

Paul W. Blackstock

AGENTS OF DECEIT

Frauds,
forgeries
and
political
intrigue
among
nations

With an Appendix by George F. Kennan

The Penkovskiy Papers
Protocol M
The Rubottom Airgram
The Biological Warfare Fraud
The Bluebird Papers
The Zinoviev Instructions
The Rountree Circular . . .

THESE are the tools of modern espionage, the “black arts” — some of the frauds, forgeries, and suspect documents that Paul Blackstock unmask in this startling new book about political intrigue among nations.

Mr. Blackstock thoroughly exposes the Cold War “paper mills” and the “personalized intelligence” hijinks of such adventurers as Colonel Ilius Amoss and Kenneth de Courcy, who managed to penetrate Washington with “vital facts” in 1964 while serving time in a British prison. The author’s evaluation of the recent *Penkovskiy Papers* provides a fascinating insight into the shadowy area of fraud and leads to the suspicion that American agencies are promoting counter-espionage propaganda with Madison Avenue effectiveness.

These tactics of subversion are centuries old, as Mr. Blackstock explains in his discussion of the “Testament of Peter the Great” and that lingering canard, the “Protocols of Zion.” He carefully reconstructs the events surrounding the Zinoviev Instructions, which blocked American recognition of the USSR in the 1920’s, and the Zinoviev Letter, which toppled a British Prime Minister.

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These case studies help dissolve the thick mist of legend that surrounds famous historical figures and events, and shows how today's agents of deceit operate. More important, the author's analysis poses serious questions for all governments and sounds a clarion call for caution by diplomats responsible for the fate of nations. Evidence manufactured by nations determined to win political warfare at all costs can frequently backfire. Governments can be victimized by their own strategies. As Mr. Blackstock points out, "in political warfare, as in wartime, the first casualty is truth."

PAUL BLACKSTOCK's previous book, *The Strategy of Subversion*, was widely acclaimed (see back of jacket) and established his reputation as "the thinking man's James Bond" in the real world of power and intrigue. A former military intelligence specialist with the U.S. government, Mr. Blackstock has actual experience in covert operations in Europe during and after World War II. His other books include translations of Karl Marx's *The Russian Menace to Europe* and Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *We Never Make Mistakes*. He now teaches in the Department of International Studies at the University of South Carolina.

COVER ILLUSTRATION BY DON WILSON



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PAUL W. BLACKSTOCK

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FRAUDS, FORGERIES AND
POLITICAL INTRIGUE
AMONG NATIONS

WITH AN APPENDIX BY
GEORGE F. KENNAN

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To Marie

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LIKE ITS predecessor, *The Strategy of Subversion*, this book has been the subject of careful security review by the Department of Defense and other agencies directly concerned. These agencies have stated for the record that they have "no objection on the grounds of military security to open publication." However, such review in no way implies endorsement of either the conclusions or the factual accuracy of content, for which the author assumes sole responsibility.

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P.W.B.

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CONTENTS

1	Introduction	13
2	The Testament of Peter the Great: <i>From Legend to Forgery</i>	25
3	The Protocols of Zion	38
4	Frauds and Forgeries of the 1920's	56
5	American Recognition of the USSR and the Zinoviev Instructions	81
6	The British Zinoviev Letter: <i>An Intelligence Evaluation</i>	103
7	Frauds and Forgeries of the Classic Cold War Period	129
8	Cold War Paper Mills and Personalized Intelligence	149
9	Peaceful Coexistence and Political Warfare Forgeries	164
10	The Occupation Fund Documents: <i>Fresh Historical Evidence</i>	200
11	The Occupation Fund Documents: <i>Pre-Content and Communications Analysis</i>	223
12	Conclusions: <i>Frauds and Forgeries in Political Warfare</i>	240
	APPENDICES	
	1. The Sisson Documents by <i>George F. Kennan</i>	247
	2. The Soviet and Communist Bloc Defamation Campaign	277
	NOTES	287
	INDEX	311

AGENTS OF DECEIT

1

INTRODUCTION

I N H I S *Gateway to History*, Allan Nevins writes that "Mankind dearly loves a good story and dearly loves to believe it true." Thus generations of Americans have accepted as true Parson Weems's invented tale of the boy George Washington chopping down a young cherry tree and confessing to his father that he had done so because he could not tell a lie. Similar apocryphal stories become the thick mist of legend that surrounds famous historical figures. Sometimes the legendary material is deliberately created over a period of years, as in the Soviet cult of Stalin, exposed and denounced by his successors after his death.

This kind of legend-building and the inventions on which it is based are familiar to historians and present few problems that patient research cannot resolve, provided adequate sources—archives, personal memoirs, and such—are available. Moreover, most hoaxes, which range from April Fool pranks to literary inventions, are relatively harmless. For the most part they provide the originator with amusement, and frequently profit, as exemplified in the long and lucrative career of the American impresario, P. T. Barnum. However, a popular study of some five hundred *Hoaxes* by Curtis D. MacDougal indicates not only that human

gullibility is almost limitless but that a wide variety of frauds and forgeries have played a considerable role in shaping public opinion and occasionally the actual course of contemporary events. The detection and exposure of fraudulent or forged evidence is, of course, important to the courts if justice is to be done. The detection of historical frauds and forgeries is important to the establishment of historical truth, although few historians would accept without reservation MacDougal's sweeping generalization that "throughout history, mobs have been formed and become hysterical, governments have fallen; reputations have been made and destroyed; international relations have been strained, and wars have been fought, all as a result of hoaxes which were exposed too late."

A hoax may be defined as "a deliberately concocted untruth made to masquerade as truth," and frequently involves the invention of written materials. These may range from the so-called "runic" inscriptions on the Kensington Stone (designed to prove that Norsemen had journeyed as far as Kensington, Minnesota, 150 years before Columbus reached the West Indies) to forged letters, telegrams, "official" government documents, personal memoirs, or even entire histories. A classic example of the latter is Father Hennepin's journal, *New Discovery of a Vast Country in America*, in which he claimed to have reached the lower waters of the Mississippi two years before LaSalle.

