the greater weight placed by governments on civil and political than on socio-economic human rights and the consequent gap between the promise of international human rights instruments and the reality of ‘underfulfilment’, particularly of socio-economic rights; see Thomas W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reform (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2002), 91. Hartley Dean has bemoaned the marginalization in human rights debates of what he regards as a stronger concept of ‘welfare rights;’ see Hartley Dean, “Social Policy and Human Rights: Re-Thinking the Engagement,” Social Policy and Society, 7 (no. 1, 2008), 1-12.


114. Although the welfare rights and claimants’ movements did not deploy a human rights discourse, the underlying idea and explicit claim of a ‘right’ to welfare creates a link between poverty activism then and now; see Kornbluh, *The Battle over Welfare Rights: Poverty and Politics in Modern America*. 
American Social Scientists and the European-American Dialogue on Social Rights, 1930-1970

Volker R. Berghahn

Looking back on the development of democracy and social rights in Europe and the United States since World War II, it appears that both saw a gradual expansion in the early postwar decades. However, while democratic participation in politics may be said to have broadened even further, if precariously, first in the 1960s and 1970s in Western Europe and, in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, social rights became progressively eroded from the late 1970s onwards, starting in the United States with the rise of Friedmanite Chicago-School economic neo-liberalism under Ronald Reagan that began to spill over into Europe a few years later, most visibly under Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, before it reached the European continent as an ideology that was taken up, not always with the same enthusiasm as among les Anglosaxons, by politicians and business people.

This meant that the state’s presence in the economy was gradually rolled back. Deregulation became the slogan of the day. The economy was to be left to the allegedly self-regulating forces of the market with its private entrepreneurial and managerial elites who were left free to make their supposedly purely rational decisions. Public welfare programs were cut back, in some areas and countries quite drastically; social inequalities increased. The gap between the very rich and poor widened dramatically and even middle-class living standards experienced a slow decline on both sides of the Atlantic, though more sharply in the United States than in Europe. Average inflation adjusted wages of U.S. workers were higher in 1973 than they are thirty years later. The top 1 percent of the population own 45 percent of private wealth. The figures for Europe are not quite so striking but also point to huge inequalities, even if the social security safety net continues to protect its populations better from falling into a void without health insurance and jobs, as now happens to millions of Americans. In Germany, for example, the “social justice gap” shows that the top 10 percent of the population added 31 percent to their average net income between 1992 and 2006, while the poorest 10 percent lost 13 percent. That, too, is unacceptable.
We may now be standing at a juncture where the ideology of leaving everything to the “Market” is proving incapable of dealing with the dynamics and irrationalities of modern capitalism, not to mention the growing social problems, the crisis in health provision, infrastructure, and pensions as well as the real threat of an environmental catastrophe. Many economists are seeing their beautiful mathematical models disintegrate before their eyes. Even the former chairman of the Federal Reserve in Washington who followed their recipes for all too many years, admits in his Memoirs:\footnote{2} “As elegant as modern-day econometrics has become, the world economy has become too complex and interlinked. Our policy-making process must evolve in response to that complexity.” More recently, he claimed to have been shocked by the crisis in the financial markets that he had allowed to boom so exuberantly, resisting the call for regulation of many old and new “vehicles” and “instruments” that the financial system had been so busily producing. The events of the fall 2008 have therefore led to a massive re-engagement of governments and reserve banks in the economy in an attempt to stabilize financial markets that had spun out of control and then spilled over into manufacturing, retailing, construction, and international trade. It is a shift that has continued in 2009 with U.S. President Obama’s “stimulus packages” and job creation plans and similar measures elsewhere.

In light of the bankruptcy of neo-liberal ideology and also of many banks, investment firms, and manufacturers that governments now have to bail out, there is hence some hope that we are at the end of a period when the “Market” was elevated to the position of the sole regulator of how wealth is created, distributed and redistributed in modern industrial societies and for that matter also in the non-western world. However, my contribution to this volume is not so much concerned with the present and future. It is firmly historical and tries to look at the period from the 1930s to the 1970s. It is also not an analysis of policies and institutions. Rather my approach is one of intellectual history, broadly defined, focusing more specifically on concepts and debates among social scientists. And – no less importantly – it is interested in the sociological networks that developed across the Atlantic.\footnote{3}

This means that the Atlantic is seen here as a two-way sea-lane along which not only goods but also people and ideas traveled back and forth, influencing mutual perceptions but also impacting on particular systems of thought concerning the past, present and future of urban and industrial societies in Europe and North America. At the same time, it is my assertion that before World War II the flow of these ideas was more strongly from east to west. It became reversed after 1945 when the United States had so clearly emerged as the hegemonic power of an Atlantic community of nations, as it began to organize itself against a Soviet-dominated East Bloc.

Hegemony is conceived here not in power-political or technological-economic terms, as it is frequently used in International Relations, but in intellectual and cultural terms. The scholars and intellectuals\footnote{4} who are the center of this study are very influential social
scientists who, on the American side, came under the spell of systems of social thought that had arrived from Europe and were often carried across by refugees from fascism. However, these European conceptions of modernity did not act like a steamroller that flattened all indigenous thought that appeared in its way. Instead European social-science ideas blended with what was more home-grown, although some of these ideas in turn had European roots that went back to the eighteenth century. Later on, when I proceed to examine the reversal of the flow in this trans-Atlantic system of exchange after 1945, this will be an occasion to observe the same processes of adaptation, resulting from a European skepticism about the imports, that in the end produced hybridizations. It will also be shown that the ideas of the “Cold War liberals,” as they were called, became the most influential, but were greeted with a similar skepticism by some of their colleagues in the United States as they were in Europe. In short, the intellectual flows back and forth were never monochromic. Alternative views were always articulated and have to be borne in mind when assessing the influence of those “Cold War liberals” who are being examined here.

When it comes to identifying specific systems of social thought, social rights, and practice that arrived in the U.S. from Europe in the interwar period and during the 1930s in particular, Marxism immediately springs to mind. It is true that its interpretations of human history and contemporary society exerted a profound influence on a considerable number of American intellectuals who had come to believe that the Great Depression of the years after 1929 represented the terminal crisis of capitalism and bourgeois liberalism that would usher in socialism. However, American Marxism produced so many variations and “deviations” that no broad consensus ever emerged among its followers in how in fact to change the world that they had all been so intensively studying. There was also the old question of why “socialism” had become so much more widely accepted in Europe than in America and even in the 1930s failed to mobilize the “proletarian masses” despite enormous economic hardship. In this context, the main protagonists of the Frankfurt School who came to New York under the leadership of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, have been studied quite intensively. When, in 1944, the two social scientists published their sharp criticism of American society and its “culture industry,” it was perhaps not surprising that they should go back to Frankfurt soon after World War II.

Another European system of thought and practice that crossed the Atlantic in those early years was psychoanalysis. It was taken up by “literary life, the social sciences, pedagogy, mass media, and daily life” and “neurosis [became] a topic at cocktail parties” before it underwent further “modifications.” It became integrated into medicine and psychiatry even before World War I, after Sigmund Freud’s lectures at Clark University in 1909. There has been a good deal of research and debate on why it proved so attractive to its practitioners and their patients, especially in the cities of the East and West Coasts. The principles of the psychic dynamics of neuroses were taught at Cornell University from
1910 onwards. By the 1930s, psychoanalysis had become “Americanized.” To be sure, there was also some skepticism, for example, with respect to an aggressiveness that was supposed to drive all human beings. The European escape into cultural pessimism and metaphysics was by and large similarly unappealing to a society whose philosophical positions were – as will be seen – deeply influenced by pragmatism.

One key factor to explain the growing popularity of psychoanalysis seems to have been its ultimately anti-Marxist message. While Marxists aimed at a fundamental restructuring of society into one in which every individual could feel happily integrated, for psychoanalysis it was the individual that would be expected to adjust and achieve an inner equilibrium within his/her socio-cultural environment. It was this message that many Americans, often of middle-class background who turned to the new soul-searching methods, found more appealing than Marxist insistence on socio-economic revolution. Furthermore, it was in tune with a widespread American belief in the self-responsibility of the individual, and that personal crises were not due to the contradictions of prevailing socio-economic conditions that needed to be overthrown. Given the underlying belief in the possibility of self-improvement, this also meant that Freud’s later and quite deeply pessimistic views on the state of modern culture were largely ignored across the Atlantic. This may also be one reason why the Frankfurt School, some of whose members were searching for a synthesis of Marx and Freud, not only failed in their effort but also found it difficult to settle into the intellectual milieu of New York or California.7

There are two more systems of thought that traveled from Europe westwards across the Atlantic and are to be discussed here. The first one is most prominently associated with the Italian sociologist Vilfredo Pareto, the second with the German social scientist Max Weber.

Pareto’s conceptualizations were in some respects closest to the credos of American individualism. Among his various reflections on the relationship between the individual and society, the Italian sociologist’s ideas on social mobility are of particular interest here.8 He asked the question of how to achieve a society that did not veer either toward a Marxist revolutionary radicalism or towards conservative stagnation and ultimate decline. Wrestling with this problem, he identified the creation and preservation of channels of upward mobility as the best vehicle for securing social change without revolution. But unlike Marx he did not think in terms of the mobility of entire social classes, and the industrial proletariat in particular, in pursuit of equality. Rather, by dividing the world into elites and “masses,” he proposed to achieve upward mobility by facilitating the rise of highly intelligent and ambitious individuals whose drive and guile would elevate them from below upward into the pre-existing elites.

To be sure, these elites in turn had to be sufficiently open and flexible to the rise of the gifted from below, so as to allow their integration. The mechanisms of mobility and circulation were also supposed to offer the replenishing impulses that would guarantee
the perpetuation of existing societal structures without a revolutionary upheaval. This to Pareto was the secret of a fundamentally hierarchical society that kept itself by a constant infusion from below of individual “fresh blood,” immunized against the slogans of Marxist revolutionaries, on the one hand, and against a geriatric sclerosis and immobilism, on the other. Where this mechanism of upward mobility did not exist or had broken down, Pareto anticipated the eventual collapse of existing hierarchies and of society as a whole. Hence his dictum that human history was full of the graveyards of elites that had failed to rejuvenate themselves by attracting talent from the great body of the “masses” further down the social scale.

It is not too difficult to see why Pareto should have an appeal among a fairly large group of American social scientists who were doubtful about Marxism and who rose, often from humble immigrant background, to professorships at Harvard and other East Coast universities where the Italian sociologist came to be widely read. This applies to those who had grown up in Brooklyn or The Bronx, gone to City College and then moved up to do their PhDs at the City University or even at Ivy League institutions like Columbia. The same may be said of the southerner C. Wright Mills, whose father was a traveling salesman and who, born in Waco, Texas, went to high school and university in the Lone Star state before moving northwards. However, from all we know about his intellectual evolution and also about such key figures in the discipline as Talcott Parsons and Seymour Lipset, Max Weber was an even greater influence on them than Pareto.

Those who had studied in Germany during the 1920s, would have come into contact with Weber’s thought at that point. But it appears that his voluminous writings were more systematically introduced and studied only after the arrival of German refugees from Nazism in the 1930s. There was, it is true, the article on the German economy that he contributed in 1905 to the Encyclopedia Americana. But it seems that it was never widely noted in academic circles in the United States before 1914. Weber’s complex prose was a challenge to non-native speakers, but translations into English began to appear, promoted by refugee scholars such as Reinhard Bendix. Parsons, significantly enough, also joined in the translation effort, and so did Mills together with Clifford Geertz. It appears that Weber’s Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism was particularly appealing to a younger generation of social scientists who had witnessed the crisis of capitalism in the 1930s but were not ready to accept Marxist materialism as the framework for their investigations. They found more plausible the notion that consciousness was not primarily determined by a person’s socio-economic situation and class position in society and were interested in consciousness and perceptions of the world as being the more decisive factor. Although Weber acknowledged the importance of socio-economic classes, it was the relationship between what he defined as the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism that had preoccupied him.
Perhaps American social scientists also felt an affinity with Weber because of the peculiar ways in which he had worked through the impressions he had gained of American society during his visits before 1914. After all, he had been much less interested in the very tangible rationalization and concentration movements of the booming and highly dynamic industrial capitalism of the U.S. than in the organization and life of civic and religious communities. Taylorism and Fordism – the new ideas on how to organize and run a modern enterprise – did not capture his attention as much as the peculiarities of American Protestantism and their supposed interactions with entrepreneurial initiatives. It was only much later that Max Rheinstein at Chicago University “produced an English translation (with Edward Shils) of the sections relating to law” from Weber’s tome on economy and society.\(^\text{12}\) If Weber’s larger conceptions of the relationship between ideas and socio-economic change fascinated a younger generation of non-Marxist American social scientists, they could also not avoid grappling with his ideas on the progressive rationalization of society and economy and the demystification of the world, not only by capitalism but also by modern bureaucracies that the German sociologist viewed as the other great driving force of modernization.

There is no space here to develop in more detail Weber’s visions of modernity, except to stress their increasingly pessimistic undertones. Indeed, in the final analysis, he was a “liberal in despair,” as Wolfgang Mommsen has called him.\(^\text{13}\) He feared the inexorable bureaucratization of the world and the rise of the \textit{Fachmensch} who would ultimately put western urban and industrial societies into an “iron cage of serfdom.” In this respect Weber was a representative of the \textit{fin de siècle} spirit that was spreading among many intellectuals in Central Europe before World War I and that was dramatically reinforced by the European experience of the catastrophe of 1914-1918.

While some of the younger American sociologists, in studying Weber in the 1930s, may have shared his pessimism, the successful mobilization of the American economy and society during World War II and the emergence of the United States as the hegemonic power of the West after 1945 turned them into anti-Marxist socio-cultural optimists. True, there were the occasional doubts that the American model of economic and political organization would win out against the Soviet alternative that was emerging on the other side of the Iron Curtain. But deep down the “Cold War liberals” who called the shots within their discipline during the 1950s believed in a modernization theory that was rooted in Weberian notions of western society without the latter’s gloomy fears that the \textit{Fachmensch} would sooner or later come to dominate the \textit{Kulturmenesch}. Instead they were convinced that the foundations had been laid in the United States for a constitutional order that was liberal-democratic politically and liberal-capitalist economically and that – no less importantly – could be perfected and made more permanently viable through prudent reformism and careful economic and political management by its elites.
One of these optimists, Daniel Bell, captured well in the title of his book *The End of Ideology* this conviction of a new generation of social scientists in the 1950s. In the West at least, he postulated, the deep and self-destructive polarization into the large blocs of extremist right-wing and no less extremist left-wing Weltanschauungen was over. The keys to the gradual and steady improvement of society had been found. Economically most of the reformers were protagonists of Keynesianism, once it had become more fully developed and understood by the late 1930s and early 1940s and appeared to them as the most promising way out of an economic crisis. Politically, they believed that the principles of American-style democracy, of the division of powers, and of a lively civil society had also taken root in the U.S.

These principles merely had to be vigilantly upheld, occasionally amended and finally “offered” as a model to the rest of the world. One reason for their optimism was that this model of modernity could be contrasted with the Soviet one across the Iron Curtain. Defined as totalitarianism, this concept became widely accepted in the United States – representing the opposite, so to speak, of modernization, with a majority of American social scientists deploying both concepts as analytical frameworks for making sense of the Cold War world. Stalinism was the alternative path not merely to be studied, but also actively to be fought and contained. For some of them, theory and practice eventually merged when they put themselves at the disposal of Washington and went abroad to apply their ideas, in some cases – as will be seen in a moment – with disastrous consequences for indigenous populations and for their own academic reputations.

While the details of the totalitarianism paradigm with its all too simplistic notion that Stalinism and fascism were basically alike cannot be discussed here, it is significant in terms of our interest in the trans-Atlantic exchange of ideas, that most of its conceptualizations were developed by refugees from fascism and Stalinism in the 1930s. However, as was indicated in the introduction to this article, none of the imports from Europe were adopted wholesale. Rather they were scrutinized and ultimately blended with indigenous ideas. With respect to modernization theory that came to dominate American social science thought in the 1950s, pragmatism became its most important home-grown ingredient. Without going into the origins of this very American philosophical position, its main twentieth-century representative was no doubt John Dewey who left a mark on the younger generation that was probably no less significant than Weber’s. Arguing powerfully that human decision-making and action should be based on experience and at the same time critical of continental European existentialism or idealism, Deweyian pragmatism drew on the insights gained from this experience to develop the guidelines for the shaping of a society’s future.

For the same reason, Dewey and his followers also attached great importance to the value of education. And this is where Dewey and Pareto came together: Education became a major conduit for upward mobility and many of the younger generation of American
social scientists – highly motivated and smart – did in fact rise through individual achievement to positions of power and influence among the country’s elites. More than one of them was the first in the family to go to college and later to graduate school. Their experiences led them to wrestle, as academics and public intellectuals, with questions of how best to organize and uphold a strong civil society and how to create a system that would reduce the still stark differences between rich and poor. Basically they continued to believe in the “American Dream” and in the individual’s quest to realize himself in the land of unlimited possibilities.

But there was also the experience and memory of the economic Depression of the 1930s in whose wake the New Deal welfare state had been created through a series of laws that offered support to the destitute and desperate “masses” not as charity but as a social right. In terms of the trans-Atlantic dialogue it is important that the American “social state” was not created in an international vacuum. Several European nations had introduced a range of social insurance schemes after World War I and in some cases even well before 1914.17 The upshot was that, next to liberal-democratic constitutional principles, social rights also came to be integrated into Cold War modernization theory, even if differences in approach remained. For many American social scientists the growing prosperity that they envisioned would not lead to a further expansion of the postwar welfare state. Rather they assumed that with the growth of the economic pie that was expected to benefit millions, it would be possible to contain popular pressures for an expansion of benefits as a constitutional guarantee. It was not a question of a redistribution of existing wealth, an issue that – as we shall see in a moment – their European interlocutors, such as Antony Crosland and also some American critics, were advocating. No less important, after 1945 and in the face of Soviet competition, the composite elements of American modernization theory about the evolution and future of modern industrial societies were, in the view of the “Cold War liberals,” ready for export, at first to the former fascist countries of Europe and more indirectly also to Western Europe whose nations had had constitutional systems before World War II. From the 1960s onwards these ideas were also offered to the non-western world insofar as it was not under communist rule.

It is not the aim of this article to examine how these ideas were applied outside Western Europe, except to mention that some of its practitioners, among them Walt Rostow, have been hauled over the coals for their misguided work on the ground. It is now clear that very bad mistakes were made in parts of the world about which these intellectuals were quite ignorant. They may have been quite well-informed about Western Europe, but knew little about other continents where their modernization recipes were applied with a dogmatism that, in retrospect, makes one wonder how intelligent men could have been so wrong. To be sure, they were not the first public intellectuals and eminent scholars who ruined their reputations when they became involved in foreign-policy making.18
Of course, these are also the professional hazards of those who not only study the world, but also actively involve themselves in changing it.

However, my focus remains firmly on the trans-Atlantic relationship. By the 1950s, civilian travel had become much easier. In the academic world, old acquaintances and friendships had been renewed, fresh contacts had been established. The pressures of the East-West conflict had fostered a sense that both North Americans and West Europeans belonged to an Atlantic community of political, socio-economic, and cultural values. Recent years have seen the close study of these relations in terms of networks, and this may therefore also be a promising approach to study the links that were forged between the American modernization theorists at Harvard and elsewhere and their European interlocutors.

On the American side, there was, emerging from the newly gained self-confidence of successful wartime mobilization, the victory over fascism, and postwar reconstruction, a strong desire to make practical proposals for the rebuilding of a war-torn Western European region, but on the basis of the provision of social rights that would be theoretically given to all and on which in the age of growing prosperity in a well managed economy fewer and fewer people would have to rely, except in an emergency. It was not a matter of a more equitable redistribution of national wealth but of giving everyone a sense of participation and benefit in economy and politics. Once the decision had been made in Washington also to rebuild and reintegrate into the emergent Atlantic alliance the West German parts of the defeated and divided former Reich and to use the industrial potential of these parts as an engine of growth and prosperity within a common market (European Coal and Steel Community, later enlarged to the European Economic Community), American economists and sociologists proffered, in memoranda and scholarly articles, their solutions to the many problems of the time.

It is against this background that the proposals to construct a democratic system in Germany must be seen that Talcott Parsons and other modernization theorists produced both during and immediately after the war. Another way of promoting their ideas was through lecture tours and presentations at international conferences as well as through the wide distribution and translation of their books and articles. While there were many such networks, the one that had been organized by the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) became particularly influential. Founded in Berlin in 1950 at the height of the Cold War as a response to communist attempts to rally intellectuals and academics to their cause, the CCF, with its headquarters in Paris, opened national branches on both sides of the Atlantic and created a permanent infrastructure. It funded major conferences and subsidized an array of intellectual and academic journals.

Much has been written in recent years about the CCF and its “network specialists,” such as Michael Josselson, Konstantin Jelenski, John Hunt, Pierre Emmanuel and others. We are now also better informed about the activities of its local associations. Finally,
there have been studies on one of its major funders, the CIA. Especially Frances Stonor
Saunders’s book has tended to put into the shadow the important contribution that the
big American foundations made to the activities of the CCF.20

Less thoroughly researched is what might be called the intellectual history of the CCF
network. How were the key actors connected to the more rank-and-file members within
the U.S., to their counterparts across the Atlantic and to the West European organiza-
tions? What was the European reaction to the ideas of the American social scientists on
economic management, wealth distribution, and the participation of the “masses” in
democratic politics? An analysis of the contributions to the journals of the “CCF fam-
ily” and the correspondences of the editors with contributors is likely to yield many new
insights into the world in which these intellectual and academic Atlanticists operated.
But there is also the no less intriguing question of their critics who belonged to other
social science networks and who adhered to conceptions of modern industrial societ-
ies and their evolution that were quite different from those of the “Cold War liberals.”
There were, on the one hand, the conservatives of whom many, clustering around men
like Hans Morgenthau, Milton Friedman and Leo Strauss, were based at the University
of Chicago and whose realism harkened back to the conservative political theories of the
eighteenth century.21 And on the other hand, stood the left-liberal critics, among whom
C. Wright Mills was one of the most prominent.

Still, it cannot be stressed too strongly that in the 1950s modernization theory and the
“Cold War liberals,” funded by the Ford Foundation, were so dominant among American
social scientists and their European counterparts that it is surprising that not more work
has been done on this topic. Their cultural optimism and belief that American society
and economy lit up the path towards steady improvement not just of incomes but also
of social rights and services was so strong that their more skeptical colleagues became
marginalized and even ostracized. While the conservatives at Chicago had built up their
bastion with the help of funding from the Rockefeller Foundation, Mills stood at the
other end of the ideological spectrum in these years. His skepticism was, it seems, rooted
initially in the disappointing failure of his Decatur Project, that he had begun in 1945
under the auspices of Paul Lazarsfeld’s Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia
University. Since then, he had turned more and more against the pure gathering of
quantifiable data and the development of techniques that were supposed to establish
sociology as an objective science. For Mills “social inquiry ranged around shared ethical
convictions” that “bespoke freedom and reason as paramount values in human affairs.”22
He, the more orthodox Weberian, probably also rebelled against Lazarsfeld and his col-
leagues, including Parsons and Bell, because, like Weber and against the objectivity claims
of his colleagues at Columbia, Harvard, Chicago and elsewhere, he certainly remained
very much aware that all forms of empirical social science were misguided that did not
take on board the connections between one’s ever more sophisticated methods and the researcher’s own contemporary situation.

This is why Mills did not share the great optimism of the “Cold War liberals” within their discipline, with their claims to being “scientific” and “objective.” He was closer to the cultural pessimism and skepticism not only of Weber but – as we shall see – of many of his colleagues in Western Europe who believed to have seen, in the interwar period, the dark side of modernity and accepted that there existed, in Mills’s words, a “rationality without reason.” Finally, there was also another kind of empirical research that was driven by precisely those ethical considerations that Lazarsfeld’s projects seemed to be missing. Michael Harrington’s *The Other America* may serve as an example here. This book examined those who had been left behind by the postwar economic boom. Other researchers found that a large percentage of the poor and very poor belonged to the African-American and other ethnic minorities suffering not merely under conditions of material deprivation but also racist discrimination. Although the U.S. Supreme Court had declared the segregationist practices of a large number of federal states to be unconstitutional, the end to discrimination occurred all too slowly and in many places not at all. To live on the other side of the tracks in a small town in the South or in one of the slums of Chicago or Los Angeles made it virtually impossible to its mostly black inhabitants to lift themselves up. Economic exploitation was widespread. Social and political rights barely existed in these parts of the country. Educational opportunities were curtailed due to an underfunded local school system. There was racist prejudice and police brutality, and we will never know how many innocent people were prosecuted and received the death penalty because of biased public attorneys, judges, and juries.

These realities of the “Other America” raised major issues of social justice and civic rights that did not loom large on the radar screens of the modernization theorists. It is not that they callously ignored these problems. Coming out of the experience of crisis in the 1930s and often hailing from families that had achieved a tangible upward mobility, social and professional prestige, and middle-class prosperity, they continued to support the ideas of the modern welfare state that had been introduced as part of the New Deal. By the 1950s, the path of economic development and prosperity that Walt Rostow, for example, had mapped out in his *The Stages of Economic Growth* proved very alluring. Sub-titled, revealingly, “A Non-Communist Manifesto,” this book envisioned a development that, once “take-off” had been achieved, would culminate in a “middle-class” mass consumption society, permanently stabilized by Keynesian management and welfare benefits for a shrinking minority of those who had failed to move upward and to exploit the opportunities of a dynamic capitalist economy and society.

We have now reached the point where these notions of social equality and rights can be fruitfully compared with their European counterparts and in particular with those European liberal “social democrats” who, in the 1950s, abandoned early postwar positions
of an orthodox socialism with its anti-capitalist nationalization projects. However, unlike in the United States, the quest for redistribution instead of a mere distribution of a growing pie was not given up. In Britain this certainly applied to men such as Denis Healey, Richard Crossman, Roy Jenkins, and Anthony Crosland who emerged as vocal representatives and practitioners of this stance. They had all come to accept in principle the basic structures of a capitalist economy; but these structures were to be cushioned by a welfare state for all. To pinpoint trans-Atlantic similarities and differences Crosland’s *The Future of Socialism* shall be examined first, after a brief biographical preface, before we turn to the cases of a prominent West German and a French sociologist. What all three have in common is their “Cold War liberal” Atlanticism. But they also differed in their responses to the role that social rights were to play in modern industrial societies which in turn was influenced by their divergent experiences and the national-historical milieus in which they operated.

Born in Sussex in August 1918, Crosland grew up in North London, with his father holding a senior position in the War Office. Having completed Highgate School and Trinity College Oxford in 1939, he fought in World War II as a paratrooper, ultimately in the rank of captain. He then went back to Oxford, this time finishing with a First Class Honors degree, and continued there as a tutor in economics. A man who wanted to change the world rather than just study it, he joined the Labour Party and became a Member of Parliament for South Gloucestershire in the 1950 national elections. Having lost the seat in 1955 he was again successful in the 1959 elections, this time in the safer Grimsby constituency in the north-east of England. In 1965, he served as Secretary of State for Education and Science in the Wilson Cabinet. Later he occupied other high government positions, such as president of the Board of Trade and Secretary of State for Local Government and Regional Planning. After 1974, he worked first as Secretary of State for the Environment and from 1976 as Foreign Secretary. He died in February 1977.

Known as a modernizer, he belonged to the right wing of the Labour Party and was – like his colleagues Healey and Jenkins – close to Hugh Gaitskell, the senior reformer of the Party. In his earlier days he was active in the Fabian Society and gained a reputation not only as a forceful speaker, but also as a Labour intellectual who was critical of the authoritarianism of the older generation in the Society and of the Webbs in particular. As we shall see in a moment, he welcomed the prospect of a less puritan and more liberal England that used the gains of mass production and mass consumption for a more fulfilled life. His influential book was written during the years after 1955 when he had lost his parliamentary seat and had more time to think about the revamping of party ideology.

Crosland’s book appeared in 1957 and was reissued in an abridged version in 1963. It begins with a number of bold hypotheses that are typical of the reformist wing of the British Labour Party. On the one hand, he asserts (in words that his interlocutors in the U.S. would hardly have used) that “today the capitalist business class has lost its [once]
commanding position” to a state that has fallen into “the hands of a new and largely autonomous class of public industrial managers.” This means that the power of the class that owns industrial property is “enormously less than a generation ago.” In light of this development, the nostrums of prewar socialism have, in Crosland’s view, also become obsolete. British society had seen a “considerable transformation” not only because the anti-capitalist classes had been pushing for change, but also because the bourgeoisie had lost its confidence in an unregulated capitalism. Consequently, a counter-revolution – the scare of the interwar period – is not likely to happen. The welfare state, that is not wedded to the notion of self-help and “aggressive individualism” but to full employment and prosperity, is here to stay.

In these circumstances, both workers and their leaders had lost their appetite for violent action. Accordingly, Crosland puts his face against the call by some contemporaries to go back to socialism’s first principles in its various nineteenth-century guises. Instead the new structural and psychological realities have opened the door towards “a more fraternal and co-operative society.” After all, the “redistribution of incomes” is taking place, not least because production for the mass consumer has proven highly profitable to all groups of society. Primary poverty, Crosland continues, “has been largely eliminated.” The “Beveridge Revolution” has succeeded. There is hence a need for a reinterpretation of the meaning of socialism. Admittedly, there is still a need for supporting the less fortunate members of society and for more equality and cooperative social relations. Consequently, “many liberal-minded people, who were instinctively ‘socialist’ in the 1930s as a humanitarian protest against poverty and unemployment, have now concluded that ‘Keynes-plus-modified-capitalism-plus-Welfare-State’ works perfectly well.”

However, this is not yet Crosland’s full definition of the new socialism of the 1950s. Firstly, there is still a need to relieve social distress and otherwise to distribute resources according to merit, virtue, ability and brains. To achieve this, he advocates reforms of the stratified British education system to create better vertical mobility. It is at this point that he, the later Secretary of State for Education, draws comparisons with the U.S. and Sweden with their more open patterns of social relations where selection is more efficient and not based purely on elite privilege. As a result, he believes that social equality is “much greater” in America. However, in a qualification of Pareto’s model that seems to be underlying his argument, Crosland insists that the working class should not simply have its leaders “creamed off,” leaving the rest as a disoriented mass. In an extension of his comparison of the American high school system with the stratified British one, he comes down squarely against elite education and in favor of comprehensive schools.

Turning to living standards, he highlights “rising consumption” for all as being the new “socialist objective.” No less important, Crosland combines this once more with a “concerted attack on the maldistribution of wealth” through progressive taxation, dividend limitation, profit-sharing schemes and “worker-directors” on the management
boards of companies. Unwilling to privatize existing public enterprises, he merely urges them to be competitive.

Finally, Crosland moves to the question of economic planning that he views as an area of diminishing controversy. Business, he believes, is no longer wedded to laissez-faire and the labor side has also modified its positions on planning. This also applies to cultural and leisure amenities. Modern housing should provide a more humane environment. As a general principle, the good is to have priority over the useful. And notwithstanding the many favorable comparisons he draws with the U.S., he ends with a reservation that may be taken as an implied criticism of the hegemonic power across the Atlantic. It would be unfortunate, he writes, if reformed Britain entered the age of affluence and abundance “only to find that we have lost the values which might teach us how to enjoy it.”

Meanwhile, in West Germany, a similar type of intellectual and politician eventually overcame the early postwar orthodox-socialist nostrums of the Social Democrats who in those early years had been looking for a “third way” between American capitalism and Soviet communism. It was a system in which equality would be secured by the creation of an equilibrium between “capital” and “labor” in the management of industrial enterprises and the national economy. By the 1950s, this conception was slowly overtaken by the idea of recognizing the existence of a newly consolidated market economy with its many social elements of welfare war widows, orphans, and veterans. In the SPD, the advocates of a transformed, more liberal social democracy finally won the day in 1959 when their ideas became enshrined in the Godesberg Program.

There are a number of other German “Cold War liberals” whose writings reflect the power of modernization theory no less distinctly than those of their American colleagues, such as Rostow, Bell, or John K. Galbraith in his *The Affluent Society*. Let me take the West German sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf, arguably the most impressive scholar and public intellectual writing in an Atlanticist vein during the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, his biography and his books would seem to represent a particularly good case in point for studying the postwar trans-Atlantic relationship with its affinities but also its ambivalences on the European side with respect to modernization theory.

Hailing from a prominent leftist family, his father – before 1933 an SPD deputy in the national parliament of the Weimar Republic – was persecuted by the Nazis. In 1944 Ralf, at age 15, was also arrested for anti-Nazi activities and for a short period found himself in a concentration camp. Having survived the Third Reich, he began his studies at Hamburg University where he received his PhD. in 1952, followed in 1956 by another doctorate from the London School of Economics (LSE). It is while researching at the LSE from 1952-1954 that he became a member of the “Thursday Evening Seminar.” In this group he studied not only Marx and Parsons, but also developed a conception of sociology that flowed into his 1957 book on class and class conflict in industrial society.
It seems that Dahrendorf had been more radical in the first years after World War II when he joined the Young Socialists, the youth organization of the SPD. Interested in continuing his sociological research, he accepted a position at the Institute for Social Research that Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno had reopened, with Ford Foundation support, after their return to Frankfurt from their American exile. But he quickly found that he was not a Frankfurt School sociologist and moved to the University of Saarbrücken to write his Habilitation thesis – that further qualification required if he wanted to teach at a university. Influenced at the LSE by Karl Popper, he moved towards reformism and became involved with the liberal Free Democratic Party. Firmly transnational and European in his thinking, he worked on the left wing of this party, and when its leader, Walter Scheel, joined Willy Brandt’s SPD in 1969 to form a lib-lab government, he became a parliamentary state secretary in Scheel’s foreign ministry.

Dahrendorf continued his impressive career in 1970-1974 as an EEC-Commissioner in Brussels, served as director of the LSE from 1974-1984 and as Warden of St. Antony’s College, Oxford, from 1987-1997. He received a knighthood for his services and finally became a Life Peer in the British House of Lords. In short, over the years he got to know the Anglo-Saxon world extremely well, first as a postdoctoral fellow in London and later as a fellow at the Center for Advanced Behavioral Sciences in Stanford, California. In 1966 became one of the founders of Constance University, whose structures were inspired by American and the new British academic institutions. Not surprisingly perhaps, he became one of the most influential modernization theorists in the Federal Republic. In his work at the LSE he devoted himself to an exegesis of Marx’s writings on class and class conflict whence he proceeded to an analysis to changing class structures after 1945 and the emergence of a system that he called “post-capitalist.”

His adherence to modernization theory is probably best reflected in Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland, his most widely read and cited book that was translated in several foreign languages. In this 500-page tome, Dahrendorf posed the “German Question” that had also preoccupied American sociologists such as Parsons during and after World War II. The question was: why did Germany’s path into the modern period diverge from that of Western Europe and the U.S., ultimately producing one of the most brutal dictatorships of the twentieth-century and industrialized mass murder? The book was his contribution to an international debate among historians and social scientists on Germany’s “special path” (Sonderweg) in which he started from an equally widespread assumption that German liberalism had failed in the nineteenth century and thus never overcame the feudal and authoritarian character of the country’s political structures and culture. Germany was the country without liberal democracy. The Germans were said to be un-modern people in a modern world.

It was only the extreme radicalism of the Nazi regime, however illiberal, anti-democratic and anti-modern it had presented itself to the world, that inadvertently dragged Germany
into the twentieth century by destroying its traditional structures and habits. National Socialism caused a sharp rupture with tradition and pushed the country into modernity. What Germany experienced in those twelve years was to Dahrendorf nothing less than “the social revolution of National Socialism.” It is this destruction of the old, also through Hitler’s wars, that created fresh opportunities and the conditions from which a parliamentary-democratic and social-liberal Federal Republic was born.

However – and this reflected a pessimism or skepticism that was typical of his generation – Dahrendorf was wary of the many remnants of traditional ties and a more general Unmündigkeit of West German society. Its modernity was completed more slowly. It remained, at least for the time being, illiberal in its structures and authoritarian in its constitution. Similarly he mentions the limitations of the development of a liberal postwar economy, above all the establishment of the principle of competition in the market-place. As he puts it: “The dislocations (Verwerfungen) experienced by German society in the past have become even more complicated. The old and the new, the yesterday and the today continue to face each other unconnectedly at many junctures of social structure” and the old blocks the path into modernity. He asks: “How stable and reliable are the transformations of West German society?” And yet, there were limits to his skepticism. The return to the old was definitively blocked. Instead the greatest danger to the structures of German society now lay “in a totalitarianism of a communist brand.” The task was to search for a “non-totalitarian path into modernity that was enshrined in liberal democracy.” This position was “very far removed from the uninhibited love of order of the statist conservatives, but also from the humane absolutism of those who want totally to change everything;” it is the position of a “step-by-step, but also of constant change.”

Another of his books, entitled Homo Sociologicus, shows even more clearly the influence of Max Weber. Here Dahrendorf came to see himself as a mediator between British and American social sciences and a re-emergent West German sociology. However, it is also significant that whatever empirical research he undertook, he remained, just as Weber, skeptical of the belief and claim that quantification and “scientific” methods would lead to a reliable – “objective” – understanding of the dynamics of modern industrial societies.

If Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland addressed the past failures of German liberalism to develop a western-style democracy that he was now hoping to change, especially in education to facilitate greater upward mobility, Dahrendorf also devoted himself to fostering freedom and democracy. He fought for the underprivileged to whom he wanted to give much easier access to education. His commitment to a reform of higher education also seems to have propelled him into a dialogue with the radical students movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s, whose dogmatism he rejected, but hoped to change. He also worried about the dynamics of European integration and pushed to overcome what he called Europe’s “democratic deficit” by creating a European parliament. Otherwise a liberal democracy, he believed, that is not anchored in institutions and gives all citizens
the right to vote, would be a sham. Very much a Weberian, he therefore also raised his voice against the dangers of modern bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{32}

To him, scholarship was not a \textit{l'art pour l'art} exercise but was to be translated into political action. No less important, it had to be restrained and rational. This is how he understood the commitment that he made not only to being active in political institutions, but also to the promotion of values such as social justice, the right to education, and civil liberties. As he put it in his \textit{Memoirs} in 1974:\textsuperscript{33} “The ten days of solitary confinement [by the Nazis at the end of the war] awakened in me an almost claustrophobic urge for freedom, that gut resistance against confinement, be it as a result of the personal power of men or of the anonymous power of organizations.” His wartime experiences and socialization into a Hanseatic social democratic milieu guided his decision to contribute, through his research and his academic and later diplomatic activities, to the rebuilding of a liberal Germany and Europe.

It should be fairly clear by now why Dahrendorf may be seen as a major representative of the European-American dialogue, promoting it but never completely taken in by the arguments of his American colleagues. He was widely known to them and \textit{grosso modo} agreed with their interpretations of modern western societies, on the one hand, and of the totalitarian Soviet Union, on the other. But there were limits that differentiated him very clearly as a European who did not share America’s at times exuberant postwar optimism. He knew and had himself experienced too much of the European catastrophe and realized that social change occurs ever so slowly, and certainly much more slowly than many of his American colleagues expected. This is also the point at which his attitudes and perceptions of the world overlapped with another member of the trans-Atlantic social science dialogue: the French sociologist Raymond Aron whom Dahrendorf, significantly enough, admired even more than Karl Popper and whose intellectual universe I would now like to examine, even if it is difficult to do justice to all its complexities and changes over time. He was part of the European-American network, but is also a good example of the reservations many Europeans have about their American colleagues.

There can be little doubt that Aron was one of the towering figures of postwar French sociology and one of the most influential public intellectuals in postwar France.\textsuperscript{34} Born in 1905 and a graduate of both the famous Lycée Condorcet and the Ecole Normale Supérieur, he studied in Germany in the early 1930s. It is while observing the collapse of the Weimar Republic that he became a pessimist about the future of modern Western society. It is also relevant that, coming from a Jewish family, he survived World War II by escaping to London. There he worked for Charles de Gaulle’s government-in-exile before going back to Paris in 1944, even gloomier about the state of the world.

Aron had closely studied Marxism from an anti-Marxist perspective as early as the 1930s, while also engaging with German existentialism. Having immersed himself in German philosophy and social thought in the mid-1930s, he found Weber to be his
strongest guide through the maze of contemporary debates on sociology as a science, on choice and inevitability, on engagement and detachment. Jean-Paul Sartre, the French existentialist, was his friend, but they soon parted ways because of the latter's unwavering attitude towards the communist left in Europe and the Soviet Union – to Aron the land of mass murder and totalitarian rule.

The British-American historian Tony Judt has called him a “peripheral insider” and this is no doubt an apt description as far as his position in French intellectual life is concerned. But he was also an Atlanticist, not of the Wilsonian kind, but from a “realist” posture. Rather than being an activist, he was above all an observer and writer on both the big questions of the time and on day-to-day socio-political issues. The range of his writings is truly astonishing and reached well beyond sociology in the strict sense, on whose major representatives and their works he wrote short analyses, translated into English under the title Main Currents of Sociological Thought. He wrote on problems of nuclear war and the East-West conflict, and became a regular op-ed contributor to major French dailies, apart from numerous articles in intellectual journals. In view of the perceived Soviet threat, he accepted that France and Western Europe had no choice but to seek protection under the American military umbrella. He also appreciated the economic might of the United States and was conscious how important its financial support had been for the reconstruction and modernization of the French economy after 1945 when France received a major slice of Marshall Plan aid.

His Atlanticism is also evidenced by the fact that he played a major role in the CCF. He was among the prominent members of the association’s first hour in 1950 and participated prominently in its Hamburg Congress in 1953, devoted to the theme of “Science and Freedom” that brought together scientists, social scientists, and philosophers. Enjoying, like Isaiah Berlin in Oxford, a high reputation at the Ford Foundation, the Americans funded the establishment of his Institute of European Sociology in Paris in 1961. By 1966, his connections to the CCF were close enough that he agreed to assume, after some hesitation, the “Presidency of a reorganized Board of Directors.” As the Ford Foundation’s Shepard Stone put it to Manès Sperber at the time, while “one could not always be at ease with Raymond, … his mind and voice were European culture at its highest.” When the CCF collapsed shortly thereafter, Aron withdrew in anger.

Stone’s remark indirectly hints at trans-Atlantic differences that went beyond the CCF/CIA scandal and were rooted in Aron’s biography. Like his friend Sartre, he, while studying in Germany, had come under the influence of Heidegger’s and Husserl’s thought, but also of the writings of Heinrich Rickert and Max Weber. Back in France in the 1930s, he committed himself to the extreme left and for a while was close, together with his friend Manès Sperber, to the circle of intellectuals that the German communist exile and Comintern functionary Willy Münzenberg had gathered around his efforts to fight fascism and undermine European colonialism. When the Nazis invaded France in
1940, Aron realized that his life was in mortal danger not only because he was Jewish, but also because he was a supporter of Charles de Gaulle’s resistance movement. While in Britain during World War II, he edited the Gaullist paper *La France libre*. For a while, he remained on the Parisian left and published essays in Sartre’s journal *Temps modernes*. Although he soon fell out with the influential French philosopher and his existentialism in a narrow sense, Aron did not abandon its underlying pessimism about the basic character of humankind. He shared the mood of disillusionment and *tristesse* that lay over the societies of Western Europe after 1945, and it seems that the news about the genocide of the European Jews had merely reinforced a sense of despair. There was also the threat of annihilation in a nuclear war that may have contributed to his decision to grapple with the dilemmas of modern strategic thought.

It is these experiences that put some distance between Aron and his American colleagues, their optimistic adoption of modernization theory, and their faith in quantitative methods and “scientific” research. Aron remained skeptical of their enthusiasm. While he had shed his earlier sympathies with Marxism and accepted the basic ideas of totalitarianism theory, he had moved closer to Weberian positions not only as a sociologist, but also as an intellectual who agonized over what he perceived to be the dark side of the human soul as well as of modern industrial societies. While pro-American for military and economic reasons during the Cold War, he felt an ambivalence towards American culture. He was sufficiently “social democratic” to have “no patience for those who condemned ‘consumer society’ while poverty still stalked much of the globe.” He was also critical of those who extolled growth rates as an end in themselves. But he was also a Parisian mandarin who saw the drawbacks and dangers of modern democracy. He observed modern “mass society,” though not constantly indignant about its manifestations, “without transports of enthusiasm.”

It is probably not too far-fetched to say that he, like so many other educated people in Western Europe, in fact found many of these manifestations of modernity objectionable and vulgar. After the upheavals of the first half of the twentieth century, the American belief in “rugged individualism” was similarly no longer sufficient to him. Solidarity and welfare that went beyond private charity were indispensable.

It is not possible, in a short article, to examine the large number of other European social scientists who were influenced by modernization theory, as it had evolved in the United States after 1945. Nor can we deal here with their conservative European critics, whether “realist” or Heideggerian existentialist, Hegelian jurisprudential or Gaullist-Catholic occidentalist. We could only give a few examples of men who articulated both the affinities and the differences in the debate about the structures and the values of modern industrial societies. Future research will have to test critically the accuracy and viability of the analysis presented here. But one argument, I hope, has become sufficiently clear and plausible, i.e., that the trans-Atlantic social science networks that emerged both in the interwar period and after 1945 fostered important exchanges concerning the character,
ethos, and development of these societies. Divergent attitudes towards the future of the welfare state are particularly telling here. The exchanges reveal many similarities of thinking and attitude, but it would be quite misleading to overlook the differences that persisted. There was the question of how far social rights should be used to level socio-economic inequalities, as many European liberal social democrats still believed; or should one merely manage persistent economic growth and leave it to the individual citizens whether they wanted to participate in the sharing-out of the new prosperity more successfully on a competitive basis? Was the assertion of the individual, as Pareto had postulated, more important than a sense of solidarity with the group as a whole that included those who, for whatever reason of fate, had been left behind?

Without playing down the differences between the British, West German and French positions that surely also existed, but have been examined here more indirectly, perhaps European intellectuals nevertheless had a point when they tended to be struck by the “otherness” of the Americans whose positions towards modernity and also towards social rights were shaped by a different mix of traditions and tangible experiences. There were also some for whom the actual dividing line did not run through the mid-Atlantic, but through the English Channel. This certainly seems to have been true of the past thirty years or so when Thatcherism openly stressed its affinities with Friedmanite beliefs in the blessings of an unfettered neo-liberal capitalism, while politicians and academics on the European continent were much more reluctant to dismantle the welfare state as far as les Anglosaxons had decided to go. It is only now, in the current crisis of this neo-liberalism, that we may see another shift in this dialogue, with the rediscovery of the modern social state in the United States that the Europeans, even after the crisis of the 1970s, had never really abandoned.40


4. In this sense it is closer to Antonio Gramsci’s use of the concept. See James Joll, Gramsci (London: Fontana, 1977). There is also an intriguing perspective on the role of these intellectuals that St. Simon assigned to them in his nineteenth-century vision of the laboring industrial class society of the future.


9. I am grateful for this reference to Frank Sutton who was a young graduate student at Harvard in those years.


12. John W. Boyer, “We Are All Islanders To Begin With,” in The University of Chicago and the World in the Late Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 96 f.


17. See Axel R. Schäfer, American Progressives and German Social Reform, 1875-1920 (Stuttgart: F. Steiner Verlag, 2000).


29. Id., *Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland* (Munich: Piper, 1965), also for the following.


Women, Democracy and Social Rights in the Twentieth Century

Pat Thane

The Spread of Voting Rights

This chapter seeks to ask what, if anything, was the connection between the inclusion of women in the formal political institutions of most states during the twentieth century and the development of social welfare rights and benefits. It draws very much on the situation in Britain, which I know best, but with reference to other countries.

The inter-war years saw the extension of the right to vote to all men and most women in most European and many other countries and the beginning of a new era of mass participation in politics. Though, of course, black voters, male and female, in the southern states of the United States often found it difficult to register as voters before the Civil Rights Act, 1964, and many continue to do so. In Australia, aboriginal men and women did not gain secure equality of voting rights until 1967. Full adult male enfranchisement was established almost everywhere in Europe shortly after World War I, but enfranchisement of women, as of men, moved at different paces in different countries. In a number of countries women gained the vote at local level some time before the national vote: in Sweden in 1862-1863, England and Wales in 1869, Scotland in 1881, Denmark 1908, though in most countries this was restricted to women with some property, as it was with men. The national vote, when it was achieved, was often similarly restricted in various ways, for example, by age, or to holders of a certain amount of property or level of education, restrictions which varied from country to country.

The first countries where women gained the national vote were New Zealand in 1893 and (women other than aboriginals) in Australia in 1902, both of which were, apart from their indigenous populations, countries of largely British settlement in the British Empire. The main reasons why Australia and New Zealand were pioneers in granting women the vote was perhaps the same as for their being early to elect progressive Labour governments, both in the 1890s, and to introduce pioneering welfare policies ahead of many European countries, including old age pensions (1898 in New Zealand, 1908 in Australia as whole, earlier in some states) and a minimum wage, introduced in Australia in
1907. Their populations were substantially made up of working class people who had left Britain and Ireland, to make a better life and who were critical of many British traditions and institutions. Women, in particular, could often achieve a degree of independence, as career women and property holders, by migrating to these and other colonies, as they could not in Europe.¹

Nevertheless, women were slow to gain election to parliament in Australia and New Zealand. It took four decades – until the 1940s – for a woman to be elected to the Australian Federal Parliament in Canberra, six decades before a woman became a federal minister. No woman was elected to the New Zealand parliament until 1933 and the numbers elected did not reach double figures until the mid-1980s, the decade in which women began to break through in elected politics in a number of countries. The percentage of elected women in New Zealand is now 28 and the country has a female prime minister. In both countries, as in Britain and other European countries, as we will see, in their early years of voting, women compensated for their lack of elected office by a high level of activism in non-governmental associations pressing for political change.²

In Australia and New Zealand, as in Britain, enfranchised women were held back from elected office by the unwillingness of political parties to select female candidates, and by the “first past the post” election system. In general women have been more successful in gaining office in proportional representation than in “winner-takes-all” electoral systems.³ In all three countries, change came only as a result of increased women’s activism, focused on improving representation, especially from the 1980s.

In Europe, Finnish women were the first to gain the vote, in 1906. They were much faster than women in other countries to be elected to the national assembly, the Eduskunta. Nineteen women were elected in 1907, 24 by 1918 in a total of two hundred members.⁴ The largest number of women elected to any British parliament between the wars was 15 (out of 615) in 1931. To give examples of the spread of enfranchisement in Europe, rather than a comprehensive list: women gained the vote in Norway in 1913, in Denmark and Iceland in 1915. In Britain in 1918, all men were enfranchised at age 21, for the first time (previously there had been a restricted, mainly property-based male franchise), women only at age 30. British women gained the vote on equal terms with men in 1928. Women were enfranchised in Russia following the February Revolution of 1917, and, on varying conditions, in Germany, Austria, Latvia and Estonia in 1918, the Netherlands in 1919, Poland and Sweden in 1921, Spain in 1931. Belgium granted the vote only to mothers and widows of fallen soldiers in 1920, and Portugal only to educated women in 1934. In France women had to wait for the vote until 1944, in Italy until 1945, in Switzerland until 1971.⁵

In some countries women could be elected to a national assembly before they were able to vote, as in the Netherlands from 1917. In Britain women could stand for election from age 21 from 1918, when they still did not qualify to vote until age 30. However,
it had long been the case that men were allowed to stand for election from age 21 even when they did not meet the property qualification for enfranchisement. Women in New Zealand were not allowed to stand for election before 1919.

Women were slow to gain elected representation in most countries until the later twentieth century as the following table indicates.

Table 1
The percentage of women elected to national legislatures since 1945

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<td>Finland</td>
<td>8.5</td>
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<td>23</td>
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A significant increase in female representation in most countries is not evident before the 1970s, and then only in the Nordic countries. A more widespread and dramatic change was evident in the 1990s. The reasons require further research, but they seem to be associated with successful campaigns by women for measures of positive discrimination on models pioneered in the Nordic countries.

For example, in the United Kingdom important constitutional changes in the 1990s increased the representation of women in some new, elected assemblies. In 1999 Scotland and Wales gained separate, devolved, elected assemblies which gave each country a high degree of control over domestic matters – such as education and social policies – independently of the British government in London. This followed many years of campaigning by Scottish and Welsh nationalists. In the first elections to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly, in 1999, women gained substantial numbers of seats, which rose in 2005 to 40 percent and 50 percent respectively. By contrast, women were only 20 percent of members of the British parliament in London, the latter being the highest percentage ever. Female members of the London parliament were overwhelmingly concentrated in one party, the Labour Party, in which women were 27.5 percent of elected members of parliament in 2005. This followed a campaign by women members for increased representation in the Labour Party. In consequence, in 1997 only women were allowed to
stand in half of all the parliamentary seats that were judged winnable by Labour – an unprecedented act of positive discrimination in British politics. It was subsequently ruled contrary to Sex Discrimination Law by the courts and has not been replicated, but women have continued to be elected in substantial numbers for Labour, but not for other parties where there have not been similar positive discrimination campaigns.8

The success of women in the Scottish and Welsh elections similarly arose from activism on the part of women. They seized the opportunity of the drafting of new constitutions for Wales and Scotland in 1998-1999 to gain more rights for women, just as in other countries constitution making has provided an opportunity for women and other excluded groups. The Weimar Constitution introduced in Germany in 1918, was the first explicitly to guarantee equal rights for men and women, and women gained increased rights in the Soviet Union after the 1917 October Revolution; in Ireland in 1921, as new constitutional arrangements followed its independence; and, more recently, in South Africa between 1990 and 1996, Uganda and Brazil in 1988, Canada in 1982, among many other possible examples.9

As part of the constitution-making process, in Wales and Scotland women successfully campaigned for elections based upon proportional representation voting systems, which, as suggested above, tends to improve the opportunities for election of women and other excluded groups, as compared with the “first past the post” system which prevails in British elections and in other countries with low proportions of elected women, such as Australia. The proportion of elected women in New Zealand has increased since they switched to proportional representation in 1996. Welsh and Scottish women gained guarantees from the political parties that they would act to ensure gender equality in the assemblies. Women campaigners learned from their overseas contacts, especially in the Nordic countries, about positive measures which had increased the proportion of elected women in these countries, evident in Table 1 above.

The women who were active political campaigners across the British Isles, and elsewhere, in the 1990s were often those who had become active in the late 1960s and 1970s. There were direct continuities between this “second wave” feminism and later constitutional politics. “Second wave” feminism tended initially to be hostile to, or detached from, orthodox party politics, but many activists later became aware of the limitations of extra-parliamentary politics, and recognized that women had much to gain from increased formal representation in elected government.10

**How Did Women Use the Vote?**

The fact that so few women were elected to governing assemblies for so long after gaining the vote has often been taken by historians and political scientists as evidence that few
women were interested or active in politics. But elected office is not the only indicator of political participation. Since, in most countries after enfranchisement, women found it hard to make an impact on politics as individuals, through selection for parliamentary office, instead, they organized collectively, in associations dedicated either to the broad principle of gender equality or to specific issues such as equal pay, changes in family law, support for unmarried mothers or widows and their children. Women's activist and lobbying groups could be very effective in promoting legislative and administrative change, especially in the arena of social welfare. They were already very active, nationally and internationally before 1914.11

In Britain in 1918 many suffrage campaigners switched their attention to helping women to use the vote effectively now that they had gained it, to assert their new citizen rights and sense of political legitimacy. One of the leading British suffrage organizations, the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies (NUWSS), renamed itself the National Union of Societies for Equal Citizenship (NUSEC) and became dedicated to educating women in political issues and political practice and to helping individuals and associations to organize campaigns, draft legislation, manoeuvre it through parliament and form alliances with politicians, mainly male since so few women were elected to Parliament.

These campaigners had no illusions that it would be easy to exert influence in a political system that was still male-dominated. They recognized that women faced as much hostility after as before gaining the vote.12 They continued to struggle against such opposition through associations such as NUSEC, and the National Council of Women (NCW), a branch of the influential International Council of Women; or in single issue associations or trade unions or women's branches of political parties. The number and total membership of such associations in Britain – the number of women mobilized on issues relating to gender equality – was almost certainly greater after women gained the vote than before. They worked closely together as well as separately, supporting each other in their campaigns.

Such collective action was not peculiar to Britain, though it has not been researched everywhere. Growing numbers of women's associations could be found in many European countries and in the United States, Australia and New Zealand after women were enfranchised. Generally, women could exert more influence once they had the vote. But, even where they did not, as in France, they gained from women in other countries a sense of women's political legitimacy which encouraged their assertiveness. Women's activist and lobby groups could, as already suggested, be very effective in promoting legislative change. They rarely achieved everything they sought – activist groups rarely do – but they did influence political agendas, particularly in the field of welfare policies.

Women's organizations tended to focus on issues concerning welfare and the family, women's work conditions and unequal legal rights, not because they necessarily believed that this was the only role women could play in politics, but they could make strategic use
of the fact that male politicians thought of welfare as lying within “woman’s sphere” and believed that, in order to attract the new female voters, they should give welfare higher priority. Also, of course, these were urgent needs, given the extent of gender inequality and levels of poverty and ill-health which still prevailed throughout the world. Since male politicians had failed to solve, or even, all too often, to acknowledge, such issues, many women believed that these should be the first priority of new women voters. Evidence accumulated in most higher-income countries, throughout the interwar years, about poverty, high infant mortality, poor housing, overcrowding, malnutrition and other social and economic problems, making these issues all the more urgent politically. In campaigning about many of them, women had the willing support of many men, but women generally took the lead in bringing these issues to public attention and formulating solutions to meet the needs of women and children. For example, women insisted on the payment of national insurance maternity benefits to the non-insured, non-working wives of insured men in Britain in 1911, Germany in 1924, France in 1928 and Sweden in 1931. In Britain they ensured that they were paid directly to the mother rather than to the insured man as originally proposed. This was part of the wider challenge to ideas of the primacy of the male breadwinner, which ran through the interwar years in many countries, demanding recognition and remuneration of the important work that women performed within the home, in the form of payments described as “mothers’ pensions” or “family allowances.” But, as with many welfare benefits, access to maternity benefit, even where it was achieved, had limits. In Britain it was payable only to wives of workers in the national insurance scheme, or to women who were themselves insured workers, which excluded many of the poorest women, who needed it most. In France, by contrast, such grants were paid to women with many fewer restrictions, from an earlier date, due less to pressure from un-enfranchised women than because the state was concerned about the low birthrate and high infant death rates.

In Britain, politicians were clearly very aware of the importance of the women’s vote and of the need to take account of women’s organizations. Women in these organizations became skilled at drafting legislation and persuading individual politicians to support it in parliament. At least twenty pieces of legislation which had been promoted by women’s organizations were enacted by the British parliament in the ten years after women first gained the vote in 1918. These included important amendments to family law, such as giving rights to custody of their children to divorced mothers equal to those long held by fathers; equal access to divorce for women and men; increasing the amount of maintenance an unmarried mother could claim from the father of her child; and achieving the first pensions for widows and orphans, the impoverished single-parent families of their day, of whom there were large numbers. British women campaigned, also, for more and better designed housing, with some success, given the unprecedented expansion of public house-building in Britain between the wars. But not all campaigns were successful and gender equality was still far distant in 1939, in Britain as elsewhere. For example the
unemployment insurance scheme continued to discriminate against women by refusing benefits to married women on the grounds that they always had employment – unpaid, in the home. Women found it easier – though not very easy – to achieve reform in family law, the financial cost of which to government was small, than in more costly social and economic benefits, and they had least success with campaigns to change conditions in the private market, such as gaining equal pay, which has still not been achieved.\textsuperscript{14}

It is always difficult to trace exactly what brings about changes in the law, because the processes are complex, but it is difficult to believe that so many changes in so many countries for which women campaigned, coming so soon after women gained the vote, were unconnected with women’s enfranchisement and their activism.

**Democracy and Social Welfare**

Social welfare and other rights and benefits developed on different trajectories in different countries, subject to different imperatives. Women’s campaigns were just one of many competing pressures upon policy-makers and the constellation of pressures differed from country to country. Women campaigners became skilled at taking strategic advantage of specific political conjunctures, such as concerns at state level about falling birthrates and shortage of labour and military strength, and the formulation of new constitutions and new institutions, national and international.

The French state prioritized the needs of children and provided maternity benefits, family allowances and childcare on the basis of family need rather than the employment status of the father from early in the twentieth century, above all because France had a low birthrate and the government feared that its geopolitical position would be undermined if its population, and hence its labour and military force, declined. The German and British states, France’s main rivals, were mainly concerned in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to maximize economic growth and military strength, and to stem the rise of socialism, which led them to focus much of their social policy upon key workers, who were generally skilled males, and to treat women and children as their dependents, though this was persistently challenged by women’s groups and was less comprehensively pursued in Britain than in Germany.

But in the increasingly tense international climate of the early twentieth century, economically and militarily, leading European governments were increasingly concerned about falling birthrates and the physical condition of their populations. Women could take advantage of this concern to lobby for improved maternity and child welfare services and health care designed to reduce the high levels, everywhere, of infant and maternal mortality and improve the fitness of growing generations. They achieved real improvements in services.\textsuperscript{15}
In both world wars of the twentieth century, in all participating countries, social policies were directed towards supporting war aims. For example, in World War I, the British government for the first time provided allowances that were much more generous than other welfare benefits to the wives, and even the unmarried partners, children and dependent parents of servicemen, in order to encourage recruitment to what was initially a volunteer army and to maintain morale in the services and at home. Even before they had the vote, but still more effectively after, women became skilled at negotiating important political conjunctures, including wars, to try to achieve at least some of their aims for improved social welfare.

Women’s Internationalism

After World War I this included negotiating with new international institutions. National campaigns in the 1920s and 1930s and after gained strength from transnational contacts and organizations. Contacts among women across nations were strong before 1914 but increased further after enfranchisement. For example, the British Commonwealth League from 1925 brought together women from across a British Empire that was larger than ever before, following the war, though increasingly challenged by independence movements, with which women, including British women, were often actively sympathetic. New transnational organizations, aiming to enhance women’s social and political rights formed, for example, the Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference met from 1928; the All-Asian Women’s Conference from 1931.

Transnational association was assisted and encouraged at this time by the emergence of new international organizations, in particular the League of Nations and its subsidiary, the International Labour Organization (ILO). The League of Nations, from its foundation, was committed to opening all its posts to women, most unusually at this time. Twenty-two women held posts between the wars. It appointed a female liaison officer to its secretariat to co-ordinate the League’s relations with worldwide women’s organizations, such as the International Council of Women and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. Women were included in the delegations of many nations to the League. British, American and Australian women were especially prominent.

The League of Nations and the ILO provided forums where women of different countries could meet and provided a focus for their campaigns, including those for improved working conditions for women, statutory maternity leave, against international trafficking of women and children, support for refugees and oppressed indigenous populations such as Australian aboriginals, among many other issues. The drafting of the charter of the ILO had been influenced particularly by French feminists aiming to achieve, internationally as well as in France, equal pay for work of equal value and greater social protection.
for women workers, both of which were promoted by socialist and feminist women in many countries. The ILO promoted such protective measures as the provision in its 1919 Washington Convention that working mothers should be guaranteed six weeks paid leave before and after childbirth and free medical services. Germany was the first country to implement this in full, in the Maternity Protection Act of 1927. This was pushed through the Weimar legislature by newly enfranchised female representatives of all political parties, other than the Nazis. Collaboration of this kind among women of different political views was, and continued to be, evident in many countries. The ILO also worked to improve international standards in relation to working conditions and social security, such as state provision of old age pensions.

The League of Nations became a focus for international campaigning groups, including women seeking to improve social conditions. It provided a forum for the international exchange of ideas about social welfare, of the kind that had been frequent but less formalized before World War I, and it could put moral pressure upon governments. Women's organizations played a significant role in pushing the League to widen its agenda on social and humanitarian issues, for example on relief and refugee work, children's rights and protection of women from enforced prostitution. Women also campaigned for an Equal Rights Treaty. They failed to achieve it, but the campaign kept the status of women on the League’s agenda, establishing that it was an international issue, not one confined to a few specific countries. It paved the way for the later United Nations Commission on the Status of Women.

These trans-national associations were not confined to white women with voting rights in privileged countries. For example, within the British Empire there were exchanges and alliances among women of diverse backgrounds from different countries. These relationships have been most thoroughly researched between Britain and India. Though many British women were upholders of imperial authority and the conventional British political and gender order, others, from the late nineteenth century onwards, were supporters of the emerging movement of un-enfranchised Indian women, demanding equal rights. As the Indian nationalist movement grew strongly in the 1920s and 1930s, feminists in Britain supported Indian women’s demands that any new constitution establishing Indian independence should include the equal civil and social rights which women lacked in indigenous Indian culture, as women did in many cultures elsewhere, including in Europe. British women sought to influence British politicians to incorporate gender equality into constitutional negotiations, as Indian women sought to influence male nationalists to take account of women's interests.

The British Empire played an ambiguous role in the lives and thinking of Indian women activists. On the one hand, it represented domination of India by a foreign power and it tended to reinforce traditional gender roles. But, in certain respects, it enabled Indian women to challenge patriarchal aspects of Indian culture. For example, many of them were
glad to use the British imperial courts to convict their husbands of the domestic violence which their own communities condoned, but which was against British law. Similarly, the British authorities sought to suppress *suttee*, the practice of burning widows on the funeral pyre of their husbands, as a (far from ancient) Indian cultural tradition offensive to British sensibilities and an extreme symbol of female subordination. This move was opposed by many Indians, as an alien imposition, but welcomed by many Indian women who were critical of such patriarchal aspects of Indian culture, especially when, like *suttee*, they were relatively recent inventions. Hence Indian women were strengthened in their opposition to male domination and in their demands for social rights by transnational, including imperial, contacts.

These brief examples of relationships among women across the British Empire are just indicators of increasing contacts among women of all nations through the twentieth century, as their sense of political legitimacy grew.

After 1945

Women’s national and international political activism continued beyond the first years of enfranchisement. Their campaigns were understandably muted during World War II, in those countries involved in the war, though they did not disappear. In Britain, for example, women continued to campaign, and used their increased bargaining power as workers in war-related industries, to strike for, and achieve, equal pay. They also successfully demanded equal social benefits, for example when the government proposed to pay women injured as a result of bombing lower compensation than men.

On an international level, the war was followed by explicit commitments to gender equality by international institutions, at least at the rhetorical level. The United Nations Charter in 1945 included a clause guaranteeing equal rights for women and men, following organized pressure from women. In 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights included commitments to equal rights in marriage, protection of the family and to equal pay. The long-established language of the “rights of man” was dropped in favour of the term “human rights.” The change of language was incorporated into the French constitution in 1946-1958 and the new constitutions of Italy and western and eastern Germany in 1949; in West Germany only after organized pressure from women. Of course, real gender inequalities remained despite the linguistic changes, but these signified a certain cultural shift, which would have been impossible without women’s activism and which paved the way for further change, gradual though it was.

Similarly, the Treaty of Rome, the founding charter of the European Community, now the European Union (EU), in 1957 included a commitment to equal pay, again partly due to pressure mainly from French feminists, though it was also designed to prevent
the undercutting of male pay in those member countries where cheaper female labour was readily available. Subsequently, the EU, the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights (both founded in 1959) have successfully exerted pressure on member countries to implement equality in terms of gender and all other dimensions, including race, sexual orientation, disability and age; and groups and individuals in the member countries have used the courts to force their governments to implement equal rights legislation. An important reason why the United Kingdom introduced an Equal Pay Act in 1970 was its desire to join the EU, and hence to conform to its standards. The Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 followed British entry to the EU. Neither item of legislation has led to the achievement of full gender equality, but they have encouraged movement towards greater equality in Britain and in other late entrants to the EU in the 1970s, including Ireland, Spain and Portugal.

Activism continued also on a national level. British women remained active on gender equality and also welfare issues throughout the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. These were not their only political interests – indeed in the 1930s many of them changed their focus to campaigning for peace22 – but it was the main focus of very many of them because it had been so long neglected in a male-dominated political system.

It has been argued that in the 1950s, by contrast, women's activism dwindled as British society became more dominated by the values of patriarchal domesticity.23 Younger and older women were indeed diverted from political activism in the 1950s, both by increased availability of employment and by higher marriage and birth rates, both occurring at earlier ages than before. Early marriage and childbirth helps to explain the relative absence of younger women from postwar campaigns, which were sustained by the dwindling numbers of older unmarried women who had been active before the war.24

But women in Britain and elsewhere were not silent in the 1950s. In Britain, there were active campaigns for equal pay, which was achieved in the public sector in 1955.25 Also for, among other things, improved child care; further reform of the divorce law; access to education and training, including in the sciences where it was especially deficient for females.26 There were many more women in the workforce. Though the British government, like others at this time, was anxious to increase the birthrate and hence to keep younger women at home, there was a labour shortage and women were encouraged to return to paid work as their children grew older, though still to a strictly gender divided labour market.

Still, in the early 1960s, only 7 percent of 18 year-olds attended university, only 25 percent of whom were females, who were overwhelming concentrated in arts subjects. These campaigns, including for the legalization of abortion (the Abortion Law Reform Association was formed, mainly by women, in 1935) continued through the 1960s.27 Many of them began to be achieved from the later 1960s. The number of university places slowly expanded, including for women. The legalization of abortion was achieved
in 1967, before the “second wave” women’s movement began. The first Equal Pay Act was passed in 1970, owing more to campaigns since the late nineteenth century by women trade unionists and Labour Party members and to the policies of the European Union, than to “second wave” feminists.

The “new wave” of feminists, from around 1968, part of an international wave of protest by younger people, had different preoccupations. They tended to be hostile to orthodox politics and to campaigning for parliamentary action. Also, it was possible, in the changed cultural climate of the 1960s, to be explicit about issues which it had not been acceptable – in Britain at least – for women to discuss in public in earlier generations, though they had certainly existed as real problems for women. “Second wave” feminists successfully placed rape and domestic violence on the public political agenda from which they had previously been absent and from which they have never since been removed. Theirs was a movement predominantly of younger women, born after World War II, less inclined to marry and enter motherhood as early as their mothers had done – the birthrate fell from the late 1960s, as did the marriage rate while female marriage ages rose, concurrently with the introduction of the birth control pill.28 They were a different generation, with different preoccupations, often influenced by their mothers’ frustrations and discontents.

Women’s Activism since the “Second Wave”

It has been argued that after the “second wave” subsided in the 1980s, that feminism declined and women were less active in pursuit of gender equality. However, in Britain, certainly in the Nordic countries, and, no doubt, elsewhere, many activists of the “second wave” continued to be politically active for the remainder of the century. An example emerges if we examine regional differences in women’s politics and political impact in late twentieth-century Britain. Though Britain has long been apparently a unitary nation-state, there are important national differences within it among the constituent nations of Scotland, Ireland, Wales and England and there are differences within some other European nation-states. There has been growing awareness of these divergent identities within Britain since the decline, by the 1960s, of the mighty empire which had long served as a focal point for a common British identity.

The island of Ireland was divided in 1920, following a bitter struggle, with the independent Republic of Ireland in the south, while Northern Ireland remained part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Irish women gained the vote on the same terms as those elsewhere in Britain in 1918, i.e., at a later age (30) than men (21), but in the new constitution of the Irish Free State, as it was then known, in 1922 they gained the vote equally with men at age 21, and the constitution stated that
“every person, without distinction of sex, shall... enjoy the privileges and be subject to the obligations of such citizenship.” Women in Great Britain and Northern Ireland had no such guarantee because they had no written constitution. But there were certain losses also in Ireland, as women gradually found their legal and employment rights eroded, and the presumption that woman's role was primarily domestic became still more dominant than before.²⁹

Women were slower to make an impact on politics in both the north and the south of Ireland even than elsewhere in the British Isles, mainly because both were dominated by conservative forms of religion: Roman Catholicism in the south, Calvinist Protestantism in the north. For example, divorce, abortion and homosexual activity remained illegal in both parts of Ireland for much longer than in mainland Britain. Abortion is still illegal throughout Ireland; British law in this and certain other respects does not apply to Northern Ireland. Religion was, and is, more influential in the culture and politics of Ireland than in England, with Wales and Scotland somewhere between the two, and non-conformist Protestantism more influential in both than in England. Until recently women were even less prominent in public life and elected office in Wales and Scotland than in England, though, as we have seen above, this has recently changed. But they were never inactive and they worked closely with English women's associations.³⁰

Women from the Republic of Ireland found- as women had elsewhere- another route to freedom in emigration. Ireland was one of the few countries from which more women migrated than men in the mid-twentieth century. Until the Irish economy was transformed by entry to the European Union in 1973, Ireland was the poorest of the countries of the British Isles, and one of the poorest in Western Europe, with high rates of emigration from the early nineteenth century. It was largely agricultural, with relatively little paid work and few opportunities for women. In Ireland, as elsewhere, women became more active in the late 1960s and 1970s, though not necessarily on feminist issues. In the north they were especially active in the campaigns for peace when conflict grew between Catholics and Protestants from 1968. However, women are still poorly represented in elected office in both north and south.³¹

Women and issues of gender equality tended to be marginalized in the nationalist Irish movement and in the movement for union with Britain in the north of Ireland.³² By contrast, women became increasingly active and influential as nationalist movements in Wales and Scotland grew and came closer to achieving their goals. These movements were increasingly active from the 1960s. with results discussed earlier in this chapter.

These events and changes in Britain at the end of the twentieth century were a continuation of a century of political activism and international cooperation among women and one set of expressions of a range of women's political activities evident throughout Europe and the world once they gained the vote.


24. Joyce Freeguard, “‘Let the Women of the 1950s Stand Up and Be Counted.’ Women’s Associations in 1950s Britain” (Ph.D. diss., University of Sussex, 2005).


28. Ibid.


Democracy and Paternalism: The Struggle Over Shaping British Liberal Welfare Thinking

Michael Freeden

The appreciation that liberalism is a complex theory riven with internal contradictions has all too often been obfuscated by the rosy-eyed views it has commanded as harbouring a language of reason and progress or, more recently, of justice and deliberation. The occasionally tortuous routes liberalism followed, and reacted to, in the emergence of the welfare state offer an instructive case study of one of its most humanist and socially generous variants, a variant that possessed concurrently a multifaceted and contentious nature. By welfarism I refer to the ideology, generally associated with the left of centre, that promoted the construction of a socio-political system that not only secured its members from unnecessary physical and economic harm, but that sought to enable them to express their abilities to their own benefit and to the benefit of society in general, and that harnessed an ostensibly tamed and democratised state in the service of those ends.¹

If that is a rough definition of welfarism, we are immediately confronted with a micro and a macro version – the one relating to measures of social security underpinning political stability; the other relating to individual development underpinning the optimal harnessing of human resources and social flourishing. Two entirely different welfare states could have emerged from those roots and, in the Bismarckian and current American cases, the distribution of social security to the economically marginal clearly overshadowed the full drawing out of human potential. But the British liberal theorists chose the second path, and they did so by means of a powerful theory of organicism – a theory whose normal pedigree had of course been largely illiberal, invoking a dominant holism that seemingly took precedence over the individual and separate components that were held in its embrace, and hitherto found in various forms of romantic, nationalist, conservative or socialist thinking.
Democracy and Paternalism

Liberal Organicism

The organic vision of society produced and disseminated by the new liberals was of a different nature, designed initially to counteract newly discarded conceptions of contract that had animated social rights theories as late as the nineteenth century. Social rights, as a sub-set of a forensic rights language, were initially slotted into a liberal tradition in which contract, choice, and the self-assumption of duties were predominant. T.H. Marshall, from the perspective of the mid-twentieth century, reiterated that view as one in which social rights simply followed on seamlessly from civil and political ones, mainly as an extension of the individualistic contractarian tradition. Contract of course still had its appeal. It was based on a voluntaristic view of social relations in which consent – or its withholding – played a central part, and which resonated with an ethos of emancipation from subordination and hierarchical relationships, and with a political account of obedience to a legitimate authority that provided a crucial justification of political support. Yet the language of contract was assailed relentlessly by new liberals who decried its distortion of proper human relationships. The problem with contractual mechanisms of social rights was that they were modelled either on natural rights theory in which states and political relationships were necessary but artificial, or on private commercial relationships in which the particular gain to each side was pre-eminent, underpinned by a strong utilitarian appeal to the instrumentality of contract.

The new liberal ideas before World War I – inhabiting a salient British Sattelzeit, in Koselleckian terms – attempted to break away from those dual constraints. Two main strands of that thinking were a reformulation of the utilitarian creed away from pleasure-maximizing to welfare-optimizing; and the identification of society as an extra-contractual rights holder alongside the individual. Society was now seen as the potential guardian of an extensive array of individual rights, not merely in order to serve the individual but in order to advance some notion or other of the social good. Rights were no longer an artificial product of human wills, but an immanent protective envelope for a naturally evolved social structure that was essential to its flourishing, and for the members without whose contribution such flourishing – as well as their own – would be rendered null and void. On the organic analogy, the liberal welfare theorist J.A. Hobson argued, the health of the social whole was dependent on the health of any one of its parts, and without attention to each of the parts the body-politics would atrophy – thus apparently overturning the illiberal implications of much organicist thinking. Unlike Marshall’s understanding of social rights as the rights solely of individuals to welfare goods, society was itself perceived as a claimant for the goods it required to discharge its functions, including its own well-being future development. For Hobson, democracy offered not only individual representation, participation and control, but channelled the energies of the members of a society towards its own prospering, promoting a robust sociability. The democratic
state was simply the agent of a unitary society, one in which individuals were both central units in their own right and members of an interdependent national group.

Hobson’s friend and colleague, L.T. Hobhouse, was the only other major left-liberal theorist to adhere to an organic theory of the state and of social relations, though after World War I he did so despite his growing pessimism – induced by the war – about the perniciousness of state power. Hobhouse remained within the framework of the search for standards and practices that promote happiness, well-being and welfare. In *The Elements of Social Justice* he set out a detailed discussion of rights revolving around ends “which do appeal to the members of the community as members.” As against the “one-sided individualism” of natural rights, which conjured up an “isolated individual in no social relations at all,”5 Hobhouse emphasised the obligation flip-side of a right as a moral relation that was not simply the concern of its owner. In particular he insisted that rights were not “conditions precedent to social welfare, but elements in social welfare and deriving their authority therefrom.” That phrase should serve as one of the guiding principles in understanding liberal political thinking on social rights in the United Kingdom. But it also involved an expansionist interpretation of welfare: social welfare as a “life of harmony”6 that far transcended the guarantee of minimum living standards with which it is usually associated. Individuals had no rights against the common good – though they could have rights against a misbehaving state – because of the strongly unitary notion of that good.

Even within the liberal interpretation of organicism, there appeared to be question marks over the openness, diversity, and participatory values that liberals might have been expected to espouse. Except that a century, and more, ago they espoused those values ambiguously. Within a theory of evolutionary social ethics that identified an increase in the rationality and sociability of all, and particularly the emergence of a sense of communality, an unequivocal liberal stance would always have been a slightly elusive outcome. Authoritarianism, illiberalism and paternalism had to be navigated constantly even in the most liberal and generous versions of welfarism. One reason for that was the superimposition of class and class conflict on welfare issues, which led to confrontation, to clashes over the nature of democracy, and to the superimposition of standards on the less fortunate. Social reform, in many of its nineteenth-century forms, was seen as a measure of social control, or as one of placating pressures from below. That said, the British version of the hostility of class relations was relatively mild, rather more cultural than socioeconomic. A second reason was the ideological base from which welfare ideas were produced – in itself a distinct intellectual elite that had to formulate, disseminate and implement its ideas often without first seeking democratic approval, or only obtaining approval in vague terms. Best expressed in the philosopher F. H. Bradley’s phrase “my station and its duties,”7 it evoked the sense of moral and social responsibility that the ancient universities, some of the churches, and a smattering of the aristocracy were
seen to disseminate. A third reason was the clash between private and public conceptions of welfare provision, the former related to a voluntary and charitable sector for which paternalism, dressed up as a quasi-religious duty, was the norm, and public approval was sought only for its results rather than its methods, results often tied to the improvement of the character of the recipient.

A fourth reason was the novelty of informal mass approval for social reform in view of the very gradual enfranchisement of the population, and its slowness to appreciate measures of social reform: that is to say, formal democratic consent was simply not available. A fifth was the contest between different ideologies of welfare, some of which – the Fabians are the most notable example – saw welfare policy as a matter of expert opinion catering to known categories of need; others as a release of capacity, the direction of which was best left to the individuals themselves who were about to be emancipated from debilitating hardships – here T. H. Green’s notion of hindering hindrances comes to mind. A sixth was the split between those who saw human vulnerability as exceptional – a reflection of the contingencies of life, or restricted to a small section of the population who were morally dissolute – requiring either occasional or targeted intervention; and those who saw it as normal, requiring permanent potential intervention in the lives of all members of society. And a seventh, related issue, was the gradual rise of a new conception of the state as responsible not just for defence, law, order and revenues but for the good life of its members – a state that was inching its way towards the centre of social life as an involved instrument of human betterment.

**Hard and Soft Paternalism**

One way of approaching some of those issues is to distinguish between hard paternalism and soft paternalism. The one was rooted in non-democratic structures and attempted to exercise a mixture of distanced benevolence and social control as part of a vague sense of feudal or aristocratic responsibility. It was split between activities in the extended private sphere (what we now loosely term civil society) and a new harnessing of the state to perform those acts of benevolence on a scale that voluntarism could not conceive – a scale necessitated by the growing power of the dispossessed, and by a general sense of moral malaise concerning the condition of the poor. That hard paternalism was usually vocal and deliberate. The other was rooted in the enlightened, even radical, views of social reform circles among the intelligentsia, often driven by a keen vision of community and by the demand for decreasing inequality, a decrease required to transform the ill-fortunes of the marginalized and to catapult them eventually into the position of participants and sharers in social wealth and well-being. That soft paternalism was usually unconscious and unidentified.
While the paternalism of British liberalism was mainly of the second kind, it did display more than a few glimmerings of the first. Of course, all national and large democracies are in effect up-down systems, as was recognized at the time by the new liberal L. A. Atherley-Jones in 1893: “the present movement for social reform springs from above rather than below.” The test of soft paternalism cannot therefore rest merely on the initiation of public policy in governmental circles, but rather (1) on entertaining certain conceptions of desirable character in the manner of nineteenth-century social reformers and (2) on the assumption that certain sectors of the population were as yet unfit to participate in the democratic process – that in addition to the thorny question of female suffrage. Soft paternalism genuinely reflected the view that the most marginalized sections of the population required not only the material means to climb out of the abyss, but were too incapacitated to produce on their own the social vision that would emancipate them, let alone act on it. But it also reflected an uncritical confidence in a homogeneous social vision, whether underpinned by moral imperatives or irrefutable scientific evidence – a liberal ideology that saw itself resting, as so many ideologies do, on self-evident ethical as well as empirical truths. To identify a soft paternalism – in many guises and doses – is not to pass judgment on it. The current tendency for unitary visions to fracture in the face of perceptions and avowals of multi-culturalism needs simply to be contrasted with the belief in organic unity that, in very diverse ways, affected all groupings in the ideological spectrum a century ago, whether conservative, liberal, or socialist.

I will pass over one notable form of liberal paternalism, because I have dealt with it elsewhere, and that is the appeal of eugenics to the British left, an appeal that was particularly acute because of the perceived link between social reform and biological science as a means of improving social and individual health. Whichever way one regards it, however, that fascinating episode was not a mainstream phenomenon in terms of social policy and welfarism. The mainstream story tells us enough. Undoubtedly, one strand of paternalism was transmitted through the admiration of British social reformers and politicians for Bismarckian social reform. The liberal W. H. Dawson, the main expositor of Bismarckian social policy to the British public, quoted large segments of the German chancellor’s speeches uncritically in his *Bismarck and State Socialism*. Bismarck had contrasted laissez-faire not with an active self-regulating community but with “a monarchical, paternally governed State” in the tradition of the monarchy as the protector of the poor. “After long wandering in the wilderness of Individualism, which had only led to misfortune and unhappiness,” wrote Dawson of Germany, “people besought the State to extricate them from their sad straits.” That mood of supplication was not one that British importers of Bismarckianism (and – through David Lloyd George, who visited Germany in 1908 – post-Bismarckianism) wished to stress in their rhetoric. The British liberal governmental emphasis was on scope, efficiency and, a few years later, a partnership between state, individual and employer; while the British liberal ideological and intellectual emphasis was on social regeneration and on the elevation of the masses to the
level of useful citizens and rounded individuals. For the then liberal Winston Churchill, Bismarck had taught a significant lesson in building up the strength of a nation.\textsuperscript{12} British liberals were also keen to distance themselves from the German model because of the central role they wished voluntary groups to play in the administration of welfare. The mutualism of the friendly societies, in particular, was compared favourably both with state and with private paternalism and those societies were expected to play an important role in social insurance,\textsuperscript{13} a role that however did not materialize. Notwithstanding, the tripartism of British welfarism was notably different from the corporatism adopted in some cases on the continent.

Nonetheless, awareness of continental social policy practices was widespread among British policy makers. Churchill claimed that his initiative in creating labour exchanges was inspired by their antecedents in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, France and Belgium, although he was also quick to insist on replacing German municipalism with a uniform and national system. That was a curious yet prevalent feature of British social liberalism, preferring centralization to decentralization in its search not only for efficiency but for the comprehensiveness of a social vision, and in doing so taking seriously the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws that reported in 1909.\textsuperscript{14} But awareness of the social and political thinking behind such reforms was rudimentary. One reason for that was simply that Britain was already in the forefront of welfare thinking; even Scandinavian theorists such as the Swede Ernst Wigforss – perhaps surprisingly in view of the advanced nature of their welfare systems – were influenced after World War I by British social liberal thinking.\textsuperscript{15} Undoubtedly the ideology of welfarism was the proudest achievement of twentieth-century British liberalism, despite its many flaws.

The Legitimation of Compulsion

If there was a problem at the time it related not to the issue of “state socialism,” democratic or otherwise, because that term had been rendered unusable by the rise of the Labour party, but to the issue of compulsion in social insurance. Compulsion, rather than paternalism, raised the hackles of many British politicians and some social reformers. What was regularly termed the German system of regulation and regimentation – backed by an intrusive bureaucracy – would not, it was confidently assumed, be tolerated by the less compliant British worker.\textsuperscript{16} Older liberals bemoaned “the newer Liberalism of Social Responsibility and … Paternal Government,”\textsuperscript{17} by which of course they meant hard paternalism. Indeed, the charge of hard paternalism had initially been levelled against British socialists as much as against conservatives. As R. B. Haldane, the future Liberal minister, saw it: “There is no half-way position between leaving grown men to bargain about their own interests, and taking the management of these interests out of their hands
altogether." Consequently, when compulsion was suddenly and rather unexpectedly introduced into the British social welfare system after 1906, it had to undergo the kind of ideological repackaging that had been superfluous in the German case. That repackaging replaced the hard paternalism of an undemocratic state with an interpretation of compulsion as a measure designed to remove hindrances to self-development, captured in the positive liberty language of a Liberal publication department leaflet that stated, in terms that did not normally fall lightly on British ears, “compulsion is simply a larger freedom.” More specifically, left-liberals welcomed compulsory insurance as establishing a right to medical treatment that was far superior to the “fatherly despotism of a Public Health Authority” preferred by socialists – compulsion, paradoxically, could be employed as a weapon in the ideological battle against Labour. As the social reformer Leo Chiozza Money contended, linking compulsion with democracy,

there is stirring amongst the masses of the people a new interest in politics and a new faith in democratic government. It is not difficult to get the average man who works for his living to see that the compulsion of democratic law is not only a different thing from the economic compulsion to which he must day by day submit or starve, but that by virtue of the compulsion of law he may find mitigation of economic compulsion and even be saved from it.

Compulsory insurance was nonetheless far from being universally welcome, and Lloyd George's emphasis on a tripartite contract was designed, among others, to elevate the status of workers as independent components of a relationship of equals and as prime beneficiaries of what we would now term a mild form of public-private partnership. The liberal insistence on the state's duty to enforce parental obligations vis-à-vis children was another case of combining state regulation with individual responsibility, with the state being favourably referred to as “over-parent.”

The (Lesser) Condition of the People

The move away from what liberals saw as the feudal approach of conservatives, comprising benevolent rule, a grateful mass of dependents, but without formal duties to the needy, was not as clear-cut as liberal themselves believed, and the tell-tale signs are again in the language. In one of the most important manifestos of the new liberalism, proclaimed in the opening issue of the *Independent Review* in 1903, the editors (who included the Liberal politician and writer C. F. G. Masterman and the historian G. M. Trevelyan) observed that “one of the chief causes of drunkenness and gambling is the people's incapacity for rational amusement, their lack of all resources in themselves.” The manifesto also noted that “Liberalism, having come, in the course of its crusade for freedom, to assume the patronage of the masses as against the classes, is necessarily attracted to the democratic
element in the new ideas, by the promise they hold out of raising the condition of the people.”23 This allusion to patronage echoed much more trenchant instances of liberalism’s soft paternalism in Masterman and Trevelyan’s earlier writings. Masterman had evoked a model of desirable character completely in tune with nineteenth-century standpoints when he referred to the university settlement movement (through which Oxford graduates spent some time in designated houses helping individuals in poor urban areas) “designed to place the culture and intellect of Oxford and Cambridge at the service of the poor and ignorant.”24 He followed that with a description of the “characteristic physical type of town dweller: stunted, narrow-chested, easily wearied; yet voluble, excitable, with little ballast, stamina or endurance – seeking stimulus in drink, in betting, in any unaccustomed conflicts at home or abroad... each individual has been endowed with ... a certain dim and cloudy capacity for comprehending what he reads.” Trevelyan expressed a more palpable elitism in the same volume, writing

we have to regret the lethargy of the natural leaders of the social body, the few score or few thousand men who, by force of brain and character, can when they will drag along with them the ‘average sensual man’ towards ideal ends... Whenever a good thing is accomplished it is not in the first instance because the people wish it to be done, but because a few men will do it ... The success of a nation, the greatness of an age, the work done by a body or group of persons, is always in ratio to the percentage of men of this quality.25

Some liberals engaged in compartmentalized paternalism, referring to past categories to make their point. Thus the notorious distinction between poverty and pauperism was redeployed, so that “the more liberal treatment of honourable poverty and the more drastic severity with pauperism will ... go hand in hand.”26 The soft paternalism of the condescending tone towards “honourable” poverty – presumably poverty that persisted despite individual exertions – complemented rather than contrasted with the hard paternalism that labelled chronic poverty as pauperism, and that continued to associate it with individual failure, profligacy and immorality. But other liberals were shocked, for instance, by Asquith’s proposals to introduce character tests into the Old Age Pensions Bill which would effectively prompt “a general inquisition into character, conducted by the local gentlefolk, clergy, and traders” or – more horrible to contemplate – by “members of the Charity Organisation Society.”27

Nevertheless, character was an obsession of the times, and re-emerged in a minor key even among those resolutely opposed to the reforming practices of charities. Hobson’s attack on the COS, singling out its central figures Helen and Bernard Bosanquet and C.S. Loch, is a case in point. Hobson rejected their undue concentration on removing incentives to idleness and their focus on the “independence and responsibility of the individual family” without securing the ability to do so. Hobson’s anti-paternalism was expressed in his critique of the “supposed superiority” of charity reformers. It was not “a moral, but ultimately an immoral superiority resting upon a monopoly of material, intellectual and
spiritual opportunities.” Theirs was also a monadist individualism that failed to see the interconnectedness of social issues. And yet, even within that holistic framework, Hobson’s conclusion was a half-way house: “a recognition of the interdependence and interaction of individual character and social character as expressed in social environment.” Elevating character was still a main desideratum of welfare policy. 28

Democracy, Rights and Egalitarianism

Hobson was also ambivalent about the relationship between democracy and paternalism. In a piece written in 1902 he attempted to integrate a theory of democracy with his strong version of organicism. As noted above, the distinctive nature of liberal organicism was to turn its authoritarian conclusion on its head, with Hobson arguing that the well-being of the whole was crucially dependent on the vitality of the parts. However, the 1902 article struck a rather different note. Hobson had previously been influenced by the theories of the French social psychologist Gustave Le Bon on mob or herd behaviour, theories that had been reinforced by Hobson’s experiences of British public opinion during the South African War. In the mob-mind, “the reasoning faculties are almost suspended,” instead of which “the passions of animal ferocity, generosity, credulity, self-sacrifice, malignity, and courage express themselves unrestrained.” No wonder, then, that Hobson wrote of the fusion of individual wills and interests in a common social life (though not of a merger with or sacrifice to a public will). Brushing aside any egalitarianism stronger than a formal one, Hobson accepted the “equality of all men as objects of social conduct” but dismissed their equality “as agents in social conduct.” Individuals were to be accorded “rights of suggestion, protest, veto, and revolt,” but that assertion of rights masked the corresponding role of “the expert governing class.” The soft paternalism was evident in the contention that it was “absurd to suppose that all classes and all individuals are equally wise and good,” notably because of Hobson’s reference to a class rather than to individuals. The merit of democracy lay rather in securing expert officialdom while ensuring that it was drawn from wide sections of the population. 29

I do not wish to suggest that even soft paternalism was a dominant strand of liberal thought. The growing acceptance of a sense of community inspired more liberal versions of holism. Because liberalism was now seen as “identifying the essential or underlying solidarity of human interests,” the aim of political emancipation-cum-democracy was to promote in individuals “a generous recognition of their mutual interdependence.” 30 Hobhouse, for instance, warned against ignoring “the subtler and less obvious conditions on which the public welfare rests,” adding that “what is needed is a better public opinion, and this we shall not find by restricting the class to whose judgment we appeal.” 31 For him, it was mainly rulers, not the people, who were at fault in undermining democracy. Famously,
that assertion reached its apotheosis with the liberal assault on the privileges of the House of Lords, to no small extent due to the persistent blocking of social reform measures by that largely conservative institution. Social legislation was not only about the release of people from economic bondage but about their treatment as equals – a theme lacking even from soft paternalism. And as governments adopted popular sovereignty and democratic procedures, there arose “a stronger sense of collective responsibility and a keener desire for the use of the collective resources and organised powers of the community for public needs.” For that reason Hobhouse objected to the cult of the expert, “prescribing to men and women precisely how they are to be virtuous and happy.” He endeavoured not to use the state as a cover for the views of the reforming elites, but saw it as an instrument of the rising forces in a democracy. And elsewhere he wrote emphatically:

There are, of course, elements of value in the good government of a benevolent despot or of a fatherly aristocracy … But the full fruit of social progress is only to be reaped by a society in which the generality of men and women are not only passive recipients but practical contributors … the best, healthiest, and most vigorous political unit is that to which men are by their own feelings strongly drawn.

If some men were “much better and wiser than others,” that could not justify irresponsible power over the latter, but the obverse: the requirement to “go to the humblest in a spirit of inquiry.”

Significantly, when non-paternalist liberals discussed social policy, the language of disadvantage and obstacles tended to replace that of incapacity. Paternalism is always a personal relationship; but discourses on rights and claims for goods and the removal of hindrances are not the natural language of families because they depersonalize and formalize their bearers. As with the development of bureaucracy from privileges to general rules, so it was with welfarism and its search for quasi-objective and quasi-universal standards in which an abstract “common humanity” would substitute for a concrete feudal bond. That abstraction was not, of course, always welcomed by the consumers of welfarism and it has been the bane, and butt of criticism, of the welfare state since its establishment. It is also important to recognize that the left-liberal idea of democracy did not subscribe to the crude majoritarianism of democratic government, or only reluctantly so. Liberal holism preferred to see democracy as a unified, communal expression of a reasonable, informed and altruistic public will, very much in line with the liberal abhorrence of sectionalism and class divisions.

On the whole, liberal welfarism was couched in a more generous language of rights and fundamental need. It displayed a broad sweep of political thinking that equated welfare with well-being and flourishing and that conceived of social policy as far exceeding the scope of insurance. Even the technical focus on assuaging life’s contingencies – ill-health, unemployment and poverty – was insufficient to fill that ideological space. As an important article in The Nation expressed it in 1912, “the new hope of social reform in this country
lies in a growing agreement upon the essentials of national well-being and a determination to move towards this ideal on a number of converging paths.” That included “health, leisure, education, insurance, housing, improved transport, and utilisation of natural resources” on top of the core requirement: “the possession by every family of a money income adequate for all its economic needs.”

Indeed in many of Hobson’s writings as well, particularly in later years, his egalitarianism gained the clear upper hand, and by the 1930s his tone had become rather different. His aversion to traditional natural rights discourse did not extend to rights as such, and he opted to reformulate, not to scrap, them. Democratic rights, Hobson asserted, were rights “which every man ‘ought’ to possess in order to regulate properly his own life and to participate on equal terms in the social life of a civilised community.” For the likes of Hobson democratic participation was a question of equal access to a pool of civilizing common goods, attained through representative devices such as proportional voting. This may be contrasted with current views of representation, seen as multifold and diverse, as both formal and informal, as enabled through voting and through other forms of informing and shaping decisions with collective import. Its object is to express and contain contention and dissent. But no less importantly, it is intended to reformulate the social rights issues of marginalization and compensation through the particular privileging of non-universal needs and practices drawn from the variable life-experiences of individuals located in groups. The social right of cultural autonomy now combines with a different notion of community as a locality – geographic, ethnic, or religious. Democratic participation becomes less a question of individual expression than of the activation of diverse cultural identities.

Hobson inhabited a different world of democratic thinking. He contrasted the formula of the French Revolution with that of the American Declaration of Independence: liberty, equality and fraternity, versus liberty, property and the pursuit of happiness. Writing about the pairing of liberty and equality, Hobson claimed that it was not so much equality that brought about improved material conditions but the reverse – the radio, cinema, bicycle and bus had brought both “a practical advance in personal liberty” and “some increasing sense of social equality.” Writing against the backdrop of the widespread failure of democratic institutions, Hobson criticised a misconception of what democracy was all about. The current actual contents of liberty, equality and fraternity “were quite inadequate to serve the needs of man regarded as a personality or as a member of a community.” A negative conception of liberty obscured its fuller meaning as “positive access to opportunities for a fuller life and a richer personality.”

We have since become more familiar with that “positive” conception of liberty, but it was not widely expressed in the United Kingdom at the time. In particular, egalitarians could not rest content with removing civil, legal and religious disabilities – in the first half of the twentieth century that seemed to be an antiquated political democracy.
The marriage of liberty (and indeed liberalism itself) with benign forms of compulsion meant that – to the consternation of the class-conscious rich – “pensions, subsidies, reliefs were beginning to be claimed as ‘rights:’ the State was to be used as an instrument for redressing the balance in favour of economic equality.” If society was responsible for so much social malfunctioning, a new right emerged against the incompetent and inefficient state coupled with the parallel right to benefit from the rational state engaged in socio-economic planning. But the democratic state also had to reflect the social interdependence of human beings: “Good government … consists in the right adjustment between that part of the personality which remains the private property of each man and women and that part which links him and her with their fellows, in the conduct of a common life.” That is why Hobson could write in a strong liberal register: “The basic feeling in sound democracy is a sense of the rights of others, requiring not only tolerance but co-operation and sympathy.” Political arrangements needed to emphasize the third aspect of the French triad: “fraternity, comradeship, co-operation, community,” through the establishment of some form of economic self-government, if not in the form of Guild Socialism than at least by delegating much decision-making to industries run democratically.

Conclusion

Illiberalism within the domain of liberalism has recently and rightly caught the eye of scholars. My focus has been on a somewhat more elusive phenomenon. We are aware that all ideologies, liberalism included, have non-negotiable components; that is to say, they are dogmatic on some issues that concern them deeply because, absent those issues, the identifying features and values of that ideology are compromised. But being dogmatic is not the same as being authoritarian and certainly not as being illiberal. Rather, it is to establish red lines beyond which an ideology will not tread. The stated red lines of British liberalism were, among others, liberty itself (broadly interpreted), human rights, and the welfare that is sustained by sociability. But its unstated red lines permitted a hitherto unimaginable degree of state regulation, as well as an insistence on upholding certain cultural standards. From J.S. Mill onwards, liberals saw themselves as the promoters of an unstoppable, if uneven, march of progress towards a civilized world whose values would be liberal ones. Indeed, the story of liberalism and its conception of development over time presented itself as identical to the story of civilization. When Jean-Jacques Rousseau – himself no liberal – famously argued that he espoused the dogma of no intolerance as the positive principle of a civil religion, that was no more than what a welfare liberal would maintain. But “intolerance for intolerance” was extended by the social liberals not only to human opinions and practices but to a new category of intolerables: abject poverty, misery, ignorance, disease and squalor in the midst of a culture that could afford
to do better, yet chose not to. On the whole, liberal dogmas were to be achieved through persuasion and example. Indeed Mill, that great libertarian, while ruling out paternalism as a good reason to compel a man, had admitted that there were good paternalist reasons for “remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him” to further his own good.45 A generation after Mill, liberals realized that persuasion and example were not enough, and underpinned their rule of reason with a firm insistence on standards to be imposed if necessary by collective effort, namely though the state. There was unquestionably an appeal to authority, if not to authoritarian practices: the authority of common sense, decency, and scientific evidence, playing a role not dissimilar to that of “self-evidence” in eighteenth-century political thought. There was also great anxiety about the taming of democracy, and liberals sublimated that anxiety by replacing the concrete class sectionalism of semi-educated majorities with a supra-class model of social harmony and unity from which joint democratic control could ensue over a benign and humane state. And there was undoubtedly a cultural elitism, propelled in part by a genuine belief in the rightness of liberal principles, that could justify compulsion – the compulsion of rational argument accompanied by the compulsion of reasonable law. But it was also propelled in part by the imperial experiences of Great Britain – a country with a long history of managing what it once saw as inferior races and cultures – and there is no question that the practices of liberal paternalism that were nourished in those foreign climes were re-imported to the mother country, not the least in the educational role self-assumed by the civil service.

Ultimately, the question needs to be asked: how did an ostensible nation of shopkeepers, of guardians of personal liberty and privacy, of reticent and non-emoting communicators, produce such a socially orientated liberalism, and such an advanced conception of welfare? That is no easy question to answer, but fragments of interpretative insight may be sought on some of the following lines, in no particular order. First, the critical reaction among the left to the excesses of imperialism resulted in often unconscious parallels drawn between the plight of subjugated nations and the distressed at home. Hobson’s theory of imperialism was an instance of that: it identified the British maldistribution of income and the consequent underconsumption it caused as a reason for the drive to invest abroad, and it exposed the evils of rampant international capitalism as a matter of both financial and moral domestic concern.46 Second, a religious sense of duty towards others was channelled, due to the relatively strong secularism of British reformers, into a humanist sensitivity towards the plight of the less fortunate. Though the language of “my station and its duties” had primarily aristocratic undertones, its communitarian implications were translated into a more egalitarian ethos of mutual responsibility and common decency, and the plethora of humanist and ethical societies in London and elsewhere attested to that urge. Third, the strong utilitarian tradition bequeathed to the ruling classes and the ideological elites a confidence in the reform and redesigning of social institutions, with an emphasis on improving the satisfaction of ordinary citizens through
the actions of a central civil service. Fourth, although class attitudes were quite obvious in
the various discourses on welfare, the lack of catastrophic class conflict when compared
to many continental countries facilitated the possibility of interclass co-operation against
the backdrop of an evolutionary, and on the whole non-threatening, democratic process.
Violent conflict and authoritarianism were far more likely to breed each other; within
liberal discourse British suspicion of the state did not go as far as to query its very motives
and trustworthiness, as distinct from its methods and inefficiency. Indeed, if compulsory
insurance did not create a major crisis that had much to do with the fact that liberals did
not expect the democratic state to misbehave. Fifth, the political space to the left of liber-
alism was not as tightly packed as in many other European countries, enabling liberalism
to occupy mutating ideological positions without running into entrenched competition
from strongly-defined rival political parties. Moreover, the absence of a sharp boundary
between certain variants of liberalism and of socialism in the United Kingdom furthered
the exploration of mutually shared ideas with moderate socialists: the Rainbow Circle
was for forty years one such notable crucible of progressive thinking.47 And finally, the
educational elites communicated at the time across the professional divides. Academics
such as Hobhouse held second jobs as journalists and commentators; the liberal press
was a missionary one, actively campaigning for social reform and actively recruiting some
of the more passionate and articulate reformers for its pages; the divide between social
philosophy as an academic discipline and informed public comment was not unbridge-
able as its equivalents are so frequently today; and quite surprisingly many British liberal
intellectuals had an open ear for continental social theories and imported them readily,
while assimilating them into liberal ideological frameworks.


The Liberal Dilemma: Social Rights, Civil Rights and the Cold War in “Vital Center” Liberalism

Marco Mariano

American liberalism is usually defined as pragmatic and flexible, as a “protean” set of assumptions and orientations that constantly change according to the dynamic of American society and culture as well as the domestic and international political context. Likewise, the political fortunes of American liberalism have been subject to constant, dramatic change. What Lionel Trilling had celebrated in 1950 as “not only the dominant but even the sole intellectual tradition” in America was in fact quite rapidly undermined by the domestic turmoil and international crises of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Since the 1980s, and especially since the presidential campaign of 1988, the “L-word” has come to label a failed political culture and an untenable political agenda: tax-and-spend policies implemented by inefficient big government, softness on national security and moral relativism. In 1998, Michael Ignatieff commented on the paradox of liberalism, which still inspired institutions and policies shaping the life of millions of Americans and yet remained “the politics that dares not speak its name.”

Recent developments have apparently signaled yet another turn in the orientations of ordinary Americans and, to some extent, in the political discourse. While still a presidential candidate under scrutiny for his supposedly ultra-liberal credentials, Barack Obama was careful not to associate himself with the dreadful L-word. In fact, in his keynote speech at the 2004 Democratic National Convention, which marked his rise to national prominence, he had implicitly distanced himself from its divisive implications: “There is not a liberal America and a conservative America – there is the United States of America.” Later, he transcended it as a thing of the past: “A lot of these old labels don’t apply anymore.” At the same time, however, public-opinion surveys and, more importantly, election results have shown that an increasing number of Americans, especially among the young and highly educated, hold views that can be defined as distinctively liberal on issues like the role of the federal government, social justice and race. According to polls, in early 1981, 54 percent of Americans believed that there was “too much regulation of business and industry,” while 18 percent thought that there was too little of it. However, in the fall of
2008, the number of those who complained there was “too little” regulation climbed to 45 percent. Other surveys show that even before the recent financial crisis a vast majority of Americans favored a more assertive role for the federal government on issues like healthcare and the environment.\(^5\) Interestingly, conservative critics have attacked the economic policies of the Obama administration as “socialist,” as though “liberal” has lost the derogatory punch it once had, while commentators that are more sympathetic hail “liberalism’s moment.”\(^6\)

At a time when the current discussion on liberalism seems to have lost at least some of the ideological fury of previous years, it is perhaps less difficult to assess how liberalism affected the notion and practice of social justice in postwar America. This essay addresses how postwar liberalism envisioned social rights by focusing on one aspect in particular: the social dimension of civil rights. In other words, how did the political culture of postwar liberalism approach the part of political space where social and civil rights overlap? This is a discussion of ideas, rather than policies implemented by the federal government or court decisions on this issue. It is an attempt to clarify how and to what extent the peculiar brand of liberalism that came of age in the Cold War years dealt with civil rights as part of the larger issue of social justice in America. Indeed, it is to be argued that one must take the international dimension of American politics in the early Cold War years into consideration to see how postwar liberalism understood racial and economic justice as interrelated issues, yet also helped create a political context that made it impossible to tackle them effectively.

The contours of such liberalism were crystallized sixty years ago by historian and public intellectual Arthur Schlesinger Jr. in his notorious *The Vital Center* (1949), a widely influential synthesis of the theoretical grounds, historical context and political agenda facing mainstream liberal, anti-communist America in the early Cold War years. To what extent Schlesinger actually embodied the liberal “consensus” of those years is probably less obvious than most commentators might think, as will be argued shortly. However, one assumes Schlesinger’s work as public voice and behind-the-scenes insider to be relevant for understanding the potential and the contradictions of the political culture of American postwar liberalism. Therefore, for the sake of clarity and at the cost of oversimplification, “postwar liberalism” and “vital center liberalism” will be considered synonymous in this essay.

**Civil Rights and Social Rights in the 1940s**

In his groundbreaking study of race relations in America, Gunnar Myrdal made it clear that the “American dilemma” over race entailed not only a moral dimension, but also an economic and social one. Discrimination was untenable because not only was it “evil”
– and politically costly in the morally charged context of the Cold War – but also because it denied equal opportunities, a tenet of the American creed.7

Myrdal’s work did not appear in a vacuum. The early 1940s were a critical time for race relations in America, as African Americans played a major role in the war effort both at home and abroad. Even before U.S. entry into World War II, the expansion of the industrial sector due to war mobilization opened new opportunities to black workers and made racial discrimination in the workplace an issue in national politics. Historians have often studied the labor movement and the civil rights movement as two distinct quests for social change; others argue that the latter originated in 1954 with the groundbreaking Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education, which opened the way to desegregation in the southern states. However, studies on the origins of the civil rights movement have stressed that unions and the workplace played a crucial role in the mobilization of African Americans during and after World War II. In fact, historian Nelson Lichtenstein has argued that the importance of labor to the civil rights movement of the 1940s is comparable to the importance of religion to that of the 1960s: “the mobilization of the black working class in the 1940s [made] civil rights an issue that could not be ignored by union officers, white executives, or government officials.”8

Black leaders like A. Philip Randolph of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters were aware that race and class were interrelated, and that fights for civil rights and economic justice might benefit from each other: “The Labor Movement,” he remarked in 1944 “offers to the Negro and all minorities the greatest hope and promise of freedom and democracy.” Randolph’s notorious threat to march on Washington in 1941, while America was building up its “arsenal for democracy” against the racist ideology of the Axis powers, was a crucial moment of the wartime change in race relations in America. In order to avert a potentially disastrous race-based domestic conflict, Roosevelt agreed to establish the Fair Employment Practice Committee (FEPC), a body designed to end discrimination on racial, ethnic and religious grounds in companies with government contracts. The creation, shortcomings and legacy of the FEPC are an indicator of broader trends at work in American politics and society, as they exemplify the interplay between changing liberal notions of racial justice and social reform, the constraints of domestic politics and the pressure of the international context.

Due to congressional opposition and the president’s lukewarm support, the FEPC suffered from chronic under-funding and lack of enforcement powers until its demise in 1946. Southern Democrats in Congress opposed its egalitarianism, while northern Republicans saw it as an infringement of the freedom of enterprise, which was regaining its respectability after the Depression. However, despite these limitations, significant progress was achieved in terms of blue-collar jobs for blacks migrating from the South thanks to the work of what Eric Foner has defined “the first federal agency since Reconstruction to campaign for equal opportunity for black Americans.”9 Notwithstanding vigorous
support by a wide array of forces – radicals like W.E.B. Du Bois and Paul Robeson as well as mainstream organizations like the NAACP and liberal voices like Eleanor Roosevelt – the Senate dissolved the FEPC in 1946. Likewise, in 1948, Harry Truman called for a permanent FEPC as part of a civil rights package inspired by the recommendations of his Commission on Civil Rights, but Congress blocked the proposal again. However, both the work of the FEPC and the campaign for its empowerment throughout the 1940s helped forge what has been defined a “labor-based civil rights movement,” i.e. a coalition of activists from labor, civil rights and religious organizations, which would have a lasting impact on the quest for civil rights in postwar America.

Support for the FEPC was growing at a time when relevant parts of white America were coming to terms with the “American dilemma.” Given that federal controls and legislation against discrimination in the workplace were part and parcel of New Deal liberalism, it is interesting to see how liberals reacted to this quest for racial and economic justice emerging from the unprecedented activism of black Americans. In fact, much has been written on the transition from the emphasis on the economic dimension that was typical of the New Deal to the “rights-based” approach of postwar liberalism. Events overseas played an important role in this transition. First, the rise of Nazism and the spread of racist policies across Europe led American liberals to address the issues of race, ethnicity and immigration with specific policies, rather than as a byproduct of the fight against economic injustice. Later, with the rise of the Soviet Union as a world power and the worldwide appeal of communism, discussing the issues of class and distribution of property became very controversial in American public discourse, which had been considerably narrowed by anti-communist rhetoric and legislation. Racial justice came to be seen as part of a rational public space, where reform was made possible by the contribution of the social sciences, while class politics was now associated with mass politics, i.e. the domain of irrationality and the “escape from freedom” by lonely, displaced individuals.

However, this transformation did not happen overnight. In fact, it was a gradual, piecemeal process that involved significant soul-searching not only among those reluctant to accept the split between “cold-warriors” and “fellow-travelers,” but also among those who accepted it and still clung to the Progressive and New Deal emphasis on class, labor and economic justice. The energies unleashed by and the accomplishments of the FEPC remind us that “what had happened was less the eclipse of New Deal economic liberalism by a ‘rights-based’ outlook than the rise of a new awareness of the interconnection between the partially overlapping, partially distinct problems of race and class.”
**Vital Center Liberalism and Social Rights**

Social reform was at the core of Schlesinger's vision of American liberalism, and social conflict played a crucial role in his interpretation of American history. As a young rising star at Harvard and later as a prominent historian and public intellectual, he consistently stressed that the roots of postwar American liberalism were to be found in the reforms of the Progressive Era and the New Deal. He saw liberalism as “the vital center,” that is, the only American political tradition that could both deal with the “social question” emerging in modern industrial societies and, at the same time, cope with the imperatives of national security.

Far from being a dangerous European legacy, in Schlesinger’s view, social conflict was part and parcel of American social and political history. In fact, *The Vital Center* – his notorious manifesto of Cold War liberalism published in 1949 – resonates with a heated anti-business rhetoric that would probably stun anyone who mistakenly took it as a call for a middle-of-the road, centrist compromise. It is quite remarkable that he opened his case for what he defined as a “new radicalism” by attacking the pro-communist left worldwide and the pro-business right in America with the same virulence, dismissing the former as “the tyranny of the irresponsible bureaucracy” and the latter as “the tyranny of the irresponsible plutocracy.”

Urging his fellow liberals to come to terms with the issue of class at a time when anti-communist rhetoric was defining the contours of American political discourse, he wrote:

> In spite of the current myth that class conflicts in America were a fiendish invention of Franklin D. Roosevelt, classes have, in fact, played a big part in American political life from the beginning…
> The fight on the part of the ‘humble members of society’ against business domination has been the consistent motive of American liberalism. Far from importing subversive European ideas when he renewed his theme, Franklin Roosevelt was only returning to the political doctrine of the hallowed past. Nor is there anything specifically Marxist about class conflict…
> I cannot imagine a free society which has eliminated conflict. So long as there is inequality in the distribution of property and variety in the nature of economic interests, so long will politics center on economic issues; and so long the insurgency of the discontented will provide the best guarantee against the tyranny of the possessors.

“Conflict” was not exactly a popular concept in the American political culture of the late 1940s and 1950s. This was a time when “consensus” was hailed as the distinctive mark of American history and current public life both by critics like Richard Hofstadter and Louis Hartz and by apologists like Daniel Boorstin and David Potter. In a review of Hartz’s *The Liberal Tradition in America*, Schlesinger argued that emphasizing consensus on shared American values could not overshadow the fact that “the conflict within the
The liberal consensus between ‘liberalism’ and ‘conservatism’ has been one of the sources of creativity and advance in American history.” In his writings, he deprived the tension between “the haves and the have-nots” of any radical or ideological connotation, and placed it at the core of his interpretation of American history and his vision of American liberalism. His classic works on Andrew Jackson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, as well as many of his countless essays, reviews and articles in widely circulated magazines form a consistent attempt to build a liberal canon centered on the active role of the federal government as the major provider of social justice. Strong, enlightened leadership acted as a broker between conflicting interests and, consequently, put the brakes on a revolutionary escalation of social conflict, which the greedy myopia of the business community could generate. The progressive presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson and the liberal presidency of Franklin Roosevelt were the cornerstones of this canon:

The process of redefining liberalism in terms of the social needs of the 20th century was conducted by Theodore Roosevelt and his New Nationalism, Woodrow Wilson and his New Freedom, and Franklin D. Roosevelt and his New Deal. Out of these three great reform periods there emerged the conception of a social welfare state, in which the national government had the express obligation to maintain high levels of employment in the economy, to supervise standards of life and labor, to regulate the methods of business competition, and to establish comprehensive patterns of social security.15

This general outlook, based on the confidence in the ability of liberal politics implemented by assertive federal institutions to tackle the social inequality created by unregulated free market and greedy businessmen, informed Schlesinger’s early approach to the issue of race in the U.S. It is argued here that, up to the mid-1950s, this approach is better understood in light of the correlation between race and class described above, which was magnified by events abroad. In later years, when the intensity of the Cold War pressure on national politics decreased and the advent of the “affluent society” seemed to have removed poverty and inequality from the political discourse, the connection between economic and racial justice lost importance in Schlesinger’s call for a “qualitative liberalism.”

**Schlesinger’s “Federalism” and Civil Rights**

Schlesinger’s belief that an activist federal government was the most effective agent of social change led him to adopt a moderate top-down approach to civil rights, which was consistent with Myrdal’s quest for federal activism against racial discrimination. “While we may not be able to repeal prejudice by law,” he wrote in *The Vital Center*, “yet law is an essential part of the enterprise of education which alone can end prejudice.”16

To be sure, he was overly optimistic regarding the challenge of racial justice. He hailed Truman’s victory in the election of 1948 as a demonstration that the civil rights agenda
of his campaign was by and large accepted across the nation and specifically in the South: “This result suggests that the South on the whole accepts the objectives of the civil rights program as legitimate, even though it may have serious and intelligible reservations about timing and method.” Schlesinger’s flawed judgment is telling evidence of the complacent perception of race relations among many white, urban, elite, northern liberals. It also obviously reinforced the mistrust towards Cold War liberalism among all those who rejected the dichotomy between free world vs. totalitarianism. In the following decade, as racial injustice continued to stain American democracy and damage the nation’s reputation abroad and the civil rights movement emerged as a major force in American society, Schlesinger gradually realized that his earlier optimism had been misplaced. In the early 1960s, as he looked in retrospect, he conceded that liberals like him “recognized that historic injustices had to end, but they thought that steady and rational progress step by step over a period of years would suffice to satisfy the victims of injustice and contain their incipient revolution.”

Critics have stressed that confidence in top-down, cautious government action and fear of mass participation and grassroots mobilization account for Schlesinger’s oversimplified attitude towards civil rights. However, the picture is probably more complex. It can be argued that his optimistic attitude was intertwined with a genuine, if cautious, commitment to racial justice, and that both optimism and commitment are related to his early interpretation of civil rights as part of the larger issue of economic justice in America.

Schlesinger’s mistrust in the ability of the American business community to provide valuable political leadership and to agree on fair social policies was so pervasive that it led him to read racial discrimination as a legacy of nineteenth-century laissez faire capitalism. As he addressed a NAACP conference in 1950, he remarked that the “Negro problem” was not just a consequence of slavery; it was also due to the short-sighted working of unregulated capitalism, which had denied African Americans the opportunities that a free society had made available to white Americans. As an historian who emphasized the importance of social conflict and the existence of classes, he was skeptical about interpretations drawing on psychology and “behavioral sciences,” which were characteristic of American historiography in the 1950s. Accordingly, he mocked historians who, influenced by Theodore Adorno’s The Authoritarian Personality, considered racial discrimination as the product of authoritarian education, “as if parents south of the Mason-Dixon line were notably more authoritarian than parents in Massachusetts or Minnesota.” Class and politics mattered more than psychology and education.

Schlesinger’s outlook had been forged in the tradition of post-World War I Progressivism and New Deal liberalism, which cast all major issues in terms of economics and class, seen as “rational,” rather than race, culture and ideology, seen as “irrational” and politically counterproductive after the rise of the second Ku Klux Klan and the restrictive immigration laws of the 1920s. This outlook accounts for the poor record of the New Deal on
Roosevelt failed to tackle racial injustice not only because of political calculation, i.e. his unwillingness to pay the political costs of anti-lynching and pro-civil rights legislation, but also because 1930s liberalism typically maintained that economic reform would eventually lead to better living and working conditions for ordinary Americans and, in the process, to significant changes in the life of blacks and other minorities.21

In the aftermath of World War II, though Schlesinger continued to read the race issue through a prewar lens, he was also acutely aware of the changes in postwar national politics. Consequently, he tried to adapt his approach to a time when a response to racial injustice through specific civil rights policies was made necessary by major domestic and international developments: the agency of African Americans, emboldened by their contribution in the war effort; the defeat of Nazism and, consequently, the definitive de-legitimization of all sorts of racism; and finally the worldwide loss of prestige and credibility of the U.S. caused by institutionalized racism in southern states. In doing so, he cautiously but consistently worked in favor of civil rights legislation among mainstream, anti-communist liberals in the late 1940s and early 1950s. His inclination to see civil rights as part of the broader issue of economic justice at home and abroad – which set him apart from most of his fellow Cold War liberals – is one of the motives behind his commitment to racial justice.

Schlesinger advocated federal intervention for civil rights reform in his writings as well as in his role as participant in liberal politics in the late 1940s and early 1950s. As a founding member of the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) he was among those who urged Truman to include a civil rights plank in his platform for the election of 1948. The creation of a permanent, powerful FEPC was a major part of ADA liberals’ quest for civil rights reform from the late 1940s to the 1960s. The ADA was founded in 1947 by liberal democrats like Eleanor Roosevelt and Hubert Humphrey, intellectuals like Schlesinger and John Kenneth Galbraith and labor leaders like David Dubinsky and Walter Reuther. At a time when the pressure of the imminent Cold War was splitting the progressive camp along the free world vs. totalitarianism divide, the ADA intended to distance anti-communist liberalism from the “frontist” left à la Henry A. Wallace and organize liberal and labor forces to counter the rising conservative influence within the Democratic party.22

As the ADA supported the Truman doctrine and a tough stance on foreign policy issues, it also needed to bolster its reform-minded profile at home. As the election of 1948 approached, it chose to do so by pushing a pro-labor and pro-civil rights agenda at the Democratic convention. Here the ADA advocated such measures as the establishment of a permanent FEPC as well as anti-lynching, anti-poll tax legislation and the end of discrimination in the armed forces. Indeed, this move contributed to Truman’s critical decision to adopt a pro-civil rights agenda in his campaign, which in turn precipitated
the clash with southern Democrats and paved the way towards a significant realignment in southern politics.

The organization continued to voice concern about and urge legislation in favor of civil rights in the following years. In 1950, Schlesinger wrote in an ADA policy statement that: “We feel that the treatment of the Negro in the United States constitutes the most disgraceful blot on our democratic pretensions. While we recognize that the situation has intricate psychological and social origins, we believe that our society can show its decency only by a vigorous and steady movement to abolish all legal and social sanctions of discrimination.”23 In his NAACP address in the same year, he reiterated his call for top-down reform as well as his confidence: “we would wish that our political leaders would show a little more earnest devotion to their campaign pledges on such issues as FEPC. But if we continue our fight, FEPC is coming, and the rest of the Civil Rights program too.”24

ADA’s call for the establishment of a permanent, effective FEPC resurfaced at the 1952 convention. However, when the fight for the selection of the Democratic nominee intensified, the organization chose to compromise on major liberal issues and supported Adlai Stevenson, whose views on civil rights were rather conservative. For most liberal Democrats, restoring unity within the party by appeasing its powerful southern base was more important than insisting on pro-civil rights legislation. In fact, as Stephen Gillon maintains, the ADA “was frequently torn between its commitment to broad ideas of social justice and its desire to work within the Democratic party.”25 Furthermore, anti-communist, centrist liberals found themselves caught in the dilemma between gradual, “responsible” change and the domestic constrains of the early Cold War years.

The issue of civil rights, due to its implications at both the domestic and international levels, exemplifies this “liberal dilemma.” During the campaigns of 1952 and 1956, Schlesinger, like other liberal intellectuals, worked with Stevenson as a speechwriter and adviser. His attempts to persuade the Democratic candidate to be more assertive on civil rights were unsuccessful, but apparently he and his fellow liberal Democrats were ready to accept a weak civil rights agenda by a supposedly strong candidate. In the campaign of 1956, Schlesinger, impatient with Stevenson’s appeal to African Americans for patience and moderation, expressed his frustration in his private journal as follows:

“I pointed out that the Negroes had never gotten anywhere except through putting on pressure, and they knew it…I said that he expected the Negroes to be more reasonable than he expected the Southerners to be, and that this seemed to me unfair. He replied that of course it was unfair; it was like expecting business to behave badly and labor to behave intelligently; but life was unfair.”26

Schlesinger’s reference to blacks’ agency points to the crisis of his approach to racial justice and anticipates a process that eventually led him to embrace a much less moderate
stance. In the mid-1950s, however, political contingency and long-term transformations had led to the crisis of what can be defined as his New Deal-Fair Deal approach to racial and economic justice.