The term "forgery" is usually applied to specific documents that are falsely represented as having been written by someone other than the person (or persons) who invent them. The broader terms "fraud" or "fraudulent" are used to describe deliberately falsified and invented matter which may be mixed with a substratum of truth. The element of motive is important in determining whether the charge of "fraudulent" is applicable, not the mere presence of false information. As frequently happens in the case of an accident, there may be wide discrepancies in the reports of several eyewitnesses to the event—without any of them intending to deceive. Only when an observer introduces deliberately invented or false information with intent to deceive can his testimony be properly labelled as fraudulent. (I shall not be concerned here with the judicial problem of weighing evidence.)

The frauds and forgeries in this collection of case studies all

have one thing in common: they are either of Russian origin or concern Russia, from the time of Peter the Great to the present Soviet regime. Under both the tsars and the Soviets, Russia has been one of the most controversial actors on the European and recently the world political scene.

Since the Bolshevik seizure of power in November 1917, the Western world has been preoccupied with the threat of communism as a secular religion and revolutionary faith. Concern with the "Red Peril" has tended to obscure the older and more basic problem of Russia's place in the European state system and the menace to that system of tsarist Russian expansion and ambitions. Ironically, Marx and Engels were most articulate in this regard and for years wrote a series of brilliant articles for the *New York Herald Tribune* exposing the Russian menace to Europe, summarized in Marx's famous dictum: "The policy of Russia is changeless. . . . Its methods, its tactics, its maneuvers may change, but the polar star of its policy—world domination—is a fixed star."

Long before Marx and Engels wrote their Cassandra-like articles, an apocryphal "Testament of Peter the Great" had been used as a basis for anti-Russian propaganda. In his famous essay on "The Foreign Policy of Russian Czardom," Engels refers to this legendary document as a "so-called testament, which seems to be the work of a wretched disciple." The origins of this fraud and the reasons for its amazing vitality are analyzed in Chapter Two.

Most important historical forgeries are eventually exposed, but those which have the support of powerful vested interests of church and state may have a very long life indeed. Even after exposure, local interests, for business or patriotic reasons, may continue to maintain a fraud against all scientific or historical evidence. Witness the number of American hotels that continue to claim proudly that "Washington slept here" long after historians have demonstrated the impossibility of his having done so on the dates claimed.

Perhaps the most famous of historical forgeries, one which endured for centuries before exposure, is the so-called "Donation of Constantine," an alleged territorial grant by the Byzantine Emperor Constantine to Pope Sylvester and his successors. Ac-

ording to the document, Constantine not only recognized the spiritual supremacy of the Roman pontiffs in matters of faith and worship, but also as a token of gratitude for his conversion to Christianity gave them temporal sovereignty over Rome, other parts of Italy, and all provinces and places "of the Western regions"—certainly a sweeping and probably a deliberately ambiguous clause. Allan Nevins has summarized the history of this remarkable forgery as an example of the "cheating document" of which the student should beware:

This document was forged sometime between 750 and 800 A.D. During the ninth century the ecclesiastical writer now called the pseudo-Isidore included it in the collection known as the False Decretals; and in time, with the authority of Pope Nicholas, it was accepted as part of the canons of the church. Gibbon pointed out that in his own day it was still formally "enrolled among the decrees of the canon law." Throughout the Middle Ages adherents of both popes and emperors regarded it as genuine. Two early popes, Sylvester II and Gregory V, used it to support important territorial claims, and in 1050 Leo IX employed it in his controversy with the Byzantines involving still larger papal pretensions. During the twelfth century and afterward it became a powerful engine of the church in its contest with the political rulers of Europe, the partisans of the Holy Roman Empire regarding it with dread and hatred, and the partisans of the Pope somewhat cautiously employing it. Dante regarded it as genuine, and as a good Guelph execrated Constantine for the supposed grant as a source of enormous evils. But Laurentius Valla critically assailed the Donation in 1440, and though the controversy persisted until the close of the eighteenth century, its fraudulent character was at last completely demonstrated.

In this instance the forgery, which long imposed upon chroniclers and historians as well as ecclesiastical authorities, which indeed enjoyed almost six centuries of unchallenged vitality, was at last consigned to outer darkness. Discussion has long since shifted to the question of its authorship, some Catholic writers attempting to prove that the church had no hand in it. The best evidence is that it was executed in the papal chancery about 775, partly as a defense of the papal possessions, and partly as a means of attacking Byzantine heresy. The wonder is that it had so stubborn a life. But it must be remembered that the Middle Ages were poorly equipped to deal with questions of evidence.

The longest lived forgeries are those which, like the Testament of Peter the Great, lend themselves to continuous political warfare or propaganda exploitation by powerful state, religious, or ethnic interests. The so-called "Protocols of Zion" are another case in point, and are discussed in Chapter Three. Concocted by the tsarist intelligence service more than sixty years ago and repeatedly exposed, they nevertheless continue to be exploited as "documentary evidence" of a world-wide Jewish plot for "world domination." The Protocols have been officially sanctioned in both Nazi and Soviet propaganda, and as late as the 1960's continue to be cited in extremist "hate literature" which periodically floods the United States in times of political tension.

The political and ideological passions aroused by the Russian Revolution have produced a mass of controversial evidence concerning even the major events of Soviet history. The problem of evaluating such evidence is by no means a purely academic one, confined to students of history. Governments depend on reports from their foreign offices and intelligence services. Raw information must be carefully sifted and evaluated to produce finished intelligence on which, at least in theory, vital national policy decisions are based. These official reports in turn are supplemented by accounts from newspapers, such as the *New York Times*, which pride themselves on the accuracy and depth of their reporting. Nevertheless, in times of war and revolutionary upheaval, even the most self-consciously "objective" reporting is almost certain to include a large element of misleading or even false information. This is illustrated by the grossly inaccurate handling of news about the new regime in Russia after the revolution in November 1917. Writing about this period in *The Russian Soviet Republic*, Professor Edward A. Ross observed:

In the course of a little over two years the *New York Times* reported the fall of Petrograd six times, announced at least three times more that it was on the verge of capture, burned it to the ground twice, twice declared it in absolute panic, starved it to death constantly, and had it in revolt against the Bolsheviks six times, all without the slightest foundation in fact.