As a “federalist” who believed in the virtues of a top-down, legislative approach to reform, he was impatient with President Eisenhower’s hands-off attitude towards desegregation. Following the Supreme Court decision in *Brown v. Board of Education*, he attacked the president’s unwillingness to lead on this issue. “There is only one man in the country,” he wrote to Walter Lippmann in 1956, “who can summon up, not just the legal, but the moral resources of the nation and bring to people a sober realization of the terrible crisis towards which we are fast moving...But thus far the president has displayed no interest at all in what is surely the most ominous domestic situation we have seen for many years.”

Weak presidential leadership, magnified by the violent white backlash in southern states against desegregation, made the optimism of Schlesinger’s early approach to civil rights more questionable than ever. Moreover, the agency of black Americans was impossible to ignore thanks to the rise of a grassroots civil rights movement in the South.

Finally, his New Deal-Fair Deal approach was undermined at its foundations by the evolution of American liberalism through the course of the 1950s. This was a time when the liberal-labor coalition that the so-called “vital center” liberalism had tried to revive was in crisis. Not only were liberals struggling to adjust to the complacent, affluent America of the mid-1950s, but labor also grew more conservative and craft-oriented with the 1955 reunification of the AFL and the CIO. Widespread, unprecedented prosperity and mass consumption triggered a discussion on the crisis of liberalism both inside and outside the liberal camp. Apologists of consensus liberalism deemed the notion of class largely irrelevant, if not detrimental, as a tool for understanding and changing American society during the allegedly post-ideological age of abundance, while radical critics like C. Wright Mills celebrated the demise of the labor mystique and the rise of young intellectuals as new agents of change.

Schlesinger and Galbraith were at the forefront of this discussion. The call of the former for a transition from “quantitative” to “qualitative” liberalism echoed and popularized the argument made by the latter in *The Affluent Society*. In a number of influential magazine articles, Schlesinger sought to deal with “the challenge of abundance” by declaring the “irrelevance” of the New Deal-Fair Deal liberalism focused on “full employment, rising national income, and expanding economic opportunities.” As the old liberalism had by and large achieved those goals, the new one had to tackle new, pressing issues like individual fulfillment in a mass society, the contrast between private plenty and public squalor and the tension between single interests and public welfare. By writing that “poverty and reaction,” which were the “major sources of social discontent” in the 1930s, had now “receded from the forefront of our national life,” he triggered the reaction of old-school
liberal and labor leaders like Leon Keyserling, who sarcastically remarked that “evidently the problem of poverty is not ‘massive’ in [Harvard’s] Widener Library.”

In sum, Schlesinger adopted Hofstadter’s distinction between “interest politics” and “status politics,” considerably toned down his anti-business rhetoric and ended up with a rather generic attempt to redefine the liberal agenda. In this context, he reiterated that “equality of opportunities not only for the Negroes but for all nationality groups must be an essential ingredient of the new liberalism,” but failed to indicate the social coalition, the political strategy and the legislative tools necessary to achieve that goal. The crisis of the old New Deal-Fair Deal paradigm undermined the labor-based approach to civil rights, which had proved theoretically consistent but politically inconclusive. As the connection between economic rights and civil rights vanished, Schlesinger, like many of his fellow moderate liberals, wondered how to account for the persistence of racial injustice at a time when economic injustice and poverty were allegedly disappearing from the American landscape.

The backlash against desegregation led him to embrace voting rights as the tool to dismantle all forms of institutionalized racism – a significant departure from his earlier approach. Later, his work with John F. Kennedy, another Democratic leader whose record on civil rights throughout the 1950s had been less than impressive, certainly did not facilitate this search for a new paradigm. The grassroots, southern, religiously oriented and rural civil rights movement remained inevitably alien to many elite, northern, secular and urban liberals. However, the wave of activism at the grassroots level and the emergence of national leaders like Martin Luther King Jr. led Schlesinger to fully support the movement, which he saw as a democratic revolution comparable only to the rise of labor organizations during the New Deal. By the late 1960s, Schlesinger had returned to active politics with Robert Kennedy and, unlike many of his fellow moderate liberals, had come to embrace a decidedly more radical stance. At a time when his “vital center” liberalism seemed definitively out of date and the quest for racial justice was taking a radical turn, he wrote that “collective violence, including the recent riots in black ghettos, has often forced those in power to redress just grievances. Extralegal group violence, for better or worse, has been part of the process of American democracy.”

The International Dimension

This essay has attempted to discuss Schlesinger’s changing view on the relations between class and race in light of the rise and decline of the New Deal-Fair Deal approach to economic and racial justice. The extensive literature on postwar liberalism is often careful to take into account the context of the Cold War, due to the obvious importance of the international dimension as both an impulse and an obstacle to liberal reform.
Radical critics stressed that the anti-communist zeal of Cold War liberals led to a fatal split within the left in the late 1940s and that a significant opportunity for progressive change in America was lost as a result.\textsuperscript{33} Recent historiography has broken new grounds by discussing civil rights in light of the Cold War and decolonization. Since segregation in the American South jeopardized America’s credibility as the leader of the free world, Cold War pressures helped pave the way towards crucial steps in desegregation and, at the same time, limited the scope of civil rights reform.\textsuperscript{34} Finally, historians who define liberalism mostly as the quest for a federal, top-down approach to the pursuit of the common good have identified the Cold War years as a time when the expansion of federal power in the realm of national security provided the foundations for “big government” in other areas as well, including welfare and civil rights.\textsuperscript{35} It can be argued that to fully understand the domestic impact of events abroad, one must consider race, class and racial and economic justice as “partially overlapping, partially distinct problems” in postwar America as well as abroad. The international dimension will therefore now be addressed.

World War II opened Schlesinger’s eyes to the reality of segregation in the South. As a member of the Office of War Information on a tour of army bases in the South in 1942, he had a firsthand experience of “the miserable and hopeless conditions in the Negro sections of Southern towns.” Later, as an analyst of the Office of Strategic Services overseas, he was “impressed by the Negro readiness to serve the country which, in some respects, promised so little to them.”\textsuperscript{36} After the war years, when the propaganda of Axis powers heavily exploited racial discrimination to undermine the international credibility of the American democracy, observers grasped the international implications of civil rights reform. Myrdal argued again that “America, for its international prestige, power, and future security, needs to demonstrate to the world that American Negroes can be satisfactorily integrated into its democracy.”\textsuperscript{37}

After the war, events abroad continued to influence Schlesinger’s view on civil rights. As an impassioned “cold warrior,” and as an intellectual who valued the role of ideas in politics, he easily grasped the detrimental effects of segregation in the context of the ideological warfare against international communism, especially among non-white people. In his NAACP address in 1950, he remarked that racial justice was relevant to national security: “the Civil Rights program is an essential part, not just of our domestic policy, but of our foreign policy, and of our entire moral existence.”\textsuperscript{38}

Cold War ideological warfare posed a partially new challenge to the U.S., one in which the overlapping of racial and economic justice was more significant than it had been during the war. As hostile propaganda came from the Soviet Union, it is no surprise that the exposure of American racial segregation and capitalist exploitation often came in one package. In 1946, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow reported on an article in the Soviet periodical *Trud* about lynching and African American labor in the South. It denounced that “semi-slave forms of oppression and exploitation are the rule” in the rural South
where “the unjust position of the Negro population is expressed…in a slave system of economic relationships and in the law.”

This argument could have devastating consequences on the war for the hearts and minds being waged against the Soviet Union as well as left-wing parties both inside and outside the West. In fact, the overlapping of race and class was crucial in the early Cold War years exactly because it was not an invention of Cominform propaganda. At home, as seen earlier, the quest for civil rights was often labor-based in terms of actors, strategies, objectives and, to some extent, ideology. Abroad, the first total war with a truly global impact had unleashed a quest for economic security and racial justice. Social upheaval, which threatened political stability in Western European countries with relatively strong democratic traditions, posed a significant challenge to the Truman administration. Once the pillars of the Atlantic order were established and the European situation seemed stabilized, some in Washington feared that consequences throughout the Third World, stirred by nationalist and anti-imperialist impulses, might be even more devastating.

Black leaders in America were very much aware of the potential for worldwide social change. “A wind is rising,” wrote NAACP executive secretary Walter F. White in 1945, “a wind of determination by the have-nots of the world to share in the benefits of freedom and prosperity which the have of the world have tried to keep exclusively for themselves. That wind blows all over the world.” In fact, in the 1940s, a racial revolution was underway at the local, national and global levels whose transnational impact both on the Cold War and on the civil rights movement has been neglected by historians of both sub-fields for many years.

Schlesinger’s *Vital Center* offered a vivid portrait of what was seen as the threat of a worldwide “social revolution” that came with distinctive racial overtones. He warned the American public that in the global upheaval stirred by war and decolonization, the Soviet Union enjoyed a significant advantage over the U.S. exactly because its message, blending class revolution and racial equality, was very effective, while on the contrary the U.S. was associated with both capitalist exploitation and racial segregation. In Europe, the U.S. strategy based on reconstruction and containment responded to American objectives, but elsewhere things were much more complicated. Africa, Asia and Latin America, Schlesinger wrote, were in the throes of social revolution – a revolution deriving its force from discontent on the land and having as its goal the assertion of national independence and the beginning of industrialization. It is a revolt against the landlords, against the money lenders, against foreign political domination, against foreign economic exploitation. It is taking place across the world from the paddyfields of China to the pampas of Argentina – in Burma, in India, in Indonesia, in the Middle-East, and in a somewhat different form, in the independent nations of Eastern Europe and Latin America. It is a revolution which has not reached its climax and which will not be checked by attempts to reinstate the past
through main force. Its beneficiaries are Mao Tse-Tung, Rakosi, Tito, Peron, Villareal; its beneficiaries are also Nehru, Soekarno, Betancourt, Haya de la Torre, Luis Munoz-Marin. And in Africa, as to an extent in Latin America and Asia, the social revolution is given an edge of bitterness by the hatred of the colored races of the world for their white oppressors.\textsuperscript{43}

It is quite revealing that Schlesinger, who had emerged as an outspoken anti-communist advocate way before the Cold War had reached its apex, was alert to the ideological appeal of international communism outside the West. He stressed that communist egalitarianism and his call for social revolution were tough competitors in the global ideological warfare underway especially in the developing world, where the race factor played a role:

The USSR claims to stand – and many thousands of individual Communists have stood honestly and courageously – for racial equality. The racial cruelties in the United States or in most areas of western colonialism compare unfavorably with the Soviet nationalities policy (at least as described in Soviet propaganda) and with the long Russian tradition of racial assimilation.\textsuperscript{44}

The challenge was such that old assets of the American foreign-policy agenda and ideology like anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism were no longer enough. What was needed, Schlesinger argued, was reform at home and abroad: support for progressive, reform-minded governments in the Third World and, at the same time, domestic reform leading a new pattern of race relations. “We must reform our racial practices – not only repeal such insulting symbols as the Oriental exclusion laws, but demonstrate a deep and effective concern with the racial inequities within the United States.”\textsuperscript{45}

It is noteworthy that arguably the most pointed quest for civil rights reform in The Vital Center came in a chapter on “Freedom in the World.” The international dimension showed that race and class were overlapping issues not only for the activists of the American civil rights movement of the 1940s but also for millions of non-white people in countries whose Cold War loyalties seemed up for grabs.

On the one hand, then, it is fair to conclude that events abroad reinforced the urgency of domestic reform geared at economic and racial justice. On the other hand, however, the international dimension introduced a major obstacle to the cooperation of liberals and radicals, black and white, which was necessary to achieve that goal. The Cold War not only weakened the American left but it also made discussing or dealing with racial and economic justice as two interconnected, mutually reinforcing issues increasingly suspect.

Schlesinger aptly exemplifies this contradiction between the theoretical awareness that race and class were to be tackled as overlapping issues and the political inability to do so. Since 1946, when he emerged as a vigorous anti-communist voice among liberals, he had warned the American public that the labor movement and African Americans were the two major targets of communist infiltration. In a notorious Life article, he went so
far as to denounce the attempts by the PCUSA to “sink its tentacles into the NAACP,” a remark that was quite disturbing for executive secretary White and his organization, which was determined to fit into the anti-communist climate of opinion of those years.\textsuperscript{46} A few years later, when the NAACP was safely within the contours of Cold War liberal consensus, Schlesinger addressed the organization and, as seen above, reiterated his now-familiar support for the establishment of a federal body against discrimination in the workplace.

Other civil rights leaders and organizations agreed to form the FEPC, but their views of the major domestic and international issues were incompatible with “vital center” liberalism. Black activist and artist Paul Robeson was among those who saw the quest for civil rights as part of a more comprehensive and radical transformation of American society. In 1951, he warned his audience at the National Labor Conference on Negro Rights meeting that the enemies of African Americans were “the lynchers, the profiteers, the men who give FEPC the run-around in the Senate, the atom-bomb maniacs and the war makers,” rather than communists.\textsuperscript{47}

Those who embraced the civil rights agenda as a Cold War imperative were essentially moved by, or at least accepted, its underlying anti-communism. The break up of the New Deal coalition along Cold War lines harmed the labor-based civil rights movement and paved the way towards an approach to racial justice based on a top-down, legalistic approach stressing desegregation and voting rights. Whether or not that coalition was powerful enough to actually carry on extensive reform in the aftermath of the war, as radical historians argue, remains to be seen. It is indisputable, however, that by the 1960s, after the movement’s great achievements to end legal segregation and discrimination, its radicalization came as a reminder that economic justice, which had ignited its earlier, “labor-based” phase, was still a critical issue for black Americans.

As Cold War tensions receded due to de-Stalinization, the split between the Soviet Union and China and the first steps of détente, Schlesinger finally came to see the urgency of racial justice in its own right. In the early 1960s, he dismissed the argument that pro-civil rights legislation was needed to improve the international “image” of the U.S.\textsuperscript{48} However, commitment to social reform at home and containment abroad continued to inform his liberal vision. Ultimately, the tension between these two poles within postwar liberalism exploded with the Vietnam War. Looking at the war in retrospect, President Lyndon Johnson described the tension with his characteristic bluntness:

If I left the woman that I really loved – the Great Society – in order to get involved with that bitch of a war on the other side of the world, then I would lose everything at home. All my programs. All my hopes to feed the hungry and shelter the homeless. All my dreams to provide education and medical care to the browns and the blacks and the lame and the poor. But if I left that war and let the Communists take over South
Vietnam, then I would be seen as a coward and my nation would be seen as an appeaser and we would both find it impossible to accomplish anything for anybody anywhere on the entire globe.49

Schlesinger, an early critic of the war in Vietnam among centrist liberals, was hardly a supporter of Johnson. Furthermore, he would have probably formulated that dilemma with a wording more attuned to the jargon of “the best and the brightest.” Nonetheless, Johnson’s was but the latest, tragic development of the “liberal dilemma” between social and civil rights on the one hand and Cold War imperatives on the other, which Schlesinger’s “vital center” liberalism faced from the early years of the Cold War onwards.


38. Quoted in Robinson and Schlesinger, *The Liberal as Cold War Nationalist*.
43. Schlesinger, *The Vital Center*, 229, emphasis added.
45. Ibid., 235.


Social Rights and Democracy in European Catholic Thought

Wilfried Loth

The relationship between Catholicism and modern democracy is not simple to describe. Otto von Bismarck once characterized the Center, the party of political Catholicism in Germany, as a movement in which there were “not [merely] two souls” but “seven spiritual tendencies in all the colors of the political rainbow, from the most extreme left to the radical right.” Eugen Richter, the Progressive Party leader, spoke of a “very mixed association in political terms, bringing together the most extreme contrasts” and in agreement on “ecclesiastical and religious questions” alone. Even contemporaries debated whether Catholicism was reactionary or progressive, liberal or social; and today too there are different answers.

A Fundamental Ambivalence

In order to deal with Catholicism’s contributions to modern democracy in Europe, the social welfare state and European unification, it is necessary to begin with a fundamental ambivalence. On the one hand, the Catholic movement in the nineteenth century was formed against the implementation of ideas from the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. It advocated principles diametrically opposed to the “ideas of 1789.” Against an emphasis on human reason and progress, it propagated the binding authority of divine revelation and the tradition of the church’s teaching authority. Against the idea of popular sovereignty, it held fast to the divine origin of the state’s authority and the church’s right to shape public order. Against developments toward a modern industrial society, it preached membership in a timeless, harmonious order of pre-modern social estates. Against the explosion of modern scholarship, it adhered to the wisdom of medieval Scholasticism; and against modern nationalism, it developed ultramontanism, the absolute bond to the pope in Rome.
The anti-modern orientation of Catholicism was repeatedly confirmed and reinforced by papal declarations. This began with Pius VI, who was not content to just condemn the civil constitution of the French National Assembly because it treated the church as a state institution in accordance with Gallican tradition. He also went on to voice explicit rejection of the Declaration of the Rights of Man as incompatible with Catholic teaching in terms of the origin of state power, religious freedom and social inequality. The anti-modern direction of the church reached its apex with the terse condemnation of liberal ideas by Pius IX in the encyclical *Quanta Cura* and the accompanying *Syllabus Errorum*. They took direct aim at the notion that society could be organized without reference to religion or the differences between various religions. They also went on to condemn popular sovereignty, freedom of thought and of religion, freedom of the press, secularization of societal institutions and the separation of church and state as an expression of unbelief, for example in the form of rationalism, economism and socialism.

Catholicism’s total rejection of modernity was no accident, nor was it the consequence of an unthinking escalation resulting from the heat of policy conflicts within the church itself. The Enlightenment constituted an attack on the church’s claim to a monopoly on interpreting the world, and the Revolution threatened the material basis of the church’s position of power, especially since revolutionary leaders decided to seize church property and ecclesiastical principalities. Thus, it was very unlikely that the church would succeed in freeing itself from traditional conditions in a timely manner or perceiving the circumstances of the breakthrough to modernity, which could have been shaped by Christianity and was even to an extent based on it. It was much more likely that it would ally itself to all those forces opposing the development of modernity and embrace an idealistic glorification of pre-revolutionary conditions in the hope of creating a new Christian realm. In the conflicts within the church that followed the revolution and secularization, ultramontanism therefore had the advantage from the beginning. It soon became the dominant factor in shaping Catholicism in the social and political realms, while attempts to create a liberal Catholicism always remained episodic.

The formation of a front against modernity was additionally promoted by the facts that the pope, as the ruler of the Papal States, was himself part of the old order and that the clergy in the other Italian states enjoyed a great deal of power. Even just for reasons of retaining that power, the church was encouraged to fight for a restoration of the old order. Not only did this foster the belief that the theoretical vision of such a restoration could actually be enacted, but it also strengthened the tendency in the liberal movement to identify Catholicism as wholly part of the reaction against it and therefore something to be fought. After 1815, the Papal States quickly took on the character of a Christian police state, which scoffed at modern sensibilities regarding the rule of law; and the popes turned to alliances with conservative powers in order to have their authority over the Papal States restored after 1848 and after 1870. Both tendencies reinforced ultramontane
positions and pulled the rug out from under those who were working for an accommodation between the church and the modern world.\textsuperscript{6}

On the other hand, Catholicism as a social and a political movement was not something that emerged from directives of the church hierarchy, for example, but rather from the initiatives of many individuals and groups, in which laypeople set the tone more often than the clergy. These initiatives made use of the modern state and rule of law in order to strengthen the position of the church insofar as it was threatened by the dissolution of the pre-revolutionary solidarity in the ordering of life. Freedom of conscience and of the press, the parliaments and the right of participation were used by advocates of the Catholic movement to mobilize the Catholic people for the cause of the church and of the pope and to anchor the church as a societal force in the post-revolutionary order. Catholicism was thereby itself a modern movement whose existence was linked to the achievements of the revolution and secularization – a modern movement against modernity, so to speak. However, it was a movement that out of self-interest could not wage a total war against modernity. This was because it carried elements of modernity within itself and, to the extent that it replaced lost feudal buttresses with the social and political mobilization of Catholics, partially modernized the church.\textsuperscript{7}

Beyond this, ultramontane Catholicism itself advocated liberal principles when and insofar as the heirs of the Enlightenment had forgotten them. This was especially the case for the link between these heirs and the tradition of the state church in Protestantism, but also for the tendency to develop a modern omnipotent state and for the narrowing of the liberal movement to the promotion of middle-class interests. Certainly, however, Catholic criticism of these developments did not rest on the conscious adoption of liberal theorems. Rather, not only was it based partly on the conviction of the inalienability of rights that exist prior to the state, but it also represented to some extent an opportunistic exploitation of the weaknesses of liberal opponents. It was indeed the case that advocacy of liberal principles did not extend to questioning Catholics’ own claims to offer an ordering of the world, a fact that severely hindered their credibility from the outset. Nevertheless, Catholicism served as a liberal corrective, which in the struggle to free the church from state tutelage simultaneously contributed to the expansion of freedoms of the individual and of social groups in a pluralistic state order.

Thirdly, in mobilizing broad masses of the population, Catholicism activated a whole series of group interests whose goals went far beyond the restoration of church freedom and positions of power, but in this process often gave the movement the political potency it needed in the first place. In this way, the reservations of traditional elites against the modern nation-state were articulated in the resistance against repressive church policy inspired by Enlightenment attitudes. Catholic citizens combined opposition to state churches with the struggle for their own rights in the constitutional state. Members of the traditional lower classes could also be won for the Catholic cause because it also seemed to
represent a defense against liberal leadership and modernization claims. Catholic workers experienced Catholicism as a refuge from the burdens of the industrial world of work and as a possible ally in the defense against exploitation by liberal employers.

In Germany, where Catholicism coalesced into an especially powerful party, these thoroughly diverse social interests were augmented during the era of unification by latent protest against the mostly Protestant leading classes in the bureaucracy, culture and the economy; not to mention the hostility of south German and guelf circles against Prussian hegemony and the opposition of Alsatians, Lorrainers and Poles against the German nation-state per se. With all this, Catholicism developed into a political power that did indeed commit itself to the Catholic faith but in growing independence from the clergy and the ecclesiastical hierarchy. It thus enabled responsible political engagement wholly in accordance with the Enlightenment.8

The modern and modernizing elements within Catholicism gained increasing ground over time perforce because the declared goals of ultramontanism were illusory. Scientific progress, secularization and industrialization were not to be stopped. The various emancipatory movements emerging from them could be suppressed for a certain period but ultimately could not be reversed or dissolved. A return to a Christian foundation of the world order was as unachievable as concepts of the corporate state that had been drawn from idealized images of the Middle Ages. After 1870, there was no hiding the fact that in the world of nation-states and imperialism, there was no longer a place for the re-establishment of the Papal States. What could be achieved was securing the freedom of the church as one group among many and securing the independence of its spiritual head. Christian engagement in this plural world was only possible if and insofar as the church adapted to post-revolutionary conditions.

The ultramontane zeal of the church waned over time accordingly. In a certain sense, that was already perceptible at the First Vatican Council. The proclamation of the universal episcopate and the dogma of the pope’s infallibility did indeed represent a victory for the ultramontanists and was thoroughly in line with ultramontane thought. However, in simultaneously securing full control for the papacy over the use of civil freedoms through Catholics, the church was arming itself for a situation in which the traditional means of power with their feudal nature were no longer available. No longer was there any talk of the material means of power of the old church only recently proclaimed in the Syllabus. Now, there was only an emphasis on the pope’s spiritual authority. In 1885, Leo XIII expressed a distancing – though only a very cautious one – from the principle of monarchical legitimacy in the encyclical Immortale Dei. At the same time, he prevented French Catholics from forming an openly counter-revolutionary party and urged an understanding, a “ralliement,” with the republic. Six years later, in 1891, he pulled back from a fixation on a society of pre-modern estates in the encyclical Rerum Novarum. After the turn of the century – and unsuccessful attempts as early as the 1880s – came
the piecemeal elimination of the *Non Expedit* that had prevented Italian Catholics from participating in general elections in the republic up to that time.⁹

**Rerum Novarum and Democratization**

*Rerum Novarum* had a mobilizing effect to the extent that, along with the natural right to private property, the rights of the poor were treated with dignity, and a “just wage” was emphasized along with the natural legitimacy and effectiveness of intermediate social organizations and collectives (the family, associations, churches and fraternal organizations). In crises, the state was indeed given a social responsibility, but in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, the mediating groups were called upon to engage in efforts to resolve the “social question” themselves. That could be and was interpreted in different ways as a criticism of capitalism as well as a call to arms against revolutionary Marxism. What was clear, however, was the call for solidarity and subsidiarity. By putting them in the center of his message for dealing with the realities of industrial modernity, Leo XIII gave great impetus to the self-help strategies of Catholic reformers and a Catholic workers’ movement. The activities of social-reform and Christian democratic groups such as Marc Sagnier’s *Sillon* in France must be seen in this context; likewise the development of the “People’s Association for Catholic Germany” (*Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland*) into a powerful reform movement; the establishment of Christian democratic parties in Poland; the transformation of Catholic parties in Belgium and the Netherlands into mass parties that proclaimed the emancipation of the disadvantaged on their banners; as well as the emergence of powerful Christian trade unions in many countries.¹⁰

In the German Empire, the mobilization of social forces in the *Kulturkampf* led to active support by the Center Party for the “civil freedoms of all citizens of the nation.” Under the leadership of Ludwig Windthorst, who was decidedly constitutionalist in outlook, the party did not shy away from advocating the principles of the rule of law and did so in cooperation with Progressives as well as Social Democrats. In 1878, the Center rejected Bismarck’s Anti-Socialist Law in the Reichstag *en bloc*. In the 1890s, the party served as a reliable barrier against the plans of Wilhelm II to reduce the rights of the Reichstag and to abolish equal voting rights in Reichstag elections. On the eve of World War I, the party worked with the National Liberals in order to strengthen the rights of the Reichstag incrementally so that the national leaders would be dependent on a long-term parliamentary majority.¹¹

From October 1918, the Center cooperated constructively in the establishment of the Weimar Republic. It accepted the abolition of the monarchy as well as the introduction of a universal equal franchise that included women in Prussia. Together with their main ideological opponents, the Progressives and the Social Democrats, Centrists developed
the Weimar Constitution and the republican state constitutions. Along with those two
groups, the Center made up the “Weimar Coalition,” the sole party grouping that was
fully committed to Weimar democracy. During the many crises of the Weimar Republic,
the Center was always ready to accept responsibility for entering a government coalition
in accordance with the fundamental principles of the constitution.\(^\text{12}\)

In a similar way, the Christian Social Party in Austria worked with the Social Democrats
to establish the First Republic. The *Partito Popolare Italiano* (PPI), founded by Luigi
Sturzo after the lifting of the *Non Expedit* in 1919, had a pragmatic reform program and
became the strongest force in the governments at the end phase of the liberal state in Italy.
The small *Parti Démocratique Populaire* (PDP) in France pursued a similar course, as did
the Catholic people’s parties of Central and Eastern Europe. Amid serious internal ten-
sions, the Catholic State Party in the Netherlands shifted from a coalition with Protestants
to one with the Social Democrats; and the Catholic Union in Belgium cooperated with
democratic government coalitions after it lost its absolute majority in 1919.\(^\text{13}\)

**Anti-Modernism and the Authoritarian Temptation**

The turn of the church away from ultramontane conceptions of the world did proceed
very slowly, however. Those in positions of authority were long possessed of a desire to
re-establish pre-revolutionary conditions. They regarded the modern world with mistrust
and withdrew into the realm of the church rather than developing new conceptions of
order appropriate for the realities of the age. The diplomat Leo XIII, who in the early
years of his papacy had hoped to re-establish the church’s external position of power by
means of an understanding with conservative governments, was followed in 1903 by the
pastor Pius X, who neglected political ambitions and concentrated on internal reform
of the church. He was supported in this by a broad religious renewal movement, which
gave religious practice a simultaneously individualizing and unworldly character with
its devotion to the Sacred Heart, Marian piety and Eucharistic rallies. The beginnings
of a re-historicization of theological thought, as developed by a wide and multi-faceted
tendency of “reform Catholic” theologians from the middle of the 1890s, were defeated
by the intolerance of both the faithful masses and the hierarchy. Ever-more-rigid meas-
ures against a “modernistic” heterodoxy (that did not actually exist in the uniformity
presumed by its opponents) served as a barrier against the church’s active engagement
with the problems of the modern world.\(^\text{14}\)

Fears of modernity prompted ecclesiastical authorities to intervene repeatedly whenever
groupings within social or political Catholicism became too strongly engaged in securing
freedoms and emancipation. Thus, Pius X banned the *Sillon* in 1910, which in his view
mixed religion and politics excessively and promoted religiously questionable justifications
for engagement on behalf of participatory and social democracy. In 1912, the Christian trade unions in Germany only narrowly escaped a papal ban due to their persistence on an inter-confessional course and the autonomy that went with it. After the proclamation of the encyclical *Singulari Quadam*, they had to live with the stigma of being tolerated by the pope only as an unavoidable exception. After World War I, Michael Cardinal von Faulhaber of Munich condemned the Weimar Republic as a child of revolution. Pope Pius XI distanced himself from the Italian People’s Party and opposed cooperation between the *Partito* and the Socialists as a means of preventing the victory of Fascism. The Dutch bishops forbade the State Party’s executive committee from cooperating with the socialists and in pastoral letters regularly warned that socialism was the most dangerous opponent of the church and of religion.\(^{15}\)

Under these circumstances, aggressive advocacy of parliamentary democracy was impossible for the leaders of political Catholicism. When Matthias Erzberger, the main architect of the Weimar Coalition, found himself the target of the anti-republican right in 1920, his party left him in the lurch. Joseph Wirth sought in vain to transform the Center into a republican mass movement and thus provide a reliable bulwark for the republic against its declared enemies. The “Republican Union” that he advocated from 1926 onward for the renewal of the Weimar Coalition found support only in portions of the Baden Center Party, the Catholic workers’ movement and the party youth organization. Centrist decision-makers and influential press organs kept their distance. Center leaders only justified their engagement for the republic as a necessary defense against revolution and civil war.\(^{16}\)

In Italy, Sturzo found himself in the minority in his attempts to save the party from absorption by the Fascists. In October 1922, the parliamentary leadership of the party decided, against Sturzo’s will, to participate in the first Mussolini government. In June 1923, he felt compelled to resign from his post as party secretary, not least of all due to pressure from the Vatican. Prominent members of the party’s conservative wing supported an election law that secured the Fascists a two-thirds majority; others left the party. Having been disavowed by the pope and the bishops, the remaining *Partito Popolare* members knew they could no longer resist their loss of power or the ban on the party that came in 1926.\(^{17}\)

The efforts at integration by the party leadership could not prevent “rightwing Catholics” such as Martin Spahn in Germany or Josef Eberle in Austria from rejecting the republican form of government as a “constitution without God” or from making severe attacks on government politicians. The difficult work of forming parliamentary coalitions and the economic sufferings of the middle classes also led to the rise of diverse forms of longing for community, a feeling that thrived on a discomfort with the increasing de-Christianization and individualization of the modern world and that identified the republic with this modernity. It found its outlet in all sorts of visions of an “organic democracy” and a new
“Reich.” These tendencies coincided in their low estimation of “western formal democracy” and amounted to support for a de-parliamentarization of the political order.  

This tendency was strengthened by developments in official Catholic social teaching. The German Jesuit Heinrich Pesch took the link between the obligation for solidarity and the demand for societal self-organization in *Rerum Novarum* and turned it into a program for an economic order that was to be primarily made up of corporately organized groups based on profession. His disciples Gustav Gundlach and Oswald von Nell-Breuning developed this so-called “solidarism” into a comprehensive societal model that amounted to a corporatist reordering of the state. To commemorate the fortieth anniversary of *Rerum Novarum*, Pius XI issued the encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* in 1931. This document had essentially been written by Nell-Breuning and was influenced by solidarism. Although Gundlach and Nell-Breuning always emphasized in their commentaries that the “order based on groups of professions” called-for in the encyclical was compatible with the principles of parliamentary democracy, it was widely understood as an alternative meant to replace it.

*Quadragesimo Anno* thus functioned as a catalyst in the dissolution of parliamentary-democratic regimes and their replacement by new authoritarian orders. The Center Party backed the attempt by Heinrich Brüning to return to government “above the parties” with the help of presidential cabinets and then urged the creation of what they called “authoritarian democracy” without defining it in more detail. As soon as the National Socialists won the *Reichstag* elections in September 1930, the Center found itself in *de facto* competition with the National Socialists and various other forces of the political right to create an authoritarian solution to the crisis of the state under the banner of “national unity.” The Center was not necessarily destined to lose, but given its internal divisions and its remaining scruples as to the rule of law, its loss was thoroughly consistent. Disoriented and divided, shot through with longings for a strong leader and an “organic” community, and still fixated on loyalty to ruling authority, the Center became an easy victim of National Socialist threats of force after January 30, 1933.

In Austria, party leader Ignaz Seipel worked increasingly to reshape the republic along corporatist lines from the middle of the 1920s onward. He interpreted *Singulari Quadam* aggressively as a call for eliminating the existing democratic state governed by parties. There was hardly any opposition at all to that. Engelbert Dollfuss, a Christian Social serving as chancellor from the spring of 1932, could therefore remain in office after the parliament was paralyzed in March 1933; he then worked to usher in a decidedly anti-parliamentary-corporatist constitution. Pressed by Mussolini and fascinated by developments in Germany, he pushed through an authoritarian constitution after the February uprising in Linz (the *Schutzbundrevolte*) of 1934. This new constitution completely banned the founding of parties. Insofar as the Christian Socials did not adapt to the new authoritarian line, their only option was to dissolve the party.
Christian democratic thought continued its development in this direction toward “personalism,” as was the case with young intellectuals such as Raymond de Becker in Belgium and Emmanuel Mounier in France during the 1930s. Their vision of a revolutionary “Third Way” between liberal individualism and socialist collectivism combined the call for a comprehensive unfolding of the human personality within its social context with vague images of constructive cooperation among social corporations, regions and nations. In accordance with that, de Becker was willing to propagate the “new order” under National Socialist domination as the new editor of the leading newspaper *Le Soir* after the occupation of Belgium in June 1940. Mounier and leading theologians of the “renouveau catholique” such as Henri de Lubac were engaged as teachers in the training center of the Vichy regime at Chateau Uriage, which was educating the future elites of the “national revolution” in France.23

In Switzerland, the young conservative movement gained a majority of the Conservative People’s Party for supporting a motion to revise the Swiss Federal Constitution; this 1935 proposal was aimed at transforming liberal democracy into an authoritarian corporatist state. In Czechoslovakia, corporatist-oriented Catholics willingly worked with the National Socialists. German Christian Socials joined the Sudeten German Party, and the Slovakian People’s Party under Jozef Tiso took the leading role in establishing the Slovakian satellite state in March 1939. In Hungary, the Christian Economic and Social Party (*Keresztény Gazdasági és Szociális Párt*) was among the supporters of the Horthy regime. Only in 1944 was a Christian Democratic People’s Party (*Keresztény Újlevél Néppárt*) formed to represent anti-fascist reform Catholicism.24

**Christian Democracy after World War II**

Fundamental advocacy of parliamentary democracy was only established in Catholicism after World War II. In many cases, conservative Catholics as well as Christian democrats who had initially succumbed to the authoritarian temptation learned to value the principle of separation of powers and the worth of personal freedom in confrontation with the practice of dictatorial regimes. In the existential danger of underground work, in shared imprisonment or under the difficult circumstances of exile, individuals and small groups who went over to the opposition because of their convictions discovered a high degree of commonality among democrats beyond the boundaries of specific worldviews. Above all, however, the determination of the Allies not only to liberate Europe from National Socialism but also to establish democracy no longer allowed for authoritarian conceptions of order.25

After the collapse of National Socialist domination, the re-foundation of parties in the tradition of political Catholicism therefore occurred almost without exception under
the banner of Christian democracy. In Germany, this was connected with the building of bridges to Protestant Christians, as middle-class modernizers and leaders of Catholic workers had long sought in vain. Elsewhere too, re-foundation involved a further emancipatory step away from church authority and an opening for those of a different worldview. In France, the Christian Democratic People’s Movement (Mouvement Républicain Populaire) could now win over the majority of church-oriented Catholics. In Poland, the left-wing Catholic-oriented Workers’ Party became the strongest force in the exile government. In light of decreasing connections to the church among adherents and voters in general, the church could hardly slow these emancipatory movements any longer.

With the now-unequivocal orientation regarding parliamentary democracy, Christian democratic parties made fundamental contributions to the establishment of stable democracies in Europe after World War II. Their ideological inheritance had them advocating a configuration of the democracies oriented toward social welfare and a strengthening of decentralized units, even if this involved differing, often mutually antagonistic conceptions in specific cases. In terms of political power, the great influence of Catholic class organizations such as farmers’ associations and trade unions contributed to the practice of collective bargaining within a democratic framework. At the same time, the rootedness of the Christian democratic parties in the Catholic tradition and the large amount of shared experience on the way to a democratic order made them especially open to the idea of European unity. That Europeans began coming together in the early 1950s in those six states where Christian democrats either served as the governing party or at least played a key role in government is no coincidence.26 In all these countries Christian trade unionists cooperated with their social-democratic partners, thereby strengthening the reformist wing of the socialist labor movement and engaging both labor organizations and the parties of Christian and social democracy in negotiations with the respective governments about the amplification of corporatist state welfare.

Admittedly, it took some time for this democratic practice to be infused with theory by a fundamental commitment to political pluralism and parliamentary democracy. This went along with the dwindling of traditional milieu links, which occurred parallel to the ecclesiastical Aggiornamento in the 1960s. It was Pope John XXIII who first committed himself explicitly to the principle of equality as well as its political and social consequences. In the encyclical Pacem in Terris, he declared that “all men are equal in their natural dignity”27 and drew wide-reaching state and social policy consequences from that: the demand for the inviolability of human rights, especially the right to social welfare; the demand for the equality of men and women; the elimination of racial discrimination; the protection of national minorities; and assistance for developing countries. For him, human rights included the “right to be in error;” he thereby implicitly embraced religious freedom and the principle of tolerance.
That was one of many justifications for the practice of Christian democratic parties, and by no means did all Christian democrats support the call for economic codetermination that John XXIII derived from the right for the fullest development of the human personality in *Mater et Magistra*, thereby following the arguments of the French personalists.\(^2\) The Catholic Church’s late arrival in the modern world thus coincided with the fading of a special relationship with a political and social formation.

In the long term, the ideas of solidarity and subsidiarity present in current debates about the future of the welfare state in continental Europe may be seen as the heritage of the Catholic experience. They may also help in finding a balance between self-organization and public assistance, as well as encouraging the search of substitutes for the dwindling national instruments at the European level.


20. On this and the following, see Richard J. Wolff, Jörg K. Hoenisch, eds., Catholics, the State and the European Radical Right 1919-1945 (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1987).


Many approaches to understanding social stratification, whether they focus on class or status, ethnicity or gender, assume a continuous present. They seek to identify who gains and who loses, who is included and who excluded, by core social practices at a given moment in time. Age cohorts can be isolated and identified in this way too. Their relative size, situation, cultural resources and historical experience lay the basis for generational identities and projects. Thomas Jefferson observed that each generation was a new country. As individuals bid for self-expression, recognition, responsibility and rewards they will appeal to, or help constitute a generational character and project. On the other hand each generation is bound to its predecessors and successors by the life course. All individuals acquire a primary identity from their long period of dependence as infants and children. Later many will seek and support the parental role. The maturation curve allows new generations to assert themselves but also perpetuates a cycle of inter-generational dependence applying to the young and the old.

Generations are trapped in a one way flow of time, posing a challenge to the market’s rules of simultaneous exchange. However the life course still offers scope for a cycle of delayed reciprocity, whereby the debt to parents is repaid when they are supported in old age. In pre-industrial societies kinship systems furnished a mechanism for meeting the needs of dependent young and old, while charity dealt with those without kin or in poverty. National “cradle to grave” welfare regimes sought to end poverty and to use risk-pooling both within and between generations, to promote modern aspirations to equality, liberty and solidarity.

Pensions, by their very nature, are devices for conferring rights to future streams of income. It is interesting that capitalism is also such a device. The rights of the capitalist stem from ownership of means of production, conferred by inheritance, saving (“abstinence”), arbitrage, and entrepreneurialism, comprising both the extraction and realisation of surplus. However capital itself is the discounted present value of the future stream of earnings to be anticipated from an asset. There is thus a continual flattening of perspectives as the future value of an asset is, as the financial jargon has it, “marked to market.”
The pensioner’s rights have traditionally been built up through public or private service, or financial contributions. Usually they take many years, or even decades, to acquire. The power to confer a pension exercised by a sovereign, or government or by a private institution or wealthy individual, is a reflection and confirmation of their power and their recognition of service. Pensions can thus best be understood by a kind of longitudinal political economy which roots them in today’s social arrangements while understanding that the final shape of the rights that have been granted – whether it be by the sovereign to the subject, the government to the citizen, the employer to the worker, the master to the servant, the financial supplier to the customer, or the husband to the wife – will only be known when the last payment is made due under the pension agreement.

These days the great majority can expect to live to long past retirement age – on average about twenty years once they’ve reached sixty-five. Of course, students, and young people generally, very understandably don’t give any thought to this. Indeed they often believe that they’ll live forever – exactly how they’re not sure. Ageing is something that happens to others. We all tend to discount ageing as something that affects one’s body, but not the core self.

In an essay which anticipated some later debates on the “ageing society” Bryan Turner saw pensioners and the elderly as stigmatised by their lack of function and their economic reliance on today’s worker. The past is the past. If its visible legacy is a financial obligation, as is the case with pensioners, that can be a source of resentment. Certainly terms such as pensioner or senior citizen can evoke negative sentiments beneath feigned respect. The supposed tedium of pension discussions may also reflect a depreciation of the old.

Turner was later to argue that rights can be seen as a device for meeting human frailty and pensions seem to qualify under this rubric. But the construction of rights to pensions has been about much more than the duty of care to the frail elderly. It is about the opportunity to enjoy life after retirement, to have more free time and to be able to command a modicum of respect from friends and relations. Those who are frail have a claim on the public which is sometimes achieved at the cost of a dependent, supplicant status. The right to a pension in retirement has been seen precisely as a far preferable alternative to being in receipt of poor relief.

In the United Kingdom and U.S. there was widespread pensioner poverty in the 1960s, a poverty that could prompt guilt, pity or contempt, or a mixture of these. The improvement in the relative position of many pensioners in recent decades changed attitudes towards the growing number of more affluent and assertive retirees. With more children than pensioners in poverty the plight of the elderly receded and they could even be represented as an excessively privileged group, notwithstanding the persistence of poverty among elderly women.

Turner believed that the stigmatisation of the aged stemmed from the fact that they were just recipients within the welfare schema. However Sarah Irwin challenged this view
by pointing to opinion poll evidence that the aged were seen as deserving recipients of public funds, in contrast to the unemployed and “welfare scroungers.” She argued that inter-generational dependence could generate solidarity rather than conflict. However, the corrosive effect of market-based perceptions can indeed erode a sense of reciprocal obligation between young and old. Modernity itself requires the young to throw off the tutelage of the old. It nourishes a cult of youth that associates ageing with negative traits. However there remains an awareness that personal and social identity develops in and through essentially trans-generational relationships. Human beings are distinguished from other animals not only by neotony – lengthy childhood – but also by the greater relative importance to them of culture, hence the past and the future, their predecessors and successors.

**Historical Patterns**

The first pensions were conferred as privileges rather than rights, the recipients being soldiers or public servants who had rendered conspicuous service. The English Poor Law allowed that aged paupers should be given some relief, but local gentry and municipalities had great discretion in awarding it. Each parish was responsible only for its own and relief could be refused, or administered only in the most humiliating way, to those deemed to be bad characters. Nevertheless by the eighteenth century most parishes did pay modest old age pensions to those deemed past work and it was not until the 1830s that residence in a poor house became a common condition of receiving this stipend. From the late seventeenth century the wealthy could purchase annuities for their spouses or favoured retainers. Advances in the calculation of life tables and risk enabled suppliers of life insurance like the Equitable Life Society, founded in 1762, to offer annuity products which enabled their clients to pool risk.

It is possible to distinguish between a “Puritan” and a “baroque” approach to pension provision. The Puritan approach was individualistic and stressed the rewards of thrift, prudence and hard work. Not a few of today’s large pension providers, whether in London, Edinburgh, Boston or New York, stress their roots in Protestant self-help. The baroque tradition reflected the claim of good monarchs to relieve the problems of deserving subjects. The Elizabethan Poor Law had elements of both approaches. In France there were several proposals in the last years of the Ancien Régime to develop a universal system of old age pensions. Condorcet argued that risk-pooling on a national scale would enable the scourge of old age poverty to be banished. In April 1794 the revolutionary National Convention enacted a decree to this effect, also setting up old people’s homes in every department and a special day set aside every year to honour aged citizens and to invite them to impart to the young a hatred for tyranny. But the overthrow of the Jacobin
republic doomed this attempt and it was left to Bismarck, the German chancellor, to introduce the first national old age pension in 1889. He believed that the legitimacy of the monarchy, challenged in different ways by the Social Democrats and the Catholic Church, would be strengthened by the monarch’s ability to raise the aged out of poverty, and prevent them from becoming a burden on their relatives. In Britain social reformers and trade unionists pressed for a similar programme leading, in 1908, to Lloyd George’s Old Age Pension Act. These pension systems embodied a weak notion of pension rights – weak because the pensions were not that generous and were conditional on means testing to prove poverty.

Increases in longevity, industrialisation and urbanisation, and the rising numbers of the population without a claim on small property, helped to encourage the idea that the public authorities should furnish an element of social insurance to risks like old age and disability. There were campaigns for old age pensions, and governments saw pension provision as a way of boosting their legitimacy and weakening opponents. The pension systems not only alleviated poverty but they also tended to confirm patriarchy and the social hierarchy – there was an echo of the baroque here, which could be seen in differential contribution/pay-out conditions and in special regimes for the military and key civil servants. Esping-Andersen sees a legacy from absolutist monarchy in such arrangements, while Philip Manow argues for the influence of religious traditions.

The pressure for universal provision developed slowly and in the meantime many of the aged worked till they dropped, or congratulated themselves on the fact that they had a paternalist employer, or a profession, or just enough property (a farm or small business) to keep them going in old age and to ensure the help of their heirs. In the United States it was not until the Social Security Act of 1935 that a national retirement pension scheme was introduced and not until 1950 that it became truly universal in scope. Puritan resistance to a public pension was greatly weakened when the Great Crash of the 1930s wiped out the savings of millions of hard-working Americans. Nevertheless President Roosevelt insisted that, in order to safeguard the programme from future attacks, it should be financed by specific contributions rather than from general taxation. Thus it was the contribution record that established the right to the pension not the mere fact of being a citizen or resident of the United States. By 1950 nearly all U.S. citizens would be covered, since all employees had a pay-roll tax deducted from their wages – their spouses and dependents were covered too. Indeed the Social Security card and number itself became the most often-used badge of civic identity.

The construction of the first public universal pension systems and the wider process of the “invention of retirement” created a new status but was itself the product of a type of class struggle. Trade unions and social democrats accused employers and governments of either working older employees to death or of throwing them on the scrap heap. While willing to accept company schemes they still usually insisted that governments alone
had the scope to establish universal measures of social insurance. The political leaders who sponsored the first public old age pensions – Bismarck, Lloyd George, Franklin Roosevelt – were bidding for support at times of great social questioning and unrest. They saw themselves as heading off class conflict and showing how a more enlightened policy could boost the authority of the established order. President Truman was responding to a showdown between unions and employers when he approved the vital Social Security amendments in 1950.

Many of those who pressed for the introduction of old age pensions saw them as ways of rescuing the aged from poverty – but also of extending free time. In the United Kingdom in 1931 over a half of workers over sixty-five were in work; by 1961 this had dropped to a quarter and by 1981 to only one in ten. In his influential analysis of welfare regimes, Gøsta Esping-Andersen describes pensions as a powerful instrument for the incremental “de-commodification” of life and labour in a capitalist society.9 Precisely because public pensions have been a mechanism of de-commodification they have also become the target of “reforms” that might revise or cancel the gains and concessions they embody. The same is true of pension rights conceded by public or private employers who can try to revoke agreements made decades ago. As argued above, it is only across considerable stretches of time that it becomes clear who has gained from a protracted tug-of-war. It is also necessary to grasp the operational logic of rather complex rules and structures in a context of scarce fiscal resources. Pension provision requires such huge resources – great chunks of GDP – that its ability to promote “social integration” can place great strain on “system integration,” if appropriate fiscal means are not found.10

The Logic of Public Provision

Universal public pension systems in the industrialised countries stem from the period immediately following World War II, with its heightened social expectations, and the immediately following period of the post-war boom and Cold War. The tremendous boost which war gave to the taxing capacity of the state played a key role in showing that it was possible to pay for something as expensive as a universal retirement system.

As the new pension systems were established or extended the contribution requirement was only loosely applied. Older male workers were usually credited with contributions they had not made, or which they had made to a system that had been destroyed by hyper-inflation and economic collapse. This “blanketing in” was possible because these systems all make great use of the “pay-as-you-go” financing system. Over time benefits were increased, contributions raised and the contribution record came to determine the precise entitlement. Wives derived rights to a pension according to their own or their husband’s contribution record, conditions which left many older women with a weaker
entitlement. The pay-as-you-go system of pension finance enabled fairly good pensions to be paid out quite quickly and was generally adopted. The stream of income to the system was used to pay current pensions, with any surplus going to a trust fund, which was invested not in the stock market but in low-interest public bonds.

The pay-as-you-go system can only be used by a public authority since only the government can count on revenue from future generations to discharge the entitlements of today’s workers – whose contributions pay current pensioners. This system, as Paul Samuelson pointed out in a classic article, only balances its books by counting on a draft from the unborn.\footnote{11} Commercial organisations cannot do this and are obliged to pre-fund, namely to use contributions to set up a fund which will eventually be able to pay a pension. The language of pension rights applies in somewhat different ways to public pension schemes and personal pension plans, and, since both are linked to contributions in some way, neither is an unqualified “right.” It is true that public pensions go to everyone who has had a job or been married. But women’s coverage is weaker, if they didn’t marry, or their husband failed to make contributions, or their formal employment was limited or broken. Above all women’s unpaid labour in the home was given no direct recognition by these contribution systems, but was weakly reflected in spousal rights. Likewise members of immigrant communities often do not have the prescribed length of contribution record – say thirty nine years for a full pension. There are currently proposals in several European countries to introduce “citizens pensions” paid regardless of contribution, but these do require either naturalisation, or are graded according to length of residence.

From the mid-1970s welfare regimes came under strong pressure to cut the value of pension benefits and to extend commercial coverage and subsidies. The parties of the left failed to consolidate and extend welfare gains, or to come up with effective answers to the “stagflation” which brought an end to the post-war boom in the 1970s. Trade unions were greatly weakened by these developments and by a large expansion of the available labour force, as the baby-boom generation came of age, as women entered the work-force in larger numbers and as jobs were outsourced to newly-industrialising lands.

Nevertheless public pension regimes in most countries other than the United Kingdom proved quite resilient. The public French, German and Italian pension systems have delivered, and to some extent still deliver, a more generous pension than do those of the U.S. or the United Kingdom. The U.S. Social Security system delivers a better pension than the United Kingdom’s basic state pension (BSP) and has so far withstood successive attempts to weaken it under Presidents Reagan, Clinton and George W. Bush. These pension systems – the U.S. included – are based on the principle that all those who contribute receive a benefit, as of right. In Britain too everyone who has the appropriate contribution record receives the BSP, but a means test limits the right to the more generous Pension Credit.
**Private Pensions and “Implicit Privatisation”**

In countries with a strong stock market – Britain, the United States, Switzerland and the Netherlands – the leading finance houses continued to offer pension products, such as annuities, to the better off. They successfully argued for valuable tax breaks for private saving. The result was what Jacob has called the “divided welfare state,” in which both public and private contribution entitlements create “path dependence,” or a vested interest in the scheme’s continuance.12

The “defined contribution” pension scheme or product has the logic of a commercial transaction. Those who contribute to a personal plan have the right to be fairly and honestly treated but no specific pension promise is being made. In this type of plan or scheme – they include the 401(k) plans in the U.S. and the “Stakeholder” plans in the United Kingdom – market risk is entirely borne by the contributor. If the market slides then the pension will follow it. Governments in a growing list of countries now give tax relief to such schemes and employers have increasingly switched to offering them over the last two decades.

On the other hand there are still many so-called “defined benefit” occupational pension schemes – though many are now closed to new members – which appear to offer something quite close to the specific entitlement of a public pension. In the case of schemes for public sector workers the parallel is even closer, since it is the state that stands to guarantee the promise. When a private company sponsors a DB scheme it is pledging its own resources to fulfilling the promise – though, as we will see, this is a promise that companies may vow never to repeat, and may try to wriggle out of.

Contrary to what is sometimes claimed governments find it difficult, at least in the short run, openly to renege on pension promises. However they can sometimes get away with apparently small changes to the rules – for example indexing future pensions to prices not earnings – and over a long period this can greatly diminish the value of the promise. This is what Margaret Thatcher did in 1980 and in consequence the basic United Kingdom state pension slipped from being 20 percent of average earnings in 1980 to being 15 percent of average earnings in 2003. But few pension “reformers” have been as effective as Margaret Thatcher. Such varied political figures as Ronald Reagan, Alain Juppé, the French centre-right premier, the Italian government of Berlusconi in the 1990s, and that of Helmut Kohl in Germany, were all forced to back down because of broad hostility to their attempts at deep cuts in public pension entitlements. Moreover even in Britain, from about 2000 onwards, the government has been under increasing pressure from the large number of older voters to raise the pension in line with earnings and to come up with sundry pension supplements.

The pressure to reduce public provision has not abated and the first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed new attempts to cut back public provision in the United States, Europe and Japan. It was argued that the public systems were far too generous,
embodying promises that – with population ageing – would ruin the national accounts if not drastically curtailed. It was also claimed that that they inhibit private saving (the evidence does not bear this out) or that payroll taxes raise the cost of labour and hence increase unemployment (there is a prima facie case here). The logic of this type of reform represents either explicit or – more often – “implicit” privatisation. The latter downgrades public coverage with the effect of obliging those affected to resort to commercial fund managers if they wish to avoid poverty. Finance houses in search of more custom and employers anxious to shed pension commitments help to constitute a powerful lobby group in favour of pension reform no matter how reluctant voters are to endorse the approach.

Governments find the attempt to cancel pension entitlements a delicate and explosive undertaking. The last decade has seen huge public battles over these issues in the core states of the European Union. However governments can simply close public sector schemes to new entrants and in that way curtail the growth of new entitlements.

Corporate managers offered “defined benefit” pensions as a method of labour retention, and as a seemingly cheap concession, at a time when employment was tight. The future cost of these schemes did not, until quite recently, even figure in the annual accounts. But with maturation of the schemes, liabilities mount. The trustees of the scheme are meant to build up a fund that will pay a pension based on final salary and the number of years spent in the scheme. When stock markets were buoyant British and U.S. companies were allowed to take quite protracted “contribution holidays,” only to be forced to make extra contributions when the stock market shrank and inflation subsided. If there is a shortfall in the pension fund it is the sponsoring corporation which is obliged to make it up. In 2004 U.S. companies had pension deficits of over $300 billion and United Kingdom corporations had pension deficits of £85 billion. The payments required to mend these deficits reduce the resources available for investment. Sometimes workers would be sacked en masse in order to save the pension fund. In other cases elaborate re-structuring – involving receivership, spin-offs, mergers or takeovers – enabled the pension fund to be deprived of the sponsor’s assets. Public outcries against defaulting companies led to the setting up of insurance agencies, the Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) in the U.S. and the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) in the United Kingdom. If the sponsor goes bust then supposedly the quango-like insurance body will guarantee some scaled down benefit. However, companies that are in difficulties often skip their contributions and can inveigle their employees to sacrifice their pension rights in order to keep their jobs. The PBGC, which had a deficit of $21 billion in 2004, has often condoned the devaluation of entitlements as well as the non-payment of contributions by sponsoring corporations. The British PPF has very modest resources and, in the event of a large company going bust, could not rescue its pension scheme.
The public systems have generally survived for more than half a century while famous finance houses (Equitable Life, Bear Stearns) and famous corporations have collapsed, or simply languish like so many once-powerful concerns – a half of the blue chips of the U.S. or United Kingdom stock markets in the 1970s are now gone or are shrunken skeletons. Millions of employees who had pension entitlements guaranteed by employers in steel, auto or the airline business has seen them shrink and shrivel. Public systems are not so exposed to the ebb and flow of the market. They gain because we know a government will be there in fifty years time. Not only publicly-supplied pensions count on future taxes, they are also cheap to administer, the contributions being automatically deducted as part of payroll in most cases. By contrast commercial suppliers have to market their wares and customise their collection and delivery. Because pension plans are a long term commitment it makes sense for suppliers to invest huge resources in signing up customers who will pay over a stream of contributions for decades to come. The resulting intense competition is very expensive; salaries in the financial sector are also high. Another factor leading to exorbitant fees is that pension plans are complex and providers much better informed concerning their workings than their customers. It is common for fees and charges to amount to between 1.5 and 2.0 percent of the fund each year; at this rate the pension “pot” suffers a reduction in yield of 30-40 percent over thirty or forty years. In turbulent financial markets savers are also exposed to market timing risk.

From the standpoint of the individual customer the impact of high charges is somewhat softened by tax relief. In the United Kingdom tax relief on pension contributions costs the Treasury about £13 billion a year, the equivalent “tax spend” in the U.S. being $100 billion. The lion’s share of this tax relief goes to wealthier savers, with the richest tenth receiving over a half of all tax relief in the United Kingdom. In the U.S. and the United Kingdom about a half of all adults lack any significant private pension entitlement.

Tax-favoured private and occupational pension funding has led to the growing importance of pension funds on the stock exchanges and in the boardrooms. This has led to a species of “grey capitalism” in which the influence of pension money is wielded not by policy-holders but by corporate-nominated trustees and by the fund managers of the leading bankers and brokers. This regime is marked by instability, an accountability deficit, by over-mighty CEOs and by scandal. Just occasionally the managers of public sector worker funds, such as the California Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS), the largest pension fund in the world, do consult with their members and throw their weight behind better corporate governance or SRI (Socially Responsible Investment).
The “Generational Contract” versus “Generational Accounting?”

Philosophically the publicly-sponsored pay-as-you-go systems have been claimed to embody a contract between the generations. Each generation makes a contribution and each receives a benefit. Where there is economic growth pensions can grow with national prosperity as long as there is a broad balance between age cohorts. A problem arises when generational cohorts are of very unequal size, because of increased longevity, and/or “baby booms,” followed by declining fertility. Rapid growth of productivity can absorb the strain but if growth slows generational imbalance will make for awkward choices. Either (1) members of the smaller cohort have to pay much more than did members of its larger predecessor in order to cover the latter's pensions; or (2) the pension received by the members of the larger cohort is scaled back so that contribution rates don't have to rise or (3) contributions rates are raised, and pensions are cut, until a fit is found based on shared sacrifice or (4) resources are found elsewhere in the system so that the shared burden is somewhat reduced.

These are not easy choices to make and yet they are unavoidable. There are many in the United States and Europe today whose past contributions entitle them to pensions they may not receive. As noted above, there has been great opposition to those politicians who try to downsize public pensions and encourage people to make their own arrangements instead. But though wholesale reform is often rejected entitlements are nevertheless often gradually and sneakily whittled down, with the real reductions not coming into force for a few decades. Some opponents of pension privatisation claim that there is really no problem. But in most parts of the developed and developing world the demographic shock of ageing is large enough to be a major problem unless new sources of revenue are brought into play.

The Puritan/baroque contrast now yields to a conflict between “generational solidarity” and so-called “generational economics.” The generational solidarity approach, in its most radical form, insists that the qualitative bond between parents and children makes any precise calculation of who gains and who loses unseemly and inappropriate. Supporters of loading all pension needs onto the pay-as-you-go systems incline to this approach and regard talk of crisis of the “ageing society” as needless alarmism. A very different assumption is made by the partisans of the “generational economics” approach which emerged among economists in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s. Just as the Puritan approach stressed individual self-reliance so advocates of generational economics argue that each generation should pay its own way, relying on no help from parents or children. Risk-pooling within a generation is okay but not between generations. The generational economists argue that if modern states only came clean with their implicit pension debt – that is, the present value of their future pension liabilities, minus the present value of future payroll taxes – they would find that they are all staring bankruptcy in the face. They regard the attempt to impose this burden on today’s children and those not even
born as the height of injustice; to do so will halve the incomes of rising generations and cause untold social strife.

The methodology of the generational economists is very questionable. The choice of discount rates with which to establish a “present value” for liabilities and future revenue is difficult and arbitrary. There may be deficits but we don’t really know how big they are going to be because we don’t know what future wage growth, interest rates or inflation will be and differences of a single percentage point, or less, can make a huge difference to the final number. The generational economists like the long view and seek to make projections 75 years, 100 years and even 150 years ahead. They insist on isolating every generation from its predecessor and successor, yet that is not how life is lived. Parents and those of their generation pay for the upbringing and education of children and the generational economists do not even try to take this into account. Generational economists and privatisers, an overlapping but not identical category, like to argue that today’s worker, paying his or her payroll tax (social security contribution), is making a bad investment since they are not likely to get a good rate of return. But if they considered their payroll tax as a way of paying the pensions of their parents and those Peter Laslett called their “predecessors at large,” then there would be no reason to expect a rate of return.\(^{18}\)

The reasoning of the partisans of generational solidarity is to be preferred to that of the supporters of generational economics but is flawed nonetheless. Each generation has a right and duty to revise the social arrangements it finds in place. While they have obligations to their parents’ generation these are not limitless. Talk of a literal generational compact would be wrong since the newborn find many choices already made on their behalf. The debate on John Rawls’s philosophy of justice provoked Brian Barry to bring out the inter-generational dimension this should acquire. He writes: “the key here is a willingness to claim and be claimed upon in virtue of a given principle. Justice must be fair from both sides… The point here is that we should think not of a choice made by a particular generation at a single point in time but of a collaboration over many generations in a common scheme of justice.”\(^{19}\)

I think that such conclusions invite us to come up with formulas for the equal sharing of the burdens of an ageing society – and, given the probability that these might be considerable, to find appropriate fiscal innovations to meet them. The fair sharing of burdens requires that overall pension provision should be adjusted so that the ratio of pensioner incomes to average incomes is held broadly constant. At the present time in Europe and North America the overall income of the average pensioner is a little over 70 percent of average income. These averages do not, of course, tell us about inequality between pensioners, or in society at large. But they do indicate a generational ratio, with the retired having lesser outgoings than those with the responsibility of growing families. To maintain something like this overall ratio, while improving intra-generational distribution, could be seen as a scheme of intergenerational justice. To do so would require
a raising of future contribution rates but also, perhaps, a greater effort to pre-fund tomorrow’s pensions by raising savings rates and obliging employers to contribute more effectively – the employers’ contribution has plummeted with the switch from “defined benefit” to “defined contribution” schemes.