In 1920 Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz made a special study of the *New York Times* reports from Russia in an attempt

to discover the underlying reasons for the inaccuracies noted throughout the early period of revolution, "war communism," and allied intervention. Their conclusions go far to explain not only how misinformation creeps into supposedly objective news but why misleading reports are willingly accepted as genuine by recipients who should know better:

The news as a whole was dominated by the hopes of the [American] men who composed the news organization. They began as passionate partisans in a great war in which their own country's future was at stake. Until the armistice they were interested in defeating Germany. They hoped until they could hope no longer that Russia would fight. When they saw she could not fight, they worked for intervention as part of the war against Germany. When the war with Germany was over, the intervention still existed. They found reasons then for continuing the intervention. The German Peril as the reason for intervention ceased with the armistice; the Red Peril almost immediately afterwards supplanted it. The Red Peril in turn gave place to rejoicing over the hopes of the White Generals. When these hopes died, the Red Peril reappeared. In the large, the news about Russia is a case of seeing not what was, but what men wished to see. This deduction is more important, in the opinion of the authors, than any other.

Twenty-five years later, in the late 1940's, this same process of distortion was clearly at work during the communist takeover in China, when the Chinese followers of Mao Tse-tung were frequently described in both official reports and news dispatches as "agrarian communists."

The early days of the Soviet regime illustrate the fact that under the confused conditions produced by war and revolution, when political tensions are at their peak, the clever forger can find a ready market for his wares or "documents." During this period, Edgar Sisson, the special representative in Petrograd of George Creel's wartime Committee on Public Information, accepted as genuine a series of forged documents which allegedly proved that such prominent Bolshevik leaders as Lenin and Trotsky were allied with the German cause and were actually paid agents of Imperial Germany. This affair is analyzed by George F. Kennan as a separate case study in the Appendix.

For years, anti-communist propagandists—and some scholars

—have been fascinated by the idea of a so-called communist master-plan or blueprint for world domination. The most scholarly exposition of this thesis is in E. R. Goodman's *The Soviet Design for a World State* and is summed up in his prefatory statement: "The evidence supplied by the Marxist heritage and developed abundantly by Soviet leaders and spokesmen has led to the conclusion that Soviet expectations and intentions constitute a well-delineated design for a World State."

Regardless of whether such universal aspirations were ever operational objectives, the Third International, or Comintern, was set up as an "organizational weapon" for the spread of communist revolution and became an instrument of Russian foreign policy during the Stalinist era. Comintern propaganda and subversive activities were a stumbling block in the path of diplomatic recognition of the USSR, first by Great Britain, by France in 1924, and finally by the United States in 1933. Such recognition was bitterly opposed by important and highly articulate conservative parties in the Western European capitals. Emigrés often stimulated and played an important role in anti-Soviet political warfare activities ranging from propaganda through espionage. Thus from the very first days of the Bolshevik regime Soviet intelligence and covert operational agencies were engaged in a relentless, continuing struggle with similar Western secret services. The early years of this struggle were marked by a number of frauds, provocations, and forgeries on both sides. As in the case of most covert operations, direct evidence as to "who was doing what to whom" is virtually excluded and may never become available, so that the origin of many anti-Soviet or anti-Comintern forgeries is still questionable. A number of frauds and forgeries of the 1920's are examined in Chapter Four, some of Western, some of Comintern, and some of still undetermined origin.

Although the postwar Red Scare of 1919-1920 had pretty much spent itself as the United States returned to "normalcy" under Presidents Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge, nevertheless the problem of communist propaganda and agitation inspired by the Comintern remained a stumbling block in the way of diplomatic recognition of the USSR by the United States. A premature Soviet bid for recognition in December 1923 gave Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes the opportunity to issue

a stern rebuff which he supported by a press release containing the text of alleged "Instructions from Zinoviev, the Head of the Comintern, to the Workers (Communist) Party of America." These instructions, which expressed a hope that the party would soon "raise the Red Flag over the White House," were almost certainly fabricated by a Bureau of Investigation (now the FBI) source, and are examined in Chapter Five.

The most famous anti-Comintern document of the 1920's, another Zinoviev letter which allegedly contained instructions from the head of the Comintern to the Communist party of Great Britain, is discussed in Chapter Six. The Zinoviev letter was exploited to the hilt by the Conservative party in the October 1924 British elections, and after the Conservative victory the normalization of Anglo-Soviet relations was set back by five years. By reconstructing what happened to the document when it was received by British intelligence agencies, Prime Minister MacDonald's apparently inept handling of the letter is cast in a new light. Malfeasance by his subordinates apparently left the unfortunate Prime Minister with very few options—all of them undesirable.

World War II was followed by several years of bitter political warfare—known as the Cold War—between the USSR and the U.S. and its allies, which reached a peak of intensity before the death of Stalin in 1953. In the fall of 1947, the rather colorless successor to the Comintern, the Communist Information Bureau, or Cominform, was organized. It was credited in a rash of newspaper stories with blueprints for political strikes, agitation, and eventual Soviet domination patterned after the communist takeover of Eastern Europe. But few so-called Cominform documents were produced and exploited by Western propaganda. Early in 1948, "Protocol M," an alleged communist blueprint for the sabotage of West German industry, was exploited by British propaganda and caused a minor flurry in allied intelligence circles. And in 1952 Radio Free Europe publicized an allegedly communist "Document on Terror" of highly dubious origin, which in reality was a defense of the kinds of provocations practiced by both the Nazi and Soviet secret police or security agencies. Both these documents are analyzed in Chapter Seven, "Frauds and Forgeries of the Classic Cold War Period."