The last three decades have seen a sharp rise in inequality in most of the leading capitalist states, especially in the United Kingdom and U.S. It is quite possible to address the issue of generational equity and yet also tackle the issue of a more equal distribution within pensioner incomes and average incomes. Traditionally all public pension schemes have involved an element of redistribution from rich to poor, even if many still allowed those who had contributed more to receive a somewhat higher entitlement. Commercial pre-funded schemes obviously make no attempt at such redistribution though they do incorporate some risk-pooling. When some proponents of “generational solidarity” claim that all pre-funding is inimical to redistribution they are wrong. For example restoration of the employers’ contribution could help to build a pension reserve pledged to supplying secondary pensions to all. The famous baby-boomers also still have some time to build up a reserve so that all the costs of their future pensions will not have to be met from payroll taxes alone. Should the baby-boomers bear some of the consequences for having fewer children? It would be unfair to see the plunging birth rate in the 1970s as simply a preference for consumption over child-rearing, since it also reflected the squeeze on earners and women’s greater participation in the labour force. However the baby-boomers have great political clout and they would be wise to anticipate the costs of ageing.

The Costs of the Ageing Society

Ageing will mean that a quarter of the population will be over sixty-five in all the large EU states within twenty five years and some way should be found of ensuring that their retirement income gives them an appropriate share of GDP – if their incomes are to be 70 percent of average income then this would amount to something in the range 13-16 percent of GDP. The onset of ageing is likely to be somewhat slower in the United States than in Europe because the U.S. birth rate is higher, immigration is higher and life expectancy among the black and hispanic minorities is still considerably below that of the white population. Nevertheless the number of those aged 65 or over is set to rise from 36 million in 2003 to 70 million in 2032, or from 12 percent of the total population to 20 percent of the total. The trustees of the Social Security system warn that it will be unable to pay promised pensions by 2042 and that it faces a cumulative deficit of $3.5 trillion by the latter part of the century. The Medicare programme which supplies medical care to the elderly faces a projected deficit that is about three times as large.
Coping with the costs of an ageing populations is by no means a problem just for rich societies. By 2050 the UN Population Division expects there to be two billion persons aged sixty or over worldwide, with 1.6 billion of these in the less developed countries. Ageing is most marked in Europe and Asia but it is advancing elsewhere too. By 2050 the size of this older group in Africa is set to quadruple to reach 207 million, comprising 10.3 percent of total population. Africa will have more older persons than Latin America and the Caribbean (with 187 million aged sixty and over), and nearly as many as Europe (with 229 million of that age). By 2050 Asia, a category that includes India and China, is expected to have no less than 1,249 million older persons, comprising 24 percent of the population.

It is often claimed that the ageing of the population can be offset by immigration. The projections I have quoted assume the continuation of current trends in migration. While migration flows can mitigate the ageing effect on a country-by-country basis, they cannot, of course, reduce the ageing of the global population.

Today women comprise 55 percent of those aged sixty and above worldwide, 65 percent of those aged sixty plus in North America and 70 percent of those aged sixty plus in Europe. World-wide women comprised 63.5 percent of those aged eighty and above in 2005, a figure that is expected to drop slightly to 61.4 percent by 2050. The frail and vulnerable “old old” are the most rapidly growing age cohort in all parts of the world. There were 88 million persons aged eighty and above worldwide in 2005, a figure that is projected to rise to 402 million by 2050 according to the UN Population Division mid-range projections. Already in 2040 there will be 98 million persons aged eighty plus in China, 47 million in India and 13 million in Brazil.

Demographic projections were first employed as an aid to pension policy in the United States in the early years of the Social Security programme. The trustees of the U.S. Social Security are obliged to produce regular assessments of the financial health of the scheme, examining both its future obligations and its likely revenues in decades to come – ranging from ten or twenty years ahead to as far as the seventy-five year horizon. While the U.S. was early to practice such forward-looking assessments they were limited to the public programme – no attempt was made to assess the likely future performance of the private sector of the mixed public/private pension regime.

In 2004 Britain’s newly-established Pensions Commission decided to the country’s pension prospects in the round. To have only scrutinised state provision would have been to ignore the important role which public policy had assigned to the private sector. So the rationale for including an estimate of future private pension provision was that this would highlight the overall financial situation of those of pensionable age. Private pensions received a handsome public subsidy – as noted above worth about £14 billion net in 2004 – and that it was right to investigate how effective this was likely to be.
Britain has a historically mean state pension so, at the then-prevailing levels of entitlement in 2004, it would absorb little future national income – only about 4.4 percent of GDP by 2050. It was estimated private provision looked unlikely to supply more than about 4 percent of GDP, and a raising of the effective age at which workers retire could add, at most, two percentage points. The United Kingdom Pension Commission estimated that to maintain pensioners’ current relative income in 2050 would require 13.9 percent of GDP assuming that women’s retirement age was the same as men’s by 2020, as planned. In order to arrive at this figure the Pensions Commission estimated the likely future yield of private funded pensions of all types would amount to only between 2.1 and 2.6 percent of future GDP. However if the existing generous “early retirement” provisions were phased out and all retirement income drawn down after sixty-five then this contribution of private pensions could rise to 3.4 to 4.2 percent of GDP.20

In addition to pension income from all sources, some of those of pensionable age also have earnings from continuing employment. The United Kingdom Pensions Commission was optimistic about raising the average age of retirement from around sixty-two years at present to sixty-eight years in future decades. Those aged over sixty-five might earn as much as 2 percent of GDP from continuing employment to add to their other entitlements. But the Commission still found a gap of over 4 percent of GDP – a very large sum – between what those of pensionable age are likely to receive and what they need to receive if their relative position is not to decline sharply. The consequent pensioner poverty will also be exacerbated by the fact that pensions and savings will be very unequally distributed amongst those of pensionable age. Many – the majority – will suffer a drastic drop in living standards – unless something is done. The United Kingdom government has legislated to raise the statutory retiring age to sixty-eight by 2050. This reduces state pension liabilities but if older employees still find difficulty in finding jobs then it will either plunge them into poverty or transfer them to a relief programme. In the hope of making up for potential shortfalls the government has also introduced “personal accounts” as part of a new savings scheme in which all employees – other than those already in a good occupational scheme – will be automatically enrolled (though they can opt out if they wish). The new scheme requires contributions from employers of 3 percent of salary and from employees themselves of 5 percent of salary. If the new arrangements are successful then will raise about 0.7 percent of GDP by 2050. Helpful as that would be it shows that more needs to be done (about which more below).

José Almunia, the European Union’s Finance Commissioner, carried out a similar broad brush exercise looking at programmes for the ageing society for the EU in a 2006 report. So far as pension provision is concerned the report predicted a steadily declining per capita benefit ratio as the numbers of those over sixty-five doubles between 2005 and 2050 while pension provision as a proportion of GDP only manages to rise from 10.8 percent in 2004 to 12.9 percent in 2050. The report included a projection of private
as well as public pension provision,\textsuperscript{21} but still found a revenue shortfall given current tax provisions.

As already noted U.S. official bodies do not seek to estimate the future contribution of private pensions to the income needs of the retired. However in my recent book, \textit{Age Shock: How Finance is Failing Us}, I am able to use a debate on CBO projections to extrapolate an estimate of projected income from approved retirement savings such as IRAs and 401(k)s. These predictions show private pensions amounting to 2.5 percent of GDP at their high-point (in 2018) and declining to no more than 1.5 percent of GDP by the 2030s.\textsuperscript{22} This compares with the 5 percent of GDP that will be supplied by Social Security old age pensions in 2030 and the 14-15 percent that would be needed overall simply to maintain senior incomes at today’s level relative to average income. The pension schemes of public sector workers would add a further 1 percent of GDP (so long as they are successfully defended). And the earnings of the over 65s might supply as much as a further 2 percent. But overall U.S. retirement incomes will be about 3-4 percent shy of what will be needed simply to ensure that average senior incomes do not fall behind the expected rise in national prosperity. A shortfall of this size will mean that the majority of seniors are living on less than 50 percent of average income. My attempt to estimate potential future revenue from privately funded pensions is certainly rough and ready, based, as it is, on projections of tax to be raised on these revenues. Commercial suppliers are happy to some up with a rosy prospectus for their customers but since the private sector garners so much tax relief it would be good to have a thorough, research-based estimate of their likely future contribution.

Demographic projections make assumptions about continued ageing of the population that reflect current trends. Europe’s well-established ageing trend is rooted in low fertility as much as increased life expectancy. In both old and new member states women are having less than two children each. In Italy, Poland, Germany and Spain average lifetime fertility in 2000 was only 1.2 to 1.3 children per woman. In Scandinavia and France, where governments have made an effort to frame child-friendly policies, it was a little above 1.7.\textsuperscript{23} While some of this decline represents women’s desire to escape from the burden of multiple child-rearing most women would still like to have at least two children. If good child-care was widely available and cheap, and if there was generous maternity and paternity leave, it could encourage women to have more children. Child-friendly policies also generate employment but they have to be publicly subsidised. Such policies should be pursued for their own sake as well as because they may somewhat moderate – but not reverse – the ageing trend. But it will remain the case that having children is expensive and that many women will wish to delay child-birth, both considerations tending to smaller families.

It is wrong to think there can be a costless solutions to the problems of the ageing society. Compulsory retirement should end and employers’ prejudices against older employees
should be challenged. But the extra time at work in later life is likely simply to offset later entry to the workforce and increasing numbers of career breaks, occasioned by re-training and parenthood. “Active ageing” policies will encourage those who have retired from their main lifetime occupation to find more fulfilling or flexible work, perhaps on a voluntary basis, but is unlikely to maintain anything like peak earnings. Education and training to ensure a productive “third age” will require new social investments. ²⁴

Existing population projections already assume the maintenance of immigration at current rates. Further increasing the numbers of immigrants is desirable in itself, helping to foster a more multi-cultural society and enshrining a right to freedom of movement which we all cherish. But it will not have much impact on the ageing trend since immigrant populations swiftly adopt the demographic profile of the host populations, with greater longevity and lower fertility. This means that ever larger numbers of migrants are needed to lower the population’s age profile. In order to maintain the ratio between workers and pensioners constant at the 1995 level between 2000 and 2050 it would be necessary to find enough immigrants to raise Europe’s population to more than a billion. But if the EU population is to triple in size this will create as many economic problems as it solves, requiring huge physical infrastructure investments. ²⁵ While immigration can contribute something to meeting the costs of the ageing society in the advanced countries we should also bear in mind the needs of the developing countries which will not wish to lose all their expensively educated and trained workforce. Most of these countries have ageing populations themselves, as we have seen. At the very least much greater provision should be made for the remittance of immigrant earnings to their countries of origin, which have borne the costs of their upbringing and education.

Policy Implications

Europe will have to pay for proper old age and health protection – and must do this at the same time as paying for child-friendly policies and more expenditure on education and research. The Anglo-American path of individualisation and commercialisation generates heavy costs of its own and leads to 2–3 percent of GDP being absorbed by intense marketing and the exorbitant salaries of the financial sector. There is a need to find other ways to finance needed social programmes. Following earlier setbacks to the “reform” project, which saw defeats for Juppé, Berlusconi and Kohl, more limited measures were enacted by Dini in Italy, Raffarin in France and Schroeder in Germany. These slashed entitlements located decades in the future while preserving those of workers over forty. So these cutbacks will hit those who retire in 2025 and after. Often those who will lose out continue to pay heavily into a social insurance system that will give them pensions that will replace less than a half of their previous salary instead of the 70 percent or more which
current retirees in much of Europe still receive. Because they leave large entitlements in place for a decade or two further installments of reform are still being negotiated.

We have seen that in the United Kingdom likely pension provision from all sources in 2050 will still fall short by several percent of GDP, measured against what would be needed simply to maintain pensioner incomes at about 70-75 percent of average incomes. The cumulative impact of pension reform over several decades will be to open up a similar gap in European provision, with the state pension still a little more generous than in the United Kingdom but with private coverage in most countries (apart from the Netherlands) being more modest. Early indications from the new member states of the EU who have adopted commercial fund management suggests that there will be disappointments here too. In Hungary and Poland heavy charges prevented any accumulation in the first three years of the new pension funds. It is also difficult to ensure universal coverage for private funded pensions where there are wide disparities in wage and salary levels. Compulsory contributions are usually not appropriate for those in debt because they will be paying much greater interest on the debt than they earn on their savings. In the United Kingdom overall indebtedness is now running at 130 percent of disposable income. Low paid workers with family responsibilities would often suffer hardship if they are also forced to make payments to a compulsory share-purchase scheme. These are problems which lie in store as Europe goes further down the path of Anglo-Saxon economics and welfare.

Pension rights are rooted in the arrangements to be found in specific territories, whether nation states or federations like the European Union. Notwithstanding globalisation, states still furnish the essential framework for trade, capital flows, taxation and welfare. Corporations that need access to specific resources and markets – especially important ones such as the United States, the European Union, Japan or China – can be obliged to pay for this, or to conform to rules established by the relevant authority. But governments have let large corporations off lightly as they contribute less and less, whether in taxes or contributions, to employee welfare.

The best way to restore faith in the future and to mend pension deficits is to find ways of obliging all corporations to contribute but in a way that does not tie the employee to the fluctuating fortunes of their own particular employer nor subtract from the resources they need for investment. Disproportions between age cohorts, whether caused by baby booms or rising longevity, do pose a problem, as we have seen. Existing pay-as-you-go pension regimes certainly still have a vital role to play in pension provision, because they are highly cost-effective and because they have considerable public understanding and acceptance. But placing the whole burden on payroll taxes is unwise and potentially undermines other aspects of a well-functioning economic order.

For the last two decades the core states of the European Union have unsuccessfully grappled with abnormally high unemployment. The deliberately deflationary policies
PENSION RIGHTS AND PENSION FINANCE IN THE AGEING SOCIETY

adopted at Maastricht in 1992 and by the European Central Bank, are certainly to blame for this. But pay-as-you-go systems have also weakened demand and raised labour costs. Payroll taxes are generally not “progressive.” They fall heavily on workers earning only average or low salaries. Laying a “tax wedge” of 40 percent on average incomes they consequently weaken demand and discourage high rates of employment. With officially-recognised unemployment running at 10 percent, and many of the unemployed not even getting on the register, certain categories of the population – above all the under-25s and the over-50s – have been condemned to poverty and idleness. Not surprisingly the demagogues of the far right have often flourished in these conditions.

If we compare the U.S. and United Kingdom with Europe we find that the different socio-economic regimes generate different types of unemployment. The company-specific formula of corporate welfare provision which flourishes in the Anglo-Saxon countries has destroyed good jobs in manufacturing and exposed employees to sponsor risk (if their employer goes bankrupt they suffer benefit loss too). Europe’s high “payroll taxes” have been consistent with manufacturing strength and the protection of good jobs. But overall they weaken demand and deter the creation of formal jobs in the service sector, helping to explain why employment rates amongst those aged 18-65 are 10 to 15 percentage points lower than in the U.S. or United Kingdom, according to 2002 data of the Directorate General of the EU. In practice unemployment has been concentrated amongst younger workers and older workers, but eventually almost everyone falls into these categories and they find their contribution record impaired. Europe faces a severe ageing shock and is not prepared for it. The problem is no longer that the pension burden will be too heavy and has instead become that there is likely to be a return to widespread old age poverty in a decade or two as pay-as-you-go systems buckle under the strain. What is needed is the establishment of social funds which could help to meet pension needs.

The Share Levy: A New Way to Finance Future Pensions?

It is now some time since governments dared to ask the owners of the large corporations to contribute more to the wider society, without which their own profits would be impossible. The most far-seeing attempt to think through the types of new finance that would be needed to guarantee generous social provision was the advocacy of “wage-earner funds” in the 1970s and 1980s by Rudolf Meidner, chief economist of the main Swedish trade union federation (LO) and co-architect – with Gosta Rehn – of the Swedish welfare system.

Of all the EU states the one that historically sought to ensure good benefits with low unemployment is Sweden. A distinguishing feature of the Rehn/Meidner model was that it embraced pre-funding for supplementary pensions on top of the basic state pension.
Sweden enacted a funded supplementary state pension in 1959. It also incorporated a wage-bargaining round that helped to protect high employment levels. Corporate taxation also strove to be “counter-cyclical,” that is to moderate the impact of economic fluctuations and the trade cycle. Whereas Anglo-Saxon companies are encouraged to take “contribution holidays” during upswings of the trade cycle Swedish corporations were, and are, encouraged to stow operating profits in special tax-exempt reserves.

Anticipating the new social expenditures that would be entailed by an ageing and learning society Meidner came to believe in the need to set up strategic social funds – “wage-earner funds” – to be financed by a share levy. This did not work like traditional corporate taxation which subtracts from cash-flow, and, potentially, investment. Instead Meidner’s levy falls on wealthy shareholders, the value of whose holdings is diluted, not on the resources of the corporation as a productive concern. According to the original plan every company with more than fifty employees was obliged to issue new shares every year equivalent to 20 percent of its profits. The newly issued shares – which could not be sold for several years – were to be given to a network of “wage-earner funds,” representing trade unions and local authorities. The latter would hold the shares, and reinvest the income they yielded from dividends, in order to finance future social expenditure. As the wage earner funds grew they would be able to play an increasing part in directing policy in the corporations which they owned. Meidner was himself a refugee from Nazi Germany and his ideas echo the debates among German leftwing socialists concerning the best way collectively to re-appropriate the surplus value extracted by the circuit of capitalist accumulation (vertfassung). While Meidner did not single out pension provision his share levy set up a claim on future output that could meet future anticipated deficits such as currently plague both public and private pension systems. However it would required patience and discipline because the levy would re-direct rentier income to future needs not current consumption.

Meidner’s visionary scheme was attractive to many trade unionists and members of the Social Democratic Party but strongly opposed by the privately owned media, and by the “20 families” who dominated the country’s large corporations. The family cartels quickly grasped that the levy would threaten their control. Attacks on the scheme claimed that it would aggrandize the trade unions leaders who would dominate the “wage-earner funds.” It was also alleged that the scheme unfairly favoured employees in the private sector, since they were to be the first to receive shares from the levy. After a scare campaign the Social Democratic government eventually diluted the proposed share levy but set up social funds financed by a more modest profits-related tax. These came to own 7 percent of the Swedish stock market but, to prevent them getting any larger, were wound up by the incoming Conservatives in 1992. The already accumulated assets were used to finance a string of scientific research institutes, which at least helped to propel Sweden to the forefront of the knowledge-based economy. But the sharp financial crisis of the early
nineties led Swedish politicians to abandon much of its historic defined benefit pension provision and to replace it with a “notional” defined contribution system that achieves projected economies at the cost of reduced living standards for pensioners.

David Lockwood has pointed out that the fiscal regimes which prevail in modern capitalist states are often highly complex and that they create winners and losers in opaque ways that appear to cut across the lines of class conflict, as classically conceived. The majority of voters are cautious about proposals for higher taxes, even if these are supposedly progressive in character, fearing that they will in the end catch many on middling incomes and that the rich will know how to evade them. While there is at least a keen awareness of tax issues there is much less understanding of how tax relief works. In the United Kingdom in 2002-2003 net tax relief on pension savings cost the public purse £13 billion, or more than 1 percent of GDP. While more than half the workforce gain something from this relief, 51 percent of the total sum accrued to the top 10 percent of earners and 67 percent to the top 20 percent. Although the majority of adults now own some shares, especially via pension funds, there is still a very great concentration of share-holding wealth amongst the richest tenth and richest 1 percent. Any proposal to tax shares, or dilute their value, would lead the wealthy to pose as the champions of a broad coalition. I have drawn attention to pension deficits, yet here too Lockwood’s caveat would apply: “Fiscal deficits are neither socially transparent nor class specific.”

Yet the prospect of pension deficits has inspired huge social movements and has toppled governments in Europe over the last decade. These movements brought together members of several generations, with groups of workers often playing a key role. In the U.S. the American Association of Retired Person (AARP) has joined in defending the Social Security Old Age Pension – but those aged between 30 and 55 have been just as hostile to privatisation. The “grey vote” is a growing factor – 42 percent of those who voted in the British general election of 2005 were aged 55 or over. There have not been many “grey” parties but nevertheless pension issues are taken seriously across the political spectrum (most recently in Germany by both government and opposition). Implicitly or explicitly these movements in defence of pension rights appeal to an ideal of the nation and its citizens as a sort of extended family which demands decent treatment of all those whose past effort and sacrifice have built and defended the national “home” (to use a Swedish locution). These movements are thus civic, national and in a sense “proletarian.” The proletarians in ancient Rome were those who produced sons and daughters – it was their labours, in their widest sense, which reproduced the Republic. Certainly pensions will not survive the time when there are no longer any children and, as Samuelson forecast, the members of the last generation will die a lonely and comfortless death.

The movements to defend pension rights have had a purely defensive character. This has been a strength and a weakness. But generational solidarity is likely to be unsustainable – or to be worn down by disappointment – unless it finds a way to tax the greatest
concentrations of wealth in present-day capitalist society, as Meidner proposed. It is noteworthy that citizens of today’s capitalist democracies pay tax on the houses they live in but large-scale owners of shares pay nothing for the power this gives them. If existing taxes are required to cover all the escalating costs of the ageing society then this will compete with other claims on the public purse (education, health, child-care) and it will raise tax rates in a way that is counter-productive, actually lowering the eventual yield.

I have elsewhere shown that in both the U.S. and the United Kingdom a Meidner-style share levy calculated at 10 percent of profits would, over 26 years, raise a total fund worth $10 trillion in the U.S. and £1 trillion in the United Kingdom, and that in both cases such a fund could augment resources needed for pension provision by 2 percent of GDP. These calculations allow compensation to be paid to all *bona fide* pension funds for the dilution of the share holdings. It is also anticipated that the new regional network of pension funds would ally with small investors in a campaign to restore good corporate governance. Meidner advocated the setting up of a network of accountable social funds. It is interesting to see that governments that feel able to do so are setting up “Future” funds (as in Australia) or State Pension Funds (as in Norway). Singapore has long had a Provident Fund and China is exploring a similar fund to be financed by a type of share levy.

With the coming retirement of the baby-boomers, the cost of pension and health care will grow steeply. Politicians fear the electoral consequences if they raise taxes just as much as they fear the backlash if they cut pension entitlements. Some might see the advantage of a share levy. But many will hesitate because it would target a supremely influential group – the capitalist class – and might presage the advent of a new type of collective ownership. A share levy remains a rather good match for looming pension deficits but as a forecaster one would have to be cautious and say that it will not be tried until all else has failed.

Historically pension provision has been tackled almost exclusively as an issue for national policy. At that level it has proved very successful at mitigating poverty and winning public support. However there is every reason to believe that the principles of good pension provision – especially in the form of “social pensions” – would be very effective if applied at international level too. I have myself urged that a global pension set at no more than a dollar a day could prove highly effective at lifting from poverty several hundred million older persons – say those over sixty in developing countries and over sixty-five in the OECD countries. The South African government has already shown that it is possible to furnish such modest pensions at little cost and with great benefit not just to the direct recipients but to that of other family members. As we look to strengthen pension provision on a national and regional scale in Europe or North America we should also seek to address the global scope of ageing costs.


National Cases
The German Welfare State and Its Transformation, 1900-1945

Marcus Gräser

The welfare state is one of the great continuities of twentieth-century German history. At first glance, it appears that none of the century’s great caesuras permanently interrupted its transformation from the former liberal state,¹ into a welfare state rooted in municipal welfare politics and accelerated by Bismarck’s introduction of social insurance in the 1880s. Indeed, World War I and the ensuing revolution of 1918-1919 brought about a significant expansion of welfare policies, especially for disabled war veterans, their surviving dependents and the unemployed. The constitution of the newly founded Weimar Republic explicitly made welfare and social politics the duty of the state and paved the way in 1924 for both the basic law of public assistance and the youth welfare law. The legitimacy of the Weimar Republic was based on the promise that, in the long run, the state is responsible for the well-being of its (needy) citizens. The Nazi idea of the state, however, was quite different, and some of the responsibilities taken over by the Weimar welfare state were downsized. Most significantly, the state’s commitment to public housing, a cornerstone of the Weimar Republic, was nearly abandoned by state and municipal Nazi governments of the German Reich. Between 1919 and 1932, nearly 80 percent of newly erected houses were built or subsidized by public authorities. After 1933, this proportion dwindled to 10 percent.²

The Nazis did, however, maintain the three pillars of the welfare state: social insurance, provision for war veterans and public assistance. In 1945, while most of Germany was in ruins, the essential laws of public welfare remained intact. Any attempt made by the Allied military government in West Germany to replace the traditional, socially differentiated social insurance system with one that was uniformly administered failed due to massive opposition from just about every interest group and expert. Other reasons for a failure to break with Germany’s welfare tradition after 1945 included, of course, the tremendous social problems that followed the war. This made it difficult to transform one of its few remaining and stable institutions, i.e. social security. Any groundbreaking change to the German trajectory of welfare state-building was also hampered by the fact that state-
guaranteed social security was a source of pride for the German people. The stability of democratic West Germany after 1949 was unarguably due to the so-called “economic miracle” of the 1950s. However, one should not underestimate the socially pacifying and economic effects of the reconstructed and expanding welfare state that followed the course of the social policies under Bismarck and the Weimar Republic, providing for a (moderate) redistribution of growing national wealth.

The major pension reform of 1957 instituted a pension linked to wages and effectively did away with poverty among the elderly (particularly widespread among widows). At the end of the 1950s, Germany’s welfare state thus seemed to be both more generous and more efficient than the internationally-acclaimed British welfare state designed by William Beveridge in the early 1940s and established by Clement Attlee’s Labour government after the war. Germans took their welfare state so much for granted that “state” and “welfare state” became synonymous terms, especially during the “golden era” of the welfare state between 1950 and 1975. The unification of the two German states in 1990 was much more than just a constitutional process: it was, and still is, a huge transfer of West German welfare standards and benefits to East Germany. The Sozialeinheit (i.e. the elevation of East Germany’s welfare state) was intended not only to facilitate the transition from a centrally-planned economy into a capitalist market economy, but also to provide social legitimation for the new democracy. However, the transfer of generous welfare-state standards and benefits has only added to the impression of an enduring financial crisis of the German welfare state.

Considering Germany’s disastrous history before 1945, is it even possible to speak of a German success story regarding welfare statism? Can the welfare state be compatible with both democracy and dictatorship? And is it then possible to speak of a Nazi welfare state? This is no small matter, since it calls “into question that identification of modernity and emancipation which underlies much of the historiography of the modern welfare state – and the welfare state itself.” The “whiggish,” or social-democratic, historiography of the welfare state cannot deny the existence of a substantial nexus between progress (i.e. emancipation, democracy, etc.) and the institutionalization of social security through the welfare state (or, at least, the welfare city). A certain amount of social security seems required to be a responsible and active citizen. Yet, this “progressive” reading of welfare state-building has been questioned from neo-Marxist and Foucault-inspired perspectives, which see the welfare state as, respectively, a functionalist trick of capitalism (“saving capitalism from itself”) or as a (close to) perfect machine of social control. From these points of view, an “elective affinity” between fascism, capitalism and welfare has seemed quite natural.

But what happened to the welfare state during the reign of the Nazis? Did they put an emphasis on welfare? Or did they transform the state and its functions in a way that deprived the welfare state of its substance? In fact, no political regime in Germany during
the first half of the twentieth century (the late Empire, Weimar democracy, or National Socialism) could risk losing the presupposed interconnectivity between a minimum of social security and the political loyalty of the masses. Social insurance in Germany was funded not by taxes but by contributions from both employers and employees. This setup, as well as the established “inter-generation contract” in the pension insurance, was flexible and robust enough to outlive political regime changes and economic crises. Its solid character was underlined by the fact that the expectation of the state as the major guarantor of social security was the result not only of the early invention of social insurance (with respect to other countries), but also a tradition of a “strong and visible state.” Welfare politics in Germany had always been more than mere politics or policies; it was (and perhaps still is) the essence and core of German “statism.”

This significant degree of institutional and mental continuity should not however hide the profound impact that Nazi rule had on the function and purpose of the existing welfare state. The present essay offers observations and arguments to help understand the fate of the welfare state in the context of both democracy and dictatorship in Germany. First, the substance of the German welfare state as it emerged between 1880 and 1927-1933 will be described. This will be followed by an analysis of the welfare state’s transformation during the Nazi dictatorship, with a subsequent consideration of whether or not this transformation can also be explained with reference to the logic of the evolving welfare state, and not just the Nazi takeover. The final section will center on a discussion of a recently published and heavily debated book by Götz Aly that deals with the intricate question of whether Hitler’s Volksstaat (People’s State) provided substantial enhancement to welfare politics and therefore served as a blueprint or a foundation for the subsequent welfare state of the democratic Federal Republic of Germany after 1949.

Most of the literature on the origins of the German welfare state has followed the international “modernization theory” trend, which emphasizes the impact of industrialization, the amount of social unrest, the roles of the social-democratic movement and the trade unions, and the bureaucratic and institutional legacy of eighteenth-century Germany’s enlightened absolutism. What should instead be analyzed as conditions or prerequisites was skewed by the modernization theory into a scheme of challenge and response: the strong and early welfare state was, according to these theorists, the logical response to the complexity of an industrialized and bureaucratized Germany. But within that framework of research, the mediation between challenge and response, that is, the real process of policy making, lies more in the shadows. What is purported to be a logical response actually comes out more like a mélange with some factors appearing highly mechanical. The strong and early German welfare state may serve as an illustration for modernization theory, but that theory does not necessarily “explain” in a subtle and precise way its emergence and shape.
Perhaps it would be best to define “welfare” in the first place. George Herbert Mead once described social reform as the “application of intelligence to the control of social conditions,” and this approach can serve as a basic element for explaining some of the processes that lead to a welfare state. In this sense, welfare state-building in Germany has been much more than just a chain of social insurance and public assistance. Welfare politics and social reform make up the everyday work of society-making, and the welfare state is an essential part of nation-building – especially in Germany where, from a comparative perspective, a (latecomer) nation-state coincided with an early welfare state.

This entanglement of welfare and nation makes it plausible to characterize the German welfare state as one of the most complex systems of exchange relationships in modern societies. The subjects of the exchanges are in some cases transparent and rational, like transfer payments in social insurance or health information in adult-education classes. In other cases, they are much more hidden and widespread: friendly visits from the local poor-relief official and personal loyalty; worker’s protection laws and loyalty to workplace and company; social insurance and national loyalty; child care and national efficiency, etc. The welfare state is in no way one-dimensional and always a matter of reciprocity.

Up until the end of the Weimar Republic this web of reciprocity and the function of welfare as mediation – between top and bottom, haves and have-nots – necessarily assigned duties to the middle class as a “middling” class. The middle class in Germany – the Bürgertum – saw itself as a force of mediation and took pride in this. No welfare state-building existed without the eminent figure of the middle-class social reformer! This reformer, male or female, took over the position of mediator between the poles of modern-industrialized and class-based societies – working class, ruling class, labor, capital, state. Furthermore, the praxis of middle-class social reform can be described as a very subjective attempt to mediate between middle-class norms and the habits of the poor that are contrary to those norms. But the middle class was not a static entity and did not enter that mediating relationship with the poor as a “definite” social group. Social reform, the production of welfare in a broad sense or, even more generally, the everyday engagement with poverty (and the risks of becoming poor), should be considered an essential part of the formation of the middle class. The typical middle-class ideal of conduct or way of life – independence and efficiency – emerged (and kept emerging, in the sense of a permanent process of class formation) in contrast to poverty and in a face-to-face interaction with the urban poor and their habits of dependency and indigence.

During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the German middle class maintained a powerful position in the city. Their influence, especially their domination of city councils and socially-homogenous municipal bureaucracies was not the result of a middle-class majority in the urban populations but rather a class-based and unjust system of municipal elections. Enlightened middle-class social reformers knew that this kind of municipal rule would soon end – in revolution or reform. But it was perhaps
this mixture of melancholy foreknowledge about the end of the middle-class “majority” and the influential position of middle-class reformers inside municipal parliament and bureaucracy that stimulated and shaped so many innovations and large-scale programs in municipal welfare politics. The relationship between middle-class reformers and the reform-executing municipal bureaucracy was a fluid one. At the very least, the municipal bureaucracy itself could be described as “social reformist.”

Seen from this point of view, it seems inadequate to focus solely on the “state.” In fact, the German welfare state did not emerge as a “state” but as a “welfare city.” The transformation of the old, pre-modern poor relief into the multifaceted municipal welfare system happened at the very moment when the German states, especially Prussia, started their own state-wide policies to fight poverty (i.e. state-wide residency requirements, etc.). This transformation was a result of the new competition between city and state. Both the municipal welfare systems and the private welfare societies could be considered defences of city-based poverty and especially the privileged relationship between the poor and the urban middle class (which saw itself as the natural ruling class of the city). That relationship, the deference of the poor and the emphasized independence of the middle class combined to serve a “pool of power.” The urban middle class was unwilling to share this source of loyalty and order with the German states (and afterwards the nation-state), which attempted to create their own “pool of loyalty” via welfare politics.

From the perspective of the “welfare city,” the Bismarckian policy of social insurance from the 1880s was not the initiation or “birth certificate” of the German welfare state. Instead it was just another, though certainly very important, step in the process of welfare state-building. Moreover, from the perspective of the urban middle class, the strong opposition to “statism,” social insurance and state intervention into society on the part of left-wing liberals was unsurprising considering they were usually the ones to act as spokespersons for city governments. Rather than a simple laissez-faire attitude, their opposition was the precise and sensitive reflex of power politics. Representatives of the urban middle class – in both city governments and the Reichstag, the German parliament – realized that the nationwide social insurance policy, with its anticipated national bureaucracy, would lead to a kind of drainage of the city-based system of helping and dominating the poor (among both the lower and working classes). Indeed, the Bismarckian policy must not only (perhaps not even mainly) be seen as it has often been described, that is, as an attempt to fight the increasing influence, however small at the time, of the outlawed Social Democratic Party and some of the radical trade unions. It must also be seen as an attack on one of the main policy arenas of the cities, a stronghold of the left-wing liberals, whom Bismarck considered his foes and who in the 1880s – especially because of their control of most of the big city governments – were much more powerful than the Social Democrats.
The system of public and private welfare in the cities certainly did not lose all of its functions and power when nationwide social insurance increased its coverage of some of the most common risks of getting poor. In fact, a far-reaching competition emerged. Not only did the cities hang on to their own cherished system of municipal welfare, but they even expanded it by constantly “discovering” and immediately including new risks and new groups of dependent people. The political rivalry between the relatively independent and liberal cities, on the one hand, and the conservative state, on the other, led to welfare competition. From 1900 on, both sides eagerly found a new clientele and created new welfare programs. The cities uncovered bedraggled and jeopardized youth and the housing situation as new fields of action, while the state successively broadened the scope of working men’s social insurance to include immediate family and a growing number of white-collar employees. That kind of innovation by competition continued even in the years of World War I and the first years of the Weimar Republic. City and state were pathetically bound together in those years by the aim of keeping the population fit, efficient and loyal in times of war and defeat.

Instead of foregrounding the great forces of modernization – industrialization, bureaucratization, democratization, the rise of the labor movement – it would be more appropriate to explain the formation of the German welfare state with reference to the power struggle between state bureaucracy, on the one side, and the cities as strongholds of the left-wing liberals, and increasingly the Social Democrats after 1900, on the other. The German welfare state must be explained as an ensemble of interacting agents and concepts. The German way of state-building via central administrative control is in fact a keystone for explaining the German path toward the welfare state from a comparative perspective. Whereas the American system of central legislative control of cities through state assemblies has not allowed for any dynamic relationship between state and city, the German development in the nineteenth century can be described as a dialectical process juxtaposing central administrative control with obstinate local identity. This would not have been possible without the heritage of bureaucratic absolutism of the eighteenth century and the concession of local self-government in the early nineteenth century. Yet, at least the effects of this process had much more to do with the power structure between state, cities, social groups and the ruling bureaucracies and middle classes of the day. This competition led to a reciprocal, escalating dynamic between a welfare state and welfare cities, a dynamic that accumulated one piece of welfare legislation or programming after the other, leading to a German welfare state that was uniquely compact before the outbreak of World War I.

The establishment of unemployment insurance in 1927 can be seen as a capstone of Germany’s welfare state. All the well-known risks of life – illness (from 1883), accidents (from 1884), old age (from 1889) and unemployment were matters of social insurance, organized and guaranteed by the state. It also arranged for the provision of disabled
persons, war veterans and the wives and children of the latter. The state and municipalities shared responsibility for the broad field of public assistance, and in the 1920s, most German cities engaged heavily in various schemes and endeavors to provide public housing.

The substance of the German welfare state was not, however, based on a density of laws and instruments and the possibility of achieving a certain level of social security for needy or jeopardized citizens. Instead, this substance can be described as the consolidation of three interwoven trends or tendencies (structural elements) that should be considered as results and incentives of welfare state-building. (For this reason, these trends are also components of a historical theory of welfare state-building, seen as a historical phenomenon – “welfare state” is not necessarily a “normative” term.)

The First Tendency

The logic of the welfare state is the logic of inclusion. At the beginning of welfare politics, only narrow and stigmatized groups of the population – the urban poor, the male factory worker – were considered proper objects of welfare politics. But the welfare state would expand to include more and more people. In particular, the interaction between the local poor relief and the state’s social insurance system led to the incremental growth of Germany’s welfare state. Health insurance at least partially covered the clientele served by municipal poor relief and thus helped reduce expenses. But municipal welfare officials were not content with reducing costs. Indeed, they successfully spent money to improve and enlarge their own relief-based system of healthcare for the poor. Due to the nationwide system of health insurance, medical fees and the cost of medicines fell, and the local welfare departments became better able to purchase medical services for the remaining poor who were not covered by insurance.

Municipal poor-relief officials and social-insurance directors even cooperated in building new hospitals. Moreover, the assets of the social-insurance funds were used for social-housing schemes, information campaigns and the propagation of measures to prevent disease. In this interaction or division of work between the traditional poor-relief system and the new social-insurance schemes, the logic of inclusion was part of an effort to close the gaps. The provision for war veterans and their families, as well as special welfare programs for those who lost their fortunes during the German hyper-inflation of 1922-1923, caused an intensification of welfare state-building. In 1925, Frankfurt welfare administrator Max Michel correctly suggested that it would no longer be possible to talk about “welfare for the lower class,” since the expansion of welfare politics in Germany had made “welfare for citizens” possible.
The Second Tendency

The transformation of the old liberal to the modern welfare state implies the transformation of a gift into a right, of charity into justice. In medieval times, and in the kind of traditional welfare privately organized by churches and bourgeois associations, care for the poor was viewed as a gift – one that was kindly provided by the (more or less) rich to the (more or less) poor. The idea that the poor were legally entitled to such help was unimaginable. Everything changed with the politics of social insurance. The contribution of workers guaranteed them a stake in, and a legal entitlement to, the benefits of social insurance. The constitution of the Weimar Republic finally made it clear that welfare benefits are a right, not a gift. Consequently, even public assistance and correctional education (in the case of minors) were considered in terms of legal entitlement, not charity.

The Third Tendency

Along with the transformation of charity into legal entitlement came an increase of clientele participation in the administration of the welfare state. From the beginning, the German welfare state was organized on the principles of decentralization and self-government, especially in the area of health insurance. Bismarck’s establishment of social insurance in the 1880s could perhaps be described as a “Bonapartist” measure, and it is certainly true that Bismarck was looking for an instrument to help him integrate the newly founded Reich (empire). But he and his advisers took the former workingmen’s cooperatives as models for the organization of social insurance. It is therefore unsurprising that shortly after the establishment of self-government in social insurance many workers and even some social democrats became officials of the health insurance funds. The democratization of German politics after 1918-1919 accelerated the democratization of the welfare state. The bureaucracy was opened to the social democratic academia and blue-collar workers could find jobs as welfare workers. Max Michel’s ideal of “welfare for citizens” materialized in two ways: welfare in the Weimar Republic was at once welfare of the people and for the people.

The Nazis did not dismantle traditional welfare-state institutions. They did not even amend the existing laws in any significant way. The Nazi transformation of the welfare state came along in the way of a “dual state,” as Ernst Fraenkel has described it, a dualistic way of retaining a state dedicated to norms and rules while at the same time establishing an ad-hoc state of arbitrary measures. The result of the interaction between these two types of politics can be described as a permanent violation of the former by the latter. The Nazis broke with all three tendencies of welfare state-building and a strong regression of the welfare state took place. The logic of inclusion was broken by a racially motivated politics of exclusion. Jews, other people considered racially “inferior,” people
with hereditary diseases or mental deficiencies and so on successively lost their legal entitlements and their stake in the welfare state as they were removed from the scope of public welfare.

This politics of exclusion was accelerated by the polycratic system of the Nazi dictatorship. The rivalry between city and state that had shaped dynamic and inclusionary welfare state-building in the years before the Great Depression was replaced, in part, by the rivalry of the different branches of the party. It was also radicalized. The successive exclusion of Jews from public welfare was not an idea handed down within the Nazi hierarchy. In some cities, such exclusion took place when radical Nazi officials tried to act as an *avant-garde* and finally succeeded in translating local practices of exclusion into central administrative decrees. The Nazis arranged for a vicious circle: by a decree effective November 19, 1938, Jews were excluded from all public assistance and had to rely on private Jewish welfare agencies instead. Only if one of these agencies became insolvent was a municipal agency to provide assistance. However, the Nazis wanted to prevent even this from being offered as a last resort, and starting on December 21, 1942, Jews were effectively cut off from any kind of public assistance. This policy sought to impoverish the Jewish population, which made Jews too poor to pay for emigration. Thus, the vicious circle was closed, since poverty served as an “argument” for their deportation.35

The degree to which the state of norms and rules was completely perverted by the state of arbitrary measures can also be shown in the extreme case of killing welfare recipients. Not a few of the children who were classified by the Nazis as racially “inferior” or “mentally deficient” were euthanized in various ways between 1939 and 1941,36 while housed in asylums. Most of the children had been sent there in keeping with the National Youth Welfare Law from 1924, which had remained unaltered. Its first article famously declared: “Every German child has a right to be educated so as to develop bodily, mental and social ability.”37

However, not only did the Nazis break with the logic of inclusion, they also cut the ties between welfare, legal entitlements and participation. They did not seek to bestow any sense of “agency” upon welfare recipients. Nazi welfare politics was shaped by the *Führerprinzip*, which aimed at eliminating the autonomy of its clientele. The dismantling of self-government in social insurance38 and the complete disenfranchisement of industrial democracy through the elimination of trade unions, worker’s participation,39 independent labor courts and mediation boards stopped all progress in democratizing the welfare state – and reversed much of it. The *Deutsche Arbeitsfront* (German Worker’s Front), the Nazi imitation of a trade union, had no direct influence on working conditions and wages. Unemployment insurance was used to fund various public-works programs and served as a source for the recapitalization of old-age insurance. Most notably, the legal claim for unemployment insurance benefits was replaced by a means test – a clear break with the old welfare state of rights and entitlements. Finally, in 1938, the *Reichsanstalt*
für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung (National Bureau of Employment Service and Unemployment Insurance), a hitherto independent agency, was turned into a subordinate instrument of the Reichsarbeitsministerium (Ministry of Labor) and used as a tool for the state’s control of Germany’s labor force. In general, the proficiency level of social insurance and public assistance remained at the low level reached during the Great Depression after 1929 and executed by the politics of Notverordnungen (emergency decrees) practiced by the last governments of the Weimar Republic.40

Well-established private and societal welfare organizations were pushed aside. The Arbeiterwohlfahrt, a social-democratic welfare organization with a huge pool of volunteers from the working class, was liquidated. Most bourgeois charity organizations came under heavy political pressure. And the newly founded Nazi welfare organization, the Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt, (National Socialist People’s Welfare, NSV) was designed to replace denominational welfare organizations such as the Protestant Innere Mission and the Catholic Caritas (but only succeeded in Austria and the Sudetenland, which were annexed by Germany in 1938).41

The great amount of personal continuity in the welfare bureaucracy of the municipalities and the state should not hide the fact that the Nazi “welfare state” was run by a new generation of technocrats. Most of the Nazi personnel who were acting as staff in institutions, organizations and at the state and municipal levels did not have a “typical” career in social reform or municipal service behind them. Most came into office as “politicos” and acted like agents of a political ideology, not as servants of an established tradition of social politics.42 Hans Günter Hockerts has asked if Robert Ley, the leader of the Deutsche Arbeitsfront, should be seen as a German version of William Beveridge, the intellectual founder of the British postwar welfare state.43 In fact, any “comparison” between Ley and Beveridge only shows that a “normal” succession of generations in welfare-state leadership was blocked in Germany after 1933. While Beveridge followed in the footsteps of the Fabians and David Lloyd George’s New Liberalism, Ley represented no tradition except the quagmire of the pre-fascist and fascist movements that had emerged in Germany after 1890.

The Nazis were correct not to use the term “welfare state” for their efforts. In their view, the “welfare state” was part of the democratic sphere of the Weimar Republic. In the guidelines for the NSV, published in July 1933, the Nazis wrote that the Weimar Republic’s effort to establish a full-fledged welfare state had brought the German people to the brink, both economically and mentally.44 This unoriginal view resembled the typical conservative and nationalistic criticism of the welfare state and its (social-democratic) utopia of a risk-free life.45 But the NSV guidelines also maintained that the welfare state had weakened the sense of responsibility within the population by generating more and more benefit recipients. The Nazis thus found the intellectual justification for renouncing inclusion and legal entitlement:
Needy citizens have to be trained not only to see their right to be supported by the people's community [Volksgemeinschaft] but also to acknowledge their commitment to improving their own situation. Their right to receive support from the people's community cannot be greater than the individual's indebtedness to the people's community.\textsuperscript{46}

From this point of view, it seems logical that the Nazis described their own idea and practice of social security as a significant step forward from “the welfare state to the work state (Arbeitsstaat)”\textsuperscript{47} Any kind of welfare or public assistance had a caveat. As one Nazi official described it, “welfare should not be compassion for the weak, but assistance for the strong, so that they become even stronger.”\textsuperscript{48} While the focus of the inclusionary welfare state had been the individual (sometimes as a member of a social group), the focus of the exclusionary Nazi Arbeitsstaat was the Volkskörper (the racial, “Arian” community). Consequently, welfare was supposed to be organized as Volkspflege, as a primarily (and racially motivated) hygienic provision for the Körper der nationalen Gemeinschaft (“the body of the national community”). As an administrative expression of that significant shift, the responsibility for public assistance within the Reichsinnenministerium (the Department of the Interior) was taken away from the Kommunalabteilung (the Bureau of Municipal Affairs) and handed over to the Gesundheitsabteilung (the Bureau of Public Health).\textsuperscript{49}

The Nazi Arbeitsstaat must be considered as a regression of the welfare state. However, there has been another quite powerful reading of the fate of the welfare state during the Nazi’s dual state of reasoned norms and arbitrary measures, at least among German historians. This interpretation holds that the turnover from inclusion to exclusion was not the result of a changing political system but, rather, a logical outcome of welfare state-building, since the welfare state was built on an illusion of omnipotence and fed on a utopia of social engineering that was bound to fail and eventually exclude anyone who was “unfit” for it.\textsuperscript{50} This interpretation errs, however, in that the cancellation of most of the eminent trends of welfare state-building – inclusion, legal entitlements, participation – was not initiated from within but was the result of independent developments. The welfare state was not responsible for the racist transformation of welfare politics, the Nazis were.\textsuperscript{51}

It would nevertheless be wrong to paint the world of the German welfare state in perfect, “whiggish” or social-democratic colors and only blame the Nazis and their attack on it. It is true that the change of the political texture finally transformed the welfare state into a racist and exclusionary system of social security. But it cannot be overlooked that the welfare state – and especially the field of public welfare – provided some disposition for a Nazi transformation of welfare politics. The rise of the ideal of racial hygiene provided the first such opportunity, and became more relevant in the last years of the Weimar Republic because of a weakened financial basis for the welfare state. The purpose of racial hygiene was not the abolishment of welfare but rather a new dimension of welfare for those classified as racially superior.\textsuperscript{52} The rise of racial hygiene in the field of public welfare must be considered as a result of a failed professionalization of social work. Since social
workers were unable to produce a coherent, contemporary ethic of welfare and professional standards of social work, they were also unable, in an intra-professional debate on welfare, to criticize the discourse on racial hygiene. This discourse was sustained by physicians who, because of their scientific work, wielded a kind of prestige never attained by social workers. At the end of the Weimar Republic, some drafts of eugenic policy had been ripe for approval. But one should be careful not to overestimate the degree of continuity between the late Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany, even in the field of eugenic policy. All the key elements of the racist transformation of the welfare state via eugenic policy – compulsory sterilization, eugenic abortion, and euthanasia – had been rejected by almost all the institutions driving the adoption of eugenic policy in the final years of the Weimar Republic.53

The question of continuity between the Nazi transformation of the welfare state and the reconstruction of the welfare state in both German states, but especially in West Germany in the years after 1945-1949, should be answered in a similar fashion. In a recent book, and in a discussion that followed its publication, Götz Aly, a well-known freelance historian, has emphasized a strong continuity between Nazi Germany and the Federal Republic. Hitler, says Aly, had erected a Volksstaat, a “People’s State,” at the expense of both the dispossessed European Jewish population and occupied European countries. Not only does the existence of such a “People’s State” explain the energy and loyalty of Germans towards Hitler and his regime, writes Aly, but it also served as a blueprint and the material basis for the rapid reconstruction of the West German welfare state in the years after 1945-1949.

A close reading of Aly’s book, however, shows that the connection between what Aly (in reference to Hitler) calls the “People’s State” and what can in very general terms be described as a welfare state, turns out to be rather broad and inexact. The public presentation of Aly’s book as a historian’s contribution to the ongoing debate over the crisis of the welfare state seems to be the result of a clever marketing strategy, in line with Aly’s personal penchant for provoking the public. His claims remain unsupported by the evidence. To be sure, Aly is correct when he argues that the Holocaust must be understood as “the most forceful mass holdup murder in modern history,”54 and his analysis of the system of bribing the population with war booty and the redistribution of foreign property55 is certainly an eminent contribution to a social history of World War II. But Aly deals with the exclusion of Jews in an economic context. He analyzes the loss of property and describes fiscal policy, compulsory labor and the German national bank’s manipulation of foreign currency in the exploitation of the occupied territories. He does not, however, say much about the welfare state and social insurance,56 public welfare, the provision of war victims, public housing and other matters of a similar nature. Furthermore, Aly’s thesis that “it is possible to identify a basic left-wing social-democratic pattern that underlies the structure of Nazi fiscal and social policy” lacks any evidence and is, in fact,
quite ludicrous. Michael Wildt has rightfully and sharply criticized Aly for his equation of Hitler’s “People’s State” with the welfare state. Given the fact that the welfare state has – not only normatively but also historically – been inseparably linked to freedom and participation, Wildt chides Aly for a denunciatory critique of modernism. In fact, Hitler’s “People’s State” was the state of the self-proclaimed people’s community (the Volksgemeinschaft). But since the Nazi people’s community was exclusionary, disobeyed legal rights and simulated participation without really enacting it, it seems inappropriate to consider the fascist “People’s State” a welfare state. It was, more accurately, a regression of the welfare state.

The typical bureaucratic and personal continuity that can be observed in the years after 1945 should not detract from the view that the blueprint for the reconstruction and development of the German welfare state after 1949 was not delivered by the Nazis. Nor was the return to welfare and democracy an unconscious restoration of the Weimar welfare state. The postwar constellation of a welfare state embedded in a democracy was, at least in part, held together by an intellectual framework made up of social scientists who had left for the United States after 1933. Their blueprints for a new welfare state were conditioned by the search for the reasons behind fascism. They intended a welfare state that could serve as a bulwark against authoritarian rule. Consider the case of Eduard Heimann, who had been a renowned social-democratic theoretician of the welfare state during the Weimar Republic and later served on the faculty of the New School for Social Research in New York City (the famous “university in exile”). Heimann saw the key for the new development of the welfare state in the middle classes. In his conception, the role of the middle class was quite different from its original role as a mediator in welfare state-building. Heimann viewed the middle class, broadly conceived, to be the object of welfare politics. He considered the middle class’ unfulfilled desire for security and their fear of proletarianization (or even a proletarian revolution) as one of the reasons behind the middle-class support for the Nazis. A new alliance between the middle and working classes seemed to him indispensable for the prevention of a relapse into fascism. As a common denominator for a stable alliance between the middle and working classes, he recommended “collective security,” which in his view was a genuine concern for all classes.

Security is today jeopardized to such an extent that the middle class has become favorably inclined toward any collective reorganization that, instead of destroying it entirely and promising something quite different, would restore and confirm it and include others as well. It is all very simple: the middle class does not want to lose what little it has, but since what it has is not the result of exploiting others it would not object to raising these others to the same plane.

Heimann’s ideal of a welfare state as a “connecting element” between the middle and working classes was clearly inspired by Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal and its
support among the American middle class. The German welfare state, a respected role model for the development of welfare politics in the late nineteenth century, had now been semantically redesigned after the U.S. model. Peaking with the New Deal, the emergence of the Swedish welfare state in the 1930s and Beveridge and Attlee's construction of the British welfare state from 1942 on, “the marriage of liberal democracy, social protection and the interventionist state, for all its limits, shortcomings, continuing poverty and exploitation, was complete.”62 This learning process was first displayed in a new political language of the welfare state. There were no precursors in Germany’s political language for the key phrase *soziale Sicherheit* (social security) before 1945. It was, quite simply, a translation of Roosevelt’s 1935 Social Security Act and a phrase from early United Nations documents. However, the German welfare state was not completely re-invented after 1945. The casting mold had remained intact. In a way, the German welfare state from 1945 to 1949 returned to a specific German trajectory of welfare state-building that was now allowed to act as a strengthening force for democracy. It therefore served as a conscious response to its regression under Nazi rule.


7. Young-sun Hong, “Neither Singular nor Alternative: Narratives of Modernity and Welfare in Germany, 1870-1945,” *Social History*, 30 (2005), 140. Hong has a very strict but acceptable view on this problem: “The normative connections between modernity, individual emancipation and welfare are so strong that it seems unlikely that we will ever be able to describe Nazi Germany as a welfare state in a fully satisfactory manner. Fürsorge (the German term for welfare) is embedded in an entirely different symbolic system than are Nazi Vorsorge and ‘welfare of the Volk’ (Volkspflege), both of which emphasize the priority of the rights of the collective and of future generations over those of existing individuals, and, no matter how finely we parse the word ‘welfare’ it is probably a vain hope to think that in this way we can ever satisfactorily resolve the question.” (152). See also Young-sun Hong, *Welfare, Modernity, and the Weimar State, 1919-1933* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).


10. See for example Jens Alber, *Vom Armenhaus zum Wohlfahrtsstaat. Analysen zur Entwicklung der Sozialversicherung in Westeuropa* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1982).


19. For a very good summary of this position, see Michael Stolleis, *Geschichte des Sozialrechts in Deutschland. Ein Grundriß* (Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius, 2003), 54-57.


24. After 1900, the situation can also be described as a rivalry between two concepts of “socialism:” a paternalist state socialism versus a more modern municipal socialism (which emerged as a kind of compromise between the left-wing liberals and the Social Democrats).


30. See, for example, the great tradition of public housing in *Wohnkultur und kommunale Wohnungspolitik in Frankfurt am Main 1880-bis 1930. Auf dem Wege zu einer pluralen Gesellschaft der Individuen*, Gerd Kuhn, (Bonn: Dietz, 1998).


46. Richtlinien, 199.


51. See Edward Ross Dickinson, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About ‘Modernity’,” *Central European History*, 37 (2004), 1-48. It is interesting that Hans-Ulrich Wohler, in the fourth volume of his *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte* (1914 bis 1949), presents a separate chapter on the Weimar welfare state but none on Nazi social policy. Of course, he is writing about social policy after 1933, but the primacy of politics during the Nazi reign allows him to disperse the relevant material into other chapters that deal with social mobility, racial politics, charismatic rule and so on.


55. Ibid., 324.

56. Most peculiar is his lack of interest in the Nazis’ partial extension of social-insurance coverage. As part of their disciplinary approach toward an integrated work force, they extended accident-insurance coverage and offered health insurance to self-employed workers. See Ritter, *Sozialstaat*, 134f.


Social Rights and the Social State in Democratic Countries during the Interwar Years: The Case of Sweden

Bo Stråth

In the introduction to the new (1981) edition of *The Crisis of German Ideology*, George Mosse noted that while his book appeared to have left the impression among some readers that *völkisch* thought must inevitably lead to Nazism, this had not been his intention. Not only had “moderate,” mainstream conservatives in pre-1933 Germany been profoundly infected with *völkisch* thoughts, but there had also existed the non-authoritarian *völkische* socialism of Gustav Landauer that drew on the ideal of the *Völk* as a democratic community of equals. In 1973, Eugene Lunn suggested that Landauer’s *völkische* socialism could provide an antidote to the tendency among historians to teleologically link *völkische* romanticism with the triumph of Hitler’s version of *völkische* ideology.¹

Mosse contended that socialists of all countries made efforts to combine *völkisch* with socialist thought and speculated that if such a blend had been successful, National Socialism might not have triumphed so easily. In 1996, Lars Trägårdh took up and developed this idea in a comparison of *völkische* ideologies in two “Germanic” countries, Sweden and Germany, taking 1933 as a point of departure for the analysis. The same year that Germans voted their way to *völkische* Nazi dictatorship, a new coalition government headed by the social democrats came to power in Sweden. Founded by men inspired by Lassalle, Marx, Kautsky and other luminaries of the German socialist movement, the Swedish party was in many ways modeled on the German SPD. However, by the end of the 1920s, the Swedish social democrats began to integrate *völkische* and socialist themes. They re-defined their party from a workers’ class-based party to a people’s party, bent on the idea of a *folkhem*, a home for the people. Class alliances and a search for political compromises replaced the class struggle as the dominant strategy for achieving the socialist dream of the classless society.

The Swedish social democrats appropriated the political priority of interpreting the *folk* concept after a protracted discursive struggle with the conservatives, who had activated the concept at the turn of the twentieth century. Their strategy, labeled one of “national socialism” by a protagonist in the debate over modernization, political science professor
(statsvetenskap) Rudolf Kjellén (later well-known for his geopolitical theories), involved using the concept as an ideological instrument to ward off the threats of class-struggle socialism. Kjellén was opposed to class-struggle socialism as a point of departure for the political discourse and argued instead for conservative national socialism that saw the country as a whole and involved everyone in political work, assigning them responsibility. The country was supposed to be a home for all the people. The integrative idea of the *folkhemmet*, in which society was organized as a family, with the home as a metaphor, subordinated the class struggle to the national welfare.

The concept had profound resonance in Sweden, like everything connected to *hem* (home). Ellen Key, a feminist and liberal critic of bourgeois society, emphasized its role. Around 1900, there was a home-of-one’s-own movement (*egnahemsrörelsen*) promoting homes for rural people of meager means. Even before that, in the late nineteenth century, the *hembygdsrörelsen* had emerged to promote the local and regional popular culture. *Hembygd* carried the same local folkloristic connotation as the German *Heimat*, before this latter concept was appropriated by nationalistic forces and transferred to the semantic of *Vaterland* and *Blut und Boden*. The freeholders, those who were smallholders rather than landowners, were called *hemmansägare*. They constituted the lower segment of the core Swedish peasantry and the symbolic representation of *folk*, and therefore the link between people and home.

At the turn of the century, the question of modernity was at the center of the Swedish debate. It was a period of social and political condensation rather than polarization. The destiny of the union between Sweden and Norway was growing less clear all the time against the backdrop of increasingly loud Norwegian voices calling for full autonomy. The excesses of mutually reinforcing nationalistic rhetoric from the left in Norway and the protectionist ultra-conservatives in Sweden exposed the union to severe strains from the early 1890s on and finally overstretched it. However, the overall impact of nationalistic polarization in both countries was rather the reinforcement of moderate forces and a political middle-ground. When the union was liquidated in 1905, political acceptance of the situation was practically unanimous in Sweden and few voices of revanchism were heard. As occurred after the Russian conquest of Finland in 1809, the response became consolidation through domestic modernization.

From the 1840s on, a large percentage of the total Swedish population – which reached a little over five million by 1900 – immigrated to the U.S. Although the emigration was of Irish proportions, it had already culminated by the 1880s. Little political debate had surrounded it when it was at its highest levels. Only after 1905, when the outflow had decreased considerably, did it become a major political issue. Emigration grew to symbolically represent the canalization of political and social energy after the Norwegian break-up of the union, which vexed the Swedish elites. Instead of talking about it, everyone wanted to forget it as soon as possible. In this situation, the emigration issue
became a therapeutic tool. An official Emigration Commission was appointed in 1907 and delivered its twenty-three-volume report in 1913. It mapped out the Swedish society in painstaking detail, asking themselves what had caused so many people to leave it and what could be done to make them stay. The issue of the poor became a question of social welfare and America became the model to emulate.