During times of great political and international tension, such as the classic Cold War period, 1947-1953, a highly charged and militantly emotional atmosphere is created and exploited by the political warfare and propaganda agencies of the major powers concerned. The propaganda mills feed on sensations, and when the supply provided by the normal course of events runs short, the deficit is likely to be made up either by intelligence agencies or by individual information and sensation peddlers, some of whom, such as the Englishman Kenneth de Courcy or the American Colonel Ilius Amoss, have achieved international reputations as "one-man intelligence agencies." The kinds of fraudulent reports produced by such sources are analyzed in Chapter Eight, "Cold War Paper Mills and Personalized Intelligence."

Cold War tension abated in the uneasy *détente* which followed de-Stalinization and the 1956 XXth Party Congress. Nevertheless, during this period of "peaceful coexistence" the Soviet intelligence agencies have turned out forgeries in volume in order to discredit the U.S. and to sow suspicion and discord between this country and its allies, and to discredit the West generally in the eyes of the rest of the world. Some thirty or more such frauds are discussed in Chapter Nine, "Peaceful Coexistence and Political Warfare Forgeries."

However active Soviet forgery mills have been, they have been more than matched by small groups of private forgers working in Paris since the early 1950's and producing more than a score of false Soviet memoirs. These political-literary fabrications, including the most famous of them, the false "Memoirs" of the late Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov, are discussed in a concluding section of Chapter Nine.

The political or ideological defector who leaves the service of his own country and seeks political asylum abroad has become a familiar figure since World War II. Such individuals frequently bring with them valuable materials, such as code books and documents, which are officially exploited for their intelligence value, while the flight of the individual himself is dramatized and exploited for its propaganda value. Similar documents are often obtained through espionage agents, who may be working both sides of the fence as double-agents. Indeed, neither the circumstances under which stolen documents are acquired nor the inter-

mediary agents who handle them are likely to inspire trust or confidence. The authenticity of such captured documents must remain an open question until they have been proven genuine.

These are basically intelligence problems which are shrouded in secrecy so far as governments are concerned, and the techniques used by intelligence agencies to prove or disprove the authenticity of suspect documents belong to the classified arcana of the craft. But the problem is also of interest to the historian, because alleged documents brought over by political defectors may be exploited for propaganda purposes and may in fact shed considerable light on historical events.

During July and August 1892, a Bulgarian newspaper, *Svoboda*, printed a score of sensational documents exposing Russian intervention in Bulgarian internal affairs, financed by money from an Occupation Fund which gave the documents their name. These highly incriminating documents were widely publicized in the European press and provoked an angry charge of "forgery" from official Russian spokesmen and a continuing controversy over their authenticity ever since. Recent contributions to this controversy are reviewed in Chapter Ten. The brief against the Occupation Fund documents relies on evidence concerning the doubtful circumstances of their origin and an appeal to political and historical "authorities" who denounced them as forgeries. Chapter Eleven attempts an intelligence evaluation of the documents. The presentation makes use of certain pre-content communications analysis techniques which are here applied for the first time to a collection of diplomatic documents for the purpose of establishing their authenticity.

There are no "do-it-yourself" manuals on "How to Expose Historical Frauds or Forgeries" available to either the amateur or professional historian. Textbooks on writing history all include broad guidelines on evaluating suspect sources. There are also specialized books on scientific, technical methods of detecting criminal cases of fraud, such as forged checks or wills. The most recent and authoritative guide to this kind of detective work is *Suspect Documents* by the British Home Office expert, Wilson R. Harrison. However, there is a remarkable similarity in the *kinds* of methods used by historians and intelligence or police agencies in evaluating suspect documents.

First, there is the investigation of the background or “pedigree” of the document: how was it acquired, from whom, and under what circumstances? This kind of inquiry seeks to answer the question, “What circumstantial evidence is there to indicate that the document or documents are either genuine or fraudulent?”

Investigation of circumstantial evidence is frequently combined with an appeal to “authority.” In the case of embarrassing political documents that are exploited for propaganda purposes, denunciations and charges of “forgery” are almost certain to be made by officials—politicians, foreign secretaries, etc.—directly concerned. Even such a relatively innocuous publication as the United States collection of Yalta papers was branded as a “mendacious forgery” by communist sources. Moreover, in the case of some of the best-known forgeries, historians have taken sides and various “authorities” are frequently cited to support one faction or another.

Second, in many cases the physical inspection of the document is called for. Many criminal cases rest largely on seeking answers—as with a forged or altered check, for example—to questions of whether microscopic or X-ray examination reveals erasures, signs of ink eradication, alteration, and such. Closely akin to characteristics such as paper, print, and ink is the question of “form” or physical format. In the case of standardized documents, such as bank statements, government publications, or even newspapers, certain formats are characteristic of any historical period in any country, so that comparisons can frequently be made between the document under examination and representative samples of what it purports to be.

A third method is content analysis. This in itself covers a multitude of sins. In cases of simple plagiarism it may be possible to compare sentences, paragraphs, or even whole pages of a document with a known, earlier source from which it was obviously lifted. This technique has furnished the *New Yorker* magazine with many amusing columns titled “Department of Remarkable Coincidence,” and is used daily by thousands of professors wading through “original” or ghost-written essays which are palmed off on them by their students. Further, more sophisticated content analysis may reveal references to events that the alleged author could not possibly have known about at the time of writing, refer-

ences to non-existent sources, etc., all of which may be indications of forgery.

Finally, in the case of certain types of documents, communications analysis, a new scientific technique developed as a hand-aid to cryptoanalysis during World War II, may provide conclusive evidence that a collection of alleged diplomatic documents (a cable file, for example) is genuine or forged.

One or a combination of these methods may be used in evaluating a given document or collection of documents, as we shall see in the chapters that follow.