In this respect, the Swedes were not unique. At the turn of the twentieth century, America emerged as a vision of the future for many Europeans. It was perceived as the epitome of modernity and the spearhead of the coming age. From the early nineteenth century on, as the social question attracted increasing political attention, emigration to the U.S. presented a viable alternative to European problems, not only with regard to the higher living standards, but also to democracy, egalitarianism and meritocracy, which all seemed to permeate American social life. However, around 1900, for groups within the Swedish cultural and political establishment seeking stability and sustained development within the framework of the given order, the economic and social advantages of transatlantic migration for people of meager or no means became a threat to the nation. The national issue grew particularly heated in 1905 when the Norwegian break-up made inroads into the Swedish self-confidence and sparked a quest for modernization. With arguments about the effects of emigration on the supply of manpower, agricultural and industrial interests and military authorities came together to push through the appointment of the Parliamentary Commission on Emigration under the chairmanship of the liberally oriented statistician Gustaf Sundbärg and the conservative agrarian politician Nils Wohlin. This occurred some twenty years after emigration had culminated in terms of annual loss of population but only two years after the vexatious loss of Norway. The Commission was highly influential in pointing out shortcomings in the Swedish economy, social organization and culture, suggesting that in order to combat emigration, the government had to get to the bottom of the problems that propelled people to seek their fortune elsewhere. Opinions certainly differed as to the root causes, but in the end, the debate shared a goal that molded together a political culture around the social question.2

According to Sundbärg, the problem was primarily a question of prosperity and opportunity. In short, Sweden had to become more “American,” or at least offer the same kind of opportunities as “America” did, otherwise many young people – i.e. supposedly the most industrious and intelligent segment of the population – would “vote exit” by emigrating to a better future in America.3 To the Liberal Sundbärg, the conclusion was simple: Sweden would have to offer a better future, and that future would have to be competitive with respect to the American alternative – an alternative future, as indeed the latter was. This implied modernization through economic, political and social reforms – paradoxically, liberalization from above, by state decree. An important measure would be to support the “colonization movement” that was already underway, organized through various private initiatives and explicitly directed against emigration by aiming at
the colonization of unexploited domestic land resources. In doing so, the Commission also looked for inspiration for “internal colonization” in Germany, the United Kingdom and the U.S. To the more conservatively-inclined Wohlin, however, the primary cause of emigration was not to be found in socioeconomic factors, even though the lack of agricultural land was considered a pressing issue. He believed it was to be found rather in a declining national sense of community, solidarity and individual work ethic, since many young men emigrated to avoid compulsory conscription. He also maintained that Swedes were becoming less willing to accept hardships previously endured, particularly since statistics showed that material living standards were on the rise. Furthermore, there was a strong sense that America did not in fact present a better alternative, but rather a utopian vision, a false lure. After reaching the U.S. port, Swedes suffered all kinds of hardship in their new homeland. In order to stifle the steady stream of emigrants to America, border control and public information on the fate that awaited emigrants in the U.S. had to be simultaneously increased. In the end, Sundbärg’s interpretation won out, and Wohlin left the Commission.

However, Wohlin and many conservatives with him would increasingly come to see socioeconomic reforms as a means rather than an end for averting social unrest and reinvigorating the nation. During the early decades of the twentieth century, the so-called neo-conservatives, centered around a group of young academics in Gothenburg and the magazine *Det nya Sverige*, propagated a complete modernization program in the name of national cohesion, loosely organized around the metaphor of the people’s home (folkhem) – later so powerful in the hands of the social democrats. The concept was originally politicized for conservative purposes by the political scientist Rudolf Kjellén. In a parallel development, Swedish businessmen, industrialists and liberal social reformers – particularly the circle around the non-governmental organization *Centralförbundet för Socialt Arbete* (National Association for Social Work) – traveled to the U.S. to bring home technologies for advertising, management, distribution of consumer products and production, as well as methodologies for social surveys and other means of social reform developed by progressive reformers in the great American cities. In 2002, David Östlund emphasized the roles played by the scientific management ideals of Taylorism and the “social engineering” movement in the U.S. on how to organize peaceful relations between capital and labor.

The turn-of-the-century modernity issue in Sweden was about more than just emigration, however. In the 1890s, conservative Sweden faced heavy pressure to modernize politically, with the more democratic and leftist Norway as a model. The claim regarded universal suffrage, defined as male as a first step. The representation reform of 1865 had transformed the Diet of the Four Estates into a two-chamber parliament, though with restrictive suffrage and eligibility rules. Unofficial but highly public “People’s Parliament” meetings, röstriksdagar, were organized on several occasions in the 1890s in order to
demonstrate that full popular sovereignty was a political possibility. While the program for social modernization was a conservative contribution to the debate – of course, the social democrats responded and overtrumped, calling the conservative people’s home the armed poorhouse – the claim for universal suffrage was a social democratic and social liberal project. In the former case, the issue at stake was the integration of social protest and the construction of a national community. In the latter case, the issue was about parliamentary power as an instrument to establish social welfare with a different profile from the conservative program. Of course, both approaches were tightly interwoven and molded together a national discourse on modernity around the social question. A suffrage reform followed in 1906-1907 (with female suffrage established in 1919).

The labor market constituted a third field of modernization at this time. The strategy of employers had long been to crush the trade unions. However, as both parties obtained increasing organizational and financial resources, more was at stake in the conflicts than ever. A growing interest in mutual recognition emerged. The December compromise on the labor market in 1906 between the top confederations expressed such recognition. This did not mean the end of conflicts as such, but they were placed inside an institutional framework. The general strike in 1909 and the fact that Sweden was one of the most strike-prone countries in the industrial world in the 1920s demonstrate that the conflict remained strong, even though the fact of the existence of forms for regulating it meant that it was modernized and institutionalized to a certain degree.

When Kjellén talked about the concept of folkhemmet, folk had a different connotation from Volk in Germany. Much more than folk, Volk went in a holistic direction inspired by Herder’s philosophy and Romanticism. Folk connoted rather an empirically derived view on the composition of all social classes. Both varieties of the concept contained dimensions of future potential as well as past achievements, but Volk transmitted more utopian and folk more empirical values.

The Swedish social democrats were attracted early on by the folkhemmet concept, although they wanted to give it a different content. They rejected the conservative version as “the fortified poorhouse,” referring to the biased distribution of military and social state expenditures in the conservative program. They gradually found themselves involved in a discursive struggle over defining the folk concept. When the social democrats took over the folkhemmet metaphor somewhat later and made it their symbol, they argued that the happiness of the lower classes, of which the working class was just one part, was based on their efforts to contribute to the folkhemmet. Folk and folkhem as expressions of traditional values were mobilized as linguistic instruments for modernization.

As in many other places in Europe, the situation in 1917-1918 in the wake of the food shortage due to the war was revolutionary. The social conflict escalated. Female suffrage was one of the concessions in a dramatic situation in which the social democrats led the revolting masses towards civil peace. Lenin evaluated the situation accurately when,
passing through Stockholm on his way to Russia after the revolution had broken out there, he expressed his opinion that the Swedish social democrats were not revolutionary. According to Lenin, their leader Hjalmar Branting understood how to manipulate the inherent trade-unionism of the proletariat better than the leftist socialists.8

In the early 1920s, influenced by the polarization at the end of the war and growing insights into the connection between universal suffrage and parliamentary power, the social democrats began to redefine themselves as belonging to a party for the working class. The universal suffrage of 1919 gave them much more parliamentary strength than they had had until then. By 1917-1920, they had already formed a coalition government with the liberals as part of a solution to the worldwide economic crisis and thereafter formed four minority governments in 1920, 1921-1923 and 1924-1926. Government power required more responsibility than the role as the opposition. By the end of the 1920s, a decisive debate over the concepts of folk and class was well under way in the social democratic party. In 1929, party leader Per-Albin Hansson summed up the issue: “Behind words are realities. It is by no means unimportant whether we consider the party a representative of class interests or a bearer of the interests of all folk.”9

The party had been a folk party from its very beginnings, continued Hansson in order to make the reformulation historically legitimate. When the first party congress made a statement on the suffrage question in 1889, the argument had been that the folk must be the masters of the house. Kautsky’s argument in Germany that same year, that it would be misleading to regard the concepts of “people” and “proletariat” as synonymous, had provoked the protests of influential intellectuals in the Swedish party, Hansson argued. Although the Swedish Social Democratic Party still very much represented the industrial working class in terms of membership composition at the turn of the century, this changed during its first two decades, he continued. In 1907, the party leader, Hjalmar Branting, had argued that the party was a “folk party in the best sense of the word.”

On the other side of the political landscape, the intellectual, academic and conservative Young Swedes movement made an impact on the two conservative governments under Arvid Lindman (1906-1911 and 1928-1932). Steps towards universal male suffrage were taken during the first government period. The second Lindman government promoted the labor peace conference in 1928 and the movement for labor peace initiated by the British employer Alfred Mond.

By 1930, the political attraction of the folk concept was strong. The concept engaged both the conservatives and the social democrats in a discursive debate over its meaning. One expression of this wider attraction was the fact that the two liberal parties, when they merged in 1934, chose folkpartiet as their new name. This did not help them much in their fight for votes, however. By 1930, the social democrats had clearly appropriated the concept as well as its interpretation.
During the nineteenth century, Germany and Sweden shared fundamental social and cultural values, which Lars Trägårdh has described as a tendency to extol the organic Gemeinschaft rather than the Gesellschaft of citizens—“community” versus “society.” The idea was to take the collective rather than the individual as a basic unit from which society should be constructed. Given this tendency, Trägårdh asks whether the divergent trajectories of Swedish and German histories express varieties of an underlying Germanic ideology, embracing mutations and variations diverse enough to include both Hitler’s Third Reich and the Swedish Welfare State.10

An elaboration on Trägårdh’s question shows important differences rather than similarities between the Gemeinschaft and the Gesellschaft concepts in Germany and Sweden, however. In 1887, Ferdinand Tönnies developed a view on the difference between the two concepts in German. Gemeinschaft connotes utopian dreams of an archaic past, which he nostalgically pitted against the atomistic Gesellschaft, which described the division of labor and the lack of cohesion in the emerging industrial society. In Tönnies’ influential version, Gemeinschaft contained the same holistic Romanticist dimension as Volk. In the 1930s, these two concepts were politically exploited and overstretched.

In Sweden, there was not the same tension or opposition between the concepts as in Germany. There was less of a dichotomy between them. The politically important concept in Sweden is Gesellschaft, samhälle, from the verb hålla samman, to keep together. It connotes both Gemeinschaft (community) and political organization/administration. In the twentieth century, samhälle, Gesellschaft, society and societas even became synonymous with the state. When the social democrats argued for the welfare state, they talked about the need for a strong society. Samhälle was never in opposition to the state or seen as something between market (or family according to Hegel) on the one side and the state on the other. When English and American neo-liberal language was translated into Swedish in the 1980s, the Anglicism civilsamhälle was invented and incorporated to express such opposition.

Gemenskap was never as holistically overstretched as Gemeinschaft. Gemenskap has much less political power than samhälle in Swedish or the German Gemeinschaft. The concept connotes rather private relationships, as in arbetsgemenskap, familjegemenskap or the religious församlingsgemenskap. The Latinized form kommun is that which has political potential. A concept like folkgemenskap is almost without political potency while Volksgemeinschaft in Germany had explosive connotations.11 In Sweden, one could talk of continuity between the concepts of state, society and community. During the first half of the twentieth century, after the discursive contention between the conservatives and the social democrats, the semantic field around these three concepts expressed an overlapping rather than a disconnection. In Sweden, while there were tensions between corporatist/collectivist and individualist ideas of social organization, they provoked political pragmatism. Only with the neo-liberal ideology of the 1980s did this situation change.
The transformation of the *folk* concept was similar in Denmark and Norway. The social protest in Scandinavia originated in broad popular coalitions, which never became populist. The labor movement became the driving force in these coalitions, but under inclusion rather than exclusion of the others. The farmers performed an integrative role in the coalitions. In all three countries, red-green coalitions took over government in the early 1930s in response to the Great Depression. The social conflict was not exclusively between labor and capital, working class and bourgeoisie. It had a less polarized and more complex cultural and discursive framework around the *folk* concept. Moreover, the overlapping of the concepts of state and society, *stat* and *samfund*, was as obvious in Norway and Denmark as it was in Sweden.

The historically-shaped preconditions of all three countries shared one element. Social protest and claims for greater democracy originated in a broader popular coalition in which the labor movement was, or rather became, the driving force, though not to the exclusion of others. Farmers also formed an integral part of this coalition. The conflict was, as just stated, not exclusively between labor and capital, the working class and the “bourgeoisie,” but had a more complex cultural-discursive matrix. The lines of division in the construction of community and the demarcation between “us” and “them” were detected within the so-called bourgeoisie and within the farmer class, between high and low bourgeoisie and large and small farmers or crofters, which increased the potential for the formation of coalitions with the labor movement. This cultural construction of social community resulted in a less-polarized society with a higher capacity for communication than one that follows a Marxist scheme opposing capital and labor.

If one extends the comparison to the other Nordic countries, i.e. Finland and Iceland, it is clear that Iceland fits well into the Scandinavian pattern. However, Finland deviated from this pattern of community construction from the civil war of 1918 to the 1950s. There were many similarities among the Scandinavian countries, and between *kansa* and the *folk* concept, but there were also decisive differences, the most important being the connection between the independence of 1917 and the Russian Revolution, which led to strong political polarization and civil war. In the 1930s, Finland was on the brink of a fascist *coup d’état* and farmer-based authoritarian politics had a strong basis there during the interwar years.

The national question, while crucial in Norway, Finland and Sweden, also oriented their actions in very different directions in these three countries, while in Denmark it had been removed altogether from the national agenda after the defeat to Prussia in 1864. In Norway, it became the symbol of a popular mobilization against union with Sweden that involved farmers, large segments of the “bourgeoisie” and the labor movement. In Finland, it led to a contrary policy when the conservative economic and political elite appropriated the question during and after the civil war. There the question implied national polarization rather than unification until 1939. In Sweden, the break-up of the union with
Norway in 1905 promoted a conservative reform strategy with the purpose of unifying the nation. This constituted a particular language that attracted the social democrats *per se*, although they hoped to fill it with other content. The discursive debate between the conservatives and the social democratic-social liberal coalition over what content to give the *folk* concept worked until 1930 despite opposing alternatives that went in a unifying and nationally consolidating direction. It also demonstrated considerable continuity when the social democrats redefined themselves around 1930 from being a class to a people's party, thus taking over the agenda from the reform conservatives.

Legitimacy was provided not only through the national question, but also through the specific Protestant ethic that permeated popular movements composed of a pietistic value orientation that emphasized individual freedom in combination with radical claims for equality. The fact that political legitimacy was provided in this way meant that political elites were forced to adjust. This pattern was more pronounced in Norway and, to a certain extent, in Sweden. In Denmark, on the other hand, the heritage of the priest, author, educator and leader of the people N.F.S. Grundtvig translated into a different kind of popular pietism with the big farmers at its core and following less ascetic guidelines than in Norway and Sweden. In Finland, the appropriation of the national question by conservatives prevented pietism from playing the same role as it did in Norway and Sweden.

The relatively low legitimacy of economic power in Norway was based on a low degree of economic concentration. The latter was much higher in Sweden, but through a skillfully developed image of thrift, diligence, industry and assiduity, and with the Wallenberg family as a model, the economic elite still managed to comply with the pietistic criteria for legitimacy. These criteria, however, were not sufficient to supply a more general legitimacy to capital ownership, and thus they were in need of constant maintenance through reformulation. Legitimacy was never stable over long periods and was repeatedly challenged. The first massive challenge in all four of these countries was the general radicalization of the political language around 1920. In Sweden, there had also been a radicalization during the general strike of 1909 and, as referred to above, in 1917-1918. For Finland, the civil war of 1918 obviously brought about a culmination in terms of polarization. The second challenge was the Great Depression of the 1930s, when red-green coalition governments re-established confidence and legitimacy through state intervention and state responsibility for crisis management.

The main point is that the conceptual development of *folk* must be viewed in relation to broader changes in the organization of society. The question should not be restricted to whether the social democrats shifted from Kautskian Marxism to a left-liberal welfare ideology. A significant dimension of the development during the 1930s was a fundamental structural change in the distribution of power and influence in the Scandinavian societies. Sweden was the model case with its higher degree of economic concentration.
and large industries. The transformation meant a development towards well-organized popular interests with the labor movement at the core of the change. One can speak about a transition from organized capitalism, in the sense of the German social democrat Rudolf Hilferding, towards participatory capitalism. Norwegian economic historian Francis Sejersted has even labeled the emerging pattern “democratic capitalism.”

The foundation of this profound process of societal change was the growth of an institutional corporatist triangle of production, politics and a reorganized state, in which reform in production spheres meant viable labor market compromises on the concept of rationalization and images of a growing pie instead of a zero-sum game. Political reform also meant redistribution of the growing pie through active financial politics. The reorganized state integrated popular pietistic values and economic interests in a well-articulated representation of interest. This was a democratic alternative to fascist corporatist models. The dynamo of this balancing of interests soon became the active, interventionist social democratic state. The 1930s saw important steps in the “socialization” and parliamentarianization of the Scandinavian states. From that point until the 1980s, state and society became synonymous concepts in the public debate. The formula allowed expansion of the capitalist order to be associated much more with a fair-share social reform policy than social turbulence. The central dimension of the emerging social democratic policy was not primarily Keynesian economics but a pronounced will and ability to institutionalize a number of fundamental compromises between conflicting interests of labor and capital.

The crisis politics of the 1930s not only became the practical experience that saved the social democrats from breaking down under either the Scylla of illusory and impotent Kautskian determinism or the Charybdis of being nothing but the political instrument of short-sighted trade-unionism. Instead of stubbornly remaining pure-hearted but powerless socialists, the social democrats took over the role of powerful physicians of capitalism and chief defenders of the Scandinavian nation states. They went from being opponents to gradually seeing themselves as the great defenders of the Scandinavian societies. When the fundamental antagonism in society shifted from capitalism versus socialism towards dictatorship versus democracy in the 1930s, Scandinavia managed to remain on the democratic side. The fear of authoritarianism in Scandinavia related more to the risks of aggressive regimes in the Baltic Rim than to the rise of authoritarian movements at home.

The 1930s in Scandinavia can certainly be described as the time of a social democratic breakthrough, but it is important to emphasize that this breakthrough was based on a high degree of continuity in important respects. An enduring debate on the social question and the fair organization of society from the end of the nineteenth century on had involved social democrats, socially oriented liberals and conservatives in extensive debates conflicting with various interests. The debates were based on pragmatic definitions of
mutual interests and a high communicative capacity in societies that, rather than being polarized in a fundamental conflict between capital and labor, developed complex and fluid conflict lines between labor, petty bourgeoisie and small farmers on the one side and high bourgeoisie, business representatives and big farmers on the other. This pattern of conflict could lead to lengthy debates that depoliticized the issues at stake in a search for technical solutions. The pension issue in Sweden is a case in point. In the same years that Bismarck introduced old-age pension to Germany, 1884, a tug of war began on this issue between social democrats, liberals and conservatives. Only thirty years later, in 1913, did they find a solution.

This continuity with the discourse on the social issue in an older, more-conservative society has often been underestimated when examining the social-democratic breakthrough in the 1930s. The breakthrough did not come out of nowhere. There was also a high degree of continuity in another respect. The belief in scientific methods of rationalizing production and society and organizing society and economy broke through at the beginning of the twentieth century, but this was based on a more-extensive science-based political debate over the possibilities to modernize the societies. The debate over modernization was vivid in Norway and Sweden from the 1840s onwards, for instance.

The social democratic response to the Great Depression in Sweden was expansive financial politics. This response was based more on perceptions of a political necessity to integrate the social protests than on theoretical considerations. To the extent that there was theoretical inspiration, it came rather from the Stockholm School of Economics than from Keynes. In the Stockholm School, social democratic as well as liberal and conservative economists worked on the development of Knut Wicksell’s monetary theory towards a general cyclical theory. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the right-wing social democrat, economist and sociologist Gustaf Steffen had introduced the ideas of the German Historical School and British Fabianism and marginalism to the Swedish social science debate. The entanglement between political pragmatism and scientific empiricism had a long continuity, but this entanglement was activated in the 1930s in the economic sphere.19

One of the most influential representatives of the Stockholm School was Gunnar Myrdal. In 1934, together with his wife Alva, he published the bestseller *Crisis in the Population Issue* in which they prescribed solutions to declining birthrates through housing and other public-welfare arrangements for families with children. While the population issue was traditionally a conservative one, a concern with having a strong and healthy population to defend the nation, in the 1930s the social democrats appropriated its interpretative power from the conservatives in this area too. *Crisis in the Population Issue* became one of the cornerstones of Swedish social democratic social engineering. The ordering of society developed a trend towards a future-oriented perfectionism. The quest for the perfect society contained politics in which the ambiguity was seen only in hindsight. The sterilization
program was racially rather than economically motivated. In the Myrdals’ publications from 1940 onwards, predominantly those directed towards an English-speaking audience, the crisis concept was conspicuously absent. The Myrdals spoke of “social engineering,” which they contrasted with the concept of “genetic engineering,” as connoting social Darwinism and racial hygiene. They did not consider eugenics to be scientifically proven and held back their support for such measures until eugenicists could “prove” their theories in a language acceptable to social science. Once this was considered to be the case, there were no longer any obstacles to the language of eugenics. The biological logic behind forced mass sterilization makes it more justifiable to talk of eugenics than genocide. The connection to ethnic racism was different, and maybe the correct term is social rather than ethnic racism. The aim was to prevent the birth of potential burdens to the new welfare society as it was conceptualized in the 1930s. The idea was not to get rid of a certain people but to reinforce one kind. The strong medicine was not intended for the extinction of a group of people, but to halt the reproduction of certain individuals representing many groups from the lower strata of society.

The example of eugenics demonstrates how fragile and ambiguous concepts like welfare and social engineering are. It also shows how close the social and the national questions were to each other in social democratic politics. There is an obvious continuity to the conservative reform strategies at the beginning of the twentieth century. There is also, however – and this must be emphasized – a clear continuity to what was seen as the scientifically legitimized standard before the defeat of the Nazi regime: the division of human beings into stronger and weaker races. Overall, the impact of the social democratic family policy was the emancipation of the individual from the family through public support of the individual in which social benefits and aid was not generally distributed according to class.

There is one more crucial factor to consider when we discuss the consolidation of the Swedish and the other Scandinavian societies around a public welfare program in the 1930s. In the wake of the Versailles Treaty, the contours of a new world emerged based on peace and international cooperation. Three imperial thrones had imploded and President Woodrow Wilson provided a prescription for how to make the world safe for democracy; his instrument was the League of Nations. The socialist experiment still going on in the Soviet Union at this time also contributed to the optimistic scenario of a peaceful world.

Throughout the 1920s, the leading social democratic parties in Scandinavia were made up of true internationalists. They believed that they could obtain peace and follow progressive policies of social justice through international cooperation and disarmament. The same was true for the liberals with whom the social democrats often cooperated in parliaments and governments. The League of Nations was their political instrument. Social democratic and liberal leaders – such as Hjalmar Branting, Arthur Engberg,
Richard Sandler in Sweden, Peter Munch in Denmark, the North Pole explorer Fridtjof Nansen, Johan Ludvig Mowinckel and Halvdan Koht in Norway – went on frequent political and government party missions to the “Continent.” Several of them spoke English, French and German fluently. The train to Geneva became a true bridge with Europe. The Scandinavian social democrats were part of, and active participants in, a new Europe perceived as politically progressive. In fact, they invested a lot more political energy and expectations into international cooperation than they had during the Second International prior to 1914. They did so in the same spirit that made the German social democrats speak about a United States of Europe in their Heidelberg Program of 1925 or that drove Aristide Briand and Edouard Herriot to their federalist visions.

The 1924 Geneva protocol tried to epitomize and clarify the mutual relationships existing between the different elements in the principles of the League of Nations: arbitration, security and disarmament. Ever since the League’s establishment, there had been a certain amount of tension between these elements. In particular, there were doubts that arbitration would be sufficient to guarantee security. The view developed that the security issue had to be solved by supplementing the sanction rules. The League of Nations’ Council was given authority to decide on sanctions and each signatory had to participate actively in their implementation. The question of international peace had a clear military dimension, which set the limits for disarmament. However, it was argued that, in the end, new steps could be taken towards general and multilateral disarmament with such a sanction order.

In the Swedish debates, the conservative politicians and media rejected the Geneva protocol by arguing that Sweden risked getting involved in war through its participation. In particular, they expressed apprehension regarding the fact that Sweden could become involved in a conflict between members of the League of Nations like France and one or both of the two powers outside it – Germany and the Soviet Union. The social democratic press argued with equal determination for Swedish support of, and participation in, the politics of the protocol. Social democratic leaders pronounced the expectations they attached to the League and collective security. Arthur Engberg – editor-in-chief of the party organ *Arbetet* and frequent Swedish delegate to meetings in Geneva – returned repeatedly to the League of Nations in the columns of his newspaper. According to Engberg, the very idea of the League was to “stretch a state organism over the international relationships, an international state,” which would gradually expand and strengthen its authority vis-à-vis the member states in order to “bring the anarchic conditions of the international society under state order.” Indeed, in this formulation, he approaches Jean Monnet’s vision and the creation of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) more than twenty years later, but only after another world war. He maintained that the League of Nations should be an organization with “the power and authority to guarantee
the observance of international law.” He also came close to a historical heritage in Swedish political culture that emphasized state authority.21

Engberg’s argument connected to another of his idées fixes from the 1920s on was related to the appropriation of the state church to turn it into a social democratic folkkyrka.22 Under conditions of growing political and military pressure on Sweden in the 1930s, by which time the League of Nations had failed to live up to most of the expectations invested in it, the connection to the Swedish religious-cultural-historical heritage was given new meaning. The forces that had polarized society in the 1920s began to work in a unifying direction under the impact of the global economic crisis in the 1930s, still more so as the security situation became increasingly menacing. Faced with powerful military rearmament in Germany and the Soviet Union, the social democrats were forced to reconsider their hopes for disarmament. They began to build a Swedish Sweden, with links to the neutrality espoused by the right, and took over the right’s concept of the folkhem. This was not the consequence of some grand plan but developed rather out of the internal controversy within both the social democratic party and the right. Rickard Sandler, for example, argued for a more activist foreign policy. Part of the social democrats’ transformation into a popular party consisted of a firmer hold on religion and the state church, with Arthur Engberg as architect. Politically progressive (social democratic) and Protestant Sweden came to stand against conservative, Catholic and capitalistic Europe. Swedish austerity and self-sacrifice were highlighted as specific virtues.23 This linked to the historical trope that mixed poverty and self-denial with Gothicist greatness and Gustavus Adolphus as the savior of Protestantism. A Swedish state church under political control would be a guarantee against Catholic power ambitions. This would make the Swedish nation invincible against the weapons of papism. In the words of Arthur Engberg:

I prefer an iron-hard, closed Swedish state church system of the kind we have to the order of things we would experience if Catholicism were permitted to spread throughout this land.24

The menace of Catholicism was set against the heritage of the Swedish people. Protestant Sweden faced Catholic Europe while Swedish isolationism confronted European Berührungsangst.25

Naturally, Swedish workers were not walking around in fear of Catholics, and the message should not be placed in such a context. It was rather a rhetorical move aimed at building up the threat from the Other. This would in turn promote accord within and beyond social democracy now that the party had become a people’s party – a development that, as we have seen, took place in the specific world economic and international situation of the early 1930s. Such rhetoric did not simply emphasize threats but also pointed to opportunities. Social democratic modernization was set against continental conservatism and Catholicism, with the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930 as an icon in the struggle against the Catholic specter. The light came from the North. In that respect,
nothing had changed since the days of Gustavus Adolphus. Social democracy stood for continuity and Swedishness, not the class struggle and Bolshevism as had been vociferously asserted as recently as the election of 1928. The defeat in that election was the more immediate factor that made the social democrats begin to reconsider their identity and strategy.

Confronted by the developments that took place to the east and south of Scandinavia in the 1930s, the social democrats were forced to reconsider their hopes and political dreams, and to transform them into a consolidated image of Scandinavia through the construction of a European Other. Finland instead was driven ever more into the orbit of the Soviet Union.

The framework for this profound transformation, accompanied by considerable continuity in patterns of values, was the experiences of crisis in two areas that coincided and reinforced the perception of a state of emergency. The experiences of the Great Depression motivated the expenditure of social energy in the direction of national conciliation and consolidation.26 A second area of crisis was found in international relations, in which the Soviet hope had slowly been transformed into a threat. A similar shift, from hope to jeopardy, was discernible in the Weimar Republic, where the social democrats became increasingly marginalized from high politics and signs of social and political polarization grew. The friendly world of the 1920s was, at least from 1933 onwards, seen from a much less optimistic perspective. Experiences of crisis were less acute in international relations than in industrial relations. The crisis emerged gradually as a dark side-show, which rejected the glossy language of the 1920s and promoted national consolidation and political stability.

Immediately preceding the emergence of this scenario, the social democrats redefined their role in politics from that of class parties to people’s parties. The perception of crisis together with the ongoing social democratic reorientation made them key actors on the political scene. They became the agents of national consolidation. One of the key instruments in their appeal for national conciliation was the demarcation of Europe. Historical continuities and discontinuities, long-term internal social experiences and immediate external political pressures were interwoven during this phase of political reorientation. The phase can be called both a democratic breakthrough and a democratic consolidation. This was surely the alternative to völkische Gemeinschaft that Gustav Landauer fought for and George Mosse and Eugene Lunn imagined to be possible on principle.


5. Originally the concept was suggested by Agrarian Party politician Alfred Pettersson i Päboda and the leader of the church youth movement Manfred Björkqvist – incidentally married to a daughter of Kjellén – seemingly independently from one another. The aim of the church youth movement was to establish a folkkyrka in place of the existing state church. The concept of folkhem responded to deep-seated emotions in the Spannungsfeld (“field of tensions”) between private and public, male and female, tradition and modernity in Swedish society around 1900, tensions similarly understood in, for example, Ferdinand Tönnies’ distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (see below).


7. Ibid.

8. Fredrik Ström, *I stormiga tider: memoarer* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1942). See Zeth Höglund, Hannes Sköld and Fredrik Ström, *Det befästa fattighuset: antimilitaristisk och socialistisk handbok* (Mölndal: Partisan, 1971 [1914]). The title of their book, *Det befästa fattighuset* (The Armed Poorhouse), engaged them in a political struggle with conservatives and their folkhemmet concept. The title alluded to the conservative interest in a strong military organization, which fueled the argument from the left that their people’s home was an armed poorhouse. The argumentation started from a question: how can you demand loyalty from a people with nothing to defend? In the Swedish context, this question was less a revolutionary proclamation than an appeal to strong emotions, in conservative Sweden and otherwise. The national conservative epic poet Werner von Heidenstam had pronounced similar thoughts in a poetic contribution to the struggle for universal suffrage. His words (“it is a shame, it is a stain upon the banner of Sweden that citizen rights are called money”) made deep inroads into conservative Sweden, as did the slogan from the suffrage struggle, “One man, one rifle, one vote.” The molding of suffrage, citizenship and defense during the first years of the twentieth century had considerable impact during World War I ten years later.


12. “Bourgeoisie” is put within quotation marks because borgerlighet is a much vaguer concept in the North and more diluted with agrarian elements than bourgeoisie or Bürgertum in German, for instance. The verbatim translation of the German concept would be borgardöme and this word does not exist in the Scandinavian languages.


15. For a development of this point, see several of the contributions in *The Cultural Construction of Norden*, ed. Sørensen, Øystein and Bo Stråth (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997).


17. Stråth, “Nordic Capitalism and Democratisation.”


20. I am grateful for comments by Carl Marklund on this point, drawing on his PhD work at the European University Institute on social engineering in Sweden and the U.S. from the 1930s to the 1950s in comparison.


The Value of Domestic Work: Economic Citizenship in Early Postwar Norway and Sweden

Gro Hagemann

In 1947, in his praise of the contribution made by housewives to society, the editor of the social democratic journal Kontakt maintained mothers’ work for their children to be “conceivably more productive than any other kind of work.” Accordingly, he argued, it should be a central task for society to make sure they are given “the best possible working conditions – and that they are paid for their work on equal terms with all productive work.” He also emphasized that the economic compensation “should not come indirectly and occasionally through the income of their husbands.” About the same time, a reader of the journal, labeling herself a “housewife,” gave her opinions on the productivity of housework from a somewhat different perspective. In spite of the fact that housewives were not paid in cash for their work, she found it “quite inadequate that Norway’s budget does not include the labor and costs for raising children.” She argued that such deficiency signified ignorance of the fact that the real assets being produced in the family represented large sums of money. “Unlike any other investment, domestic laborers seem to jump into the productive sector – and the national account – at the age of fifteen, ready for work, totally free of charge and without any previous input of labor.”

These two contributions illustrate the favorable climate of the early postwar years for housewives calling for respect for their work. The attitudes expressed reflect both the special situation of the immediate past and the challenges of the near future. In Norway, as elsewhere, experiences of shortage and suffering during the war had highlighted women’s efforts in keeping bodies and souls together. The war experience had therefore put a spotlight on married women’s contribution to the national economy. In war-making countries, housewives had been drawn out of their families into employment. In occupied countries like Norway, on the other hand, their efforts at home had been crucial for managing everyday life during times of hardship and scarcity. After destructions and institutional disintegration caused by the war Western democracies had to rebuild and re-establish society. Moreover, there was an extraordinary demographic situation to deal with. Western societies entered the postwar period with increasing marriage rates and
a ubiquitous baby boom. Accordingly, serious considerations were dedicated from the very start to improving conditions for children and families and attending high birth rates in the long term.

Paying respect to housewives therefore appeared crucial to recovery efforts and for providing for future welfare. On the other hand, labor shortage was substantial within industry and service. To overcome the challenges each country made up their own combination of complying with market demands, adjustment to prevailing norms, and proactive state involvement. In the Scandinavian countries, housework made up a broad field of policy-making, supported by governments, national economists, public administration and trade unions. In addition to the efforts carried out to ease domestic work, housewives were even encouraged to make an active commitment to the democratic process as voters, representatives and participants. Women themselves were optimistic in these years about an improvement in their status. In Norway, women’s associations from all across the spectrum formed a united front to further their claims on gender equality. Such a broad agreement among women was no everyday occurrence in Norway. As a matter of fact it had not happened since the suffrage campaigns of the early twentieth century.

Norwegian housewives who were demanding respect for their work in early post-war years frequently used a language of money. For organized housewives, like the anonymous one quoted from Kontakt, recognition and valorization of their work meant being upgraded to the status of their husbands. The approach may seem odd from a contemporary viewpoint. Such reasoning definitely conflicts with the priority given to employment in the current discourse on gender equality. Only recently have the very first years of life been valued in economic terms through unqualified cash benefits and pension accumulation for unemployed parents. These privileges have been contested, however, from both a feminist and a social democratic point of view. Such benefits counteract the contemporary social democratic principle of acquiring social rights through employment. Accordingly, statements have been made against the “unreasonable” idea of “paying people just to stay at home” even at high political levels.

Quite another chord was sounded on these issues in postwar Norway, not least from the ruling Labor Party. When a child allowance was adopted by law in 1946, it was quite explicit on the point that the cash amount being paid out to women was compensation for their unpaid work. “For the first time we have passed a law establishing that housewives are entitled to appreciation from society for the work they carry out to bring up children,” Rakel Seweriin, a Labor MP and Minister of Social Affairs, wrote enthusiastically in the Danish journal Frie Kvinder. Recognizing and valuing housework was regarded as crucial. Women encouraged, approved of and organized for the option to be a full-time housewife. Within the context of postwar optimism and hopes for extensive democracy, the awareness of their crucial role as mothers and housekeepers encouraged married women to claim full rights as citizens. Seemingly, a total change of policy had occurred.
The field of “housewife policies,” as developed and implemented by the Norwegian Labor government during the first decades after World War II, is the topic of the present paper. How can one explain this enthusiasm among women for “staying at home” and the anticipation of domesticity as a road to gender equality? Did the social democratic government succeed in their ambition to fully include housewives in their welfare project and make them real citizens of the democratic community?

Facing Postwar Challenges

Housewife policy was supported and confirmed among social democrats in the international community during the early postwar period. Much attention has been paid to the conservative housewife ideology that held hegemony in the 1950s. However, all the attention given to domesticity in the postwar period has too often been interpreted strictly in terms of an ideological “backlash” that was carried out in the same way everywhere to reconstruct social order after the tumults of the war. This interpretation needs to be modified. Domesticity was also an issue for progressive politicians whose goals were social justice and a strengthening of democracy. Although a conventional “cult of domesticity” flourished in popular culture, conservative journals and certain social milieus, this cult was not a distinct element in social democratic policy-making.

In his influential plan of 1942, thoroughly read even by Norwegian policy-makers, the British Sir William Beveridge put “housewives” into a class of their own. In this class he included all married women of working age who were “not gainfully employed and were below pensionable age.” The definition accords with the practical language used in Norway at the time. Married women were automatically called husmor – “house mother” in direct translation. Whether employed or not, marriage implied domesticity for women. British authorities made plans for part-time work accordingly from an early date. With basic social security for all citizens as his goal, Sir Beveridge also named fields in which economic support would be needed for the housewife class: maternity grants, widow’s benefits and pensions.

Similar attitudes were expressed at the 1944 International Labor Conference in Philadelphia, when representatives from all the western democracies came together to discuss the transition from war to peace. Their ambitions included a positive attitude toward gender equality and women’s economic rights, as well as attention to the special situation of married women. In discussing the challenges of redistributing labor after the war, the majority agreed that redistributing workers in the postwar economy should be organized according to the principle of equal pay and also “the principle of complete equality of opportunity for men and women on the basis of their individual merit, skill and experience.” On the other side, housewives were regarded as a group in need of
vocational training and betterment after the war. Åse Gruda Skard, who was part of the social democratic delegation from Norway, played an active part in instigating a separate gathering of female delegates to discuss the situation of housewives further, to make sure their social rights would be taken into consideration and that they would be given the opportunity to fully participate in democratic activities.9

Social democrats from Norway were among the delegates at the ILO conference who contributed to the negotiations and followed up the proposals at home. A high priority was given to modernizing housework in a basic and material sense. Generous public spending was offered for housing, waterworks and electricity boards in every region. Housing shortages were widespread. Young couples were entering wedlock in large numbers, many families were coming back from exile under the German occupation and hundreds of displaced persons were returning to the burned-down northern region of Finnmark in the far north. At the end of the 1940s, every second married couple under the age of thirty was still waiting for their own house.10 Furthermore, the quality of existing dwellings was often poor. By the end of the German occupation in 1945, more than half of rural households lacked running water inside the house, and several local communities were still short of electricity.11 It is no wonder then that housing was made a priority, thereby lessening the burdens of housework.

Priority was even given to a symbolic valorization of housework. Symbolic manifestations were explicit in the rhetoric of the Labor Party. Housewives and their work were identified in a language similar to that used when referring to working-class men. Housewives were workers of the home, the kitchen was an industry and work done in the home should be measured by quantitative methods. Social reforms were also adopted to include housewives in benefits available to the male worker. Since they were workers as well, housewives working at home should also be entitled to social benefits like vacation, social security and free time to participate in politics and cultural life. With a view to all housewives, employed or full-time, day-care facilities for children, home assistance in times of need and even babysitters were politically encouraged and partially implemented.

Freedom of choice – the option to manage with only one income in the family – meant a real social improvement for working-class families. Most of all, the option was realized by means of a radical redistribution of income to the advantage of families with one income and many children. Cash benefits for all children and tax allowances for providers were offered to compensate for the extra costs of raising and providing for children. Generous tax allowances for housewives were introduced to compensate for their unpaid work, in accordance with the Marriage Law of 1928 in which housework was equalized with paid work in providing for the family. Among postwar social economists, who were the central planners of the future society, much attention was also given to the “family problem,” the unjust distribution of cash between those who provided for children and those who did not.12 This way of reasoning was by no means exceptional to Norway. Like the marriage
laws, which resulted from a close Nordic cooperation in the 1920s, the family taxation of the 1940s and 1950s was also developed on a Nordic level. Again, the Swedes were at the vanguard in finding a solution that could be applied, with some variation, in all the Nordic countries.13 Everywhere progressive taxes and enforced equalizing of income distribution between providers and non-providers were considered appropriate within a framework of social justice.

According to the arguments made by the central actors, each of these initiatives included a democratic dimension. Making housework less time-consuming and strenuous served the purpose of adding to the time available for participation in community and politics. Accordingly, day-care facilities were explicitly aimed at the needs of housewives at home. At least in Norway, part-time kindergartens for full-time housewives were established with greater success than the more expensive and all-inclusive ones needed for employed mothers. More-explicit action was also taken to include women as political citizens. After 1945, there was a notable increase in the representation of women within political bodies, although the numbers remained modest at the leading levels. Greater was the number of female members appointed to public commissions. But even here, the general rule seemed to be that on each board and commission, as well as in government, one single housewife representative was sufficient to speak on behalf of all women. Only on special occasions was more than one woman appointed. It was considered self-evident that female representatives were competent to speak for the interests of women and women-related topics. It was not until the 1970s, however, that they were regarded as capable of speaking on behalf of general interests.

**Economic Citizenship**

Housewife policy, then, seems to represent an ambition to make married women citizens in a full sense. Also the common language of money used in the argumentation agrees with this ambition. The idea of acknowledging unpaid housework by including it in the economy and statistics was already well-known in the public debate before the war. In the 1920s and 1930s organized housewives had made requests to the National Bureau of Statistics to have married women’s unpaid work calculated in economic terms.14 The problem had even been considered by a group of young social economists in their planning of the national postwar economy during the German occupation. In their calculations of national accounts during the war, they estimated the economic value of unpaid housework. Although based on a modest equivalent – the average wage of a domestic servant – they concluded that the value of this sector made up a larger sum than the total value produced in agriculture, forestry and fishing.15 Indeed, their interest in the matter is underlined by the fact that the quotations from the “housewife” above are taken from
an article by economist Johan Vogt.\textsuperscript{16} Since the experiment of including housework in
the national accounts did not survive long, it turned into a symbolic act.\textsuperscript{17} By exposing
the large amount of work being done outside the market, it still had a certain influence
on political discourse, acting as a reminder of the importance of married women's unpaid
work and their standing as fully productive and autonomous citizens.

Yet, such questions were hardly ever discussed in terms of “citizenship” in Norway. Unlike
in Swedish, there was no real equivalent to the English concept in Norwegian. Only during
the post-Marshallian debates of the 1980s was the Swedish concept of \textit{medborgerskap} im-
ported into the scholarly debates in Norway. Nevertheless, the Norwegian postwar policy
was clearly referring to ideas very similar to those underlying T. H. Marshall’s theory of
social citizenship.\textsuperscript{18} Unlike Marshall, who referred exclusively to social class, Norwegian
Labor also paid some attention to gender. In their very first working program of 1945,
they explicitly declared “equal rights for men and women in all fields of society,” including
the right to work and leisure time as well as education.\textsuperscript{19} In doing this, they were in fact
touching on elements that accord with recent ideas on “economic citizenship,” as developed
by Alice Kessler-Harris. In her understanding, economic citizenship is “the achievement
of an independent and relatively autonomous status that marks self-respect and provides
access to the full play of power and influence that defines participation in a democratic
society.”\textsuperscript{20} This form of citizenship might have become more hidden and implicit within
a capitalist economy compared to eighteenth-century mercantilism. For male citizens,
economic liberty was no longer a contested matter in the twentieth century. However, in
many ways, this remained a male privilege: “For women family attachment has vied with
individual rights; dependence and protection with autonomy and liberty; and tradition
with the market.”\textsuperscript{21}

Interestingly, this way of dealing with the peculiar situation of (married) women cor-
responds with the concepts used by Swedish historian Gunnar Qvist when analyzing the
early economic liberties of nineteenth-century Sweden. Questions of economic liberties
for women, he claims, were dealt with in vastly different terms from those of economic
liberties in general, meaning the liberties of men. The latter was mainly founded on the
“principle of the individual,” meaning that all men were entitled to universal human rights
bestowed by nature. Among these rights, Gunnar Qvist identifies economic freedom to be “the most unbreakable right of man.”\textsuperscript{22} As opposed to this, the economic freedom of
women was considered from a utilitarian “principle of the family” point of view, taking
both natural order and pragmatic needs into account. Thus, the problem of providing
for unmarried and divorced or widowed women made limited economic freedom for
unsupported women advantageous.

Such double standards regarding general rights might be given validity beyond the
specific context of early-nineteenth-century Sweden. This is not solely a question of gen-
der, since weighing individual rights and common utility is integrated into the concept
of citizenship as such. Still, the main division of labor between economy and family leads to enduring gendered tensions between women’s family responsibilities as a housewife (or housewife-to-be) and her general obligations and rights as a citizen. Quite often, gendered conflicts of the twentieth century were caused by – and spoken of – as opposition between family needs and personal freedom, between social concerns and individual choice. When feminist women strongly opposed the international convention of night work prohibition of 1906, their personal freedom was defended at the expense of utilitarian ideas of protecting motherhood and future generations. The Nordic countries ended up with different answers to the dilemmas embedded therein. In Norway and Denmark, the feminists got their way when night work prohibition for women was rejected because of the prevailing liberal discourse.23

The conflict between individual rights and utilitarianism was also at stake in two issues that will be discussed further in this article: restrictions on married women’s employment as adequate measures in times of unemployment; and the system of joint family taxation – treating the earnings of married couples as one income. In both cases, family was made the relevant category when a fair policy of distribution was at stake, conflicting with women’s individual rights. Quite often, the principle of the individual had to cede to a family principle. This does not go without exceptions, however. Night work prohibition was rejected in Norway in favor of advancing women’s economic freedom. Restrictions against women’s employment were found to be illegal by the Norwegian High Court, and joint taxation of spouses was gradually done away with starting in 1959. In the long run, then, there is no doubt that the family principle was fading to the background. Hence, postwar housewife policy was developed as part of a contested field between individual and family principles. Looked at from a long-term perspective, the first postwar decades form an interesting interlude between what might be referred to as two regimes of gender: the first dominated by the principle of the family and the second by the principle of the individual.

The dilemmas arising in the interval between these principles were dealt with differently by western democracies after the war. Regardless of how, it had to be handled in one way or another, to meet economic and social needs and be in some accordance with the general democratic opinion. In this context, Norway – or rather the Nordic countries – exhibit some distinctive features. As part of the social democratic “Nordic model,” a certain version of housewife policy was worked out, offering married women the freedom to choose whether to be full-time or employed housewives. Although its shape was that of a housewife contract, housework was not defined as the only and life-long commitment of married women. Housewife policy aimed at enabling families to manage with one wage-earner, and to release working-class housewives of the burden of double-work. Also, the employment of married women was encouraged and organized for; in all the Nordic countries initiatives were taken to recruit married women into the labor force.
Although the implementation was far from effective everywhere, the political agendas endeavored to establish day-care facilities and other social arrangements adapted to mothers seeking employment. A further purpose was to encourage political commitment and participation from a majority of working-class women who were too tied up with domestic duties to have time and energy for political activities.

The Principle of Mutual Maintenance

Sweden and Norway used to be regarded as the most consequential social democratic regimes of the Nordic countries. They most thoroughly developed the characteristics of the Nordic model according to the conventional interpretation: a strong state with wide authorization; extensive tax-financed welfare support and benefits; and a regulated labor market with strong organization on both sides (for employers and employees). Among their Nordic counterparts, the Swedish and Norwegian labor parties were also the only two who continuously stayed in power during the postwar period. The social democratic influence was clear in all the Nordic countries, but only in Norway and Sweden was it hegemonic. Until the Norwegian oil age began in the 1970s, Sweden was definitely the rich cousin in the relationship, able to implement costly reforms much earlier than its western neighbor. The economic gap between the two countries was especially wide immediately after the war, when Norway had to rebuild the country after five years of German occupation. Sweden, instead, had remained outside the war and had experienced economic growth and welfare development throughout the 1940s. During the postwar period, Sweden represented the land of prosperity for Norwegians, who were short of almost everything at the time – except for money. Due to comprehensive and long-lasting import restrictions, Norwegian housewives and families went by bus on shopping tours to Sweden to buy sugar and luxury goods like chocolate and silk stockings.

The uneven starting points constitute one obvious reason for the slower development in Norway of costly welfare benefits. Already more industrialized before the war, Sweden’s lead was bound to increase after Norway’s stagnation during the war. In recent research, further differences have been drawn between the two countries. In his comparison of female employment in the Nordic countries, Klas Åmark concluded that “the Norwegian modernization process seems to have followed its own path.” He is referring to the male breadwinner model, which seems to have been comparatively strong in Norway, even among the urban working classes. Some social scientists have made similar arguments by pointing to a Norwegian Sonderweg concerning gender and family policies. Significant differences between and within the two countries have been revealed, proving heterogeneities and variations between two seemingly shared and coherent patterns. Differences in social norms and national culture have also been central to their explanations.
The Norwegian reluctance to recruit married women into employment has been understood in terms of Norwegian traditionalism, based in extensive religious influence and stronger support for a male breadwinner model among the urban working classes.\textsuperscript{25}

Without dismissing the presence of such conservative elements, there is still good reason to introduce nuances to this interpretation. Indeed, it is the purpose of this essay to argue that the conservative and traditionalistic elements in postwar housewife policies tend to be overestimated. Sweden definitely took a leading role in arranging for married women’s employment from an early date. The Swedish government compensated for labor shortage by restructuring and rationalizing all trade and industry in a more efficient way than in Norway and most other countries.\textsuperscript{26} According to the idea that efficient use should be made of national labor resources, the Swedish government made greater efforts to recruit married women into part-time work from an early time. Due to the labor shortage in the expansive industrial sector, employers and unions worked together from the early 1950s on to find ways of employing married women. In the 1960s, they also campaigned to encourage women into taking untraditional jobs. Simultaneously, the government organized welfare benefits in order to make it easier for housewives to be employed.\textsuperscript{27}

Although labor shortage was quite widespread on the Norwegian side as well, efforts to recruit potential labor resources were less aggressive. That does not automatically imply that the long-term goals were different. Although Norway brought up the rear in recruiting women into employment, the main strategy seems to have been the same: to arrange for the extensive use of female labor supplies. Ideas of a modern welfare state were unthinkable without making use of married women’s labor. If for nothing else, this motivated social democrats to encourage and organize for female employment in the end, although other tasks and interests had to be given priority in the short run. Facilitating women’s employment took its toll in time, money and motivation. It was not until the late 1960s that wholehearted efforts were finally made to accomplish these goals.

In its main structure, however, the gender policy was rather similar in Norway and Sweden, and even in other Nordic countries. In spite of differences in the actual priorities made between employment and domesticity, housewife policy seems to have been an integrated part of the welfare model in both countries. Freedom of choice for married women also appears to have been the main characteristic of both. The option of being a full-time housewife was regarded as an improvement and a social right for working-class women with small children and cumbersome housework. Time permitting, married women were even encouraged to take on employment. In her book on the National Swedish Trade Union, Yvonne Hirdman blames social democratic women for speaking with a forked tongue.\textsuperscript{28} But perhaps instead they express a Nordic, social democratic compromise in the shape of an intentional balance between employment and family.

The origins of a common Nordic model in this field weigh heavily on results from previous decades. There is certainly inspiration from Alva and Gunnar Myrdal, whose
social theory offered a rich supply of possible initiatives in Nordic policy-making from the second half of the 1930s on. Alva Myrdal’s book with Viola Klein from 1956 marks the peak of inventiveness concerning governmental services to improve living conditions and freedom of choice for working-class families. There is certainly another side to these ambitions. In order to offer generous support for ordinary working-class families, severe restrictions were placed on individuals regarded as unsuitable for raising families and bringing up children.

Of similar importance for the Nordic model were the principles established in the Marriage Acts passed in all the Nordic countries during the 1920s. As mapped out recently in a Nordic project, the legislation was the product of a rather consistent plan. Although developed and adopted while the welfare states were only rudimentary, the legislation has had a decisive influence on Nordic gender and family politics. Compared to previous legislation, the new acts were both more restrictive and more liberal. For example, rules that were instituted regarding entry into marriage were more prohibitive. The age limit for brides to marry was raised and medical restrictions on marriage were extended. On the other hand, central male privileges within the family were also removed and economic equality between the spouses was declared: either they were married or agreed to divorce. The legislation established that husband and wife were mutually obliged to provide for each other and recognized women’s unpaid work as equivalent to cash earnings in providing for a family. Although unpaid work is normally associated with women, the implications of the laws could also be interpreted in gender-neutral terms, as an equal valuation of cash and care to support a family. Needless to say, the principle of equality did not automatically put an end to patriarchal norms and practices within families. The short-term consequences may therefore have seemed small, at least as long as the marriage lasted. After a divorce, joint property and mutual maintenance were indeed severe realities. The parallel Nordic marriage legislation may therefore be regarded as an attempt to overcome the conflict between the principles of family and individual.

There is some evidence that Norwegian actors started out by giving the principles a more traditionalistic interpretation. The mutual responsibility of spouses to provide for each other was used more insistently to give value to women’s unpaid housework as an equivalent contribution to the family economy. In Sweden, on the other hand, it seems that interpretations were used more actively as an argument to support the rights of married women to be employed. This was demonstrated in the divergence on married women’s employment during the Great Depression. Nearly everywhere, the labor movement recommended a restriction on women’s work as an adequate measure during times of unemployment. The policy became a contested field in all the Nordic countries. The attitudes of the social democratic parties appeared to be different, however. In Sweden, organized women both inside and outside the labor movement immediately formed joint actions in rejection of any restriction on married women’s right to work,
and the leadership of the Social Democratic Party supported them. According to Per Albin Hansson, the leader of the party, a marriage bar for women did not coincide with democratic principles.32

In Norway, on the other hand, both the National Trade Union and the Labor Party were furthering a marriage bar, arguing that income for family providers was superior to married women’s right to work. Women in the labor movement gradually turned against the marriage bar, however, because it weakened their economic citizenship. A gender gap – and a gap among women – appeared when the fervent opposition of unionized women was supported by a younger generation of party women, resulting in a rejection of the marriage bar at the Labour women’s national meeting in 1936. As a young party activist in the 1930s, Rakel Seweriin expressed profound concern over the discord developing between women and the party, and among women in general. Women dedicated to social democratic politics, she claimed, stood at risk to rule out unionized women, leaving it to bourgeois women’s associations to speak for them:

At present, when women’s rights are attacked by advancing reaction, dictatorship and fascism, the socialist labor movement should be in the front row fighting for women’s unlimited right to work, and to increase women’s influence in society.33

Controversies over the marriage bar for women definitely brought on a change in social democratic policies in the Nordic countries. To be sure, a women’s campaign was started earlier and was more successful in Sweden, ending up with the progressive conclusions of the governmental Committee on Women’s Employment, Kvinnoarbetskomiteen, in 1938. Referring to the principles in the Marriage Law, the committee explicitly refused any restriction on women’s right to work. Though not as vocal as in Sweden, a noticeable radicalization even took place among social democratic women in Norway. After having confronted the official politics of the Labor Party, a genuine shift in gender attitudes took place. Aase Lionæs, an economist and an outspoken antagonist of the marriage bar, became the editor of the women’s journal Arbeiderkvinnen, turning it into a radical feminist and anti-fascist mouthpiece. In 1938, the practice of a marriage bar for women within the labor movement was even judged to be in conflict with the constitution when the High Court upheld the claim of a female employee who was fired from a consumer co-op two days before her wedding.34

The spirit of Nordic cooperation was also present in the issue of family taxation, which brought about an enduring conflict in gender politics during the postwar period. The practice of jointly taxing spouses was evaluated in all the Nordic countries after the war, promoted not least by women’s claim on equality. On a principal level, this was regarded as a question of great importance within the women’s movement, as a continuation of previous struggles for women’s economic citizenship. Since the earnings of married couples were taxed as one income, employed housewives did not have much left of their earnings once the progressive tax system had taken its share. Furthermore, the inferior
status signified by the lack of independence in tax matters was regarded as contrary to their individual status as citizens. Fighting against the prevalent tax system, then, turned into a joint action between feminists in all the Nordic countries.

In Norway, a broad alliance of women’s organizations, including the female branch of the Labor Party, began their activities in 1945 with high expectations, claiming the right for married women to pay their own taxes. In the context of postwar optimism, expectations were prevalent throughout the Nordic countries that women, married or unmarried, were from then on to be treated as equals. Not only did women call for recognition of their right to work, but also the permission to pay their own taxes and actions of solidarity in order to attain equal pay. On a practical level, however, this turned out to be a more contested field. The broad agreement initially exhibited among women gradually developed into a conflict between employed women and housewives.

To investigate the taxation issues, governmental commissions were set up in all the Nordic countries, with 50 percent female representation in both Sweden and Norway. Forceful action from those claiming individual taxation was met with bountiful tax allowances in favor of one-income families. Even among feminists, this generous alternative made it difficult to uphold the previous request and brought on a division within the women’s front. The split should not be interpreted exclusively in terms of traditional restrictions against women’s individual rights, however. Even a social dimension was at stake here. The system of joint taxation definitely conflicts with women’s personal freedom within a conventional understanding of citizenship. The reason to go on with the system, however, was not as a rejection of gender equality as such, but rather to advocate the conflicting principle of social justice. Dealing with the family as the relevant subject of taxation was regarded as fair in the interests of a majority of working-class families, and even in accordance with the principle of mutual maintenance established by the marriage laws. Sweden was the first to decide to prolong joint taxation between the spouses. They made their conclusion in 1949, thereby influencing the result in neighboring countries as well. There were liberal feminists in Norway who changed their priorities after hearing about the Swedish argumentation. Within a system of progressive taxation, separating the dues of each spouse was regarded as an advantage for educated middle-class women and their families, whereas working-class women and one-income families were the losers. Rather than an explicit male breadwinner norm, the commissions based their conclusions on concerns for working-class families with small children.

One consequence of the system, also admitted by the law-makers, was the economic drawback for married women with employment; the progressive system left them with only a small output from their work. From an economic perspective, there were hardly any incentives for married women to be employed, since one-income families were privileged. Nevertheless, this was the strategy chosen everywhere, including in Sweden. Successful Swedish efforts to recruit female labor were not therefore caused by a favoring of female
employment through direct financial incentives. The tax burden and the redistribution of income were at least as heavy and incisive in Sweden as they were in Norway and other Nordic countries. Instead, financial earnings were put toward the organization of part-time work combined with the establishment of tax-financed child-care facilities and other generous social arrangements to enable housewives to be employed. The advantage of Swedish industry and economy, definite even before the war, increased through the different wartime experiences. The long-term ambition was the same, however: to arrange for the extensive use of female labor.

**Housewife Policies in Norway**

There is hardly any doubt, then, that the starting point of Norwegian Labor in 1945 differed a great deal from the pre-war situation. For one, the state of the market was quite different from the Depression and unemployment that had provoked the marriage bar in the 1920s and 1930s. With the labor shortage of the postwar years there was no reason for such restrictions. Equally important was the shift of attitudes among leading social democrats in their gender policies, which is clearly demonstrated by the formulations of the party’s 1945 working program. To be sure, there was still no general agreement in this regard within the labor movement. There was the fact, however, that both Rakel Seweriin and Aase Lionæs, women who had led the feminist opposition in the 1930s, were now holding leading positions in the Labor Party. Social democrats from Norway, men and women alike, also took definite stands on these issues at an international level.

In several fields, social reforms were put forth in order to raise the status of housewives. Whether she was employed or a full-time housewife, many arrangements were requested to make work less strenuous and to enable participation in society outside the home. Housewife policies included reforms and social rights on a broad spectrum of fields, most of them directed at all housewives, no matter their employment status. For full-time housewives the main purpose was some assistance and leisure time. When interviewed for a pamphlet at the election campaign in 1945, Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen underlined this point. To enable the participation of housewives in society as full democratic citizens, they had to be granted time off. Child care for some hours during the day, vacations from family responsibilities for a week or two during the summer and home-care assistants in cases of illness or child birth were regarded as appropriate measures.

For employed housewives the situation was different. *Kindergartens*, nurseries and home-care assistants were just as important for them. Investigations into the accessibility of the labor market for married women proved beyond a doubt the importance of organized child-care facilities for those seeking employment. Those already employed needed both reliable child-care arrangements and home-care assistants to step in when
children fell ill. During the optimism of the early postwar period, expectations that these arrangements would be made available to all housewives, and be made into social rights, were still widespread. This was definitely the ambition of the female branch of the Labor Party whose leader, Aase Lionæs, repeatedly mentioned child care, vacations and home-care assistants as benefits in the interests of both housewives and unionized women. “At stake for all women today,” she wrote as the editor of Arbeiderkvinnen, “is full economic freedom of all women. Women in trade and socialist movements should therefore always stand together and support each other.” As practical politics and economic realities took over, however, the ambitions gradually became more modest. Starting out as ideas of universal social rights, these arrangements developed into more limited and conditional social aid for those most in need.

The idea of a special vacation for housewives came to the fore when wage-earners got one extra week of vacation in 1948. Since free time for husbands and children usually meant more work for housewives, it was argued that they should be allowed holiday time without their families. In its most radical, universalistic version, it was imagined that the rights of housewives would translate into a cash amount distributed before the summer to everyone who received the universal child allowance. In the version actually implemented, public funds were passed on to private organizations that arranged vacations in summer residences for housewives who needed it.

Child-care facilities were also primarily initiated and carried into effect by private organizations, above all the National Union of Housewives (Norges Husmorforbund), though some municipalities and companies joined in as well. However, suggestions that the state finance the running of child-care facilities were subsequently turned down. In this field, Norwegian politics definitely differs from that of Sweden, where the state-financing of kindergartens was agreed upon as early as 1943. In spite of several motions posed and vividly debated at national meetings of Labour women in Norway, it was repeatedly declined. The only exception was tax-financed support for disabled children who needed social and linguistic training. Consequently, the establishment of child-care facilities in Norway was mainly left to private initiatives, which made part-time facilities their priority.