**THE TESTAMENT OF
PETER THE GREAT:
From Legend to Forgery**

THE FOREIGN policy of Russia is changeless. . . . Its methods, its tactics, its maneuvers may change, but the polar star of its policy—world domination—is a fixed star.” Long before Karl Marx wrote this famous dictum, which has become a standard theme of anti-Soviet propaganda since World War II, a legendary Testament of Peter the Great, which embodied the same idea and was born of similar fears, had been circulating in Europe, reappearing regularly during periods of international tension centering around conflict with Russia.

In the winter of 1724 a Russian ship sank in the Finnish gulf. While taking part in an attempt to rescue the crew, Peter the Great caught a severe cold. A few months later on February 28, as he lay dying, he scrawled on a piece of paper the unfinished sentence: “I leave all . . .”; too weak even to speak to his daughter Anna, who had been brought to his bedside, he died without even naming a successor.¹ This pitiful scrawl is all that exists in the way of an authentic will. Nevertheless, and in spite of the fact that Peter I never learned either French or English, the myth persists that he left an elaborate “political testament” written in excellent French, tersely described by an English his-

torian, the late B. H. Sumner, as "a much exaggerated and in part fantastic diatribe against Russian foreign policy in the eighteenth century." ²

The origin of this legendary Testament is obscure and has been the subject of considerable historical dispute.³ The first printed text of the will was widely circulated as anti-Russian propaganda by Napoleon in 1812. In 1863 a brochure entitled "Napoleon I—Author of the Testament of Peter the Great" ⁴ openly charged the Emperor with having forged the will, and this opinion was generally held in intellectual circles in Germany and France. On the other hand, during this period the Testament was generally accepted as authentic and figured prominently in discussions of Russian foreign policy in England, Austria, and Hungary.⁵

The Testament of Peter the Great paints in broad strokes an alarmist picture of the Russian expansion as its major theme. Repeated use of the legendary will for purely anti-Russian propaganda purposes based on this familiar threat of "world domination" has distracted attention from a secondary theme: the idea of Poland as the key to relations between Russia and Europe. As spelled out in Article 6 of the alleged Testament, Russian ascendancy in Europe is made dependent on the permanent partition and subjugation of Poland. Here indeed the will cast a long shadow into the future, for when Poland was reconstituted as a state after World War I, "a common sharp hostility to the new Polish State was one of the most potent bonds between Berlin and Moscow, and another partition of Poland the silent maximal aim of both governments throughout the interwar period." ⁶

It will be recalled that in 1795 Poland was partitioned among Russia, Prussia, and Austria. The legend of Peter the Great's Testament originated with the first stirrings of Polish resistance to this three-way foreign domination. It was drafted as a memoir supporting the ambitious plans of Polish emigrés for the liberation of their country, projects which, so far as the occupying powers were concerned, were subversive and constituted treasonable activity. In February 1798 the Austrian government tried a number of Polish conspirators in Cracow. Copies of official papers concerned with the treason trial were discovered in the State

Archives in Berlin sometime in 1878-1879 and make it possible to reconstruct how the Testament originated.

At the time of the partition of their country in 1795, a small group of Polish notables were imprisoned by Catherine the Great in the Fortress of St. Peter and Paul in St. Petersburg. Included in the group were ex-Foreign Minister Ignatz Potocki, Zakrewski (former "president" of Cracow), Kosciusko, and Michel Sokolnicki, who at that time held the military rank of colonel. After two years in prison they were liberated by Catherine's son, Emperor Paul of Russia, and in the fall of 1797 Sokolnicki went to Paris, which had become (and remains today) a center for Polish emigrés.⁷ Sokolnicki joined the French Revolutionary Army, served as Chief of Staff of the Polish Exile Legion on the Rhine (1799-1802) and rose to division commander in 1809, and later served as a general attached to the Imperial Headquarters of Napoleon in 1812.⁸

Soon after Sokolnicki and his friends arrived in Paris they began plotting ways and means of liberating their country. One project (ultimately realized under the German occupation during World War II) was the organization of a resistance movement based on a vast network of secret societies. Another, which Sokolnicki drew up for presentation, was a "Plan for the Formation of a Polish Legion on the Rhine." His memorandum called for a general "preemptive" war of Europe against Russia, in which the Polish Rhine Legion would take part. Even his compatriots found Sokolnicki's original memorandum too bold and explicit. Accordingly it was revised, and on October 19, 1797, he presented two memoranda to the Directory. The first called for a simple recruiting office preparatory to the formation of a Polish Legion in exile. The second was a revision of his ideas on the Russian menace. It was called simply an "*Aperçu sur la Russie.*" This memorandum on Russian history and foreign policy is the original text of what later became the famous Testament of Peter the Great. Sokolnicki added a supplement in which the key position of Poland between Europe and Russia is emphasized. Poland is the "northern barrier" which Europe has let be broken, has abandoned to her fate. One day she may well regret having done so. Sokolnicki concludes the memorandum with an offer to publish

an expanded version and, if called upon, "to include useful advice and counsel on how to trigger a revolution in or to wage war against Russia."⁹

The reference to insurgency must have been eagerly seized upon by the prosecution at the Cracow trial, and the memorandum itself was the subject of a special investigation made at the request of the King of Prussia. Among the trial documents is a letter from Sokolnicki to Dabrowski, the commander of a Polish Legion in Italy, with which the *Apercu* was sent as an enclosure, and a note to the effect that it was "the result of the advice of citizens Barss, Bonneau, Kochanowski and Woyczinski." At the Cracow trial Woyczinski testified that he knew of the recruiting office plan, and that in addition to being a visionary, and presumptuous, Sokolnicki was "by nature a publicity seeker."¹⁰ However one may judge his character (and his grandson of the same name has written a sympathetic biography of him), he apparently received no credit during his lifetime for the Testament of Peter the Great, and his connection with the legend was unknown even to scholars until 1879.

Sokolnicki begins his memorandum by stating the sources of his inspiration: two years of meditation in the prisons of St. Petersburg, his own research on the moral and physical bases of Russian strength, plus the insight and information provided by his colleagues who were able to use the Russian archives seized in Warsaw in April 1794. These "gave him knowledge of an iniquitous but vast and daring plan mapped out by Peter I for the subjugation of Europe under the Russian yoke. The plan is preserved in the secret archives of the Sovereign's Cabinet; I barely had time to grasp the main points and fix them in my memory." Sokolnicki states that, hopefully, a summary of this plan will interest "the heads of the world's foremost nation to whom Europe turns today as to the arbiters of its destiny." He is "convinced that France alone is at this moment capable of saving Europe from the approaching peril which threatens her."¹¹

Following this introduction comes the text itself, almost certainly the first draft of what in later versions was circulated as the so-called political Will or Testament of Peter the Great. The text consists of thirteen numbered paragraphs. In addition to the copy produced at the Cracow trial (see above), Sokolnicki's grandson

(of the same name, Michel) discovered a copy in the archives of the French Foreign Office and wrote an article about it and in praise of his ancestor for the 1812 centenary.¹²

The second draft, and the first printed reference to the legendary will, was a product of anti-Russian propaganda produced under Napoleon's orders to support his 1812 campaign. At the Emperor's request a French Foreign Ministry official, Charles Louis Lesur, wrote an alarmist book, *On the Expansion of Russian Power (Des Progrès de la puissance russe)*, which pretends to give a summary of the so-called Testament. Like his precursor, General Sokolnicki, Lesur did not claim to have seen the actual will itself and was probably purposefully vague about its origins:

It is asserted that there exist in the private archives of the Russian Emperors, some secret memoirs written in the hand of Peter I, where the projects conceived by this sovereign are plainly revealed, and recommended to the attention of his successors, some of whom have in effect followed them with what may be called a religious persistence.¹³

Lesur gave no indication of the immediate source of his resumé, which he copied almost literally from General Sokolnicki's memorandum of 1797, adding an eighth paragraph of his own dealing with alleged Russian designs on Persia and the ancient trade routes to India.

In 1879 Harry Breslau established beyond any reasonable doubt the priority of Sokolnicki's *Aperçu* over Lesur's resumé. His article is a model example of the scientific comparison of texts and their analysis. The two drafts are printed side by side and compared exhaustively as to style and content. Sokolnicki's draft has a number of clumsy expressions which are smoothed over or corrected by Lesur, who was writing for a French audience and who had a better command of his native language than the original author whose work he plagiarized. As noted above, the eighth paragraph was obviously added by Lesur, who did not even bother to cast it in the same form as the others. (Each of the other paragraphs begins with an infinitive: "to neglect nothing, to keep the state, to expand to the North," etc.; paragraph 8 begins: "He [Peter I] advises his successors," etc.) Lesur also added a final sentence to the last (paragraph 13) of the original text: "All

these diversions will then provide the line army with ample latitude in which to move vigorously and will assure it the capability of conquering and subjugating the rest of Europe." ¹⁴

Apparently Napoleon gave wide circulation to Lesur's propaganda tract, *On the Expansion of Russian Power*, and hence to the Testament legend. The British military attaché with the Russian High Command during the War of 1812 found many copies among captured enemy property and sent one of them back to Lord Gray in England. ¹⁵

With the defeat of Napoleon the legend of Peter I's will might well have become part of the forgotten legacy of the anti-Russian propaganda of the period. But it was soon revived, this time without political overtones, with the publication in 1836 of Frederic Gaillardet's *Memoirs of the Chevalier d'Eon*, ¹⁶ one of the many scandalous false memoirs of the period which were literary sensations. The hero of Gaillardet's fraudulent memoirs was real and a sensation in his own right without literary embellishment. Charles Geneviève Louis Auguste André Timothée d'Eon de Beaumont (1728-1810) was an eighteenth-century prototype of the ubiquitous secret agent glamorized in espionage novels and films of the mid-1960's. ¹⁷ During his checkered career he served as an espionage agent dressed as a woman, as captain of a regiment of dragoons, and as French Minister Plenipotentiary in England, and he acquired a well-deserved reputation as one of the most formidable duelists of his day. He was also a notorious transvestite, so much so that while d'Eon was serving as Special Ambassador in London early in 1770, speculation ran so high that London bookmakers began issuing "policies of insurance on the sex of Monsieur le Chevalier d'Eon." ¹⁸ The question remained unsettled until his death in London in 1810, when a post-mortem of the body was made by a panel of British physicians and various distinguished witnesses, including a French lieutenant general, the Count of Behague, who sixty-three years earlier had served with d'Eon when the latter was still a lieutenant. The panel established that d'Eon was of the male sex only, although he had spent at least thirty-four years of his life dressed in female attire. ¹⁹

During the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), while still a

young man of twenty-seven, d'Eon was sent to St. Petersburg as a secret agent of the French government with the dual mission of spying on the French Ambassador there and collecting other information useful to the Court of Versailles.

According to Gaillardet, d'Eon had already been sent to Russia the year before, disguised as a woman under the assumed name of Mlle. Lia de Beaumont. In this guise d'Eon supposedly served as a "reader" to the Empress Elizabeth and had enjoyed a status of "boundless intimacy" with her. There is no historical evidence that either this earlier mission of d'Eon or his allegedly intimate relationship with the Empress were anything more than a literary invention of Gaillardet.²⁰

Gaillardet claims that d'Eon's special relationship to the Empress had made it possible for him to conduct "uncontrolled investigations into the most secret archives" of the Peterhof, the palace of the tsars. Thus, when he returned to Paris in 1757, he was supposedly able to bring back with him a "priceless document," nothing less than "a literal and faithful copy of the testament left by Peter the Great to his descendants and successors to the Muscovite throne."