Home-care assistance, on the other hand, was developed as a public service to a larger degree, although the National Union of Housewives was also a pioneer here. Inspired by the Swedish model, a parliamentary committee was appointed in 1947 and the proposal was unanimously supported by the parliament. Two considerations were indicated in particular: the need for assistance in case of acute illness to prevent long-term effects on the family, and the demographic interests associated with the situation following childbirth. Home-care assistants were to be trained workers with regulated wages and working conditions, and they were to serve first in homes with the greatest need. Financing was based on cooperation between the state, municipalities and the individual families. This was a totally new, initially voluntary, social sector, which was made mandatory for all
municipalities from 1955 on.\textsuperscript{38} Companies were also encouraged to arrange home-care assistance for their employees, and some of them did. Services offered by private organizations were advised against, however, probably because Labor Party women disliked competition from “bourgeois” housewives. In \textit{Arbeiderkvinnen}, Aase Lionaes warned against turning the issue of home-care assistants into a field in which private organizations could spread their “basic view on politics.”\textsuperscript{39}

Child-care facilities, home-care assistants and vacation combined to create a housewife policy with a double meaning, since these arrangements were directed at employed and full-time housewives alike. Several attempts were made during the early postwar years to recruit the reserve of married women who remained unemployed to meet the dramatic shortage of labor at the time. The shortage affected all sectors, not least the ones relying on female labor, including all forms of domestic work, textile and garment industries, healthcare and education, hotels and restaurants, and fishery and food-refining industries. The decreasing proportion of unmarried women available contributed to a considerable shortage. Women entered the labor market later and married earlier than they had in previous decades. Fewer lived their whole lives without marrying.

In this situation, married women formed an important, or rather the most important, reserve of labor. Moreover, vigorous rationalization and greater work intensity were regarded as adequate measures to increase the economic output. Two public investigations were launched to deal with the issue. In 1946, a committee was appointed to find out how to reduce absenteeism and increase productivity in the Norwegian economy.\textsuperscript{40} Since women’s absence proved to be high, actions to improve their presence at work were taken into particular consideration. In 1947, a second investigation was made with the explicit mandate to propose actions that would increase the supply of female labor.\textsuperscript{41} Both reports, then, paid attention to married women and requirements for increasing their employment and the intensity of their labor. Among the measures proposed in both reports were the development of day-care facilities and the introduction of home-care assistants and home nurses. Companies were called upon in particular to initiate such arrangements for their female employees. Furthermore, both the current taxation system and the strict regulation of business hours for shops and public offices were regarded as obstacles to married women’s employment, so both reports recommended these obstacles be removed. Finally, additional long-term initiatives were requested in order to strengthen women’s training and motivation for employment. Young women in particular were seen as a target group in need of guidance.

In the 1947 investigation, special attention was paid to evaluating the effects of and motivation for part-time work. Enthusiasm for part-time work was high among economists and executives in employment offices and the public administration. They referred to initiatives related to part-time work in both Sweden and England to recruit married women into employment. Knut Getz Wold, State Secretary in the Department of Social Affairs
in 1947-1948 and the secretary of the investigation committee, requested clarification of the issue along the lines of the Swedish policy. However, the clarification was never made, likely due to disagreement among the committee members. Employers, for one, were skeptical and did not believe optional working hours would have a positive effect. Rather than an increase in married women’s employment, they feared more part-time work among those already employed. Trade Union members on the committee were similarly unenthused, with trade unionist women in particular protesting all part-time work, anxious it would result in a general organization of female labor according to family and housewife principles. The reluctance of both employers and employees delayed the clarification requested, and the report ended up in a department drawer.

Indeed, most measures proposed in the two reports were put aside for one reason or another. While insufficient public funds to be invested in this field counts for a part of it, the priority given to other interest groups was just as important. Certain measures formulated to increase female employment conflicted with powerful interest groups like trade unions and agricultural organizations. The protests of both male and female unionists played a definite role. Having demonstrated their potential power through the marriage bar campaign in the 1930s, the protest of unionized women was a force to be reckoned with. And farmers’ organizations were influential, since they formed an important power base for the Labor government. Having gained a great deal of pressure-group power through regular agricultural negotiations aimed at income equality between farmers and workers, their subsidies no doubt left less space for social arrangements in favor of married women.42

For a variety of reasons, then, Norwegian authorities were quite reluctant to follow the Swedish example of state initiatives to arrange for increased employment among married women. There were competing interests in Sweden as well, and quite often the conflicts ran along similar lines. However, labor market demands tended to be more effectively fulfilled than they did in Norway. Moving labor from rural areas was carried out more vigorously, and public funds were used more generously. Swedish day-care facilities for children, for example, were established by means of public funding from 1943 on. In Norway, this field was left to voluntary organizations and municipalities until the 1970s. Part-time work was investigated in Sweden in 1944, and implemented in spite of protests from some employers as well as women in the trade unions. In Norway, the question was shelved until the 1970s. In Sweden, a permanent committee, the Arbetsmarknadens Kvinnonämnd, was appointed, and from 1951 on, the National Trade Union, the Employers Association and labor market authorities worked together to find incentives to recruit more women.43 Equivalent bodies were not appointed in Norway at the time. Initiatives to liberalize business hours were met with protests from trade unions in both Norway and Sweden, not least from women in the trades affected by the liberalization. In Sweden, restrictions on business hours were gradually loosened, until they were entirely done away with in 1972.
No changes occurred in Norway until the early 1980s, when the conservative right-wing government untied the knot and carried out the first liberalization.44

The only exception to the rule of the Swedish lead in arranging for female employment was Norway’s abolition of joint family taxation. In 1959, employed housewives were entitled to choose individual taxation, six years ahead of Sweden and eleven years before Denmark. It may seem paradoxical that individual taxation was made an option in Norway earlier than in other Nordic countries, but the motive was far from surprising, since the revision was made to facilitate the employment of married women. It was in fact the first economic measure carried out for this purpose in Norway. How effective that measure was, however, is unclear, since one needed a considerably high income to forgo the generous tax allowances still given to one-income families.45

Regardless of the obvious dissimilarities, however, the main priorities appear the same in social democratic housewife policies. Both Sweden and Norway endeavored to improve the conditions of married women, including a social policy for the majority of working-class women and ambitions to incorporate housewives into the general social benefits of the time. Starting with the innovative turn in population policy introduced by the Myrdals in the 1930s, Sweden took the leading position in stimulating matrimonial fertility in a less restrictive and more encouraging way than had normally been the case until then.46 Even in this field, Sweden was far more ambitious and developed a model for all its Nordic neighbors to admire. Thanks to social entrepreneurship and economic prosperity, as well as their neutrality during the war, Swedish social democrats turned the 1940s into a productive decade of social reforms. In fact, most of the housewife-friendly social reforms put forth by the Norwegian Labor Party were inspired by, and often copied from, the Swedish ideal.

Ongoing debates over Norwegian exceptionalism, employment rates and labor-market politics are mostly one-sided in their focus on measuring gender equality. Consequently, tax-financed benefits offered to ease the combination of employment and family work have been regarded as the main progressive aspect of the model. While tax-financed day-care facilities, regulated part-time work, maternity or parental leaves, etc. have been stressed, the progressive ambitions of housewife policy-making have tended to fall by the wayside. In Norway and Sweden alike, social democratic housewife policies were also replaced by generous welfare benefits financed by the state. In present debates, this is only rarely interpreted in terms of modernity and gender equality. More often than not, it is addressed in negative terms as a conservative cult of domesticity, a hindrance to equal opportunities in the labor market.
Balance Displaced

Like the contemporary repugnance for “paying people just to stay at home,” debates over Norwegian exceptionalism often seem to accept and reinforce an understanding of gender equality as part of a dichotomy between progressive employment policy and traditionalistic housewife or family policy. In this writer’s view, they should rather be seen as two sides of the same coin, the central point being the balance between them. Historically, marriage has involved double responsibility for women – and some men – in both the economic sector and unpaid care-work within the family. Upgrading unpaid care-work and lessening the burdens of married women’s two-fold responsibility formed the essence of Nordic housewife policy as it was designed in the early postwar period. The main purpose was to develop a social policy with social rights for the majority of working-class women, to improve their welfare and incorporate them as participating political citizens. By taking housewife policy seriously in policy-making, their cause was explicitly included as part of the political agenda. To be sure, the policy was male-dominated in the sense that men were regarded as the normal providers and women the normal care workers. Nevertheless, central policy-makers in Sweden and Norway alike favored permissiveness over restrictions when it came to ideas about a “woman’s place.” In spite of problems, defects and certain utopian elements, these housewife policies stood for willingness on the part of governments not only to give married women freedom of choice, but even to give up a certain amount of economic growth to improve the welfare of working-class families. In neither country were housewife policies so restrictive as to obstruct women’s employment or regard domesticity as the only acceptable occupation for married women.

This does not imply, however, that the picture of Norwegian and Scandinavian housewife policies should be drawn too optimistically. In Norway, the ambitions for radical reforms and all-inclusive citizenship imagined in 1945 were carried into effect in a considerably reduced form. Housewives hoping for full equality in all fields of society would come to face several disappointments. From the late 1940s on, employed housewives definitely experienced a change in the housewife policy balance to their disadvantage. Economic trends favored domesticity, whereas day care and other services were insufficient to encourage mothers to work outside the home. While the constant problem of female labor shortage was often dealt with as an issue of importance and there were no open restrictions on women’s employment, serious initiatives to recruit married women into employment were apparently put on ice after the fruitless reports of 1946-1947. As an alternative, housewives were warmly encouraged to use their surplus time volunteering. More than in Sweden, women’s employment and the development of a tax-financed welfare sector was neglected in favor of voluntary social work organized by private organizations.

On the other hand, aspirations of economic compensation for housewives in their own right also faded to the background quite early on. Except for the considerably modest child allowance, income redistribution in favor of housewives came mainly from
indirect and occasional compensation through their husbands’ income. In fact, for many women the child allowance was the only cash income they ever received, as was clearly demonstrated by the protests launched against proposals to convert the cash payment into a tax deduction. As a rule, full-time housewives were attached to the social security system through their husbands. There was one exception, however. Unlike in most other countries, Norwegian housewives were entitled to disability benefits in their own right starting in the 1950s. Gradually, certain long-term consequences of neglecting the personal economic rights of housewives rose to the surface. For one thing, no reliable arrangements had been made to protect married women if they were left alone. When widowed or divorced, their well-being weighed heavily on the economy and the rights earned by their former husbands. After a long life of unpaid family work, many ended up in a “woman's trap,” not entitled to more than a minimum pension. They were like a lost generation of women, no longer appreciated for their efforts, with no economic rights to help them face their old age.

While employed women drew the short straw during the first decade after the war compared to full-time housewives, the balance began shifting gradually in the mid 1960s, to the disadvantage of one-income families. The replacement of the family tax system with compulsory individual taxation in all the Nordic countries around 1970 was one important sign. The new attention paid to gender equality in policy-making was another. The swinging sixties saw postwar baby-boomer women entering employment and higher education with very different ambitions from those of their mothers. New voices also joined the debate, questioning central premises that had been taken as givens until then. Social scientists introduced “gender roles” as a new and challenging concept to match the call for a new agenda. Should housework and child care really remain the sole responsibility of women? Were marriage and children really the only ways for women to lead a satisfying life? Radical ideas on free sexuality, cohabitation and shared housing were advanced, supported by the anti-authoritarian and feminist attitudes of the sixties generation. Furthermore, the first initiatives were taken to arrange for spouses to share work both in the family and outside the home.

The transformation was welcomed by the younger generation of women who had grown up after the war and had profited from the expansion of higher education. Those who had been excluded from and silenced by the strong heteronormativity of housewife policies also welcomed it. The real outsiders of the prevailing order had been those who did not belong to the majority, which was made up of married men and women. Both the public scene and welfare systems rested on an obvious heteronormativity, signifying marriage as the normal status for adults. The Criminal Code of 1902 effectively banned homosexuality and cohabitation in Norway, and this lasted until 1972. Although the legislation was applied liberally, the social dishonor was a heavy burden to bear if such immorality were discovered. Even an unmarried status was generally regarded as a social
and sexual insufficiency, especially for women. Not only were spinsters socially ranked below both married women and bachelors, they also suffered the low wages that were normal for female labor sectors. Women not belonging to a “normal” family, then, appeared to be second-class citizens, restricted from entitlements to redistribution and recognition, and even public and political representation. More often than not, only housewives – and mothers – were regarded as real women entitled to speak on behalf of the female gender.

As for the changing balance of housewife policies, something happened on the way between postwar optimism and the alterations of the late 1960s. A change in the recognition and valorization of unpaid care-work and its practitioners can be traced in conspicuous linguistic modifications from a rather early date. Most striking is the gradual disappearance from social democratic discourse of the language of women’s rights and gender equality. After using a vocal and militant language of female citizenship during the early postwar years, even the women’s branch of the Labor Party had stopped making such formulations by the 1950s. Though it had started out with concerns about the low status of housework and the interests of married women as citizens, the rhetoric developed into a de-gendered language of family and consumer concerns. References to major political priorities remained clear: keeping the birth rates high and increasing private consumption of expensive household items. While housewives continued to play a central role in the ongoing modernization process, their special interests as full citizens entitled to social rights on their own behalf gradually disappeared in favor of the interests of consumers, children and families.
3. *Norske Kvinner Samarbeidsnemnd* was organized in 1946 with affiliation by most women’s associations, and it was active until women from the trade union and Labour Party withdrew from the front in the early 1950s.
4. From a statement given by Thorbjorn Jagland, leading politician of the Norwegian Labour Party.
5. Cutting from the journal in Rakel Seweriin’s private papers, Labour Movement’s Archives and Library, Oslo, box DA 001.
17. Sangolt, “To Count or Not to Count.”


34. Berg, Nødvendige hensyn i krisetid?


36. The Statistical Office of Oslo, “En rekke Oslo-husmødres arbeidsdag” (A sample of housewives in Oslo and their working hours), investigation carried out by The National Union of Housewives 1950, Statistisk kvartalshefte (1951), 1st quarter, special print no 8.

37. “Hovedsaken i kvinnesaken” (The main issue of feminism), editorial article, Arbeiderkvinnen (no. 9,1946).

38. The facts here are based on Frode Skjelbred, Husmørens storhetstid: Arbeiderpartiets kvinnesekretariat og innføringen av husmorviker og husmorferie (Master thesis, University of Oslo, 2004).

39. “Sosialpolitikk eller veldedighet” (Social policy or charity), editorial article, Arbeiderkvinnen (no. 6, 1947).


41. Tilrådning om åtgjerder for å øke tilgangen på kvinnelig arbeidskraft, unpublished report by Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (Sosialdepartementet) (1947).

42. Johan Vogt, ”Kvinnesenes innsats i vår samfunnsøkonomi” (Women’s Contributions to National Economy). Committee to Increase Production and University of Oslo (Central Committee to Increase Production).


48. In Norway an experiment involving the sharing of work between spouses was started in the late 1960s. See Lars Grue, *Arbeidsdelingen i familien: en analyse med utgangspunkt i prosjektet om ektefelledelt arbeidstid* (Master thesis, University of Oslo, 1978).
A Social Republic?

It has long been a mainstay of French historiography that a high level of political democracy has been accompanied in France by relatively little in the way of social democracy, particularly when compared to the social policy of Germany, for example. It is argued that, given the importance of farmers, small retailers and the independent middle classes, the Third Republic was characterized by strong bureaucratization and political democratization combined with weak industrialization and a resulting lack of social policy. However, recent historical research has somewhat altered this view. In particular, it has drawn attention to the way that earlier analyses have tended to underestimate the important role played by other forms of social protection, such as social assistance and the law, by considering insurance data alone. When action at the local level (e.g., by municipalities and charities) is considered alongside that of national actors, social reformers, associations and factory inspectors, the Third Republic could in fact be defined as a social republic with its own unique modes and forms of action.

The unique quality of French social policy became less obvious after World War I when masses of wounded, sick and disabled persons came to occupy the nation's attention. Labor inefficiency, the failure of the worker and paesant pension law (adopted in 1910) and the re-annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, a region that had benefited from Bismarckian social insurance from 1871 on, all led the Chamber of Deputies to reconsider the country's social policy. Yet social insurance legislation – which might have allowed France to converge with other continental European countries, especially Germany – would not be adopted until the end of the 1920s, even though the CGT (Confédération générale du travail or General Confederation of Labor) and the National Federation of French Mutualism both reversed their pre-war positions to defend the principle.

In the aftermath of the May 1928 elections, Raymond Poincaré and the government of André Tardieu sought to inaugurate a newly interventionist economic policy in the hope of modernizing the country. A five-year “national retooling” program was launched and
social reforms were initiated (by the housing laws of Louis Albert Loucheur and Albert Sarraut, the social insurance laws of 1928 and 1930 and the family grant law of March 1932). All this was meant as a collective foundation for state-sponsored reconciliation between the capitalist rationalizers in industries that were growing rapidly and undergoing structural overhauls and a wage-earning population that was at its interwar peak (7 million in 1931). Rather than impinging on or trying to nationalize the extensive network of friendly societies and family employers’ funds, the social laws gave them legal status and assistance. But hardly had they opened the path to a welfare state when the economic crisis of the Great Depression interrupted the process.

Communists, Socialists, Cégétists and Foreign Economic Models in the 1930s

Starting as early as the 1920s, some social reformers on the fringes of the main French labor organizations drew inspiration from foreign social experiments. Not only did Mussolini’s corporatist regime therefore inspire Georges Valois’ “integral syndicalism,” but by the beginning of the 1930s, fascist corporatism had also won the attention of Pierre Laroque, a highly placed civil servant charged with drafting a report about collective contracts for the National Economic Council. In preparing the report, Laroque found that sometimes such contracts depended on strong, institutionalized unions, as they did in a corporatist system like that of Italy. He also took particular note of the German model during the Weimar Republic in which collective contracts were considered all important for the stabilization of social order and peace. However, if the CGT, the Communist Party and the Socialist Party were all acquainted with and attentive to foreign efforts to manage – and, if possible, take early measures against – the economic crisis, they could hardly choose fascist Italy or Hitler’s Germany as models. On the contrary, those countries provided undesirable examples of state authority and their economic and social policies, whatever they might be, were inevitably considered as political counter-models. In fact, in 1936, Under-Secretary of State Léo Lagrange made explicit use of them in just this way, seeking to differentiate his own cultural policy from its fascist counterparts.

The leftwing organizations that would later form the backbone of the Popular Front had other models to which they could appeal. Soviet economic planning, for example, was an obvious choice for both the French Communist Party and the CGTU (Confédération générale du travail unitaire, the communist unions that reunified with the CGT in 1936). In the early 1930s, the Russian economic scheme also caught the attention of intellectuals and observers who did not belong to communist organizations, since the Soviet Union seemed to have been sheltered from the crisis thanks to its five-year plan. Yet the SFIO (Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière – the socialist party), the CGT
and, of course, the Radical Party saw the plan as an authoritarian response to the crisis and therefore rejected it. After June 1934 and Comintern’s subsequent adoption of the antifascist alliance strategy, even the Communist Party and the CGTU stopped referring to Soviet economic planning (for which revolution was a necessary precondition) as a relevant model.

Albert de Man’s plan, on the other hand, was discussed from early on within Léon Jouhaux’s CGT. As Jouhaux explained in a 1937 book, the union had considered endorsing the Belgian experiment in “sympathy.” He wrote that the CGT would also support the “Roosevelt experiment when doctrinarians of the now old-fashioned and outdated capitalist economy joined their voices with the anti-capitalist ideologues who looked at [such an economy] with horror.” As a representative of the CGT, Jouhaux challenged Laroque’s proposition after the National Labor Council endorsed collective contracts in 1934. Describing the Roosevelt experiment as an example to be followed, he called for contracts to be used as a means to protect workers from deflation and to develop a new political economy through the spread of standards like a minimum wage. He cited the National Recovery Act, which supported union rights and favored a maximum workday and a minimum wage to be set by the president. Institutionalized unionism, argued Jouhaux, could participate in national economic policies designed to deal with crises.

The socialist party’s analysis was slightly different. Before 1934, Léon Blum had shared the CGT’s conviction that the Belgian plan was too concerned with structural reform. He was also skeptical with regard to Roosevelt’s New Deal. In 1934, the socialist journalist and financial expert Georges Boris wrote a book called The Roosevelt Revolution, which held that a state-led social revolution was the only way to both save the West from the Depression and preserve a democratic regime. The New Deal experiment would serve as a model in Boris’ view, since it had the potential to achieve economic democracy, linking it firmly to political and social democracy. At the time, however, Blum was less enthusiastic of these experiments in the absence of structural reforms, particularly since their initial economic results seemed disappointing. Then, with the events that took place in Paris on February 6, all the aforementioned analyses became ineffective.

“Bread, Peace and Liberty”

In the aftermath of the February 6, 1934 riots of the rightwing league in Paris, the political side of the crisis came to take priority over its economic aspects. Though a trade union, the CGT was the first organization to respond to the threat to democracy by calling for a general strike on February 12, in order to bring together “all those who reject force as the source of law and want the 1789 human rights charter to remain a charter for all free men.” A few weeks later, this union confederation would also be the first organization
to draw up a plan to deal with the economic crisis. The CGT’s working plan, introduced in April 1934, differed from Belgian, American and (of course) Soviet models. Indeed, the CGT criticized the Belgian plan as being too focused on structural reforms and insufficiently attentive to distribution problems. Its own plan took the opposite tack and gave distribution reforms the highest priority. Jean Duret, one of the authors of the plan, regarded the “project of economic and social organization through liberty” as a new unionist guiding principle that would replace the general strike by bringing together the healthy, democratic features of French society in a constructive effort.11 CGT representatives frequently used the term “liberty” in their speeches and writings from that time on to describe the union’s approach, and its leaders tended to define their organization as a “movement of free men.” They considered France to be “one of the last bastions of liberty” from both a political and an economic point of view. However, since CGT leaders did not raise the theoretical question of the state’s class identity (i.e. whether or not it was intrinsically “bourgeois”), they were able to entertain the idea of a property division, with state-controlled and private sectors existing side by side.

The SFIO – or rather its majority, represented by Blum – could not agree with the CGT’s analysis. Even if the Communist Party was rather weak, its very existence and the terms of the debate at the socialist Tours Congress of December 1920 had prevented the French socialist party from defining an openly reformist strategy. It was obliged to both defend itself against criticism from its left side and to hold fast to the conviction originally held by Jean Jaurès, defended by Léon Blum at Tours, that socialism was nothing more than fully developed parliamentary democracy. The SFIO thus kept its distance from any strategy involving reinforced state power that would further postpone the prospects of a revolution. This explains Blum’s violent reaction to the “neo-socialists” in the socialist congress of July 1933 who tried to define an original strategy as summarized by the triptych “order, authority and nation.” “I hear you,” said Blum, “but I must say I’m terrified.”12

The events of February 1934 and the threat to democracy they represented strengthened his convictions. Henceforth, foreign experiments would be seen through the prism of democracy or its opposite. The antidemocratic riot thus buried the prospects of central planning within the SFIO and, more generally, excluded any policy involving reinforced state power. From then on, the responses to the Depression were to be determined by the requirements of the antifascist riposte.

Certainly, by 1935, the French Senate’s rejection of state reform, the victory of Pierre-Etienne Flandin over Gaston Doumergue and Roosevelt’s encouraging economic results had the potential to alter the anti-statist trend. For a few months, Socialists and Cégétists (CGT members) were citing American codes of fair competition as well as Czechoslovakian, English, and even Italian and German policies, in support of their demands for a “significant” reduction in the work week. They also paid a lot of attention to President Roosevelt’s public works projects. In May 1935, the socialist Robert Marjolin
wrote that, although they were necessarily of limited impact, such projects nevertheless
represented the only effective last-resort action that could be taken by a capitalist country
in the absence of more profound transformations. However, the New Deal was seen
less as a model and more as an experiment, whose critical examination could afford the
intellectual means with which to frame policy issues within and among organizations,
as well as to combat opponents. More generally, both union organizations tended to
promote their own particular proposals. The CGT identified the origins of its working
plan in its own 1918 program and the “constructive policy” it had tried to define at the
time, rather than in the example of foreign models. In July 1935, Léon Blum declared:
“We were the first to properly establish the etiology of the disease, to advance a diagnosis,
to indicate a treatment […] Today, any known or unknown “plan” outside of France rests
on the fundamental principle that an attempt to recover from the crisis must endeavor to
increase the general capacity for consumption.” In January 1936, however, the Socialist,
Communist and Radical parties and the CGT (which would reunify several weeks later,
in March 1936) finally compromised and adopted a common platform (entitled “Bread,
Peace and Liberty”) in the run-up to legislative elections that spring. The joint program
was primarily inspired by the requirements of antifascist unity and departed from both
the foreign models discussed earlier in the 1930s and the CGT’s working plan, despite
the fact that the Socialists had proposed adopting it as a basis for discussion. Indeed, the
Popular Front alliance and its program was mainly a response to the political dimension of
the French crisis after February 1934. While the program was symbolized to some degree
by its slogan, the notion of “liberty,” which implied the defense of republican institutions,
took precedence. For a time, then, the Popular Front chiefly presented itself as a strategy
for combating fascism and lacked any clear economic or social guidelines.

Since the Radical and the Communist parties were opposed to any structural reforms
for opposite doctrinal reasons, the Popular Front program was intentionally limited to
“measures that can be immediately applicable.” Even if Blum, who had long admired
the English constitutional system, advocated strengthening the executive under the
strict control of the parliament, the first part of the Popular Front program, devoted
to political issues, did not mention institutions (implicitly to be protected), nor did it
demand an extension of democratic liberties. The program’s second and last part, de-
voted to economic claims, took into account the CGT’s immediate demands but made
no reference to its working plan or its project for ending deflation and combating the
危机 with inflationary measures. Nor did the program include structural reforms, and it
failed to embrace either devaluation or economic control. The structural reforms that did
survive were the desires to transform the Banque de France through a strengthened role
of the state, to establish a national wheat office and to nationalize war-related industries
for pacifist rather than economic reasons. The insertion of social reforms on the other
hand – like a pension law, a national unemployment fund and a significant reduction of
the work week without a reduction in wages – betrayed a lack of independent initiative
concerning the social measures affecting workers. Nor did it take either social insurance or family grants into account. It was not until the Popular Front was defeated and the Family Code was promulgated in 1939 that the family-grant scale (the sliding scale for family subsidies) was unified and the foundations of a global family policy were laid. It is therefore impossible to talk of a full-blown “social policy” of the Popular Front in January 1936. Moreover, its electoral victory did nothing to profoundly innovate the former guidelines of its social action.

The Social Reforms of June 1936

Until the elections of April-May 1936, the social and political reforms that all members of the Popular Front had agreed upon were guided by the requirements of antifascist unity. Following its victory in May 1936, the new Popular Front government and its prime minister, Léon Blum, were obliged to take another constraint into consideration. A wave of strikes had broken out right before Blum’s appointment by the Chamber of Deputies, affecting the “order and rhythm” of reforms, as Blum would put it a few months later, as well as the general public’s long-term perception of the meaning of reform itself. The wave of strikes caused the CGPF (the general employers’ association) to accept Blum’s arbitration and propose new reforms as early as June 517 in order to bring an end to the strikes. Negotiations were launched two days later at the Hôtel Matignon (the prime minister’s residence) to resolve the conflict under government arbitration. Negotiators from the CGPF and the CGT were at the table. Though this was not the first time arbitration had been attempted in the history of French social policy, French industrial relations had until then been characterized by an extremely low incidence of government intervention. The CGPF demanded it in 1936, believing the negotiation needed to be seen by workers and employers alike as an event of great relevance. The “Matignon Agreement,” ratified on June 7, was more a declaration of general principles than a detailed settlement of the conflict. Its success would depend on the local negotiations carried out according to its terms. The principles of collective bargaining and labor delegation were both upheld by the agreement. Indeed, the CGPF delegation had already been prepared to implement these on its own in recognition of foreign models to show that both principles improved industrial relations (a point later stressed by Alfred Lambert-Ribot, the vice-president of the Comité des Forges, the employers’ organization of the steel industry).18 On these two issues, then, the government played a neutral role as mere witness to an agreement entered into freely by the CGT and the CGPF. By contrast, government arbiters would impose a significant increase in wages on resisting employers – who nevertheless insisted that Blum would be held responsible for the consequences – and the CGPF delegation was obliged to reaffirm the freedom of workers to join trade unions.
The measures that constituted the Matignon Agreement were not completely innovative, however. Trade unions had been legal in France from 1884 on. Worker’s delegates were first introduced by Albert Thomas in munitions factories during the Great War and suppressed in 1919, when France chose to “return to normalcy” – that is, to a liberal economic order. The law of March 1919 had already made collective contracts possible (though it was more restrictive than that adopted by the parliament after the Matignon negotiations). Other measures, such as the forty-hour work week without wage reduction (which implied a minimum 20 percent increase in the hourly wage) and paid holidays, were more innovative and less unanimously supported. In fact, the CGPF had previously informed Blum that it categorically rejected them. Moreover, as mentioned, though they figured in the CGT’s own program, these social measures had not been adopted as part of the Popular Front platform that was ratified in January 1936. Instead, it urged significant reductions in the work week while maintaining current wages, said nothing about how much the work week was to be reduced and made no mention of holidays at all. Such innovative measures, however, were intended to reduce unemployment and increase wages in order to stimulate consumption. The system of paid vacations also sought to relieve workers’ bodies and minds. Both the shorter work week and paid vacations bear the stamp of Blum’s own social conceptions.

The measures were approved by the parliament just a few days later. The scale and extent of the strikes may explain why a majority of deputies from other parties also voted for these laws, despite never having been part of the Popular Front platform. Workers were thus able to start benefitting already in early August, only three months after the elections and two months after the largest general strike ever experienced by a capitalist country. For this reason, paid vacations, which no French government has ever withdrawn, not even during the Vichy regime, remain emblematic of Popular Front policy.

**Roosevelt à la Française?**

In June 1936, the Treasury Minister of the French government, Vincent Auriol, cited the evidence of Roosevelt’s New Deal and other foreign experiments in an effort to convince senators that economic growth through increased consumption would help augment public revenues. Léon Blum returned to Auriol’s theme a year later, voicing his desire that one day he would be in the position to repeat Roosevelt’s words at the outset of his second presidential mandate: “A century and a half ago they established the Federal Government in order to promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to the American people.” We have precisely the same mission, the new prime minister said. Despite such publicly pronounced parallels and the resemblance between certain New Deal and Popular Front policies, several considerations preclude talk of a
“French Rooseveltism.” The first of these concerns the area of public works. Though the Popular Front government financed projects like the construction of schools and sports fields in order to promote a revival of the market and realize its educational and cultural policies, its involvement was weak compared to that of Roosevelt’s government. More importantly, it quickly succumbed to the urgent need to concentrate state resources on rearmament. The second consideration, which rules out any easy identification between Popular Front and New Deal policies, has to do with the insufficiently selective nature of French economic policy. The political necessity to help the middle classes – and more precisely small farmers – in order to seal their political alliance with wage earners tied the government to an economic policy that prevented enterprises or retail establishments from merging. Agricultural and industrial structures in France were therefore less affected by the Depression than in any other country, especially the United States. As a result, the main difference between France in 1936 following the wave of strikes and the United States during the 1930s was the nature of its social relations.

By late June 1936, Léon Jouhaux was able to say the following in an American radio broadcast: “The strikes taking place in France right now are neither political nor insurrectional. They are strictly corporate. Their grievances are those put forth by the American Federation [of Labor] and to which President Roosevelt has responded.” But while the grievances of striking French workers were indeed similar to those of the AFL, the fact that social reforms had been inaugurated in France after the most powerful wave of strikes ever known made a huge difference and had long-lasting consequences. In the U.S., social reform was led by the government from 1934 on. In France, by contrast, it resulted from a new social and political balance among employers and employees that was, for the first time, in favor of labor. Because of the strikes, the conviction that “struggle pays” (la lutte paie) would become an enduring feature of French working-class culture and would long weigh heavily on industrial relations. Consequently, in 1936, French bosses were unwilling to accept the measures that their American counterparts had agreed upon just a few months earlier.

Foreign Models as a “Horizon of Expectation”

During the summer recess, a series of palace revolutions took place within the CGPF. Three of its four representatives at Matignon were dismissed and Claude Gignoux, who was to become its next leader, reorganized the federation (henceforth known as the Confédération générale du patronat français and no longer de la production française). He then launched a counterattack on labor that would eventually be one of the causes of the Popular Front’s economic failure and would result in renewed labor unrest. As early as September 1936, both strikes and factory occupations recommenced, especially in the sector of metallurgy.
While employers sought exemptions from the forty-hour work week and renewed authority within their factories, trade unions concentrated on achieving strict observance of the five-day work week and work-free weekends. The high level of conflict and the difficulties of collective contract revision in 1937 revealed the limits of the attempts to institutionalize the new social relations as well as the employers’ continued dominance in the areas of work organization, professional qualifications and dismissal. The state had to consider these limits when it endeavored to extend its sphere of action.

From late 1936, social measures (or lack thereof) had mostly been determined by growing financial difficulties and labor unrest, along with the political effects they produced (especially within the Radical Party). The plans for a pension law and a national unemployment fund included in the Popular Front platform were abandoned in February 1937 following the “pause” declared by Blum and the December 1936 adoption of a conciliation and arbitration law to regulate conflicts. This legislation, initially voted in for only six months, was prolonged through March 1938. The government of Albert Chautemps, who had succeeded Blum in June 1937, attempted to advance a more ambitious “labor statute,” according to which unions and delegates would be universally recognized as instruments of social regulation and progress, strikes would be submitted to prior secret vote, government arbitration would be reinforced through sanctions and a greater capacity for mediation, collective contracts would be extended (especially in the field of agriculture), and wages and prices would be controlled. This latter measure, which entailed strengthening state control in the economy and social relations, broke with French tradition and failed, having to be replaced by the compulsory labor arbitration law of March 4, 1938. While conciliation, mediation and compulsory arbitration laws managed to avoid several conflicts,24 they could not prevent employees or unions from radicalizing. In November 1938, the Daladier government published a decree aimed at ending the “two-Sundays week,” meaning the forty-hour week. Such a decision was apt to provoke organized labor to call a general strike. The government, however, had considered that risk and was ready for it. The defeat of the strike was therefore a tipping point in the social and political relations fostered by the Popular Front. In a radio broadcast, Paul Reynaud (the only deputy to vote against the 1936 arbitration law) argued that it was impossible to have a social and an economic policy at the same time. He also stated that, in a capitalist economy, the government had to respect the laws of profit, free enterprise and competition.

In the ranks of socialists and other reformers, this series of failures contributed to new approaches to foreign economic models, and northern European countries were now increasingly cited as examples to follow. Auguste Detoeuf, formerly a negotiator for the employers’ federation at the Hôtel de Matignon conference of June 1936, acknowledged his interest in the Swedish system. Pierre Laroque, who had been an admirer of the Italian corporatist model in the early 1930s, promoted the Scandinavian organization of work
and praised the French compulsory arbitration law of March 4, 1938 for its resemblance to the Swedish system, since both featured powerful unions, legalization of labor contracts and state intervention that was restricted to legislating and protecting society from labor unrest. CGT’s growth and its support for Popular Front reforms might explain Laroque’s conversion to state-managed contractual syndicalism.25 Albert Chautemps, for his part, regretted the lack of cooperation on the part of employers after the parliament’s rejection of the Progressive Labor Statute and referred to the example set by Sweden, a country where “one would not find such dogged resistance from a blind and old-fashioned part of the bourgeoisie.” This statement indicated an interest in the kind of social regulation that had likely inspired the drafters of the statute. At the same time, Chautemps pointed out that “France [could] not be compared to Northern Europe.”

When Léon Blum returned to government in spring 1938, he paid no heed to alternative foreign models, seeking rather to be more resolutely dirigiste – that is, state-control-oriented – than ever before. In formulating his new program, Blum received advice from Georges Boris, who was familiar with Keynesian theory, as well as Pierre Mendès France. The program applied Keynesian notions of spending one’s way out of a depression and of controlling foreign exchange. However, the newly threatening international scene meant that all new spending was concentrated on rearmament. This priority would henceforth guide the social policies of the government, which embraced the goal of high productivity and intended to clear the bottleneck created by the forty-hour work week, especially in the area of metallurgy. On the other hand, it also recommended direct and indirect wage increases; sought to pass an expanded version of the Modern Labor Statute to include strike regulation, labor contracts and dismissal regulation, collective bargaining compliance and a balanced system of conciliation and arbitration; and, finally, sought to get pension and family benefit laws approved.26 As a result, the foundations of the welfare state were in place to counterbalance the need for increasing the length of the work week and were linked to Keynesian monetary and growth policies. While monetary policy was the foundation of sound economic policy, full employment was the aim of the latter, and both at the time were subordinated to the political necessity of rearmament. Nevertheless, according to French historian Michel Margairaz, Keynesian influence upon the government program must not be overestimated. According to Margairaz, international and national constraints, the self-critical rethinking of the failure of the first Popular Front government and the high political cost of the “pause” and its ultimate ineffectiveness as a financial strategy all had a greater influence on the framing of the new program than any direct Keynesian inspiration. Its “Keynesian” aspects, if one wishes to use that term, were the plans to respond to the international conjuncture and avoid the failures of the previous government.27 In any case, the program would never have the opportunity to be tested. With the French conservative press describing it as “pure financial Hitlerism” and center and rightwing legislators objecting to its statist and inflationary character,
the new government failed to survive even one month in office. That said, its program nevertheless laid the foundations of the postwar market economy.

**Conversion to Statism**

Even if the Popular Front’s social measures represented neither a global social policy nor a Keynesian-inspired pump-priming, its government experiment still anticipated the later declaration of fundamental rights in the preamble to the French Constitution of 1946. The idea that the state had to provide full employment and become a welfare state that managed both direct and indirect incomes (even after crises had been overcome) thus became common currency in most French political families. At the end of the 1930s, Keynesian notions were at the center of many parliamentary debates, the National Labor Council and the press. They would then go on to be endorsed by the Resistance and written into its platform, which was first publicized in March 1944. This was when the clandestine *Conseil National de la Résistance* (CNR, National Resistance Council) developed the platform known as the CNR Charter. As we have seen, the Popular Front program had been split into two parts dedicated to political and economic measures, respectively. For its part, the Charter, which said nothing about political institutions, advanced social and economic “measures to be enacted” upon liberation of the country in order to establish “true economic and social democracy” in France, or an end to capitalist “feudalism.” The Charter reasserted the right of wage-earners to rest and work, the creation and improvement of collective contracts, the re-establishment of free trade unions and the necessity of a wage increase. Consequently, it adopted aspects of the Popular Front platform – the pension law, the national unemployment fund and a variety of smallholder protection measures – that had been abandoned in February 1937 at the onset of the “pause.” Though the Charter took into account some of the reforms propounded by the Popular Front government in 1936, it drew upon this legacy only selectively. The needs of reconstruction prevented its signatories (among them the CGT and the CFTC – the *Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétien*) from reviving the forty-hour work week. Indeed, the way arbitration law had been used against workers in 1938 may explain why such attempts to regulate social conflict were abandoned. This, in turn, had the effect of restoring the trade unions’ pre-war culture of mobilization.

By contrast, those who signed the Charter at the end of the war managed to insert some of the structural reforms originally proposed by the planners and the CGT in 1934 but rejected by the Radical and Communist parties (and thus absent from the 1936 platform). According to the Charter, a rationally organized economy was in the general interest. Production would be intensified according to a plan formulated by the state after broad consultation. Monopolies, energy, mineral resources, insurance companies and banks
would be placed back into the hands of the state and a complete social security plan would be elaborated to supply the foundations of a social (or welfare) state able to “grant each worker and his family security, dignity and a truly human life,” as the constitution would put it two years later. But what had caused such a unanimous conversion to statism?

For those who had rejected statism and structural reforms in the 1930s, this transformation was more a practical than a theoretical measure. The conversion of employers, begun after the victory of the November 1938 counterattack and its effects on the balance of industrial forces, was amplified under the Vichy regime. For the Communist Party – the country’s largest organization in 1944 – the conversion was possible because statism appeared at the time to be a result of both the Resistance and the new balance of power in favor of the workers’ parties. The Charter and its structural reforms were thus seen as an achievement of the Resistance, which could also be considered a social mobilization, though rather different from that of June 1936. Consequently, the CNR Charter was adopted by left- and rightwing parties alike (those that had taken part in the Resistance), both trade unions (the CGT and the CFTC) and the partisan movements. It was the quintessential Liberation-era reform, revealing widespread, joint support of statism and a shared effort to balance rationalization with liberty. However, the conversion to statism, and the welfare state it empowered, was brought about without any of the institutional reforms that tended to reduce parliamentarism and strengthen executive power. Indeed, in both 1936 and 1943-1946 this resulted in an exceptional political balance, in which reforms and conversions were pursued, maintained or restored in the name of liberty. The precedent of the former authoritarian Vichy regime prevented any institutional reforms aimed at strengthening executive power, such as those that Charles De Gaulle wished to adopt. The conversion to statism owed nothing to state authority, which was only weakened, and even less to authoritarianism (which would however prevail after May 1958 due to a profound political crisis and the historical legitimacy of Général de Gaulle).

An Invented Heritage

In 1945, the French social security regime combined Beveridgian principles, such as non-occupational universal citizenship rights, with Bismarckian ways and means like social insurance. Indeed, the social measures enacted in 1928, 1930 and 1932 were largely integrated into a unique, unified and universal system by the regime’s architect, Pierre Laroque. However, the political balance that brought forth a new social security program in 1945 once again generated a different perception.

In November 1946, the preamble to the Constitution of the Fourth Republic reasserted the Declaration of Human Rights as well as some of the social principles that had been expounded ten years earlier during the Popular Front experiment (such as the rights of
workers to belong to trade unions, go on strike, be represented by delegates in their factories, work and rest), thereby lending them constitutional relevance. These social reforms, advanced either by the provisional government or the Constituent Assembly from 1944 on, and especially the social security principle, were also reasserted in the preamble in order to achieve the same relevance. The constitutional consecration claimed to have its roots in the French Revolution, the political reforms of 1944 and the social innovations of 1936 and 1944. It helped ground the belief among the French leftwing parties and unions that welfare, which became a fact with the creation of social security in 1945, was deeply rooted in the 1936 experiment. From the point of view of labor organizations and most Resistance movements, the time sequence of 1936-1946 could be thought of as a unique period for social policy. Such a notion tended to stress the Keynesian influence on the social and economic policies of the Popular Front while playing down their Bismarckian tones, despite their important role in the 1920s and their re-enactment in 1945. According to the memory of the French left, structural reforms such as planning and nationalization were legacies of the Popular Front, part of a line of continuity between 1936 and 1946, while social security was more attuned to the social policy of the late 1920s than that of the Popular Front. Beginning in 1945, however, this heritage would largely be forgotten.

This historical and political memory has tended to diminish the Bismarckian legacy in favor of Keynesian — and even more so, Popular Front and Liberation — influences, which would come to be narrated as political sequences that had contributed to the same cultural revolution.31 Both the Popular Front and the Liberation were characterized by unprecedented mass mobilization, though they differed in their means (strikes and demonstrations in 1936, the struggle against Nazism in 1940-1945). They were also characterized by an unprecedented demonstration of power by the national working class and its organizations, as well as the rise of the French Communist Party and the CGT as protagonists of French public life. Simultaneously, as mentioned before, the Popular Front and the Liberation were characterized by the social measures of 1936 and the social policy that brought forth the French welfare state in 1944-1945. For the French working-class organizations and their long-term cultural memory, the popular mobilizations and legislative innovations of 1936 and 1943-1946 were one and the same, not to be dissociated from each other, and interpreted Keynesian regulation as a left-oriented value. Consequently, in 1972, Keynesian principles would inspire the Common Program of the left, ratified by the Communist, Socialist and Radical-Left parties as an alternative to rightwing, capitalistic politics. Because of the recession and neo-liberalism that followed, however, this would be the last time such an untimely Keynesian statement would be made before the present depression would make for its revival.

The intimate connection between mobilization and legislative achievements also reinforced the French tradition of persistent social conflict as a means with which to
expand and/or defend favorable regulation. This legacy, which remains part of the “French exception,” resurfaced in 1995 and again in 2005 in movements to protect social security and pensions. This in turn may explain why the Popular Front and the Liberation – each an original experiment in its own right – might have been perceived abroad as political, rather than economic or social, models of antifascism.
12. Jean-François Biard, _Le socialisme devant ses choix. La naissance de l’idée de plan_.
21. Paid-holidays law of June 11: 563 deputies in favor, one against; 295 senators in favor, two against. Forty-hour-work-week law of June 12: 408 deputies in favor, 100 against; 176 senators in favor, 80 against.


25. Laure Machu, “Négociations et conflits,” in *Le pain, la paix, la liberté*.


29. Margairaz, L’*Etat, les finances et l’économie*.


Axel R. Schäfer

Transatlantic Welfare States after World War II

One of the abiding ironies of the transatlantic formation of welfare states after World War II is that the personnel and precepts of the New Deal, which were instrumental in the American agenda for postwar European reconstruction, were marginalized during the construction of the Cold War state in the U.S. On the one hand, “Americanization” in the building of postwar European welfare states was part of a process of transatlantic progressive policy convergence centered on macroeconomic planning, a basic system of social security and Keynesian interventionism in which both New Dealers and exiled European political elites participated. One might even speak of the “Europeanization” of Europe via a process of policy reimportation, since many of the policies of the New Deal were themselves recycled from concepts that American progressives had first gleaned from Europe before World War I. Postwar European public policy drew much of its intellectual and cultural strength from the confluence of European and American precedents. Anti-communist intellectuals, including such luminaries as Raymond Aaron, Benedetto Croce, Alfred Weber, John Dewey and Reinhold Niebuhr, were united in their goal to establish an inclusive social-liberal democratic order to undercut the appeal of communist visions after the defeat of fascism. This vision included elements of measured statism, redistributionist policies and labor-management cooperation. Likewise, during their years in exile, many political and labor leaders had been exposed to the more accommodationist industrial unionism practiced in the U.S. and Britain. In turn, their traditional emphasis on class conflict gave way to the mutual goal of labor and capital to increase productivity, stabilize the market, ensure social peace and increase consumer spending. Many critics have pointed out that imposing a transatlantic social model on postwar Europe stifled a more radical reordering of social relations along the lines of large-scale nationalization of industry and industrial democracy. In Germany, for example, American occupation policy actively suppressed the anti-fascist committees, replaced their supporters in the military
administration and exploited internal division and organizational problems of the labor unions. Nonetheless, viewing postwar reconstruction solely as a “missed opportunity” for democratic socialism in Europe ignores the extent to which American planners promoted progressive policies in postwar Europe that went against the grain of free-market capitalism and business control.

On the other hand, World War II and the Cold War undermined the prospects for the continuation of New Deal-style policies in the U.S. itself. Wartime reliance upon the expertise of large corporations and the close ties between government and business in mobilizing and managing the war economy strengthened the opponents of the New Deal. Military contracting had resulted in 70 percent of war contracts going to large corporations, and government profit guarantees, cost-and-fixed-fee policies, expansion financing, and the suspension of anti-trust suits cemented government-business links. Not only did this mean large profits for big military corporations, such as General Motors, Boeing and Lockheed Martin, but it also facilitated the corporate takeover of the war effort via a plethora of mobilization boards, advisory committees and regulatory agencies staffed with personnel recruited from big business. The more the war effort relied on the administrative and organizational capacities of business and was associated with the effectiveness of businessmen and state-private networks, the more New Dealers were relegated to the role of onlookers. By 1942 an anti-New Deal coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats in Congress portended the postwar rejection of New Deal-style interventionism by dismantling the Works Progress Administration (WPA), the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), the National Youth Administration (NYA), the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB) and other flagship government agencies involved in long-term social planning. Similarly, the failure of the Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill, which sought to place the federal government in charge of unemployment programs, workman’s compensation and a comprehensive federal health insurance program, indicated the wartime strength of the forces of conservatism, which regarded the New Deal as short-term pump-priming at best and creeping socialism at worst. Though few Americans doubted the need for expanded government power in the postwar era, many eschewed the more radical drive for public control over the means of production, industrial democracy, income redistribution and a comprehensive welfare state pioneered in the 1930s.

The close link between government spending, big business, wartime prosperity and military success also promoted the postwar divergence from New Deal policies in other ways. Most importantly, it helped renew public faith in the basic soundness of the American system of liberal capitalism and restored the battered Depression-era image of big business. Unlike in Europe, where the war-related collapse of former empires, physical destruction, socio-economic decline and communist advances led to the massive loss of confidence in the old elites and the need for integrative and redistributive policies, the icon of the “good war” in the U.S. reaffirmed the established political and socio-economic
order. While most Americans agreed that the postwar exigencies of global power, national defense and economic stability could only be met by expanding the administrative capacities of the nation-state, the Cold War defined as both an economic and a spiritual struggle against totalitarianism and communism placed severe limits on progressive conceptions of public control and economic planning among a public that loathed “big government” and expressed renewed faith in the basic soundness of the American system of free enterprise. “For us, the war did not produce a revolution in social relations so much as it restored the prosperity to which we had been accustomed,” noted political scientist Edward Berkowitz. The American government, he concluded, “owed its citizens nothing more than continuing prosperity; the private market, charity, state and local government, and voluntary associations would take care of the rest.” Or, in the more familiar words of President Eisenhower’s Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, “what’s good for the country is good for General Motors, and vice versa.”

In turn, state-building in the aftermath of World War II neither replicated the “associative state” of the 1920s nor constituted simply an extension of New Deal economic planning and regulation. Instead, 1920s-style associationalism and corporatism, the expansion of the welfare state during the 1930s and the growth of the warfare state in the 1940s combined to form the institutional and ideological bedrock of what scholars have dubbed “vital center liberalism,” “welfare capitalism,” “Cold War consensus” or even “people’s capitalism” in the postwar period. Although postwar policy-makers often rejected New Deal-style interventionism, they nonetheless embraced expanded federal administrative capacities as fears of economic depression, the experience of government-funded wartime prosperity, the success of business-government networks during the war and Cold War economic and military exigencies came together to shape bureaucratic practices, ideological premises and political constellations. Seeking to reconcile these conflicting impulses, policy-makers ended up constructing an entirely new administrative state – one that built a political consensus around the expansion of the national-security and welfare state while upholding an ideology of limited government. In the words of historian Michael Sherry, postwar policies created an institutional and ideological legacy, which, while extending the size of the federal government, at the same time threw “a smokescreen of symbolic anti-statism over deepening government responsibility.”

Three postwar policy features in particular were central to forging a political consensus around combining the image of limited government and the sanctification of liberal capitalism with the massive expansion of the state’s military and welfare components: the politics of economic growth, the principle of subsidiarity and the moral construction of poverty. In the mid- to late 1940s, influential “vital center” liberals, such as Oscar Ewing and Leon Keyserling, viewed growth-oriented policies in a capitalist setting as the solution to problems of social deprivation, embraced the “procuring state” as opposed to the “providing state” in welfare policy and employed traditional moral categories in
their thinking on poverty. Though usually associated with the conservative backlash of the 1990s, these policy trajectories constituted one of the fundamental dynamics of “Cold War liberalism.”

The Politics of Growth

If the experience of the Great Depression and the wartime economic boom had a legacy in common, it was the growing conviction among a broad cross-section of Americans that the self-regulating market had failed and that some measure of economic planning, government intervention and deficit spending would be necessary to prevent economic disaster in the postwar era. Wartime prosperity, in combination with fears of a postwar economic downturn due to the collapse of war-related government contracting, turned military spending into a major economic proposition and laid the groundwork for the “military Keynesianism” of the Cold War. Postwar planners, who deemed both the maintenance of a costly international military presence and a stable domestic economy crucial for maintaining America’s new role as “defender of the Free World” and “Arsenal of Democracy,” increasingly thought of the Cold War military build-up in terms of its social and economic benefits. Arguing that “one of the most significant lessons of our World War II experience was that the American economy, when it operates at a level approaching full efficiency, can provide enormous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption while simultaneously providing a high standard of living,” the drafters of NSC-68 maintained that massive increase in military spending “might not result in a real decrease in the standard of living, for the economic effects of the program might be to increase the gross national product by more than the amount being absorbed for additional military and foreign assistance purposes.”

As postwar guns-and-butter thinking turned the expansion of the “garrison state” into a function of the “social security state,” federal fiscal practices changed from an emphasis on balancing revenues and expenditures to ensuring that they fulfilled strategic and policy objectives. Military expenditure, which had hovered around 15 percent of total federal spending in 1939, increased from roughly 33 percent in the late 1940s to over 50 percent by the early 1960s. Defense spending on this scale provided employment for large numbers of soldiers and civilian personnel and pumped billions of dollars into private businesses, particularly in the south and the west of the country. Transformed in the 1930s by New Deal spending on social welfare, public employment and large-scale infrastructure projects such as the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the Bonneville Power Administration and rural electrification projects, the region became a magnet for defense contractors during and after World War II. In addition to defense-related spending, there were generous postwar support programs for returning soldiers, such as housing
subsidies, loans, tax breaks and full employment policies, extended social welfare benefits and boosted consumer spending in the region. The Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans’ Administration, for example, provided mortgage insurance for suburban tract developments that not only discriminated against inner-city cores and racial and ethnic minorities, but also “made possible the easy transfer of savings funds out of the cities of the Northeast and the Middle West and toward the new developments of the South and West.” As federal funds turned agricultural areas into sprawling metropolises and the Sunbelt into the Gunbelt, both economic activity and population grew at a breathtaking speed and turned the region into the modern-day equivalent of the Gold Rush. In places such as Seattle, San Diego and Wichita at least 20 percent of manufacturing employment came from the military, providing the regions with one of their main sources of income. “Until the 1940s, Huntsville was an agrarian backwater with two main products: cotton and watercress,” recalled a recent report on the Alabama city. “Sixty years later, it has more PhDs per capita than anywhere else in the U.S.” During World War II it was chosen as the site for a large munitions factory. After the war, as Wernher von Braun and others were brought there, it evolved into a missile-research center and home of the early U.S. space program.

By the same token, however, the postwar politics of growth limited the interventionist role of government to Keynesian ideas of indirect management of the economy. In the words of Daniel Bell, growth-inducing policies emerged as a new ideology of consensus, implying that basic contradictions and tensions in society had been resolved. Rather than relying on New Deal-style intervention, redistributive policies and social welfare programs, the politics of growth employed deficit spending and subsidies to private businesses and nonprofit organizations as the main instruments for achieving social and economic stability. They made economic expansion in a high-consumption capitalist economy the primary objective of government in response to both social problems and global challenges. “The common ground of fiscal policy defined the means by which government could stimulate the economy without coercing its private institutions.”

The policies of the Truman administration exemplified the view that the country could solve socio-economic problems by virtue of growth without structural changes or government management. The 1946 Employment Act, for example, a watered-down version of Truman’s proposals for a full employment bill, created the Council of Economic Advisers and specified that the government should pursue employment policies that foster and promote the system of free enterprise. Large-scale infrastructure projects, such as river dredging, electrification, land reclamation, dam and harbor building, provided contracts for private construction companies via the Bureau of Reclamation, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Bonneville Power Administration and various water development agencies. Urban redevelopment underwritten by the 1949 and 1954 Housing Acts, the postwar extension of the federal highway system and, after
1956, the creation of the interstate highway system meant millions of jobs in the private construction industry and economic stimulation via federal subsidies and public works projects. Likewise, in the foreign policy arena, economic aid programs, such as the Marshall Plan, were in part designed to secure overseas investment climates and access for big corporations and to provide money to purchase American products. They showcased the close link between an international U.S. presence and American economic well-being, and helped ensure the global power of American multinational firms in the aftermath of the collapse of European competitors and colonial empires.17

Similarly, the politics of growth, seen as a welfare policy instrument, privileged market solutions over public control and established the primacy of economic expansion over social solidarity. Postwar planners understood poverty and social deprivation largely as a problem of insufficient economic growth and the lack of employment opportunities, rather than of structural inequalities and shortcomings of the self-regulating market. They designed social policies as instruments for boosting consumer spending through subsidies, tax breaks, full employment policies and deficit spending without engaging in economic restructuring. As James Patterson has noted, “the key to progress was not welfare – that was relatively insignificant – but economic growth.”18 The various federal loan programs, for example, benefited the middle classes in their quest for the suburban home and a college education. Likewise, although the federally administered social security system was expanded to include previously excluded groups and became America’s largest generalized social welfare program in 1950, its expansion was the exception in a climate that allowed states to control and cheapen unemployment insurance, encouraged the development of private social insurance plans and relied upon company-based pensions negotiated by labor unions. “A feature of the years immediately following World War II was a remarkable attack on the notion of expanding and improving public services,” John Kenneth Galbraith pointed out in 1958, criticizing that “a certain mystique was attributed to the satisfaction of privately supplied wants” whereby all public services were regarded as a desolating burden on private production.19

The Subsidiarist State

While the literature on the politics of growth is substantial, another constitutive feature of the Cold War state is among the least recognized and analyzed elements of U.S. social and foreign policy. Its key characteristics are easily sketched out, however. While forsaking New-Deal-style economic redistribution and direct public control, in the aftermath of World War II the federal government dramatically increased public funding for non-governmental and charitable organizations, linking up with their administrative capacities in order to meet Cold War social and foreign policy objectives. In their efforts to ensure
international security, generate economic growth and create social stability without constructing a broad-based welfare state, policy planners funneled billions of dollars of federal, state and local funds into private and nonprofit health care, higher education and welfare agencies via grants-in-aid, vouchers, purchase-of-service agreements, loans and tax exemptions. Funding streams through legislation, such as the 1944 GI bill, the 1946 Hill-Burton Act and the 1967 Social Security Amendments, both fuelled the growth of nongovernmental agencies and became the backbone of the large-scale expansion of the human services infrastructure in the postwar years. Likewise, in the national security arena, the reliance on nonprofit providers to distribute foreign aid, the federally funded expansion of the army chaplaincy and the sale or donation of government surplus land and military facilities to private and nonprofit organizations allowed the government to tap into the resources of nongovernmental agencies in the pursuit of Cold War goals. In short, rather than creating new government agencies and providing services directly, postwar policy-makers devised an administrative state that centralized revenue-gathering and policy-making, but devolved program implementation. In turn, state-private networks became the administrative core of Cold War public policy and a key instrument in the massive expansion of both the federal government and the nonprofit sector after World War II.20

Scholars have used a variety of terms to describe this feature of the Cold War state. For example: Lester Salamon talks about “third-party government;” Peter Dobkin Hall applies the term “allocative state;” and Donald Critchlow calls it the “second welfare state.” The term “subsidiarity,” used in this context by Bruce Nichols, expresses most aptly, if a bit awkwardly, the arrangement whereby important roles are left to nongovernmental institutions in serving essentially public goals. Derived from Catholic social thought, subsidiarity describes three interrelated components, namely, a policy instrument that devolves functions to lower levels; an emotive concept that upholds the notion that mediating structures are less impersonal than, and thus superior to, government bodies; and an ideology that defines social problems in terms of rehabilitative intervention, rather than large-scale socio-economic redistribution.21 The interaction of these three dimensions also indicates why scholarship on state-private networks has been so sparse. Exasperated scholars and statisticians of nonprofits and social policy have found the vastly complex system of different funding arrangements on multiple governmental levels nearly impossible to monitor. “In almost every policy sphere,” Lester Salamon concludes, “federal operations now involve a complex collage of widely assorted tools mobilizing a diverse collection of different types of actors to perform a host of different roles in frequently confusing combinations.”22

The use of federal funds to subsidize charitable and philanthropic institutions has, of course, a long tradition in the U.S., particularly as part of the associative state of the 1920s. Moreover, state and local government historically played a significant role in public
funding for nonprofit agencies. Nonetheless, in the 1930s, New Deal funding was largely confined to public agencies, in part as a reaction against the perceived failure of charities to respond to the disasters of the Great Depression and a sense that private charities were not the most effective way of using public funds. The war and postwar years, however, saw a fundamental reversal of these policies. World War II was key to establishing new patterns of federal funding for both secular and sectarian international relief agencies and hospitals. Although many observers locate the “quiet revolution” of the emerging partnership between government and the nonprofit sector either in the 1960s, as part of the expansion of the welfare state, or in the 1980s, as part of its retrenchment, Peter Dobkin Hall insists that the welfare state was “devolutionary and privatizing from its inception” in the postwar period.23

The postwar imperative to devolve functions to nongovernmental entities as part of the backlash against the New Deal was matched by the nonprofit sector’s newfound eagerness to enter into financial arrangements with the government. Many philanthropies, remembering the devastating financial impact of the Great Depression, had relaxed their opposition to public subsidies. While pre-war hospitals, higher education institutions, social service providers and foreign aid agencies had largely relied upon charitable giving, postwar philanthropies relied increasingly upon government monies. In turn, many postwar foundations re-shaped their programs to take advantage of subsidiarity and worked effectively “to increase federal funding in these fields, while minimizing federal controls.”24 By the 1970s, the federal government had become the largest single source of direct and indirect revenues for nonprofits. Federal support accounted for over a third (35 percent) of the total income of nonprofit service organizations, with many receiving over 70 percent of their funds from federal and state sources. Federal funds constituted on average 36 percent of the overall revenue of hospitals and healthcare providers, 22 percent of the income of educational and research institutions and 55 percent of the combined funds of social service providers and foreign aid agencies. Despite some changes in the mix of federal and state support, nonprofits remained substantially dependent on government funds. As Lester Salamon concludes, the data “confirm again how faulty the conventional image of the funding structure of the voluntary sector really is. Although the sector is typically identified exclusively with its private philanthropic base, in fact government is its principal source of support.”25

The Moral Construction of Poverty

In addition to being underpinned by growth-oriented and subsidiarist policy instruments, postwar state-building was shaped by shared normative assumptions. In the social policy arena, widely shared conceptions of poverty held sway and delimited the welfare state.
The “poverty knowledge” generated by bureaucrats and social scientists, as Alice O’Connor has pointed out, located the origins of deprivation in behavioral deviance, moral deficiencies and cultural pathology, rather than in socio-economic inequality, structural inequality or the maldistribution of income. This focus on character issues in anti-poverty policies legitimated strong discretionary elements in the welfare system, which made benefits dependent on behavior, rather than establishing them as rights or even entitlements. It sanctioned the testing of morals, punitive intervention, gender discrimination and racialized welfare provision. In the words of Michael Katz, “the capture of the social science agenda by government combined with the capture of poverty research by economists to confine the scope of debate within market models of human obligation and interaction. In the process, they either ignored or belittled the few alternative frames proposed.”

Talk of morals, therefore, is not just part of the rhetorical arsenal of resurgent conservatism. Although many conservative critics of the welfare state insist on a stark contrast between their agenda of personal responsibility, voluntarism and retrenchment, and the “permissiveness,” welfare dependency, and bureaucratism allegedly nurtured by liberal social policies, both approaches are often strikingly similar. As part of the transformation of American social theory beginning in the late nineteenth century, the terminology of welfare dependency, dysfunctional families, the culture of poverty and the deficiencies of poor communities gained scientific legitimacy within the liberal research tradition. These concepts became fundamental to progressive social thinking and diverted attention from economic interpretations of poverty. In terms of social policies, the progressive concept of the “social self,” by tying value formation to social interaction and declaring the poor deficient in the development of their social norms, defined poverty as a problem of insufficient socialization, rather than as a problem of the maldistribution of wealth. This analysis helped channel reformist energies either into addressing the deficiencies of the poor through social-work intervention and workfare policies, or in the direction of macroeconomic planning to remove barriers to labor-force participation and encourage economic growth.

In effect, linking poverty to behavioral patterns couched traditional “moral tales” about deservingness, which had historically defined the perception of social problems and framed the welfare debate, in the authoritative language of the social science professional. In American social work, for example, the emphasis was on disciplining and rehabilitat ing clients, rather than on income maintenance. In the words of William Epstein, “the literature of the social services can be read as a denial of greater spending for the basic institutions of a humane civic culture, an attempt through myth to ignore stark cultural failure, supplanting it with the fiction of cure, prevention, and rehabilitation.” No matter how charitable, compassionate and sophisticated it is, however, rehabilitative social-work intervention, as Hannah Arendt has pointed out, is inherently more stigmatizing and denigrating than an impersonal system of social provision based on citizenship rights.
Its recourse to moral themes, by definition, denotes certain groups as morally worthy and others as morally suspect and expands social provision only on the basis of means-testing, morals-testing and targeted programs at the expense of generalized entitlements.

In the same vein, Progressive-era conceptions of state social responsibility tended to legitimate social provision on the basis of cost-benefit calculations, risk management and earnings, rather than on the basis of civic empowerment or human rights. Progressive concepts of regulatory intervention viewed the state as the guardian of basic standards upon which the pursuit of self-interest in a competitive environment could be made socially beneficial. As Henry Carter Adams, a late-nineteenth-century economist who theorized about regulation, argued, while the state should “condition” economic relations, intervention should not “destroy the force of self-interest.”\textsuperscript{29} Regulatory intervention, therefore, aimed to enable people to fully function in society according to the norms and practices of advantaged groups. Its “facilitative function of coercion,” while allowing governmental activity in the interest of economic productivity and the protection of certain disadvantaged groups, primarily strove “to respect private property and freedom of contract.”\textsuperscript{30} Many progressives defined regulation, including anti-trust legislation, prohibition and minimum-wage laws, in term of business efficiency and moral uplift, rather than in terms of social rights and the civic potentialities of public control. Risk minimization and economic productivity, rather than rights, were the ideological foundations of regulatory statutes. Regulatory intervention did not critically reflect upon established power relationships or explode socially constructed patterns of exclusion. Instead, it assumed that the socio-economic status quo was beneficial except where it had mistakenly discriminated against specific groups.\textsuperscript{31}

Similarly, the social insurance model, which also came into play in the Progressive era but did not come to fruition until the New Deal, is not based on rights but on earnings. However, it differs from the regulatory approach in that it affirms distributive justice as distinct from market distribution. Social insurance sees the state as providing social protections on the basis of compulsory insurance financed through contributions paid for by productive labor. Encompassing old-age insurance, unemployment insurance, medical care for the elderly and disability insurance, it relies heavily on the image of individual savings accounts managed by the state. The New Deal’s Social Security Act, for example, established social rights neither as human rights nor as citizen’s rights, but as producer rights that were earned based on contributions of productive labor.\textsuperscript{32}

Both regulation and social insurance, therefore, remained tied to a moral code that uses work and productive labor to legitimate inclusion and charges of non-productivity or dependency to legitimate exclusion. As Cass Sunstein concludes, the motivating idea of regulatory intervention to prevent discrimination is that “differences that are irrelevant from the moral point of view ought not to be turned into social disadvantages;” meaning the inverse statement – that alleged moral differences legitimate social disadvantages – also
holds true. Rather than drawing a clear line of distinction between “liberal” and “conservative” welfare ideologies, it is therefore more appropriate to talk of different conceptions of the liberal welfare state vacillating between “hard” and “soft” paternalism as Michael Freedan has stressed. While hard paternalism indicates recourse to social control and punitive measures, soft paternalism stresses social participation, interdependence and “social inclusion.” Both, however, rely upon a “rhetoric of incapacitation,” and both focus on social-relational rather than socio-economic issues, while at the same time ignoring problems of commodification and social injustice. Understanding poverty in these terms, as Alice O’Connor has pointed out, created the “knowledge base that, however unintentionally, has opened itself to conservative interpretation.” The liberal conceptualization of poverty stressed psychosocial and cultural factors; centered on themes of responsibility, work, family and local administrative discretion; and tied welfare benefits to the responsibility of becoming self-sufficient through work, thus anticipating the later right-wing critique of “permissiveness.” At the same time, the dilemma of the liberal welfare state remained unsolved, since neither the contributory, producer-rights-based principle of insurance nor the risk-management approach of regulation could adequately address the problem of poverty. As Michael Katz noted ruefully, “no one noticed that the foundation of liberalism had crumbled, until it was too late.”

It comes as no surprise that the moral construction of poverty and its contradictions manifested themselves institutionally in ways that perpetuated gendered and racialized social hierarchies in social policy. Although women in the United States were more involved in designing the welfare state than in Europe, they often ended up being treated worse. For example, the early “maternalist” American welfare state of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, which included mothers’ pensions, was designed to enable poor mothers to stay at home and take care of their children, but it was also meant to discourage welfare as an alternative to paid work. This established a policy tradition in which welfare payments were mostly geared toward single-parent families headed by mothers, yet means tests, man-in-the-house rules and suitable-home regulations at various times enforced the ideal of the nuclear family. As a result, mother-headed households were both stigmatized and legitimated. Although female advocates of maternalism frequently used their ascribed roles as upholders of moral values to break out of the confines of the household and enter the political scene, the emancipatory potential of this step was mitigated by the conservative content of their social ideology, which was often moralistic, strictly middle-class and designed to preserve traditional gender relations.

Similarly, the racial divide inscribed into the system of social provision disproportionately segregated African Americans into the most discretionary, stingiest and politically-exposed programs. Racial discrimination was not just the result of the mobilization of racist attitudes but also that of the normal workings of institutional structures, which, as Robert Lieberman has maintained, were equally powerful in defining racial hierarchies and
identities. During the New Deal, for example, agricultural, domestic and service workers were excluded from Social Security, leaving a larger number of African Americans without coverage. Likewise, the GI Bill and racially-coded housing policies in the postwar period mainly provided subsidies for the development of homogenous, racially-segregated, white, middle-class suburbs at the expense of both African Americans and inner cities.38

The “rhetoric of incapacitation,” racially-coded provision and gender discrimination embedded in the administrative organization and the normative content of social policy reinforced a hierarchical system of social provision and inhibited the development of universal coverage. What emerged was a “segmented welfare state” that differentiates sharply between “welfare” and “entitlement” in which a variety of government, private and nonprofit agencies use bureaucratic discretion to administer a wide range of programs to different social groups based on an ideological construction of poverty, one that serves to uphold social norms rather than address problems of social deprivation. While non-contributory assistance programs for the poor – such as Food Stamps, the dismantled Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Medicaid – offer meager support with many restrictions for a largely female and minority population, social insurance, like Social Security and Medicare, are “respectable” programs that serve a largely male working- and middle-class clientele. Responsibility for the non-contributory welfare system is devolved to state and local levels, leaving extensive discretionary leeway for arbitrary exclusions, stigmatizing requirements and moralistic intrusion. The contributory dimension of the social insurance system, however, consists mainly of entitlement programs run by the federal government.39

The “Binding Ideology” of the Cold War State

Viewed in context, the politics of growth, the principle of subsidiarity and the moral construction of public policy not only existed side-by-side but they also mutually reinforced each other in ways that stabilized the politics, institutions and norms of the Cold War order. Together, the symbiosis of growth-inducing welfare and defense spending, state-private networks and the behavioralist approach to problems of poverty formed the binding ideology of Cold War state-building by gaining “ideological hegemony over the boundaries of political discourse.”40 They formed the basis of a broad political consensus that cut across partisan positions in social policy and legitimated the growth of the state among both liberals and conservatives.

The politics of growth defined the role of the state largely in terms of regulatory intervention and expansion of government subsidies to the private and nonprofit sectors. By defining social policy solely as a function of economic opportunities and voluntary-sector moral uplift, it sanctified market solutions and a normative attachment to liberal
capitalism that privileged private providers, regressive taxation and fragmented provision. This faith in the salubriousness of market forces shifted the focus from questions of how to democratically organize social provision as a civic endeavor and a matter of social solidarity to delivering goods to consumers without regard for the public, private or nonprofit nature of the service. The politics of growth thus disavowed the idea of an alternative model to capitalism and limited the role of government, yet at the same time legitimated rising government expenditure in support of nongovernmental providers. Moreover, by framing social problems as an issue of economic growth and labor force participation, rather than distributive justice, the politics of growth reinforced the emphasis on behavioral rather than structural factors in social policy, and thus cemented the moral construction of poverty.

Subsidiarity allowed the state to mobilize the organizational capacities and ideological resources of nonprofit and private-sector agencies in order to meet the political exigencies of Cold War social and foreign policy. Devolving functions to nongovernmental providers made charitable and private-service agencies appear intrinsically superior to public institutions and provided political shelter for their organizational autonomy. Administrative leeway and procedural autonomy for publicly-funded nongovernmental agencies effectively condoned the “poverty knowledge” embraced by the organizations it helped to fund. Thus, subsidiarity not only reflected the market solutions embedded in the politics of growth but also helped institutionalize the moral construction of poverty.

Finally, the normative and moral underpinnings of Cold War public policy had distinct institutional repercussions that helped perpetuate its growth-oriented and allocative structures. Linking poverty to behavioral patterns implicitly sanctioned the notion that economic opportunities and labor-force participation in a capitalist economy would solve the problem of poverty. It normatively demarcated the public and the private, depicting the market in terms of “self-regulation” and “free enterprise” and the public sphere in terms of regulatory intervention and punitive control. This defined individuals as either self-interested consumers operating freely in a marketplace or morally deficient “sinners” in need of punitive rehabilitation via public intervention. By embracing moral uplift at the expense of generalized social provision, “poverty knowledge” framed the welfare debate in ways that limited the role of government in social and economic affairs and ensured that public funds would mainly be deployed as part of an anti-poverty strategy centered on economic growth. Likewise, it reinforced the notion that charitable and private-service providers were preferable to public institutions and legitimated their funding, autonomy and normative approaches.
Conclusion

The findings indicate that the policies of the postwar liberal consensus transported institutional and ideological concepts usually associated with the conservative resurgence. In putting the accent on ever-increasing economic output, state-private networks and therapeutic adjustment, postwar liberal policies inadvertently shored up the right’s social-welfare discourse, which was centered on “retrenchment,” “privatization” and the “undeserving poor.” This suggests that the postwar liberal welfare state prepared the ground for the resurgence of conservatism not as a result of a “backlash” against the “New Deal state,” but by failing to address the meaning of “more” in a consumer culture; creating the kind of privatization of social services that the political right later employed so effectively in denouncing the welfare state; and perpetuating the segmentation, fragmentation and moral categorizing that left liberalism and its electoral support structure vulnerable during periods of economic downturn. In order to recapture its radical promise, effective, progressive social policy must therefore be intellectually rooted in what Barbara Ehrenreich has called the “social infrastructure for a revitalized democracy,” namely, a progressive vision of meaningful civic participation via a reconstructed public sphere of control.41


25. Salamon, Partners, 93, see also 86-93, 99. For figures on the government becoming the main source of nonprofit income, see Salamon, Nonprofit Sector, 25-26, 45-46; Hall, “Welfare State and Careers,” 363-65, 375, 381-2; Hall and Burke, “Historical Statistics,” 8-9, 29-30 and tables; Critchlow, “Family Planning,” 213; Kramer, Voluntary Agencies, 152; Monsma, Sacred and Secular, 89-90; Smith and Lipsky, Nonprofits for Hire, 4, 66-70; O’Neill, Third America, 98.


33. Sunstein, Rights Revolution, 62.

34. On the terms “hard” and “soft” paternalism, see Michael Freeden, “Democracy and Paternalism: The Struggle over Shaping Liberal Welfare Thinking,” published in this collection, 110-112.

35. O’Connor, Poverty Knowledge, 17.


39. See, for example, Brown, “Segmented Welfare System,” 188.


The January 1943 issue of *The Educational Forum* featured an article by Leonard Covello, the principal of Benjamin Franklin High School in New York's East Harlem. At that time, the area, one of the poorest in Manhattan, was home to the largest Italian community in the United States. Some 60,000 first- and second-generation Italian immigrants were concentrated in the easternmost section of the neighborhood, extending from Third Avenue to the East River. (East Harlem's western section from Third to Fifth Avenue was more mixed, with a predominant Puerto Rican and African-American population, and the scattered remnants of what had once been a large Jewish community). Covello’s article, entitled “A Community-Centered School and the Problem of Housing,” reverberated the author’s two intersecting identities. A public intellectual and an ethnic leader, Covello was a pioneer of multicultural education in heavily immigrant communities – a project in theory and social action that he labeled the *community-centered school*. In these few pages, Covello illustrated his school’s role in catalyzing the needs and energies of the community in which it was embedded and sparking the mobilization of the people of Italian Harlem to support the construction of a federally-subsidized, low-rent neighborhood housing project. In fact, the article was the retrospective celebration of a success. In just three years – from 1938 when the grassroots mobilization for public housing began until 1941 when the first tenants took possession of their apartments – the 1,170-unit East River Houses went up in East Harlem, the first public high-rise project built in New York City.

Covello’s article included a photographic section featuring five images under the caption “Parade Celebrating Housing Victory.” The photographs were taken on East 110th
Street on October 15, 1939, the day of the largest rally in the campaign to demand better housing for East Harlem from the administration of Mayor Fiorello La Guardia. Italian Harlem was the district that had elected La Guardia to Congress between 1922 and 1932 and had given him landslide support in the mayoral elections. In fact, La Guardia was a resident of the district at the time. One of the photos shows four women in their forties and fifties dressed completely in black with their hair combed back. They are leading a parade of other women who look like them, barely visible in the background. The parade walks past a tenement block; a car is parked on the curb. Signs on storefronts advertise the “Venetian Beauty Salon,” the “Merkel Optical Store” and “The Communist Party of the U.S.A. - East Harlem Section.” The hammer-and-sickle symbol stands out against the tenement façade and may well not have been a random choice of the photographer to have it included inside the photo’s frame. The parade was co-sponsored by the Harlem Legislative Conference, a political organization dominated by Vito Marcantonio, the protégé of La Guardia who represented East Harlem in Congress five times between 1932 and 1950. The HLC was a Popular Front coalition of over one hundred left-wing organizations (including the local branches of the Communist Party), unions, settlement houses, parent-teacher associations and social and athletic clubs. Photographers documenting the initiatives of the HLC were often reporters for the Communist Party paper, the *Daily Worker*.
Gazing gravely ahead, however, the women pay no attention to the communist symbol, which was part of their everyday urban landscape. The fur collar on the coat of the woman on the left, who carries a Star-Spangled Banner Flag (the only one who looks like she could be non-southern Italian), is the only concession to alternate cultural influences. The black dresses, the hair discreetly combed back, the unpretentious shoes and cotton stockings of the three women on the right, including the one who carries an Italian flag, tell the readers of *The Educational Forum* that they are respectable mothers in the “Italian tradition.” They are women embedded in the familist ideology and practices that Italian American historian Robert Orsi has called the “domus-centered society;” supposedly unaccustomed to walking the streets for much else than visiting relatives and shopping for bargains in the neighborhood markets and stores. The practical, black handbags they all carry (the one holding the Italian flag swings it around her forearm) suggest the important work of accumulating social capital that these women performed on a daily basis inside tenement kitchens and modest living rooms, from windowsills and across backyards, or in unadorned hospital rooms where they spent visits to sick relatives. This unpaid work of social architecture made Orsi’s “domus-centered society” come into being in the first place, helping Italians to shape the representation of their place in American society. An all-companing family ethos and a thick web of community relationships based on a shared moral code was in fact the core of what the ethnic identity of Italians in Harlem was and what they believed distinguished them from other “races.”

Besides familism and social parochialism, the community’s investment in the struggle for low-rent public housing was also apparently at odds with a pivotal element of Italian American consumer behavior. The determination to attain homeownership, either in New York or in Italy, by pooling together every family resource and sacrificing other alternative paths to social mobility, was a key social goal for Italian women and men in Harlem. Their culture – rooted in the rural background shared by most immigrants – viewed owning property as a fundamental source of autonomy, empowerment and security in times of unemployment, sickness and old age. The prospect of accumulating enough money to return to their home village and buy a house was one of the most important motivations for Italian migration to North America. When economic conditions – namely, the availability of jobs for women and children – indicated that they could achieve homeownership here, Italian immigrants to New York pursued that goal with fierce willpower and a huge investment in gender as the productive force of a new family culture. To achieve it, in fact, they did not hesitate to mobilize all family resources, moving hastily from one rented apartment to another, doubling up or opening the doors of their homes to boarders, sacrificing their children’s hopes for social mobility through education and encouraging girls to work outside the home. By the end of the 1920s, many had fulfilled their Italian American Dream. In 1930, a full third of the households with an Italian-born head of family owned their homes (nearly all of them in Brooklyn and the other outer boroughs). Others continued to follow the social north star of homeownership.
on a transnational ground. After the onset of the Depression, skeptical about being able to fulfill their aspirations in New York, many left East Harlem to go back to Italy and purchase property there. In *Christ Stopped at Eboli*, Carlo Levi describes the fate of these returnees in one small village in Basilicata, the province from which many Italian Harlemites came from.\(^6\) To Italians in Harlem, investing in government-subsidized low-rent public housing through grassroots political participation meant a radical change of perspective. It meant parting from the ideas of home as an object of private consumption and of homeownership as the leading social value on which they had founded much of their experience as Italians in America, not to mention their transnational lives.\(^7\)

Yet, the single photograph of the women in black marching through the streets of the neighborhood is evidence that in the late 1930s, Italians in East Harlem acted collectively to demand that the state provide for what they understood to be their entitlement: a “decent house,” a social right hinted at by President Roosevelt in his second Inaugural Address in 1937. They mobilized under the guidance of Italian American leaders that they had endorsed to represent them – as Italians – in the local and national political arenas.\(^8\) Indeed, the parading mothers suggest that they did so not by rebutting their ethnic culture of domesticity but by bestowing it with political value.
The ethnic maternalism symbolized by the Italian flag and the purse – trespassing spheres and being invested in the struggle for better housing – is scarcely acknowledged in histories of Italian America. Even recent contributions maintain that the Italian family ethics and its emphasis on motherhood is the burden in spite of which a minority of Italian Americans participated in class struggle and political activism. Documenting the agency of these solemn Italian mothers in black, reclaiming the most politically-charged space of all – the street – and carrying out concerted community action, asks us to work at a more nuanced and historically complicated interpretation of Italian American ethnicity. The relations between Italian Americans, the welfare state and their political activism to enforce New Deal public policies may in fact be Italian American history’s best kept secret. Radicalism, a chapter of the Italian American past that gave global progressivism two icons like Sacco and Vanzetti, has been rescued from the shame-induced oblivion in which it had been buried in Italian American memory. Major works in the subfield have recently been published, including the monumental collection edited by Philip Cannistraro and Gerald Meyer, tellingly titled The Lost World of Italian American Radicalism.9 There is no equivalent for the history of Italian Americans as both clients and supporters of the welfare state. The reasons for on-going neglect most probably lay in the fact that this history is more politically charged today than Italian American anarchism or communism. As scholars of the discursive construction of race and whiteness of Italian Americans and other European ethnicities have pointed out, the denial of the fact that immigrants enjoyed public-policy benefits in the decades around World War II is the column upon which rests the “bootstrap myth” – the memory tale that separates the hard-working and self-reliant Ellis Island immigrants (and their descendents) from today’s welfare-dependent, taxpayer-subsidized immigrant and native-born non-white minorities.10 One purpose of this article is to begin to shed light on this important and unappreciated feature of the Italian American experience. As the most proletarianized of the European ethnic groups in New York and a fundamental component of the local New Deal coalition, Italian Americans were disproportionately represented among the beneficiaries of welfare-state and social policy measures during the Depression years, and not only in terms of jobs and subsidies.11 In the years preceding the war, public housing was an area of social policy where the dynamic role of local ethnic progressive leaders and grassroots ethnic activism coalesced with New Deal-inspired Italian American feelings of entitlement to government aid.

Because of its success, the mobilization for public housing of Italian Americans in East Harlem may provide a further historical lesson. Many political scientists have criticized multicultural policies, insisting that the recognition of ethnic diversity hinders public social policies; either because it imposes additional economic burdens on welfare-state budgets or because, by apparently awarding more resources and rights to marginalized groups, it discredits the welfare state in public opinion and undermines the support that it might otherwise enjoy.12 Some important histories of working-class America have
reinforced the idea of incompatibility. In her book *Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939*, Lizabeth Cohen crafts a disjunctured picture of ethnic workers’ lives and affiliations in the 1920s and 1930s. Cohen maintains that in the 1920s, non-unionized immigrant workers, clustered in culturally homogeneous ethnic enclaves, relied on ethnic institutions for support in case of need. Cultural and social insularity came at a high price. “Isolated in local neighborhoods and fragmented by ethnicity and race,” Italian, Polish, Bohemian, Slovenian, Jewish and African American workers were not effective as national political participants. Everything changed, according to Cohen, with the Great Depression. The collapse of ethnic institutions, unable to provide relief to their members, allowed immigrants to finally form an American working class across ethnic lines. In the mid-1930s, Cohen contends, Chicago ethnic workers turned to the New Deal, the Democratic Party, the CIO and each other across ethnic boundaries, “having lost faith in the capacity of their ethnic communities […] to come to the rescue. By the mid-1930s, they, and their counterparts elsewhere in America, where championing
By describing a completely shifting allegiance of immigrant workers from ethnicity to class solidarity, Cohen’s chronology of the American working class pits the universalism of welfare-state policies against the particularism of cultural pluralism. You can have either one or the other, Cohen ultimately suggests; either universalistic redistributive social policies or ethnic particularism and cultural recognition – not both.

The case of Italian Harlem’s struggle for public housing in the years 1937-1941 illustrates a successful effort at bridging these apparently alternative demands. Exploring its dynamics can finally help us to make sense of the parading mothers in black carrying American and Italian flags. Leonard Covello, Vito Marcantonio and Fiorello La Guardia were ethnic leaders, integral parts of the New Deal coalition, who used cultural pluralism as a progressive force. They pursued a brand of social reform that would not extinguish but mobilize cultural diversity and tried combining social policy with public support for an ethnic group to maintain its distinct identity and practices, within the larger framework of interethnic tolerance and pluralism. Not only did they claim there could be no real progress without cultural recognition, but they actually appeared able to deliver on it.
This was something qualitatively different from the strategy of the urban machines of previous decades. Ward leaders did partly address the social-policy concerns of immigrants, but they did so in non-ideological, pragmatic, largely non-redistributive ways, which had the effect of blunting the development of class-based politics, just as Cohen insists. As a result of the reform agenda that Covello and his political allies managed to inflate into the battle for public housing, the new sense of universal entitlement to government help that the New Deal had spread in East Harlem in the late 1930s came ostensibly with no real “loss of faith in ethnic communities.” Rather, it produced an unprecedented mobilization within an ethnic community known for its political cynicism and apathy around progressive ethnic leaders who seemed to embody the values, expectations and ideals of first- and second-generation immigrant women and men. The fact that an educator was the single most prominent character in the drama that eventually procured the new low-income housing project for East Harlem speaks volumes about the role that culture played in such a community-wide movement. Such a role is easy to overlook from today’s vantage point, because of the eventual failure of such a project.

Finally, the success of the campaign for better housing in Italian Harlem shows that, to reconcile redistribution and cultural recognition in public policies, the work of the ethnic leaders mediating between the state and the immigrant group should not merely consist in funneling public money into the community. That would posit an ethnic electorate without values. Instead, mediation entailed translating the language of the welfare state into immigrant culture and vice versa. La Guardia, Marcantonio and Covello – each in his own role – spent their social capital as authoritative members of the community, respectful of the community’s moral world, in attempts (often successful) to both reorient...
and cater to the priorities, public behaviors and consumer choices of the people of Italian Harlem. They thus provided an example of how ethnicity can be mobilized as a force in support of social policies and how social policies can effectively remold ethnicity to accommodate for a culture of social progressivism.

The Mobilization of the Italian Community: The Political Value of Ethnicity

The mobilization for better housing in Italian Harlem stemmed from the disastrous condition of its housing stock, which by 1937 ranked among the worst in New York City. Unlike West Harlem, which had originally been an upper-middle-class community, East Harlem had always been a working-class neighborhood; a home for transient groups of immigrants attracted to the area by its low-rent tenement houses. By the early 1920s, however, the profit that landlords could reap from their properties was shrinking. The opening of new outlying urban areas drained the neighborhood of its most well-off immigrants and the Immigration Acts of 1921-1924 cut back heavily on new demand for cheap housing. Neither did proprietors make any investment in new housing or renewal. By 1934, 90 percent of housing in the section east of Third Avenue had been built in the previous century. In the most heavily Italian blocks, 83 percent of the apartments lacked central heating, 67 percent a tub or shower and 55 percent a private indoor toilet. While the worst dwellings remained vacant and rapidly decayed, some experienced extreme overcrowding, providing the ideal conditions for the spread of disease. From 1936 to 1940, the tuberculosis mortality rate in Italian Harlem was double the average for New York City.

La Guardia and Covello both had first-hand experience of the effects of the “evils of the slum” in the most tragic way. In 1921, as a tenement dweller in Greenwich Village, La Guardia lost both his wife and his one-year-old daughter to tuberculosis. As a child, Covello saw his immigrant mother pine away and die, never able to reconcile herself to life in the tenement flats of Harlem. In 1918, his first wife died of an undiagnosed disease for which doctors had prescribed better air and sunlight. The scars that these deaths left on the two men had a tremendous impact in making housing a central item in their social reform agenda. What he endured personally helped La Guardia shape his determination in bringing the housing issue to the center of his political action as the mayor of New York. Presenting the first low-rent housing projects to be developed there, the First Houses and the Williamsburg Houses, he told reporters, “If there are any monuments I should like to leave this city, they are decent, modern, cheerful houses in the place of the present tenement houses, with windows in every room and a bit of sunshine in every window. And I’m for any step that will hasten achievement of this goal.” For Covello, an advocacy campaign to bring low-income public housing to East Harlem became the top priority of his life.
as a teacher, social reformer and community leader in the years 1937-1941. The New
Deal housing legislation, most notably the passage of the 1937 United States Housing
Act, which made adequate housing for low-income families a permanent responsibility
of the government, provided them with the framework for action.

The receptive and sympathetic attitude of the prewar New York City Housing Authority
towards local communities involved in redevelopment plans encouraged Covello to look
at public housing programs as an occasion to turn his particular strain of cultural plural-
ism – based on bilingual education and full interaction of the school with immigrant
families and community – into social practice. In 1936, together with Miriam Sanders
– the head of the largest settlement house in Italian Harlem and Vito Marcantonio’s wife
– Covello participated in the East Harlem Community Study of the Mayor’s Committee
on City Planning.22 The Committee, on the one hand, recommended demolition and
reconstruction on a large scale for the doomed Italian Harlem. On the other hand, it
envisioned a future in which the richly-textured social networks of the community and
its distinct ethnic character would not only remain intact but also thrive, liberated from
the negative stigma of the slum. The 1937 final report of the Mayor’s Committee recom-
mended “that much of the traditions and culture of Italy will be preserved to enrich the
outlook of the Americans of Italian forbears who will live here in the future. In that case
that area may gradually develop as the principal center of Italian culture in the Western
Hemisphere. The preservation of national character can be fostered by giving to new
groups of buildings the cachet and distinctiveness of Italian architectural treatment. Then
East Harlem will become noted […] as a neighborhood that combines the beauty and
glory of the old world with the outlook and vision of the new.”23

At Benjamin Franklin High School, Covello redesigned the entire curriculum, from
literature to art classes, in order to address the issue of housing and its relevance for the
community. Students were sent out to map any single block in the neighborhood, reporting
on the conditions of streets, houses, stores and businesses. They created models, graphs
and drawings for special exhibits, and attended lectures and film screenings about social
housing in New York and Europe. Parents were involved in all the events, so that they
“mingled with teachers, social workers, civic leaders,” and a Housing Committee was
formed to provide for a permanent forum on housing for immigrant families.24 Covello
insisted on the area’s potential for physical rehabilitation as a tangible result that the
community could understand on its own terms, construe within its value framework and
strive for without recourse to abstract notions. He later acknowledged that BFHS teach-
ers’ “good-neighbor manner of approach and their lack of dogmatic or pedantic attitudes
were a decisive factor in stimulating the interest of the community.”25 Rather than trying
to hammer middle-class ideas about what decent housing was like into Italians’ heads,
Covello set out to stimulate awareness of the housing problem through the practice of
community education. He insisted that mobilization was a goal in itself, as it entailed
a lesson in cooperation for a people estranged from the very notion of it. It was a question of both method and theory. He envisioned the creation of a new form of Italian American ethnicity in which Italian cultural particularism and traditions were imbued with middle-class notions of rationality, responsibility and respectability conducive to the democratic and pluralist-based Americanization that represented his ultimate goal.

Finally, Covello soon understood that the school needed political alliances to broaden its base of support, organize efficiently and effectively influence decision-makers in city hall and Washington. To that purpose, in January 1938, the Benjamin Franklin Housing Committee joined forces with the Harlem Legislative Conference (HLC) to form the East
Harlem Housing Committee. For the next three years of the campaign, the joint committee would be fully responsible for better housing in East Harlem, conducting rallies, parades and petition drives under its auspices. The HLC was a multifarious coalition of left-wing and progressive organizations – trade-union locals, settlement houses, political, religious, fraternal and youth groups – based in East Harlem, whose declared primary purpose was to improve living conditions and fight racial discrimination in the poverty-stricken and ethnically diverse community. More than anything else, the HLC was Vito Marcantonio’s personal machine, responsible for intercepting community needs and demands and supporting his reelection to Congress. Marcantonio was HLC chairman from its inception in 1937 to its demise in 1943.

Marcantonio had a radical stance on housing. As a young lawyer, he had worked under the aegis of his mentor La Guardia in support of poorer tenants, organizing them to fight rent increases and evictions. He was a strong advocate of rent control and, after the New Deal housing legislation went into effect, low-cost public housing. When the campaign in East Harlem got underway, Marcantonio used his best rhetorical repertoire to call his constituents’ attention to the housing problem and indicate government aid as the solution. In the summer of 1938, he declared in a radio talk:

Our community is the most congested in the city of New York. Our people exist in the worst slums of our city. Our children are raised in dismal disease-breeding fire-traps. […] Instead of spending billions for war for destruction of human lives (Marcantonio was a
militant pacifist before Pearl Harbor), let our government spend billions for war against crime, disease and death, by the building of low-cost houses and the elimination of the slums. I therefore urge the people of our district to support the Mayor’s program and the demand for more and sufficient federal appropriations. As President of the Harlem Legislative Conference I urge you all to join with us in militantly demanding a low-cost Housing Project at no more than a monthly rental of $5.28

For Marcantonio, housing was an obvious area for the intervention of redistributive New Deal social policies, and there was no better way to inculcate this notion into the consciousness of Italian Harlemites than by making reference to family values or the jeopardized safety of beloved Italian children.

In fact, the mobilizing language that Covello and Marcantonio used throughout the housing campaign reflected their attempts to accommodate their own progressive agendas with the cultural inclinations and values of the Italians of Harlem. Two childless, visionary men in a community obsessed with family and motherhood, Covello and Marcantonio had to navigate cautiously between the two ends. Most often, Covello articulated his messages in the family-culture code that Harlem’s Italians could immediately understand and make sense of. As a radical politician, Marcantonio employed a more bellicose style, relying on the sense of isolation and estrangement from the larger society that Italians in Harlem experienced. When he talked of the reactionary forces that reviled the multiracial nature of East Harlem and hated the idea that the community stood up for its rights,
he provided the community with a useful, faceless enemy towards whom they could express resentment and frustration. When rumors spread at a certain point saying that private speculators may have tried to buy the attractive riverfront land where the public housing project was supposed to rise, Marcantonio delivered a heated radio address that played on the sense of territoriality of Harlem’s Italians: “The East River is our river. We learned to swim in that river. We were born on its banks, and we want that river for ourselves. It is our river, and we do not intend to have anybody take it away from us.”

Because of this meticulous attention to language and approach, the participation of the people of Italian Harlem in the campaign for low-rent public housing was unprecedented in the life of the community. Hundreds of immigrant women and men attended the forum on housing at Benjamin Franklin High School together with their children. This provided an opportunity for immigrant parents and their American-born generation to fill the chasm of the generational conflict that had represented one of the most painful incidents in Italian Harlem history.

The first rally of housing activists sponsored by the East Harlem Housing Committee was a “Monster Mass Meeting” held at PS 102, in the heart of Italian Harlem, on March 22, 1938. The leaflets advertising the meeting (in English and Italian) asked, “Who Wants Better Housing? Our Housing Conditions in East Harlem Are Becoming Worse Every Day and Nothing Is Being Done About It. We Have Had Plenty of Talk. We Want Action!”

The mass meeting brought together churches, schools, labor unions and settlement houses,
along with a crowd of men, women and children from the community. The newly-formed Housing Committee decided to print out and circulate in the neighborhood hundreds of petitions addressed to the mayor and the New York City Housing Authority, under the heading “East Harlem Tenants:” “We, the undersigned tenants of East Harlem, living in one of the worst slums of the City, urge you to: 1) Allocate funds for a low-cost housing project along the East River Driveway; 2) Enforce the provisions of the “Multiple Dwelling Law” [a 1929 New York State Law declaring substandard housings a menace to public welfare]; 3) Demolish all vacated and condemned buildings. We want low rents and better apartments – We believe in better housing for the people of East Harlem – We want a new housing project in East Harlem.”

The petition drive was actually less directed at pressing La Guardia than helping him in his search for federal funds and lobbying in Washington. La Guardia worked behind the scenes to move the project forward, while staying constantly informed of its developments and giving his preliminary approval of relevant issues such as the location of the housing project selected by NYCHA. In February 1938, Marcantonio wrote Covello: “I had a long discussion with the Mayor about a week ago with regard to the housing problem in Harlem. Confidentially, he is with us. He asked me to submit right away land values along the East River. Will you please get these for me at once?”

The participation of the community in the housing movement reached its apex on March 18, 1939, when a fire broke out in an East 112th Street tenement, killing four children. The East Harlem Housing Committee circulated an impassioned leaflet denouncing the tragedy:

Horror and Death Strike Twice in a Week! Four Children, Four Victims, Four Deaths. Yes – the people of East Harlem were again witnesses to a tragedy, a tragedy which this time took as its victims five innocent children peacefully at sleep, but suddenly awakened by the noise of roaring flames, which led to their destruction and death. This tragedy happened on East 112th Street – who knows when or where the next one will occur? The East Harlem Housing Committee of the Harlem Legislative Conference is fighting for a low-rent housing project. You can win this fight by coming to the Monster Housing Parade. Mobilize at Benjamin Franklin High School.

The Italian community, outraged by the images of family destruction, responded by sending hundreds of letters of protest and attending the “Monster Housing Parade” by the thousands.

On March 25, a huge crowd rallied to demand immediate actions against tenement conditions and a housing project for East Harlem. Again, along with representatives of left-wing political organizations, union locals, settlement houses, and Italian associations and clubs, led by Marcantonio and Covello, the bulk of the parade was made up of the people of Italian Harlem. The majority of them were women, who marched through
the neighborhood shouting slogans like “We refuse to die like rats, in dirty old tenement flats,” and “Make East Harlem a model town, tear the old-time tenements down.”36

Finally, on September 14, 1939, Marcantonio received a radiogram from the United States Housing Authority notifying him that President Roosevelt had “approved a loan contract in the amount of $6,631,000 for low-rent housing in East Harlem.”37 Two days later, NYCHA Chairman Alfred Rheinstein publicly revealed the plan for the construction of the low-rent housing project on the riverfront in lower East Harlem. The fourth public-housing unit to be built in Manhattan, East River Houses would cost a total of $7,690,390 and include “educational and recreational facilities open to residents of the general neighborhoods” with ample space “devoted to landscaping and gardens.”38 To celebrate, the East Harlem Housing Committee organized a “Victory Parade” to be held in the streets of Italian Harlem on October 15. On that bright Sunday morning, Covello and Marcantonio marched at the head of cheering Benjamin Franklin students and their mothers, strutting behind banners reading “Hurray for Homes for Harlem” and “Goodbye Slums - Welcome Housing Project.” The slogan chosen for the parade – “Start Building Now!” – reflected the down-to-earth and wary attitude of the Italian community, even while in a festive mood, and its commitment to continue fighting if necessary.39 Dozens of meetings, four mass rallies and several petition drives later, the community had achieved an unprecedented goal by bringing a major public works project to Italian Harlem and mobilizing as a cohesive movement in the process.

The participation of women in the housing campaign was momentous. Their newfound grassroots activism stemmed from a social change we can call Depression maternalism. Record numbers of men were out of work by the end of the 1930s. Italian Harlem had the highest percentage of heads of families on relief in New York City. With few jobs available to them, children stayed in school longer. Classes at Benjamin Franklin swelled, providing Covello with a wide audience for his experiments in education reform and social action.40 Women were invested with unprecedented responsibilities as consumers and persons in charge of dealing with welfare agencies. The patriarchal framework of family economy, responsible for the total mobilization of resources towards the goal of homeownership, weakened, while a new awareness of the welfare needs of women and children – including better and safer housing – emerged.

As a result, not only were women more numerous and more active than men, but they introduced gendered meanings to the housing movement, visions and needs that went beyond the intended goal of the campaign, and made their voices publicly heard like never before. Women’s activism was doubtless able to emerge because housing was traditionally seen as an area of female competence; because women performed their political activities in the streets of the neighborhood that were familiar to them and closely monitored; and because, remaining in close proximity to their homes and children, they could continue to
perform their labor as mothers and wives. However, as the campaign mounted, groups of Italian women began to challenge both the physical boundaries of the neighborhood and the limits of their action. In early 1939, Anna Russo, Mary Cammarota, Mary Bassano and Antonietta Cuoco formed a delegation of “mothers” — as they identified themselves — and made visits to Mayor La Guardia and the chairman of the New York City Housing Authority Alfred Rheinstein to hand them the petitions they had collected in Italian Harlem. They used their authority as mothers to press male politicians and bureaucrats to take action and meet their housing needs, thus claiming new roles for themselves as citizen-consumers and transforming their emphasis on motherhood in public policy.41

Race was also a central factor in the housing campaign, but with a more divisive and controversial meaning than gender. The Italian sense of racial otherness had germinated in America from the complex transnational works of scientific racism, discrimination in the workplace and the media, relative isolation, fascist nationalism and even projects
in cultural pluralism such as Covello’s. Italian American students surveyed by Covello in the late 1930s considered themselves as members of the “Latin race” and constructed their identity as opposed to their Jewish and Irish as well as Puerto Rican and African American counterparts. By that time, however, Italian Americans in Harlem started to reclaim a white identity, largely for attrition with American tales of racial entitlements to citizenship, economic competition for scarce resources with Puerto Rican and African American newcomers and in a desperate, and often violent, effort to distance themselves from their “darker-skinned” neighbors. Recognizing that most of the racial tensions in East Harlem originated in housing – that is, in the “strong tenant resistance to Negro and Spanish-speaking families seeking access into tenements occupied by ‘aborigines’” – Covello and Marcantonio thought that better housing would remove many of the reasons for racial hatred. As liberals, they dismissed race – as opposed to ethnicity – as an obstacle to social justice. They saw the victimized Puerto Ricans as the Italians of yesteryear and, envisioning a future for East Harlem in which Puerto Ricans would outnumber Italians, they worked towards a peaceful transition, fostering tolerance and mutual understanding between the groups. In their perspective, the housing campaign would be a perfect occasion for such interethnic cooperation.
In no other area did Covello and Marcantonio fell so short of achieving a balance between their identities as Italian American leaders and champions of redistributive social policies. Notwithstanding Marcantonio’s and Covello’s stalwart racial ecumenism and promotion of tolerance, cooperation between ethnic groups within the East Harlem Housing Committee was minimal. Although a few Puerto Rican leaders were involved and a few alliances were built across ethnic lines, the campaign remained firmly in Italian hands, with rank-and-file Italian activists, men and women, developing a strong sense of ownership towards the entire undertaking. Mass meetings were always celebrated in Italian Harlem and most speeches were given in English and Italian only. Many Italians grudgingly accepted that East River Houses would eventually be integrated – a consequence of the approach of NYCHA at replicating the multiracial composition of the community in the new housing project. In a meeting between NYCHA and the Housing Committee of East Harlem Council of Social Agencies, the representative of the East Harlem Housing Committee Peter Amendola raised the issue of the racial composition of the upcoming housing project: “We have had the question put to us – who else is going to live at the project besides us. It is hard for us to say that the project is built for the community. Color problem. I would like to know definitely on what basis this is going to be handled. May
we have an expression of your point of view?” Catherine Lansing of NYCHA replied, “The primary thing is if the family is eligible on income and the relative degree to which houses are substandard.” May Lumsden (NYCHA): “We have black and white at Red Hook and Queens[bridge] [Houses].” Amendola: “What is the percentage?” Lumsden: “I don’t know.” Amendola: “They think that the project is theirs.” Helen Harris (National Youth Administration): “I think that the best thing to do is to take it for granted that as long as there are Negroes in the district the project will house them.”

**East River Houses: Italian Americans, Cultural Pluralism, Ethnic Maternalism and the Welfare State**

The groundbreaking ceremony for East River Houses was held late in the morning of March 2, 1940, in the presence of La Guardia, Marcantonio, Covello and other authorities. The project received its first tenants on April 1, 1941. Because of eligibility requirements that included income limits, the state of previously-occupied housing, American citizenship and a preference for those who worked in the area but not necessarily lived in it, only a third of the first tenants came from East Harlem. That was admittedly far less than Covello and Marcantonio had hoped, but the new housing project was still a great achievement. Echoing the pluralist and tolerant agendas of the leaders who inspired the mobilization for low-rent public housing in East Harlem, East River Houses was one of the few integrated project in New York at the time. 10.8 percent of the tenants were black. Puerto Ricans were also well represented, largely thanks to the efforts of Marcantonio at having them included.

Despite the fact that the new housing project was to house multiethnic tenants, a majority of them not originally living in the community, Italian ethnicity in Harlem was definitely reinforced by East River Houses and the way it had been won. Italian Americans predominated, contributing to make East River Houses Italian territory in the eyes of the people in the neighborhood. As many as 208 of the 1,170 heads of households (or 17.8 percent) were Italian-born, and many more were second and third-generation Italian Americans. The future envisioned by the mayor’s Committee on City Planning – a development that properly housed the same Italian community that had already been living in Italian Harlem – did not entirely come true (and after the war would actually turn into a nightmare). But for the time being, East River Houses was regarded as an achievement of the strength of Italian numbers, a monument to the Italian community’s ability to mobilize under the banner of ethnicity and a demonstration of the sophisticated political power of Italian Harlem leaders. A significant social prestige befell the first tenants of East River Houses. Minimum income limits excluded the poor and the unemployed. The beneficiaries of the project were mostly working-class
families that had been hit by the Depression but had retained their ethnic working-class brand of respectability. The units were state-of-the-art two-to-six-bedroom apartments equipped with all the modern appliances that made them compare favorably with any middle-income apartment available on the market, at half the rent. East River Houses and the way its project had been won definitely reinforced and extended the meaning of Italian ethnicity in Harlem.

Gender was an equally momentous, but more complicated, factor in defining East River Houses, resulting from both the influential positions that many middle-class women had inside the New York City Housing Authority and the important role that women in Italian Harlem had claimed for themselves by mobilizing as entitled clients of NYCHA services.

On the one hand, East River Houses was obviously designed for conventional families. Singles were utterly excluded and no experimentation with communal kitchens or other alternate living arrangements was made. The photographs in the booklet on East River Houses published by the NYCHA demonstrate the determination of public-housing designers to instruct and regulate the conduct of working-class women. The underlying principle was their horror of the permeability between home and public space and the lack of privacy that characterized Italian Harlem housing. A first set of photos, captioned “Street Scene - East Harlem,” “Lunch-Time - East Harlem,” “Winter Time - East Harlem,” and “Wash Day - East Harlem,” embodies the bleakness of the environment in the immigrant subjects, who appear hopeless and frowsy. The unifying theme of geographical contamination between public and private links the interstitial outside environment’s intrusion into the home – in the photograph of a woman who dispiritedly examines the linen she has hung outside to dry – to the offensive view of the toilet merging into the dining room in the photograph of the family having lunch (with the parents’ faces hidden from view in order not to humiliate the victims), and of course to the gathering of women and children on the dangerous street. The other set of photos, taken inside the apartments of East River Houses and the recreational open spaces of the complex, reveals how the foremost gendered mission of the new housing projects was to enclose working-class women in a sealed and sanitized private space. Socialization had to happen in the space enclosed in the housing project, which turned its back on the hated street and simulated a non-urban environment. The Italian American subjects in the photographs are themselves cleaner, tidier and happier than in the Italian Harlem images, clearly suggesting that the environment, more than race and class, determines people’s destiny.

However, the client activism of Italian American women guaranteed that public housing administrators would take their needs into account (as women within the conventional family) far beyond what was being done in private housing. Facilities in East River Houses included a playground, a children’s health station, a nursery and several social rooms. Not only would working Italian Americans never have been able to find such services
in the private housing market, but they were also the services that the women of Italian Harlem had included in their requests during their housing campaign. By using motherhood as a political tool, they had bridged ethnic and class differences with middle-class women reformers and shaped policies and institutions to suit their own needs — not by relinquishing but by brandishing their identity as Italian Americans.


4. Robert A. Orsi, *The Madonna of the 115th Street: Faith and Community in Italian Harlem* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988). On women’s “kinship work” in the production of ethnic identity, see Micaela di Leonardo, *The Varieties of Ethnic Experience: Kinship, Class, and Gender among California Italian Americans* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 191-229. Covello summoned up the power of social control exerted by the Italian American family ethos in East Harlem in these terms: “Just as in Italy, all social control was based on no other moral categories than those of family, so any social consciousness of Italo-Americans within ‘Little Italys’ appertains primarily to sharing and adhering to the family tradition as the main motif of their philosophy of life. […] The Italo-American family continues to be the repository of the old-world cultural inheritance and the locus of a cultural transfer upon the American-born generation;” in Leonard Covello, *The Social Background of the Italo-American School Child*, 280-281.

5. According to the US Immigration Commission, in 1908 only 1.3 percent of families with a foreign-born Southern Italian head in New York City lived in homes they owned (sample blocks from “Elizabeth Street, Spring to Houston, East Side,” and “East One Hundred and Fourteenth Street, Second to First Avenue, North Side”); see United States Senate, *Reports of the Immigration Commission. Immigrants in Cities: Study of Selected Districts in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, Buffalo, Cleveland, and Milwaukee, with Statistics and Tables* (26 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1911), I, 209. By 1930, a total of 53,849 families whose head of family was Italian-born lived in their own homes. 144,835 rented. Few Italian homeowners lived in Manhattan: only 1,213 families as compared to 31,196 in Brooklyn, 11,012 in Queens, 7,371 in the Bronx, and 3,057 in Staten Island (Richmond); see Bureau of the Census, *Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930: Population. Special Report on Foreign Born White Families by Country of Birth of Head* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1933), 162-164. As late as 1949-1950, few Italians in Harlem owned the homes where they lived. The percentage of owner-occupied units in “Italian” census tracts oscillated between 7 percent and 6.8 percent, for a median percentage of 3.6 percent, with evidence of a direct relation between median income and rate of homeownership (the higher the income, the higher the rate). In the same census tracts (194, 192, 188, 178, 162, and 170), a median percentage of 22.5 percent dwelling units were reported to be without private bath or dilapidated; see Robert Charles Freeman, *Exploring the Path of Community Change in East Harlem, 1870-1970: A Multifactor Approach* (Ph.D. diss., Fordham University, 1994), 234.


11. Italian Americans benefited more than any other European ethnic group in New York from New Deal programs, especially the Work Projects Administration (WPA). They had the largest percentage of Home Relief recipients (eligibility for Home Relief was a prerequisite for being hired for a WPA) and workers engaged in WPA projects. While 14 percent of the white population as a whole received some sort of public assistance, Italian Americans accounted for 21 percent—the highest percentage among white families and almost twice that of the Jews (12 percent), who represented the largest ethnic group at the time, or 30 percent of the population of New York; see Beth S. Wenger, New York Jews and the Great Depression: Uncertain Promise (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 17, cited in Gerald Meyer, “New York City's Italian American Community and the Great Depression: A Case Study of Its Response to the New Deal” (unpublished paper). In an unpublished book about Italian Harlem, Covello estimated that “more than 75% of the people in the community are being sustained, at present [1938], through Home Relief Bureaus and other organizations assisting in the amelioration of conditions due to unemployment,” in “Covello Book, Community-Centered School (1938-39),” Covello Papers, Box 18, Folder 2, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.


15. Two decades after the East River Houses opened, Italian Harlem was merely a rapidly shrinking and aging community of a few thousand individuals. East Harlem (by then the area with the highest concentration of public housing in the United States) was an internationally renowned emblem of the ominous effect of a public-housing policy aimed at accommodating a homogeneously poor population in on-budget, constructed inner-city megablocks – a distopia that stood a far cry from the integrated, multicultural and
permanently mobilized community envisioned by Covello. The forces unleashed by World War II, political and socio-demographic changes, mismanaged federal and city planning, the private interests of realtors, banks and homeowners, racism and the racial tensions that marked urban transformation all proved to be overwhelming; see Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Vintage, 1961).


22. Mayor’s Committee on City Planning in cooperation with the Works Progress Administration, *East Harlem Community Study* (New York, 1937).


25. *Ibidem*, 139.

26. “Minutes of the first meeting of the East Harlem Housing Committee of the Harlem Legislative Conference, January 15, 1938, East Harlem Housing Committee Meetings,” *Covello Papers*, Box 43, Folder 10; “East Harlem Housing Committee of the Harlem Legislative Conference,” *Covello Papers*, Box 43, Folder 11.


29. Marcantonio, “Transcript of radio talk.”


33. Marcantonio to Covello, February 13, 1938, *Vito Marcantonio Papers*, Box 2, Folder “Covello, Dr. Leonard (Benjamin Franklin High School).”

34. Leaflet in *Covello Papers*, Box 43, Folder 10.


39. “East Harlem Housing Committee, Minutes of the 39th Meeting, September 19, 1939,” “East Harlem Housing Committee, Minutes of the 42nd Meeting, October 9, 1939,” *Covello Papers*, Box 43, Folder 10.

40. At the inauguration of the Community Advisory Council of BFHS in 1935, Covello stated, “We began with an enrollment in 1934 of 2,000 boys and today our registration is close to 2,600. We are already on double session. Last year the school began its work at nine in the morning and continued as a day high school until three. From four until six the playground and some of the rooms were used as an afternoon recreational center for the children in the immediate neighborhood and from seven until ten there was a community center for adolescents and adults. Our school was constantly in use.” Leonard Covello, “Address delivered at the Organization Meeting of the Community Advisory Council of the Benjamin Franklin High School, October 15, 1935,” *Covello Papers*, Box 39, Folder 15.

41. Jennifer Guglielmo, *Living the Revolution: Italian Women’s Everyday Resistance and Labor Radicalism in Industrializing America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, forthcoming 2010), chap. 8. Evidence of the participation of these women in the housing campaign are in “Housing Committee, s.d. [1939],” *Covello Papers*, Box 43, Folder 6; “Minutes of the 18th Meeting of the East Harlem Housing Committee of the Harlem Legislative Conference, November 14, 1938,” “Minutes of the 20th Meeting of the East Harlem Housing Committee, December 13, 1938,” “Minutes of the 32nd Meeting of the East Harlem Housing Committee, April 17, 1939,” “Minutes of the 33rd Meeting of the East Harlem Housing Committee, April 24, 1939,” “Minutes of the 34th Meeting of the East Harlem Housing Committee, May 5, 1939,” “Minutes of the 35th Meeting of the East Harlem Housing Committee, May 19, 1939,” *Covello Papers*, Box 43, Folder 10.

42. The open answers of the students offer examples of their elaboration on Italian racial identity and American citizenship at this time: “My most miserable days were the first two years at public school. I was scared even to talk to the other boys, not to mention chumming with them. In the sixth and seventh grades I could hold my ground. They didn’t scare me any more. I knew I was just good as they were. Just a bunch of kikes, spiks, no real American among them. In high school [Benjamin Franklin High School] it was the same thing. Why should I feel inferior when I know I am a better American than this bunch of Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Poles and Germans. My father came here fifty years ago, and he is anyway more American than those. I think East Harlem is a good place to live in. Without Puerto Ricans and Negroes it would be swell.” L.V., cited in Covello, *The Social Background of the Italo-American School Child*, 350.


46. “Minutes of a Meeting of the East River Committee held in the Authority Office, January 18th, 1940,” *NYCHA Papers*, Box 0056E1, Folder 10, *La Guardia and Wagner Archives* (CUNY: La Guardia Community College).


49. “Number of Families at Federal Projects Shown by Racial Composition at Initial Occupancy and on June 30, 1954,” *NYCHA Papers*, Box 0063C7, Folder 19.


55. “Minutes of the Housing Conference held at Benjamin Franklin H. S. on December 17, 1938,” *Covello Papers*, Box 43, Folder 10.
Social Security in Postwar East Central Europe

Béla Tomka

Social security (including health-care, old-age, work-injury, unemployment and other similar schemes) became the major institution of social welfare in Europe from the late nineteenth century on. Its eminent role in past and contemporary European welfare states makes it an important field of welfare research. In fact, most of the scholarship on welfare states concentrates on such programs. In East Central Europe, social rights have also centered on social security, both during the interwar years and since the fall of communism. The communist period itself, however, constituted an exception in several respects. The intimate relationship between social rights and social-security programs on the one hand, and the peculiarities of East Central European welfare development on the other, justifies focused attention on social security in that region. This discussion will therefore concentrate primarily on the postwar decades of the communist period, before moving on to examine more recent developments.

The scope of the present paper has a number of limitations. Most importantly, East Central Europe is obviously not a homogeneous region and its diversity cannot be properly addressed here. Among the countries in the region, the focus will be on Hungary, while the other countries will only be dealt with to a narrower extent. Moreover, to make the information on social welfare contained herein sufficiently comprehensive and detailed, it is necessary to limit the analysis to certain specific aspects, comparing them with the main trends in the scholarly research on European welfare states. The major themes examined here include welfare spending, the relative importance of welfare institutions, the characteristics of social rights and the organization of social-security programs. These issues are widely discussed in the literature, although other areas of welfare studies, such as the role of state and public organizations, issues of legal regulation, the role of gender in welfare and, even more importantly, the equality of welfare distribution, are also deserving of attention. In fact, the effective outcomes of welfare systems have been among the most robust indicators for comparative analysis, but the lack of relevant long-term data prevents us from a historical survey of such results. While such limitations significantly reduce the breadth of this essay, it still addresses strong indicators of major tendencies in
East Central European welfare development and may therefore at least serve as a starting point for further, more comprehensive study.

Communist Welfare Systems

During the first decades of the twentieth century, the development of East Central European welfare institutions coincided with Western European trends in many respects. Unfortunately, considerable difficulties arise when comparing welfare expenditures due to methodological problems and the lack of appropriate data. Nevertheless, we can make some general observations based on the definitions of welfare services most often applied by international organizations like the International Labor Office (ILO) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as well as those accepted in scholarly research. It can be said, for example, that although East Central Europe has lagged behind most Western European countries in welfare spending relative to the GDP throughout the period in question (from the interwar years to the present day), the difference was smaller between the world wars – and greater for most of the communist period – than has previously been suggested in the scarce literature on the subject. Furthermore, provided the benefits reserved for public employees are taken into account, social-security expenditure levels in the interwar period appear considerable even when compared to Western Europe.

Nevertheless, due to the lack of reliable long-term data, it is hard to advance any definitive opinion regarding the specific convergence or divergence of Western and East Central European welfare spending during the first half of the twentieth century. If Germany and Great Britain are considered, then Hungarian and other East Central European welfare legislation and programs, which intensified in the 1920s and 1930s, only show that at the time social insurance and social security expenditures in East Central Europe converged with those of Western Europe. In addition, similarities surface in the structure and differentiation of social-security programs. Although the pace of differentiation is difficult to measure, it is clear that health insurance came of age in Hungary and other East Central European countries during the first half of the century. As a result, it considerably expanded the types of services financed by social security, even more so than in Western Europe. The particularly rapid growth in pension spending, on the other hand, made it the most important among the programs and therefore comparable to the situation in Western Europe.

Before World War II, the organizational features of East Central European social-security programs resembled those of the countries that followed Bismarckian principles because, as in Germany and Austria, programs were introduced in the form of compulsory
insurance. Moreover, both before World War I and during the 1930s, several schemes included aspects of self-governance.⁷

Except for Czechoslovakia, social rights in interwar East Central Europe reveal a dichotomy when compared with Western Europe. On the one hand, the ratio of people covered by social security was lower in Hungary and Poland than in Germany or Austria – which was due above all to the fact that a lower percentage of industrial employees were included in the early social-insurance programs. On the other hand, the relative level of benefits, especially those for state employees, mostly resembled the conditions of leading Western European countries. In Hungary, with the emergence of the generous 1928 pension insurance, further convergence could be expected.⁸ Interwar Western European trends were also reflected in the changes of the eligibility conditions for social-security benefits. The means-test principle only came after the insurance principle and specific eligibility conditions such as age limits and a waiting period for pension insurance. The parallel waiting period for health insurance also approached Western European standards. At the same time, the pattern of coverage with high levels of benefits conforms to the Bismarckian tradition, especially when it is applied to a predominantly agrarian country with a relatively small working class.

The communist takeover disrupted the convergences in many respects. In communist East Central Europe, a specific structure of social rights emerged, since the welfare arrangements in the region had a strong authoritarian-paternalistic character. Social rights included several provisions, but they were confined to “workers” or “employees.” Enemies of the regimes, i.e., those who were politically or culturally persecuted by the dictatorships, were either excluded from the benefits or entitled to fewer provisions. Furthermore, there was no explicit institutional differentiation between the economy and social policy, as had been the case in the region during the interwar years as well as in Western Europe from the late nineteenth century on. Rather, social rights were embedded in the production process or, more precisely, benefits were tied to employment status.

The establishment of a strong safety net for the population and the improvement of living conditions in general were major goals of the communist countries. Progress in these areas was supposed to prove the superiority of the communist social and economic system over that of the capitalist countries. However, it was unclear what specific role welfare institutions had to play in the communist social order, and relevant concepts, ideas and policies have changed considerably over time. In the early years of the communist regimes in East Central Europe, there was a consensus among the government elite that social policy was a product of capitalism and thus unnecessary in socialism, since the whole political and economic system served the well-being of the people. However, ideological concepts of social policy were gradually abandoned from the mid-1960s on, and the term eventually became part of the standard vocabulary of declarations and documents issued by the government and the Party. At the time, some politicians even argued that a real
and effective social policy had only been possible with the socialist system, in which it was alleged that social policy alone would serve the interest of the whole population, while in the capitalist countries it supported the interests of the ruling class.

Despite these ideological claims, the content or the desired model of social policy has never been clearly defined. The same holds true for the relationship between social policy and the economy.\(^9\) Notwithstanding these ambiguities, social welfare had an enormous ideological impact on the communist regimes. Mass unemployment in the western countries was contrasted to full employment in their communist counterparts. In fact, in communist East Central Europe, the basis of social welfare was full-employment, even if it implied low levels of income. Other specific welfare institutions included price subsidies for certain goods and services and the system of social benefits offered by corporations – both of which varied in importance over time.

In most cases, the right to work was guaranteed by a country’s constitution, demonstrating its central importance to communist ideology and practice. However, it was not defined as an individual right that could be exercised against the interests of the government or a company. On the contrary, it was a promise or commitment made by the state and a right guaranteed by the socialist economic system. There were no civil or political rights, and consequently no social rights were guaranteed either. Instead, these were attributed through a bureaucratic procedure. As Zsuzsa Ferge put it, “social provisions (…) could not become rights. They have remained gifts, charity of the party-state, reinforcing the subordination of ‘subjects’.”\(^{10}\)

To reach full employment, a wide range of policy measures were implemented, such as the centralized allocation of the workforce and other resources, or the establishment of a dense network of child-care facilities to promote female employment. The need to ensure a decent daily life for the population led to high levels of employment, since most of the social benefits were tied to employment status. Alternative welfare systems, such as social assistance, practically did not exist. Indeed, unemployed persons, particularly males of working age, were persecuted and often imprisoned. Only in Poland was “work-shyness” not criminalized. In 1979 in Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, more than five thousand people, including more than four hundred young people, were punished for their “parasite life-style.”\(^{11}\)

Even more important in a system of economic shortages were major resources like the workforce, which were demanded in quantities that were impossible to fulfill, thus improving the position of employees vis-à-vis employers.\(^{12}\) Labor laws and relations were therefore obstacles to the firing of employees.\(^{13}\) This came with an economic price, since it hampered efficient employment. Indeed, it proved difficult to shift the workforce to more effective sectors and companies and to resolve the issue of unnecessary, redundant work. Such employment systems could only be maintained over the long term if companies
were protected from the consequences of low productivity by the entire system of the centrally-planned economy.