This account of the origin of the Testament is patently absurd since, not knowing Russian, d'Eon could hardly have used it as a research tool, and since Peter the Great did not know French, the Chevalier could not have made a "literal and faithful copy" of anything written by the Tsar in that language. Moreover, it is at this point that the legend based on earlier "resumés" of the will is transformed in Gaillardet's hands into an outright forgery which begins, "In the name of the most holy and indivisible Trinity, We, Peter, Emperor and Autocrat of all Russia," etc.

There seems to be little doubt that in drafting this concoction (which he attributed to d'Eon) Gaillardet followed Lesur's resumé as a model. There are the same number of paragraphs (fourteen) with slight deviations in the order of the first twelve, while the last two are taken almost verbatim from Lesur.²¹

A standard translation of the fraudulent Testament, taken directly from Gaillardet, is that of the English historian Walter K. Kelly and appears in his *History of Russia* published in London in 1854. It is reproduced below:

THE WILL

1. The Russian nation must be constantly on a war footing to keep the soldiers warlike and in good condition. No rest must be allowed, except for the purpose of relieving the state finances, recruiting the Army, or biding the Favorable moment of attack. By this means peace is made subservient to war, and war to peace, in the interest of aggrandizement and increasing prosperity of Russia.
2. Every possible means must be used to invite from the most cultivated European states commanders in war and philosophers in peace; to enable the Russian nation to participate in the advantages of the other nations without losing any of its own.
3. No opportunity must be lost in taking part in the affairs of Europe, especially in those of Germany, which from its vicinity, is of the most direct interest to us.
4. Poland must be divided, by keeping up constant jealousies and confusions there. The authorities there must be gained over with money and the assemblies corrupted so as to influence the elections of the kings. We must get up a party there of our own, send Russian troops into that country and let them sojourn there so long that they may ultimately find some pretext for remaining there forever. Should the neighboring states make difficulties, we must appease them for the moment, by allowing them a share of the territory, until we can safely resume what we have thus given away.
5. We must take away as much territory as possible from Sweden, and sedulously contrive that they attack us first, so as to give us a pretext for their subjugation [Finland was formerly part of Sweden]. With this object in view, we must keep Sweden in opposition to Denmark and Denmark to Sweden, and sedulously foster their mutual jealousies.
6. The consorts of the Russian princes must always be chosen from among the German princesses, in order to multiply our family alliances with the Germans, and thus to unite our interests with theirs. And thus, by consolidating our influences in Germany, to cause it to spontaneously attach itself to our policy.
7. We must be careful to keep up our commercial alliances with England, for she is the power which has the most needs for our products for her navy, and at the same time may be of the greatest

service to us in the development of our own. We must export wood and other articles in exchange for her gold, and establish permanent connections between her seamen and our own.

8. We must keep steadily extending our frontiers northward along the Baltic and southward along the shores of the Black Sea.

9. We must progress as much as possible in the direction of Constantinople and India. He who can once get the possession of these points is the real ruler of the world. With this in view we must provoke constant quarrels at the one time with Turkey, at another with Persia. We must establish wharves and docks in the Euxine and by degrees make ourselves master of that sea, as well as the Baltic, which is a doubly important element in the success of our plan. We must hasten the downfall of Persia, push on to the Persian Gulf, if possible re-establish the ancient commercialties with the Levant through Syria, and force our way into the Indies, which are the storehouses of the world. Once there, we can dispense with English gold.

10. Moreover, we must take pains to establish and to maintain an intimate union with Austria, apparently countenancing her scheme for aggrandizement in Germany, and all the while secretly arouse the jealousies of the minor states against her. In this way we must bring it to pass that one or the other party will seek aid from Russia, and that thus we shall exercise a sort of protectorate over the country, which will pave the way for future supremacy.

11. We must make the House of Austria interested in the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and we must neutralize their jealousy at the capture of Constantinople, either by preoccupying it with a war with the old European states, or by allowing it a share of the spoils, which we can afterward resume at our leisure.

12. We must collect around our house, as around a center, all the detached sections of the Greeks which are scattered abroad in Hungary, Turkey, and South Poland; we must make them look to us for support, and thus by establishing beforehand a sort of ecclesiastical supremacy, we shall pave the way for universal sovereignty.

13. When Sweden is ours, Persia vanquished, Poland subjugated, Turkey conquered, when our armies are united and the Euxine and the Baltic in the possession of ships, then we must make separate and secret overtures, first to the court of Versailles and

then to that of Vienna, *to share with them the domination of the world*. If either of them accepts our propositions, which is certain to happen if their ambitions and self-interest are properly worked upon, we must make use of one to annihilate the other; this done, we have only to destroy the remaining one by finding a pretext for a quarrel, the issue of which cannot be doubtful, as Russia will then be in the absolute possession of the East and the best part of Europe.

14. Should the improbable happen of both rejecting the propositions of Russia, then our policy will be to set one against the other, and to make them tear each other to pieces. Russia must then watch for and seize the favorable moment and pour her already-assembled hosts into Germany, while two immense fleets, laden with Asiatic hordes and conveyed by the armed squadrons of the Euxine and the Baltic, set sail simultaneously from the Sea of Asof and the harbor of Archangel.

Sweeping along the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, they will over-run France on the one side while Germany is over-powered on the other. When these countries are fully conquered, the rest of Europe must fall easily and without struggle under our yoke. Thus Europe can and must be subjugated.²²

In spite of his many real and fancied capers, it seems unlikely that the colorful Chevalier d'Eon ever had any connection with the Testament of Peter I except in the imagination of Gaillardet. Although written like most literary sensations—for the purpose of making money—his fraudulent *Memoirs* revived political interest in the fake will and provided an “authentic” text which still circulates today.