Although sustaining full employment was a constant objective of communist economic policy, this goal could never be fully realized. Collectivization often created a surplus of workforce in less-industrialized regions. There was also the so-called “hidden unemployment” or “unemployment on the job,” since economic regulations and incentives issued by the central authorities encouraged companies to employ even people to whom they were unable to provide appropriate work.\(^\text{14}\)

In the East Central European communist countries, the system of price subsidies for basic consumer goods and services was another major tool of welfare policy. Its explicit goal, that is, the improvement of the purchasing power of people’s incomes, was not unlike the objectives of other means of welfare policy. However, the principles underlying the subsidies differed significantly from those informing other welfare schemes to be discussed below. Not only did the price subsidies serve the purposes of welfare, but they also had a more complex function; for example, to support inefficient firms and branches, often for political reasons. Moreover, scholarly research has shown that subsidies had only a moderate impact on social policy, primarily because affluent segments of the society had much easier access to them than those less privileged. Moreover, in areas like health-care or the consumption of basic foods, they actually resulted in a large-scale waste of resources.\(^\text{15}\) In any case, price subsidies in East Central European communist countries definitely amounted to a significant share of the GDP. In 1982, they made up 9.1 percent of Poland’s GDP and 9.0 percent of Hungary’s, although they never grew to be as disproportionate as they did in the German Democratic Republic in the 1980s, where the funds allocated for subsidies surpassed social-security expenditures.\(^\text{16}\) What is more, the growth pattern of price subsidies was considerably different from that of the benefits of social policy. In Hungary, for example, the growth of subsidies, excluding housing benefits, was highest in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. Then, after reaching its peak in 1986-1987, it fell sharply.\(^\text{17}\)

A further feature of communist social welfare was the eminent role that corporations and other employers played in social policy. Although companies that provided welfare benefits for their employees also existed in Western Europe, fringe-benefit systems became much more diversified and extensive in the East Central European communist regimes than in market economies. A mixed welfare system therefore emerged in East Central Europe that was a blend of the classic corporate social policy with that of the state implemented by companies. Depending on their size, many factories established nurseries, sports and cultural facilities, health-care establishments and holiday resorts. Companies even distributed a fair share of goods that were in short supply, most importantly apartments, and often procured such basic necessities as apples or potatoes for their employees.
Changes in the functions of social security, on the other hand, were contradictory in communist East Central Europe. Not only did the elimination of traditional institutions of poor relief and charity increase the importance of social-security programs, but the influence of social-policy considerations in other areas, which enjoyed relative autonomy in Western European societies at the time, also decreased the importance of social security within the whole welfare system. As suggested earlier, the welfare system that emerged in East Central Europe after the communist takeover was embedded in the production process, relied on full employment and job security, and was furthermore complemented by other specific features, such as fringe benefits and an extensive system of price subsidies. This was the system into which social security was integrated.

Legislation enacted in the aftermath of World War II and partly initiated by non-communist political forces promoted the extension of social rights in the region. Social-security coverage continued to increase at a significant pace in East Central Europe after the communist takeover. At the same time, a policy of particularism and privileges, rather than universalism, emerged as well. Eligibility for social security came to be more differentiated in all East Central European countries, where industrial workers and members of the armed forces, the Party and state bureaucracy were privileged. In contrast, previous social rights were eliminated for political reasons and certain social groups, especially farmers, were discriminated against during the early communist period (though the harshest forms of discrimination were abandoned by the early 1960s). The solidarity principle became more important in the 1960s and 1970s, especially in the area of eligibility for social services. This caused a rapid increase in coverage and can be regarded as a move toward universalism. However, solidarity had its limits. Not only was the benefit system heavily influenced by employment status, but cash benefits (pension, sick leave) were also determined by income levels, a feature of social-security arrangements that became increasingly pronounced over time.

There were also some significant differences among the East Central European countries in terms of coverage. Poland, in particular, stood out from the other countries due to its high number of private farmers who were not eligible for pension insurance for quite a long time. However, by the 1980s, universalism had gained ground in all three countries while the differences within the region had simultaneously decreased. In Hungary as well as in Czechoslovakia, the 1970s was the pivotal decade since universalism became the underlying principle of social security in 1975. In Poland, on the other hand, this development took place only a short time later, at the end of the 1970s.

Ratios of social-security coverage increased considerably in East Central Europe during the postwar decades, soon becoming comparable to those of Austria or Germany. However, the absolute, and even the relative, level of benefits in the region does not compare favorably with Western Europe because the dynamics of social-security spending were not parallel to the increase in coverage. A striking feature of the communist welfare...
regimes established in Hungary and Poland in the 1970s was the relatively moderate level of social-security spending compared to both the interwar period and the European context. In terms of social-security expenditures relative to the GDP, Poland and Hungary diverged from Western Europe until the end of the 1970s. In 1980, Hungary was even further behind the West than it had been in 1930. In contrast, Czechoslovakia had a high social-security/GDP ratio during the first two postwar decades. Yet the process that was making the countries of East Central Europe uniform also manifested itself at the level of social spending. While in 1965, the ratio in Czechoslovakia had been almost double of that in either Poland or Hungary, which were already spending more or less the same amount, by 1980, the difference had mostly disappeared. This implies that while Czechoslovakia had managed to keep up with the social-security spending of Western Europe during the first part of the communist era, by the 1970s and 1980s, instead, it was lagging well behind them, alongside Poland and Hungary.

Regarding the relative levels of Polish and Hungarian welfare spending, the late 1980s may be seen as a turning point. The ratio of social-security expenditures began to increase considerably from the 1970s on. Then the process accelerated at the end of the 1980s, due both to the economic recession in Poland and Hungary that caused the stagnation of the GDP and the efforts of the regimes to buy the support of the population at a time when their legitimacy was eroding quickly.

The expansion of social-security programs took place in East Central Europe with different priorities from those in Western European countries, since its main goals were production efficiency and workforce mobilization. The differences in the structure of institutions can best be represented by the structure of expenditures. During the first two postwar decades, the most important differences compared to Western Europe were the low ratio of pension-related expenditures and the relatively high ratio of health-care spending. The changes that occurred between 1960 and 1980 only signaled the region’s approach to the Western European pattern in terms of the growing proportion of pension expenditures. As far as other expenditure items were concerned, the trend was the opposite. In sharp contrast to Western Europe, health-care spending decreased in proportion, family benefits increased and unemployment expenditures had no place in East Central Europe.

After World War II, a strong divergence began to appear between East Central European and Western European welfare states in terms of the organization of social security, which basically persisted all through the communist period. In most Western European countries, the state commanded an increasing role in the operation of social security. In East Central Europe, on the other hand, the complete nationalization of social security led the state to exercise considerably greater influence than anywhere in Western Europe. There were also some organizational differences within the region, but they did not affect the inner logic by which the social-security systems were controlled. In Hungary, from
1951 until the mid-1980s, the operation of social security was in the hands of the trade unions, and they themselves were in turn an organic part of the power structure of the party-state. In Czechoslovakia and Poland, social security was instead directly supervised by the state administration. What is more, there was no democratic control of any kind over social-security schemes, elected self-governments did not exist and the lack of democratic control over the state administration made even indirect control impossible, which is probably the sharpest difference with regards to the social-security regimes of Western Europe.

While in several Western European countries, impending parliamentary elections had tangible effects on the increase of welfare benefits, above all pensions, in Hungary, this type of electoral cycle was altogether lacking. After World War II, elections were merely formal events, which obviously could not play any role in social-policy decisions. Instead, a kind of “crisis cycle” can be observed, in which coverage was increased both immediately after World War II and following the 1956 revolution. The same pattern is repeated in social spending, the highest growth of which occurred under critical economic and political conditions in Hungary in the late 1980s.

On the basis of that which has been addressed thus far, it can be plausibly argued that communist, social democratic and Bismarckian features and traditions were simultaneously present in East Central European social-security schemes, though their importance varied over time. When it comes to the largest service – old-age pension – a communist feature can be distinguished in the relatively low weight of social-security pensions in the overall welfare system of the 1980s due to the system of price subsidies described above, among other things. By the 1980s, an increasing number of benefits were granted because of citizenship, as was the case from the late 1970s on for all kinds of health-care benefits, similar to the British and Swedish systems. Furthermore, parallel to the social-democratic regimes, the management of social security was centralized with the state playing a central role in its administration. At the same time, other important social-security services, such as pensions or sick pay, were closely connected to contributions when it came to eligibility requirements and benefit levels, a situation similar to the “conservative” or “corporatist” Western European welfare regime.

Of potential interest is the degree of bearing that this legacy, that is, the development of the welfare systems outlined above, had on East Central Europe during the course of the political, social and economic transformation of the 1990s. For example, the scale of welfare efforts (including price subsidies and other welfare expenditures) in late communist East Central Europe that were similar to those in Western European countries can be regarded as an asset. As shown above, there were also several other features similar to the social-democratic and conservative welfare systems dominant in Western Europe. Furthermore, since most of the former differences derived from the communist political system, then its democratization could in theory eliminate major divergences.
Nevertheless, the fact that welfare spending was profoundly interwoven with the communist economic system (like price subsidies, fringe benefits in factories and the indirect, hidden costs of full employment) was a burden when it came to transforming communist social policy. In fact, the fall of the regime jeopardized the survival of the former programs of social protection. Consequently, the fate of the welfare systems after the regime change depended greatly on the success of transferring resources associated with the old regime to a new welfare system compatible with a market economy.

**East Central European Welfare during the Transformation**

In the early days of the political and economic transformation of the 1990s in East Central Europe, observers anticipated various outcomes for the region’s welfare systems. Bob Deacon, one of the experts most familiar with the social policy of the region, expected welfare developments to be heterogeneous, that is, that the three countries would take three different paths. The British scholar also saw the would-be welfare regimes to be more or less consistent with Esping-Andersen’s typology: the “social democratic” regime in Czechoslovakia, the “post-communist conservative corporatism” in Poland and the “liberal-capitalist” welfare state in Hungary. On the contrary, the majority of experts, including Esping-Andersen himself, forecasted the dominance of liberal regimes in East Central Europe in the near future. Their expectations were based on two major points. The first followed the argument whereby international agencies like the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the World Bank preferred liberal welfare policies and would have a large impact on the transformation process, especially in countries with large foreign debts. Meanwhile, other international entities moved slowly, especially the ILO and the European Union, which might have been expected to support an anti-retrenchment welfare policy. The inaction of the European Union is particularly remarkable since, contrary to the ILO, it had effective political and economic leverage with which to influence government policies in the region. The second point followed the line of political reasoning among experts according to which the “most articulate and politically best-organized social forces” preferred the liberal model. As will be seen below, the actual course of the transformation would put such forecasts to the test.

The transition to the market economy deeply affected and challenged the East Central European welfare systems during the early 1990s. Not only was there a decline of the former practice of guaranteed employment and subsidized prices of basic necessities, both of which were among the major features of communist welfare, but the possibilities of a new social-security structure compatible with the market economy were also jeopardized. First of all, the social costs of the transition increased the demand for welfare services, while the number of social-insurance contributors significantly decreased as a result of
mass unemployment, a growing informal economy and the easy availability of early retirement and disability pensions. Despite the economic recession and the dominant liberal scenarios, the first years of the economic transition did not result in much of a decrease in social expenditures. In Hungary, for example, spending even increased in relative terms, since the first democratic governments introduced costly programs, such as unemployment benefits and new social-assistance schemes, in order to meet the social needs created by the rise in poverty. At the same time, entitlements to the major former social-security benefits remained unchanged for several years, even if they lost their purchasing power.32

Overall, the social-security systems in East Central Europe retained their mixed character, though with different compositions. The communist features disappeared quickly and the mix of social-democratic and conservative principles prevailed, since they were deeply rooted not only in institutions but also in public attitudes. According to opinion polls, the majority of the electorate favored a combination of universal welfare arrangements (especially in health care) and work-related (cash) benefits.33

Despite the considerable path dependence of welfare institutions and the public attitudes that supported a full-scale welfare state, liberal reforms and tendencies challenged the status quo. While they further strengthened the mixed character of the welfare systems in East Central Europe on the one hand, they caused a considerable degree of volatility in the welfare regimes on the other. Once again, Hungary suitably illustrates the point since 1995 marked a watershed in its welfare system. As part of an austerity package, the new ex-communist (socialist) government significantly reduced social benefits, going on to pass similar measures in the years that followed. In the first two years of the new policy course (in 1995 and 1996), the loss in social expenditures amounted to 5 percent of the GDP – a fall from 29.5 percent to 24.3 percent. Furthermore, welfare retrenchment was consciously carried out by a policy of non-indexation of benefits, at a time when inflation was galloping well over 20 percent annually again. Some entitlements were also cut back34 and the two biggest cash welfare schemes, pension and family allowance, were also affected by liberal reforms. The new pension system was modeled after Latin-American – specifically Chilean and Argentinean – precedents favored by international agencies like as the IMF and the World Bank, based on three pillars: a basic state pension, a compulsory private pension and a voluntary private pension.35 Universal family allowance, which had only just been initiated in 1990, was gradually abolished from 1995 to 1997. A means-test procedure was introduced in its place, first for families with no more than two children and then for all families.36

Nevertheless, there was no consensus on the direction of welfare reforms among the Hungarian political elites. After the 1998 elections, the new government, usually labeled conservative, cancelled several aspects of the liberal measures and reintroduced solidaristic principles and universal entitlements. It revised the pension law and lowered
the contributions going to private insurance companies so that more revenues could be directed toward the public pension fund, a step that could only partly counterbalance the introduction of private insurance schemes. The pension system did however retain its predominantly public nature with nearly universal coverage.

After the 2002 parliamentary elections, Hungarian governments acted in contradictory ways and sent conflicting messages. On occasion, they stressed the need for a liberal reshuffling of the welfare sector, including the introduction of means-tests and the abolition of universal social rights. However, due to the highly competitive political arena, they only managed to implement minor liberal reforms. In another new change of the pension policy, they moderately increased the social-security contributions for private insurance funds. As for family policy, they maintained universal family allowances and maternity benefits, even significantly increasing the real value of some. Then the year 2006 saw another turn in welfare policy. The re-elected (ex-communist) socialist-liberal government suddenly tabled the campaign program that promised not just to keep but to extend existing welfare arrangements, and inaugurated instead a neo-liberal transformation of the welfare system in which the direction shifted from universalism to selectivity. Measures included the abolition of free health care as a right of citizenship and dismantling laws on the job security of public employees, the privatization of hospitals and the introduction of tuition at universities, among several others. The policies provoked intense popular discontent and in the spring of 2008, a referendum voided key measures of the liberal health-care regime and other reforms, forcing the government to abandon other neo-liberal plans as well.

In sum, there is no indication of a liberal transformation in major areas of welfare in East Central Europe. For the last fifteen years, private pensions have remained rather insignificant, however incrementally this is changing. Pensions continue to be based on contributions, i.e., on work performance. There also exists a solidaristic element, since a modest vertical redistribution among contributors is taking place. Indeed, this feature of the public pension system even grew in strength during the years of the political regime change because indexation was often applied to pensions in a non-linear way, therefore favoring the lower ones. Pension reforms in Poland and Hungary anticipate a growing significance of private pension schemes for young employees who are obliged to enter the new, mixed system. Other major schemes of social security have remained more or less universal, the most important of which are the cash and in-kind benefits of health insurance, even if its widespread corruption institutionalized under communism considerably hinders the effective enactment of social rights. The role of means-tested poor relief and other social-assistance measures, often regarded as indicators of a liberal regime, have remained subordinate. For example, in Hungary, the share of social assistance within social expenditures was well below the ratio of liberal regimes in Esping-Andersen’s study, and in the late 1990s, it was only 3.3 percent as opposed to 18 percent in the U.S. and
16 percent in Canada.\textsuperscript{37} As a result, none of the East Central European welfare systems would qualify as a liberal regime in Esping-Andersen's sense, even if it is true that the liberal tendencies, however moderate, further strengthened the mixed character of the welfare systems.

While the case of Hungary can be viewed as typical of the region's welfare development in several respects, the transition of social policy in the individual countries still showed some unique features. In Poland, the economic shock therapy went together with a slow restructuring of the welfare system. Unlike in Hungary, however, the pension reform received fairly extensive support from the political elite.\textsuperscript{38} In the Czech Republic, the prevailing liberal economic terminology was paralleled by a surprisingly continuous, solid funding of social security during the first half of the 1990s. The most profound reforms were made in the area of health care, in which a system of competing public health-insurance funds was established, while benefits based on the principle of citizenship and universalism remained intact.\textsuperscript{39} What made Slovakia unique was the even slower pace of changes throughout the 1990s, which has only gained momentum in recent years.\textsuperscript{40} As a result, the differences between the welfare systems of East Central European countries increased somewhat compared to the 1980s.\textsuperscript{41} However, despite such differences, outside political entities and observers were, depending on their ideas, either disillusioned, like the IMF and the World Bank, or satisfied, like the EU, when they realized that a rapid, liberal reshuffling of the welfare systems according to the U.S. model had not been carried out in the region. For example, discussing the reforms of the health-care system in East Central Europe, an EU publication declared that “all health care financing reforms are in the mainstream of Western European tradition.”\textsuperscript{42} The statement might seem somewhat inconsistent considering the fact that the EU, unlike the World Bank and the IMF, did not actually take part in the social policy issues of the region. Important research findings also emphasize the lack of full-scale liberal changes not only during the early period of the regime change\textsuperscript{43} but also at the end of the 1990s and beyond.\textsuperscript{44}

Since popular attitudes favored an extensive welfare state in East Central European countries, even moderate liberal reforms and tendencies call for some explanation. The pressures of international agencies with a liberal agenda (like the IMF and the World Bank) and those, whether real or perceived, stemming from the international economy\textsuperscript{45} only provide a partial explanation since, among other things, their activity and influence declined considerably, especially from the mid-1990s on. Because of low labor costs, the region has benefited from the growing internationalization of the economy thus far, so neither can globalization be considered a major explanatory variable. As a result, the determinants of welfare in post-communist East Central Europe advanced by mainstream research are insufficient. An alternative interpretation is therefore advanced here; one that emphasizes factors related to the weakness of welfare recipients vis-à-vis other groups interested in welfare retrenchment.
The long-term efforts of communist regimes to prevent the evolution of civil society weakened traditional communities, institutions and values vital for the politics of social solidarity, and thus constitutes one of the most significant social and cultural legacies of communism. The respective strength or weakness of the labor sector is therefore a major indicator.

In the early days of the transition to democracy and the market economy, many experts envisaged the emergence of strong labor solidarity and many liberal economists saw labor unrest as the main potential obstacle to economic reforms. The heroic images of mass mobilization in the final days of communism definitely contributed to such ideas. Indeed, the history of popular unrest in communist East Central Europe, together with the central role of the Solidarity movement in Poland, originally conceived as a trade union, delivered even more ammunition for those expecting labor unrest during the collapse of communism. Although East Central European economies experienced a very strong decline and real incomes fell by some 20-30 percent during the early 1990s, the response of the labor sector was fairly moderate and labor mobilization even declined. However, determining what makes a labor sector strong or weak, or what makes labor activity militant or moderate, is far from obvious. According to one definition, “the ability of unions to secure material rewards for its members and exercise a degree of authority in the workplace over national policy” is what matters. The conventional criteria with which to measure labor strength are union density, the capacity for collective bargaining and strike rates.

During communism, the trade-union membership was high. This cannot however be considered an expression of labor strength, since trade unions functioned as “transmission belts” between communist parties and workers. The party-state also made membership practically compulsory, not to mention attractive, since, as mentioned above, the unions managed various welfare programs, including summer holidays for example. With the loss of these functions after the collapse of communism, union membership declined sharply. The relevant ILO publications are not fully trustworthy since they are based on figures reported by the trade unions themselves. According to the survey data available on unionization, however, in and around the year 2000, the average percentage of the non-agricultural labor force that belonged to a trade union was 33.7 percent in Western Europe; 27.9 percent in Slovakia; 24.1 percent in the Czech Republic; 17.5 percent in Hungary; and 12.7 percent in Poland, with an overall average of 20.6 percent. Indeed, the trend is declining and the public sector is highly overrepresented by union members. For the last decade, the level of unionization in East Central Europe has been moving away from, rather than converging with, the Western European average.

Labor disputes, that is, strike intensity, constitute the next measure of labor strength and here the comparative evidence is quite straightforward. The relative number of employees involved in strikes is much lower in East Central Europe than in the Western
part of the continent. The number of days not worked per thousand employees a year was around 11 in the four East Central European countries at the turn of the millennium, while in Western Europe it was around 100. It is true that minimal strike activity can reflect either labor strength in terms of the unions’ ability to secure material rewards for its members or labor weakness in terms of organizing workers. However, considering the fact that real income fell sharply during the first years of the transition everywhere in East Central Europe and income levels remain very low, the first line of reasoning seems implausible.\textsuperscript{49}

The ratio of employees included in collective bargaining agreements, which were naturally only formal, was nearly 100 percent during the communist period. During the 1990s, on the other hand, coverage decreased rapidly to well below Western European levels with an average of 43 percent for three of the East Central European countries (we have no specific data for Poland), while the comparable Western European ratio was 75 percent. Most of the agreements were reached at the company level, rather than the sectoral or the central level. What is more, they were not negotiated, “but either defined unilaterally by employers or, following state socialist traditions, simply repeated the law.”\textsuperscript{50} In addition, 37 percent of collective agreements in Hungary have no wage specifications, and the so-called wage premium for unionized workers, that is, the wage margin these workers enjoy over their non-unionized fellows, is 3-5 percent, i.e. almost negligible.\textsuperscript{51}

Consequently, all the available information supports the argument that the labor sector is weak in East Central Europe, for reasons advanced by three major lines of interpretation. The first deals with economic factors and argues that in general, high unemployment and economic depression – which have both affected East Central Europe during the transition years – weaken the position of employees and create an unfavorable environment for strikes or other forms of interest assertion. Other experts have held that the sizeable and growing informal economy has made room for individual strategies of survival.\textsuperscript{52} Politically-centered explanations, on the other hand, call attention to the role of corporatist institutions in the region. According to such arguments, the institutionalized mediation of labor, capital and state interests is ineffective and responsible for failures in regulatory labor legislation, among other things. Also along political lines, some argue that union fragmentation is a major source of weakness because unions cannot put together the “critical mass of members needed for mobilization.”\textsuperscript{53} Path dependence – the institutional and ideological legacies of communism – constitutes the third major line of interpretation\textsuperscript{54} according to which the problem lies in the communist origins of the major unions and all the associated shortcomings: lack of legitimacy, ideological disorientation of leaders and activists, old attitudes towards company managers and union members, the strong relationship with communist-successor parties that are often more liberal than social-democratic, etc. In fact, several polls suggest that trade unions are among the least trusted institutions in East Central Europe.
As far as the validity of these interpretations is concerned, the dynamics of strikes and union formation in East Central Europe does not fit the economic theory of strikes/labor relations. By the mid-1990s, the worst years of the transformation crises were over. Economic recovery was underway and unemployment was on the wane, although apparently this had no effect on the indicators of labor strength. The size of the informal economy had even reached its peak somewhat earlier, around 1992. However, its fall since then has not been reflected in union activity either.

The ineffectiveness of union participation in corporatist institutions is likely due primarily to their lack of support, in other words, by the very labor weakness we are trying to explain. The argument regarding union fragmentation in East Central Europe has also been challenged by empirical studies. These prove that, on the one hand, there is pluralism at the national level, but there are also major federations dominating the union landscape. On the other hand, fragmentation and even pluralism are rare at the shop-floor level, which means that low membership and member apathy are the major problems facing the unions.

Among the causes of labor weakness, the institutional and ideological legacy of communism is undoubtedly a robust variable. Indeed, the associations of the large unions with the ex-communist parties have long discredited trade unionism, and because the present-day unions have inherited the old membership and infrastructure, new unions with greater credibility have been crowded out. Nevertheless, two decades after the collapse of communism, institutional inertia alone cannot convincingly explain why new unions have not been established or, more specifically, why the emerging unions have remained marginal and unable to emancipate themselves from the old ones and revive trade unionism as a whole.

In sum, the mainstream interpretations of labor weakness in East Central Europe do not sufficiently identify its source, and alternative explanations thus appear more plausible. One such explanation, for example, regards the weakness of civil society, the absence of trust in interpersonal relations and social institutions in general and the lack of social structures that allow for effective cooperation among members of a group and society at large. The resulting organizational weakness and decreasing influence of welfare recipients, as opposed to other well-organized groups interested in welfare retrenchment, coupled with the mixed features of welfare institutions, are vital factors. Indeed, they help to explain why external and internal pressures to make the welfare state residual have persistently challenged the welfare status quo since 1990, causing the considerable instability of its arrangements. At the current stage of scholarly research, however, this claim cannot be further verified. Frameworks and even sociological attempts to interpret these particular features of East Central European societies are still in their infancy. In fact, the role of cultural factors in welfare-state development is a rarely-explored but potentially promising direction of research with regards to both Western and East Central
Europe. As far as the latter region is concerned, further study needs to be carried out on individual countries to make comparative analyses possible. Until then, however, it is plausible to assume that the lack of trust and social structures contribute to the low level of societal solidarity and the inability of members of the labor sector to cooperate effectively and form trade unions.

Expert assessments on the prospects of the welfare systems in East Central Europe vary greatly, with opinions ranging from those expecting a liberal transformation or only reluctantly taking sides, to those stressing the slow speed of change. However, the countries of this region have passed the stage in which the rapid marginalization of the welfare systems was urged by budgetary crises, demanded by international monetary institutions and facilitated by high inflation as well as a non-transparent, volatile political situation. According to the findings of several opinion polls, “the majority of Central and Eastern European citizens are indeed very much in favor of the full-fledged ‘European Model’,” which suggests that the liberalization of welfare systems would clash with the will of voters. This is even more true now that democratic institutions operate more transparently and reliably, reflecting voters’ preferences to a greater degree than in the first stage of the transition. Moreover, the political environment in East Central European countries has become highly competitive during the last decade. New membership to the EU also encourages these countries to adopt and support the conservative and social-democratic welfare institutions dominant in the rest of Europe. At the same time, social groups that advocate welfare retrenchment stand a good chance of enacting their programs, since opposing groups interested in the preservation of extensive welfare systems only possess a limited capacity for organization.

Summary

In the present paper, it is argued that a specific structure of social rights emerged during the communist period in East Central Europe where welfare arrangements had a strong authoritarian-paternalistic character. Social rights included several provisions, but were confined to “workers” or “employees.” Moreover, there was no explicit institutional differentiation between the economy and social policy as there had been in Western Europe from the late nineteenth century on. Social rights were embedded in the production process, or, more precisely, benefits were dependent on employment status. It was unclear, however, what role the specific welfare institutions played, and relevant concepts, ideas and policies have changed considerably over time.

Notwithstanding such ambiguities, social welfare had enormous ideological importance in the communist regimes. Its progress was supposed to prove the superiority of the communist social and economic order over capitalism. Mass unemployment in Western
countries was contrasted with the full employment in the communist world – considered in fact the foundation of social welfare, even if it implied low levels of income. Other specific institutions of communist welfare included price subsidies for basic goods and services and the system of social benefits offered by companies.

However, the changes in the functions of social security were contradictory in communist East Central Europe. On the one hand, the elimination of traditional institutions of poor relief and charity increased the significance of social-security programs. On the other hand, other areas of social policy which enjoyed relative autonomy in Western European societies, decreased the importance of social security within the welfare system. A mixed system of welfare regimes and social rights emerged in which parts of the communist, social democratic and Bismarckian traditions and features were simultaneously present, even if meanings have changed over time.

At the beginning of the political and economic transformation in East Central Europe, most experts anticipated the emergence and dominance of liberal welfare regimes. However, this scenario has not yet come to pass. Social-security systems have retained their “mixed character,” though with varying compositions. The communist features disappeared quickly and the mix of social-democratic and conservative principles prevailed, with emerging patterns deeply rooted not only in institutions but also in public attitudes. At the same time, liberal tendencies and reforms have often challenged the welfare status quo, which has led to a considerable degree of volatility in East Central European welfare systems.


64. Ferge, “Welfare and ‘Ill-Fare’ Systems in Central-Eastern Europe,” 151.

The Origins and Development of the Welfare State: Democracies and Totalitarianisms Compared

Chiara Giorgi

Introduction

The Great Crash of 1929 was a determining factor in the redesigning of social and economic orders around the world, especially concerning the new social policies that were subsequently launched in both totalitarian and democratic states. The “great transformation” of the 1930s (to revive the famous catchphrase by Karl Polany, among the most clever to understand the specificities of the crisis as it was evolving) offers a privileged perspective from which to interpret the fault lines of liberal institutions and the new worldwide strategies adopted to govern depressed societies. The effects of the Depression, be they mass unemployment or the substantial weakening of the market economy, caused the state’s role in the social and economic lives of national communities to be revisited as a problem. The framing of modern programs came to the fore to encourage public interventionism and social planning aimed at satisfying fundamental needs. At the time, observers stressed the similarities between “the emerging fascist or socialist regimes and the New Deal,”¹ united in their abandonment of the principles of laissez-faire, their adoption of new social policies and their placement of the “welfare state” at center stage.

If we keep in mind what Pietro Costa has called the “direction of meaning of the respective ‘experiments’,” however, we find significant variety in the different countries. On the one hand, in authoritarian and fascist contexts, newer social policies and insurance and welfare measures – so-called bio-politics – were functional to expansionist strategies with a nationalist, imperialist tinge and to “a defense of the racial integrity of the people.” On the other hand, in liberal-democratic and social-democratic contexts, social innovations were inspired by a “principle of liberty,” which could utilize “the interventionist power of the state to sustain the emancipation of the individual.”² As a result, the attempt to identify the common traits of anti-Depression measures and the new approaches to welfare cannot and should not nullify the differences that even historians most keen on comparative analysis have stressed for a long time. In enacting analogous social-policy innovations and framing a new model of the social state there were obviously profound differences between the authoritarian-totalitarian fascist paradigm and the democratic
model in Europe and the United States, encompassing both the social-democratic and liberal-democratic versions.

**Common Solutions: The New Social Policies of the 1930s in Europe and America**

In his *Prison Notebooks* (Quaderni dal Carcere), Antonio Gramsci observed similarities between a fascist regime and the leadership of the United States.³ In Gramsci’s understanding, both these orders tried to answer the crisis of liberalism via the corporatist management of conflict and the beginning of a planned economy. However, Gramsci mainly focused on Fordism (and less on Roosevelt’s New Deal), by stressing the profound difference between Italian strategies, based on a regulated state capitalism,⁴ and those of the United States, based instead on private capital. To be sure, the “political formula” of the two systems of government was very different. Yet, a comparison of the situation in Italy and the United States in the years following 1929 revealed some important analogies. Vis-à-vis the blatant inadequacy of liberal economic and social policies, both countries showed a similar propensity for adopting unprecedented measures of public interventionism accompanied by a critical re-examination of nineteenth-century-style social protection. In both the Italian and the American discourse of the early 1930s, fascist corporatism and the New Deal are often described as two similar ways of confronting the gravity of the situation created by the Wall Street Crash. The formula of the fascist “third way” between capitalism and socialism was explicitly publicized as a direct inspiration for New Deal measures. For many Italian intellectuals and politicians there was no doubt: while in the U.S., the New Deal was a sort of a corporatism on the verge of success, in the rhetoric of Mussolini, its establishment of new policies (especially the NRA) was inspired by Italian fascism.⁵

As a consequence, beyond the claims of official fascist propaganda that continued for as long as diplomatic relations between the two countries remained friendly, and despite the *real* (more limited) role of corporations in the Italian economy,⁶ the notion of corporatism remained the main point of agreement between fascist and New Deal formulations. Both countries adopted a system of government based on the “functional coordination of economic interests under the supervision of the state”⁷ to reach a new level of social integration. Also analogous was the trend towards economic concentration, cartelization, medium- and long-term financial interventions by the state through new agencies (like the IMI and the IRI in Italy and the RFC in the United States) and increased spending on large public-works projects to re-employ a large body of available manpower. Both countries also tended to direct public spending towards military production (as was the case for Italy’s rearmament against Ethiopia and that of the U.S. against Japan and
Germany). Finally, the Depression pushed both countries to expand their social welfare systems, making them more comprehensive than those of the liberal legacy. However, as illustrated below, all this emerged in the context of a substantial difference between the Rooseveltian social policies inspired by the universalist concept of social security and those of Italy that were instead very much category-based and particularistic.

A look at the broader European landscape reveals similar trends belonging to new, twentieth-century institutional arrangements; interpreted as part of a “recasting of bourgeois Europe” entailing the “decline of parliamentary authority” and the simultaneous “evolution towards corporatism.” As Charles S. Maier has stressed, the interwar period saw the emergence of a government system that tried to win consensus “less through the occasional approval of a mass public than through continued bargaining among organized interests.” As a result, it is important to stress that in Italy fascism put a kind of “applied corporatism” in place, insofar as it encouraged the “colonizing of political decisions […] by categorical interests” now officially represented in public institutions.

To be sure, in Italy, as in Germany, the “more or less explicit rewriting of the social contract” necessitated by the crisis that took place during the interwar years and the “search for new avenues of social integration,” used repressive means like the division of the working class and “the destruction of…[its] unions and parties.” At the same time, however, the complex governmental practices of social management and control in fascist Italy need not be underestimated. In this sense, one can also speak of the successful emergence of a “technocratic-corporatist” policy of “planning” in authoritarian contexts during the 1930s.

All European political contexts had one feature in common: governance had become impossible without the participation of interest groups as mediating and bargaining actors. During the interwar years, the appearance of structured political and social actors who directly participated in economic and societal governance went hand-in-hand with the increasing problems caused by traditional political forces that were founded on the central role of the classic parliamentary system. New trends dawned as a result, like the expansion of administrative activities, along with their legal autonomy and sometimes quasi-legislative functions, sector planning and the consequent “contractualization” of the content of the law.” The change in the nature of the latter, and in particular the change in the ways the law was produced, caused the government to become more of a “protagonist in the area of legal regulations,” with the consequent increase in the decision-making role of technical elites. In the context of such profound changes, a strong increase in public interventionism was common, especially after World War I. This led in turn to the establishment of guidelines for the new, modern social state. The 1930s saw the distinct rise of modern welfare policies, though in different forms. The newborn “multi-class state” (to borrow the expression coined by eminent legal scholar Massimo Severo Giannini) also saw new administrations emerge, especially those that
were to preside over “social protection” and “economic direction.” Their novelty was in their guiding principles. While nineteenth-century institutions of “social protection” were mainly conceived as public charities, in the twentieth century “the lower classes came to be vested with a share of power” and the notion of “social protection” was redefined.\footnote{15} In this sense, Giannini explains, “[social-policy] itineraries in all countries, with not very pronounced differences,” came to coincide. There was a shift away from an assistance limited to certain categories of laborers (especially those in industry), that only covered certain protective issues, towards a “wider and more comprehensive protection from both a subjective and an objective point of view.”\footnote{16} The same was true in contexts where the occupational nature of social protection continued to prevail and levels of social service remained low. In Nazi Germany, for example, compulsory insurance was extended to cover many categories, including self-employed workers, while at the same time public policies helped lower the rate of unemployment and launch public-works and government-spending programs.

The common foundations of the subsequent, postwar developments in European social policy, centered on Beveridge-type welfare and a Keynesian management of demand, were laid down in the 1930s. From 1929 to the early 1940s, the issues emerging from the modernization process and the inadequate precepts of liberalism led to a search for solutions that were “distant from traditional visions.” In particular, the break with free-market orthodoxy moved to center stage together with new policies based on stimulating demand via a budget deficit, that is, via a “more pronounced state regulation of the national economy,” which after World War II would come to be known as Keynesianism.\footnote{17} New measures of deficit spending and wide-ranging policies of welfare reform seemed adequate responses to the crisis of the 1930s and also supplied the means needed to control future economic crises and encourage national cohesion.

As mentioned above, the results differed widely. The particularistic, corporatist social state that came to prevail in Italy was very distinct from what happened in Scandinavia, where security policy moved away “from the social insurance principle more than elsewhere, as the defense of the income level came to be considered an unlimited right of citizenship.”\footnote{18} What all cases shared was the intention to move beyond nineteenth-century welfare and insurance as well as the models of Bismarck and liberal public assistance. Certain important interpretations tend to embrace a long-term, wide-ranging view of the welfare process, stressing the fact that compulsory social insurance was enacted in Europe between the second half of the nineteenth century and World War I, while welfare rapidly expanded in many nations “between 1925 and 1930, and between 1935 and 1940” (though all-encompassing insurance coverage would only be achieved between 1950 and 1960).\footnote{19} The experience of the Depression certainly made a fundamental contribution to the way social security evolved, though with different rhythms. In Scandinavia and the United States the process had already started by the mid-1930s, while in Great Britain and
other European countries it began at a later date. The convergence of numerous interest groups in favor of Keynesian economic policies was, however, decisive. In Sweden, for example, an expanded social state that extended beyond “the simple fulfilling of primary needs and the security of a subsistence minimum” was achieved quickly because of the converging political and labor practices of the LO and the SAP. A social-democratic compromise soon followed, one that allowed for advanced, redistributive and comprehensive social policies (also supported by groups outside the working class), vast public-works programs, numerous governmental housing projects in favor of lower social groups and a steeply graduated tax reform.

In Britain and France, social and political conditions conducive to a welfare regime inspired by American “social security,” Swedish universalism and full-employment policies were established later. Despite making important steps in social insurance during the 1920s (including the compulsory unemployment insurance extended to all workers in 1920), the United Kingdom witnessed a deadlock in social policy in the 1930s when liberals and labourites were unable to forge a coalition (the so-called “Lib-Lab” pact) that would insist on Keynesian policies based on the early twentieth-century model. The interpretation embraced in the present essay and inspired by Peter A. Gourevitch has exposed the similarities between the Swedish, American and German responses to the Depression, which caused large coalitions to adopt unprecedented stimulus policies for the demand created by intersectoral and inter-class alliances among groups that were unwilling to continue relying on economic remedies based on market mechanisms.

The Italian Perspective: “Le Assicurazioni Sociali” (1930-1943)

Against this European background, it is interesting to examine how the new policy approaches to welfare came of age in Italy. Its context was rather unique, marked as it was by both the authoritarian, corporatist policies of the fascist regime on the one hand, and a search for new strategies of social and economic government, which it shared with other nations, on the other. The debate hosted by the journal of the Fascist National Institute for Social Welfare (the Istituto Nazionale Fascista di Previdenza Sociale, or INFPS) during the interwar years aptly reveals the ambiguity of the Italian case. The journal, entitled Le Assicurazioni Sociali (Social Insurance), focused on the welfare experiences of other European and non-European countries, published numerous data and stimulated a discussion about various developing “experiments” in welfare and insurance policies. The journal evolved into an important mouthpiece for the new interventionist state, Keynesian policies and even the Beveridge model. It alternated articles by scholars and experts in welfare, health care and life insurance with those written by intellectual and political members of the fascist leadership. It also fluctuated ambiguously between a rigorous, scientific
approach and one that celebrated the new fascist corporatist state, eventually resulting in a site dedicated to both a free, in-depth exchange of ideas and an exaltation of the social policies of the fascist regime. Articles celebrating *il Duce* and his “social mission” went hand-in-hand with specialized studies on social insurance in Europe and elsewhere, with positive assessments of universalist, redistributive welfare models, inspired by the notion of social security (in countries like New Zealand, for example).

Equally wide-ranging was the set of issues dealt with in the articles: family policies, health care, public housing, demographic developments, vocational training, Taylorism, the scientific organization of labor and the organization of the public agency in charge of Italian welfare. Vis-à-vis the rather limited, self-enclosed scenario of fascist Italy, the journal showed a scope, perspective and set of interests that were considerably comprehensive and looked well beyond the boundaries of Italy and even Europe. Reports on international activities and news columns dealing with foreign countries (from Argentina to Venezuela) were also very articulate. Contributing authors varied greatly: everyone from official foreign representatives to experts in social insurance to academic scholars dealt with both European and non-European cases. The issues from the early 1930s and the early stages of World War II were especially rich. While in the 1920s the journal had focused on the European debate over whether Bismarckian social insurance could be exported to countries outside Germany, it went on to host a much larger discussion comparing several countries and regions, in particular Great Britain, France, Scandinavia, Germany, Austria and the United States, in addition to Italy.

When it came to the foreign cases closest to Italy, such as Germany and Austria, *Le Assicurazioni Sociali* tended to praise their National-Socialist social policies. German government officials often illustrated the welfare programs of the Third Reich in detail, frequently pointing to the similar criteria of Italian welfare for managing social protection. In 1933, for example, the Reich Labor Minister wrote of the “great recovery enterprise” undertaken by Hitler and aimed at improving insurance protection in the name of “guaranteeing social peace;” strengthening the contributory principle and the careful proportion between benefits and contributions; and adopting additional welfare measures, like programs of special assistance, to assist the unemployed and cover new productive sectors, including self-employed workers. It was typical of German propaganda to make reference to community values, the “German community” and the “German people,” as well as to stress a selective-categorical principle that was typical of Nazi and fascist social policies. As Tim W. Mason has stressed, what remained obscured in these articles was the real situation of the German working classes, the real state of the vocational training classes and the core of an employment policy “characterized by the use of relatively scarce means,” and based “more on propaganda than on economic-political aims.” The new legislation of the second half of the 1930s in Austria was also addressed in these essays, which praised its spirit of modernization and national integration.
One of the common traits of the German, Austrian and Italian cases was that in actual practice the accent clearly fell on the “categorical” and occupational principle, suggesting the notion of a “corporatist-particularistic” model, especially for Italy.\(^{27}\) When it came to theory, however, the rhetoric on the unity between the state and the individual and the principle of the collective good as superior to individual purpose was more common. The political use of the welfare issue was common to all three countries, where the partial recognition of social rights corresponded to a total denial of political and civil rights, and the benefits of government assistance were distributed following criteria of political consensus and “clientilistic” logic. The countries were also analogous in their appeals to community and political loyalty to party and union structures that would expand the social protection of workers “outside the field” of labor relations (as with the “exemplary Italian achievement of *Dopolavoro*”)\(^{28}\) or extend forms of social insurance when they were “found wanting” or “inefficient.”\(^{29}\) In Italy, the fascist party became a co-manager of welfare.\(^{30}\) In Germany, the National Socialist Party was said to have “taken on the task of leading the entire nation and the life of the individual to such an extent that, next to the activities of the existent state institutions,” this was the party’s decisive role “for the life of the people and the individual as well as for health care.”\(^{31}\) Finally, Hitler’s health-care policies were inspired by the notion of “racial hygiene,” that is, racial-biological principles, which came to increasingly permeate the protective activities of mass organizations like the party and labor unions.\(^{32}\)

The journal also took into account the social insurance of other nations, if more occasionally. In fact, articles dealing with the welfare measures of authoritarian nations like Germany, Austria, Spain and Portugal became much more frequent at the end of the 1930s. Earlier, the attention had fallen on the welfare developments in Great Britain, France and even more in the United States,\(^{33}\) where the focus had centered on the fundamental features of the federal social-security law (the Social Security Act) and the amendments passed at the end of that decade. In 1939, the American funding mechanism legislated in 1935 (which had created a special fund managed according to the principle of capitalizing the contributions of the insured) was modified and substituted by one of distribution, the “paygo” (“pay-as-you-go system”). Other changes touched old-age insurance, for which a benefit amount was adopted that was “calculated on the basis of the worker’s monthly paycheck, instead of the total salary received during the work period.” According to an article from 1939 written by J. A. Altmeyer, this measure would be advantageous for older workers. The same insurance was also extended to allow the system to cover more categories while others, like that of agricultural workers, were still excluded. However, as stressed in the article, the amendments legislated at the end of the 1930s “developed measures to deal with public assistance, especially the support of dependent children.”\(^{34}\)

In *Le Assicurazioni Sociali*, articles on American welfare embraced what eventually became the most frequent interpretation of social security. Despite certain more insightful
readings, the term “social security” came to mean compulsory social insurance rooted in individual rights, while welfare came to mean assistance for the needy. The distinction implied a sharp difference between the two and would leave the American social security regime partially incomplete (or, as it has been defined, “residual”) with regard to its universality, comprehensiveness and adoption of similar measures in the area of health care.

A Wide View: The New Nazi Social Security Regime and the Beveridge Plan

The DAF Plan

As mentioned earlier, the journal’s studies on the German social and welfare situation increased to such a degree that by the beginning of the 1940s, the countries of the Triple Alliance (Germany, Italy and Japan) had become its primary focus. However, as the editors commented, “the scientific nature of the journal allowed it … to remain sufficiently in touch with developments in social ideas despite and beyond the battle lines.” As a result, “the journal did not fail to report or comment upon relevant social events and ideas to emerge in neutral or enemy countries.” Exemplary of this approach was the extensive commentary on the Beveridge Plan of 1942.

The large number of articles on German social insurance stemmed not only from the political and military alliance, but also from the interest created by the social reform plan advanced by the German national trade union, the DAF (Deutsche Arbeitsfront or German Worker’s Front), which Director Robert Ley had framed on Hitler’s orders in the early 1940s. The original social security plan bore drastically new features. In the end, the enactments were delayed until after the war due to opposition from the ministries of labor, economics and finance, the national director of health care and milieu of doctors and businessmen, among other things. However, the plan showed important parallels with the “almost contemporary plans advanced by William Beveridge to reform the British regime of social security,” in the context of the wide-ranging trend towards universalizing social protection.

One of the reasons Italian and German experts wrote essays on the central features of the plan in a unanimously favorable light was because of the boost to social discipline that stemmed from it. They agreed that the German plan responded to the principles of the racial, community-based ideology typical of German demographic and health-care policies, and therefore excluded “asocial” and “non-Aryan” elements from social welfare. Moreover, the DAF plan was viewed in these articles as the result of a longer process developing within the German insurance and welfare regime that had already achieved an important step forward in the reform of unemployment insurance in 1939. While the 1939 reform led unemployment assistance even further away from the quality of
insurance, since it gave up any request to “prove entitlements” and chose a “new way to determine the persons to cover,” it was only with Ley’s proposal that such a drastic departure would be carried out. It was emphasized that “health insurance and the defective old-age, disability and survivors’ benefits regimes, based on the insurance principle and the organization of individual occupational categories” would be replaced “by a welfare regime addressed to all citizens, and funded by general tax revenues.” Numerous articles were devoted to the issue. According to the president of the Reich Institute for Labor Placement and Unemployment Insurance, for example, the new old-age assistance took place in a wide-ranging social-policy context that encompassed “the comprehensive reorganization of people’s health care, the equitable regulation of wages, the increase in workers’ performance thanks to leisure time and paid vacation, and finally a solution to the housing issue especially in favor of industrial workers.” More specifically, the president continued, “the fundamental guidelines of the new regime are inspired by the new concepts of national solidarity, which are expressed in the mutual commitment of laborers and the community to strengthen the latter and protect the weak and disabled.” Consequently, “a project for old-age protection” was now in a preparatory phase. It required no insurance contribution from would-be beneficiaries, since it was a matter of principle that an individual “has contributed enough when he has offered and made use of his capacity and will to work for the collective good.” The needed funds would therefore be drawn “annually from the general tax revenue” and the new welfare would cover all German people, since it was based on the “ethics of the national body and the awareness of the government’s responsibility to the people.” The only exception had to do with “‘asocial’ elements, whose conduct contrasted with the duties towards the national community.”

Another commentator on the plan drew a parallel between these “new concepts of national solidarity” in Germany and the “moral and social vision of Fascism” in Italy, with the conviction that it was always up to the state to care for individuals, “on the basis of the same principles the state has embraced in caring for its own public employees.” As a result, this new welfare regime would be grounded in a generational agreement similar to that at work in the pension system of public employees and would entail – as far as old-age protection was concerned – first a single common pension and then pension minimums graduated according to the income earned in the last ten years.

Italians were among those who commented enthusiastically on the German plan. Such observers placed particular stress on its universalist nature, which guaranteed “security in later life to all German citizens, independent of their belonging to the category of industrial workers, intellectual laborers, independent professionals or craft workers.” To make the plan understandable to Italians, Giuseppe Mazzini was even evoked, along with his “principle of labor and capital in the same hands,” which signified at once an “individual economic reality” and one that was “national and statist.” Celestino Arena made a pivotal
Italian contribution with his detailed illustration of the “New Trends in [German] Social Insurance” and an extensive discussion of its implications. He highlighted the “wholly revolutionary” nature of the new welfare regime, which implied a reform of social insurance “based on a different perspective from that openly advocated by Bismarck, that is, moving away from a corporatist thrust to follow a statist one instead.” Arena clarified that German reform was inspired “by the new ethics of the national community, which stressed the concepts of national solidarity and collective justice.” These in turn were understood as “the duties of labor to the community and the parallel duties of the latter to guarantee a decent life for the elderly and the disabled and in general the health and wellbeing of all workers.” However, the author reminded us that “this public guarantee of a national subsistence minimum” was addressed to citizens who were loyal to the state and the national community, not those who were “asocial” and unable to perform their duties towards the latter. Arena’s opinion was definitely positive, for he believed the new German regime would extend “the area covered by social insurance in terms of both the beneficiary groups and the amount of the benefits.” While the “fundamental technical character” of traditional social insurance “certainly lacked a heart,” added Arena, social protection would still enjoy a “larger scope” through “different means” since the “collection of the funds needed to pay for this new benefit would not be drawn from individual groups of the insured, but through everybody’s fair contribution via the tax burden.” It was therefore fundamental to “include the families of the insured within the scope of social insurance,” especially because “family members could then become real co-insured parties with their own rights instead of just potential, secondary (subsidiary) beneficiaries.” It was equally fundamental that the “risks, premiums and benefits as well as the administration” of social insurance be unified and homogenized.44

Arena’s comments exemplify a vision that was very different from an individualist notion of social rights. Instead, it was markedly based on the main features of a “gregarious doctrine of community” (an expression that showed up repeatedly in the German articles) and of familism. On the one hand, the DAF project epitomized the authoritarian management of the welfare system to be used as a means of social discipline and increasing consensus. On the other hand, the coeval Beveridge plans responded to different principles, as stressed in the journal essays devoted to them.

The Beveridge Plan: “From Womb to Tomb”

In a 1943 article, Riccardo Del Giudice, a unionist with the Fascist Confederation of Commercial Workers (Confederazione Fascista dei Lavoratori del Commercio), took it upon himself to explain the essential guidelines of the Beveridge Plan to the Italian public, together with an in-depth assessment. Del Giudice was definitely ambiguous about how the plan should be perceived. Though his approach was mainly critical, there were some relatively important, if somewhat timid, exceptions.45 After illustrating the plan,
Del Giudice went on to indicate its purpose in terms of a “complete insurance against the interruption or destruction of [one’s] earning capacity and [in support of] the needs arising from birth, marriage and death.” Its pivotal new feature was therefore its coverage of “all citizens from all income brackets, divided into six distinct classes, depending on their legal and economic standing.” Moreover, fundamental to the plan was the provision whereby “those who might fall outside the six classes of the population will benefit from a unified system of national assistance whose subsidies will be awarded immediately upon exhibition of a poverty certificate.” Del Giudice went on to stress that “a ministry of social security, which will unify all the existent central and local administrations, will preside over the organization of social insurance and national assistance and the promotion and control of voluntary insurance.” After listing the plan’s main innovations in twenty-three points, he arrived at an overall assessment in which his disapproval is prevalent. “The plan is not revolutionary at all,” he wrote. On the contrary, he considered it to be “typically conservative and reactionary,” since it emerged from a long stream of social-policy legislation that had been adopted by national governments from Bismarck onwards to lessen the popular pressure “against the political and economic constitution of capitalism.” Consequently, the purpose of the plan was not oriented towards transforming all of society, but insuring the status quo “against the risk of change, thanks to a capitalistic, conservative program of social insurance.” As far as the technicalities of the project were concerned, Del Giudice maintained that “a national insurance covering everybody, from waiter to nobleman,” was “a generous utopia when, above a certain income level, it limits itself to prescribing an obligatory insurance against certain risks at an amount that responded to the individual’s needs, predictions and advantages.” However, it became social and economic nonsense or, better, a piece of demagoguery, when it pretended to superimpose a uniform measure of welfare over an economically and politically free society. Here was the plan’s worst technical deficiency, in Del Giudice’s opinion. It was the priority of modern social insurance to “simplify the contributory system without separating it from the income level of the insured,” he explained, “to both duly respect the tax burden bearable by each individual and to create a proportional scale of benefits.” Beveridge, however, had swept the problem under the rug since he had anticipated a general principle of equality for everyone with regards to both contributions and benefits. According to Del Giudice, it was an all-too-simplistic – if profoundly innovative – perspective that ran counter to the experiments and initiatives enacted in both Italy and Germany, all of which were notoriously based on the traditional contributory, occupational insurance regime.

A hint of appreciation does appear on the last page, however. In answer to the question of whether the “famous,” “almost miraculous” Beveridge Plan was to be fully rejected or bore any interesting advice for the progress of social insurance, Del Giudice maintained that, while it certainly amounted “to a step backwards in the techniques and policy of social insurance,” it also contained a few principles that “emerged from the main institutional trends of social protection and are therefore to be found in every well-organized social
insurance regime.” His concluding assessment was therefore more multifaceted than a total damming of the plan. On the one hand, he condemned it for entailing an “egalitarian, materialistic” notion of society that was more in tune with a “charitable paternalism” that came out of “the legal charity of non-contributory pensions than with the deep social reorganization happening before our eyes.” On the other hand, he admitted that the plan also responded to the unavoidable principles of a modern system of social insurance, which posited, above all, the need for: “the unification of all social security activities in one special public department;” unification and autonomy “of health-care services in a national organization;” and “the unification of the financial amounts granted to beneficiaries when work is interrupted because of unemployment, disease, accident, marriage, maternity or death.” Last but not least, Del Giudice selected a principle of the plan that he deemed necessary for the progress of welfare protection, that is, “the enactment of a basic insurance, covering the largest number of potential risks, that is as comprehensive as possible.” He thus ended up implicitly praising the theoretical foundation of a strategic premise of social security, since the Beveridge reform was meant to extend social insurance to almost all citizens, amalgamate the different types in one body and guarantee a uniform, national minimum wage.

In his last lines, Del Giudice concluded that, since insurance was becoming “a direct component of the state budget” in contemporary society, it consequently amounted to both “an important instrument of social justice through the redistribution of national income” and one that would enhance “social cohesion and security,”46 stressing once again the strategic use of welfare as a means of social control.

**Conclusion**

Through the course of the 1930s, then, *Le Assicurazioni Sociali* represented a fruitful vantage point from which to compare the circulation of ideas on social and insurance policies that were developing in Italy with the often-different guidelines preferred by other countries both inside and outside Europe. At the same time, the journal also managed to illustrate the main features of the current Italian situation: the decline of traditional political representation and the eclipse of the classical representative parliament, the changing economy and the modernization of society. All these developments led to a new form of government that obeyed a networking principle, one that managed to get more and more subjects, as well as public and private social and political institutions, involved in the public process. On the one hand, as mentioned before, this government system was based on unprecedented consultative procedures among new social subjects who had their own organizations, increased their participation in governing the country and managed to colonize supposedly general political decisions with their sectional demands. Indeed,
it is because of this process that fascism is referred to as “imperfect totalitarianism.” On the other hand, the regime was able to design an institutional framework that would manage to survive the end of fascism, since the relations between public and private to emerge in the 1930s continued uninterrupted until the end of the 1960s.

Central to the fascist institutional framework was the welfare regime and the mediation of its managing agencies. Not only did public welfare become more and more relevant as a macroeconomic factor in the Italian economy (as happened in other countries as well), but the agency in charge, of which the journal was an expression, turned out to be an increasingly important manager of economic resources and a distributor of the political and social privileges made available by the regime. In fact, during the interwar years, the welfare system came to play multiple, all-important roles in both insurance and the economy, in the social and the political sphere – a process that Le Assicurazioni Sociali illustrated accurately.


4. In this respect, Gramsci’s remarks on the new role of the state in Italian capitalism are most insightful, beginning from the paragraph entitled “Azioni, obbligazioni, titoli di Stato,” *ibid.*, 2175.

5. This comparison is dealt with in detail in *Corporativismo e New Deal. Integrazione e conflitto sociale negli Stati Uniti (1933-1941)*, Maurizio Vaudagna (Torino: Rosenberg e Sellier, 1981), 198ff. For a fascist interpretation of the Roosevelt experiment vis-à-vis the social policies of fascist Italy, see Mariano Piero, *L’esperimento Roosevelt e il movimento sociale negli Stati Uniti d’America* (Milano: Mondadori, 1937).

6. On the failure to actually enact the corporatist project, see Sabino Cassese, “Corporazioni e intervento pubblico nell’economia,” in *La formazione dello Stato amministrativo*, idem (Milano: Giuffrè, 1974).


8. Charles S. Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe, Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade after World War I* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 30ff. Maier observes that according to political scientists the term “corporatist” could be replaced by that of “pluralist.” However, in his opinion, the latter normally points to a free competition among social actors, which was impossible in fascist Italy.


12. As has duly been remarked, Mussolini himself could not but maintain a cautious relationship with the representatives of the existent social and economic interests within a regime that has been called a sort of an authoritarian version of a larger attempt to be detected in all capitalist countries aimed at changing the representatives of interest groups into bureaucratic partners. See, Charles S. Maier, “‘Vincoli fittizi… della ricchezza e del diritto:’ teoria e pratica della rappresentanza degli interessi,” in *L’organizzazione degli interessi nell’Europa occidentale. Pluralismo, corporativismo e la trasformazione della politica*, ed. Susan Berger (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1981), 85. In this respect, Legnani, “Sistema di potere fascista,” 441, has talked of an inevitable “authoritarian compromise” that the regime had reached with a series of independent powers that were reluctant to accept projects of “totalitarianization.”


16. *Ibid.*, 394. Giannini went on to say that “soon assistance will be extended to all workers in the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors, and will then be extended to self-employed workers; welfare agencies that used to be subdivided into different categories of subjects and objects now tend to be more concentrated when it
comes to organization and more uniform in terms of this objective [...] The next step will be to generalize welfare assistance for all citizens, whether they are well-off or not.”


20. Gerhard A. Ritter, *Storia dello Stato sociale* (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1996), 105. Ritter has stressed that in the case of Germany, not only was the impact of the Depression on welfare regimes very negative, since stagnation prevailed after 1930, but “social benefits even made a step backwards.”


23. Gourevitch, *La rottura con l’ortodossia*, 239. Gourevitch has stressed that, while the labor movement was suppressed in Germany, labor unions in Sweden and the U.S. participated in the social alliances. The similarity with Germany therefore consists in the interest-group model and the break with orthodoxy, while the political formulas were different.

24. To this regard it has been remarked, as far as the “social security mechanism created by fascism,” is concerned, that “the comparative approach that prevailed in the 1980s […] would allow for a better appreciation of how relevant the welfare policy of and/or under fascism has been as one example of something typical of all the most advanced European countries.” “The social security regime” can be considered one of the “keys with which to interpret social and political mobilizations, increasing social differentiations, the articulation of the institutional system under, with and through fascism and more generally in the course of the twentieth century.” Maurizio Degl’Innocenti, *La società unificata. Associazione, sindacato, partito sotto il fascismo* (Manduria-Roma-Bari: Lacaita, 1995), 114-115.

25. Franz Seldte, “Il risanamento delle assicurazioni sociali per le pensioni in Germania,” in *Le Assicurazioni sociali* (from now on *AS*), 6 (1933), 992f.


27. Ugo Ascoli, *Il sistema italiano di Welfare*, 17. Referring to Richard Titmuss’ scheme of welfare regimes, Italian welfare has been defined as “particularistic-clientelistic,” that is, a “clientelistic” variation of the “particularistic-meritocratic” welfare regime of continental European social states. “The widespread clientelistic orientation that the delivering of benefits has come to follow in both its ‘corporatist’ and its ‘assistance’ components” actually appears as the distinguishing feature of the Italian social state. Compare this analysis with id., “Pubblico e privato nel sistema italiano di Welfare,” in *Stato e regolazione sociale*, ed. Peter Lange-Marino Regini, 278.


32. Ritter, Storia dello Stato sociale, 131. However, it should be noted that the development of eugenics and social hygiene not only took place in Germany but extended to other nations as well. Sweden is an example, whose case is illustrated in Per la Nazione e per la Razza. Cittadini ed esclusi nel ‘modello svedese,’ Piero S. Colla (Roma: Carocci, 2000).


34. Arthur Altmeyer, Il nuovo programma di previdenza sociale negli Stati Uniti, AS, 6 (1939), 1040f. The fundamental principles of the Social Security Act are treated in Il programma di sicurezza sociale negli Stati Uniti, ibid., AS, 1 (1938), 22f.


38. Gisela Augustin, La riforma dell’assicurazione contro la disoccupazione in Germania, AS, 1 (1940), 65f. On this issue, see also L. Richter, L’interdipendenza tra prestazioni e contributi nelle asicurazioni sociali tedesche, AS, 4 (1940), 498f.


40. Albert Griessmeyer, La previdenza per la vecchiaia del popolo tedesco, AS, 6 (1940), 895f.
42. Ritter, *Storia dello Stato sociale*, 133.
46. Ibid.
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Some sixty years ago, the British social scientist, Thomas H. Marshall articulated what has since become the paradigmatic conceptual framework for describing the relationship between social rights and citizenship. Until the twentieth century, Marshall thought, the expansion of citizenship rested on the achievement of political and civil rights. But in the twentieth century, the progress of citizenship began to depend on the diminution of inequality. This end, he believed, would be achieved by “incorporating social rights in the status of citizenship and thus creating a universal right to real income.”

In the course of the century, Western industrial countries have struggled to expand the meaning of real income and to re-distribute it more equally. Education, health care, access to employment, pensions, food, shelter, child and elderly care are counted among the resources citizens expect as a matter of entitlement. These goods have, as Marshall put it, modified “the whole pattern of social inequality.” The new social edifice, he thought, would accommodate far more voices and, ultimately, a more inclusionary polity.

Marshall’s expectations have been only partially fulfilled. Over the course of the century, social rights have been extended in ways that have equalized material resources among individuals. Yet they have not necessarily led to enhanced social citizenship. In many places, the poor and minority groups have no greater voice in the polity than in the past. The relationship of social rights to democracy now appears to be far less certain than it did in Marshall’s day.

The essays in this volume help us to understand how in many European countries the extension of social rights acted as a counterweight to the worst predations of capitalism. In the United States the battle has been harder fought and social rights have been provided in such a way that they have yielded little voice for ordinary folk. The advent of neo-liberalism in the 1980s seemed to suggest that the limit had been reached in both America and Western Europe. And yet, the current disarray of neo-liberalism is far from reassuring. As nationality, and ethnic origin become criteria for the distribution of rights, and global streams of migration continue unabated, questions about who is entitled to the perquisites of citizenship pervade political discourse and the rights that accrue to citizens seem to narrow visibly. The war that Marshall declared goes on. It has simply taken another form.