Like General Sokolnicki, who wrote the first draft resumé almost forty years earlier, other Polish emigrés in Paris in the mid-1830's eagerly seized on Gaillardet's concoction and used it as a basis of continuing anti-Russian propaganda against the tsarist regime and its empire. But it was not until the Crimean War (1855-1856), in which France and England were pitted against Russia, that the Testament was widely circulated again in both countries. The English historian Kelly not only translated it, but after noting that “Doubts have been cast upon the authenticity both of the [Gaillardet] memoirs and of the so-called will,” he adds:

Independently, however, of its authenticity, the will possesses great intrinsic interest, as embodying principles of action which have been notoriously followed out by Russia during the last 100 years, with such modifications as time and circumstances and the variations of the European equilibrium have rendered necessary.²³

Kelly's inclusion of this fraudulent concoction in a serious history of Russia is a classic example of scholarship in the service of propaganda. As will be seen later, even in open societies academicians tend to bend with the pressure of domestic political winds and to make their knowledge available to the propagandist, especially in wartime or in periods of heightened tension.

As Bonaparte had before him, Napoleon III also exploited the so-called Testament during the Crimean War, when he ordered copies of it posted on many public buildings in Paris and the provinces.²⁴

The myth was revived again in England during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. British propaganda made such effective use of it at that time that the Russian Emperor, Alexander II, complained about it to the British Ambassador, and in his official dispatches the Russian Chancellor, A. M. Gorshakov, denied its existence, calling it "old trash."²⁵

Later, during the First World War, when Russia was again caught up in a conflict with the other European powers, the Testament reappeared in German propaganda.²⁶

The Russian Revolution of March 1917 unleashed a flood of anti-communist propaganda in which the kind of traditional imperial aspirations embodied in the Testament of Peter the Great were largely overlooked or forgotten. For many years anti-Soviet propaganda concentrated on such ideological themes as World Communism and World Revolution. Preoccupation with ideological questions reached such a stage that World Communism was frequently endowed by its opponents with a separate, almost corporeal power, as an independent force in world affairs in its own right. In its extreme form this concept holds that it is impossible to distinguish between the national interests of *any* communist state and the ultimate goal of the World Revolution. Thus by means of this supernatural and supranational force, "Its [Russia's] national existence, national interests, and national strength *have been assigned* an integral role in the historical process of the

Communist revolution. . . . Once Russia as a basis of power was given a place of prominence in the achievement of Communist ideological ends, 'nationalistic' and 'ideological' motivations have in practice become indistinguishable." 27

It was not until after World War II, when the USSR extended its control over Central Europe from Stettin on the north to Trieste in the south, that political analysts again turned their attention to Russia's traditional role and aspirations as a great power in Europe. It was this historic threat of Russian expansion westward that fascinated Marx and Engels, who were the first to draw the Stettin-Trieste line as the "natural" limit of such expansion.²⁸

In the early years of the Cold War (1947-1953) many "experts" developed the thesis that traditional Russian imperial aspirations combined with the maximalist aims of communism together formed a well-delineated "Soviet design for a world state." 29

Given this kind of an intellectual atmosphere, it is not surprising that the so-called Testament of Peter the Great was again revived as an integral part of anti-Soviet propaganda at the start of the Cold War. Writing in 1948, Dimitry V. Lehovich notes:

Recently it turned up at a business luncheon in New York in a speech delivered before a large audience; it is being discussed by "displaced persons" in their camps throughout Central Europe; and it was circulated among the armed forces of a European nation. Anonymous and parentless as a ghost, it appears, gains credence, and then vanishes again into its forgotten grave.³⁰

After reflecting on the circulation of the will in New York City, Lehovich concluded several years later:

I am convinced that the idea of using this fraudulent document for political ends in the U.S.A. is of emigré origin. However, this is something which is difficult to prove. I did some research along these lines, and came to the conclusion that this type of propaganda might have been inspired by certain emigré groups among the Poles, Hungarians, and Ukrainians in this country.³¹

Whatever the presumed emigré source, the same translation of the will by Walter Kelly which circulated in New York was published on February 8, 1949, as a special Supplement No. 1556 to the *Foreign Letter* of the Whaley-Easton Service. This service

is one of numerous Washington "intelligence" or newsletter-type publications and describes itself as "The Standard Washington Authority." Under the caption, "Will of Peter I (A.D. 1725)" the *Foreign Letter* notes: "This document was transmitted to Louis XV by Chevalier d'Eon de Beaumont, a secret Ambassador, in 1757, and its authenticity has never been questioned"! A box on the front page contains the following comment which is typical of early Cold War propaganda:

This will of Peter I has been informally circulated in official Washington quarters and has been discussed also in the diplomatic world. The important point is that the objectives of Russia have not changed in 200 years. It is the method only that has been altered for, while the Czars depended on secret diplomacy at high levels, the Communist mode of operation is to corrupt whole peoples by promises of proletarian aggrandizement. Stalinism is global demagogy.

Again, in the December 1953 issue of *The American Mercury*, the Testament appeared in a version which had been severely cut down by the editors of the magazine, and was apparently based on the text given by Gaillardet in his *Memoirs of the Chevalier d'Eon*. Curiously, this recent American edition incorporates an entire page of Gaillardet's introductory remarks, putting them in the first person as if Peter the Great had drafted them as a preamble to the numbered paragraphs of the will itself.

Since the Khrushchev era there has been a general relaxation of tension between the United States and the USSR. The main axis of tension in Soviet foreign relations has shifted from Moscow-Washington to Moscow-Peking. It will be interesting to see if Peter the Great's forged Testament is given a new lease on life by Peking's propagandists as the Sino-Soviet dispute smolders into the 1960's with ever-increasing intensity.

In the Soviet area (even with respect to ideology and "problems of communism"), there has been a healthy return to studies designed more to enlighten than to persuade, with an emphasis on traditional Russian interests as a great European and now world power.³² So far as anti-Russian propaganda of Western origin is concerned, the ghost of Peter the Great's legendary Testament has apparently returned to its obscure grave in the archives of the Quai d'Orsay and Berlin.

THE PROTOCOLS OF ZION

YOU KNOW, my favorite quotation from St. Paul is: 'God's will is accomplished through human weakness.' . . . For the sake of our faith God can transform the bones of a dog into sacred relics; he can also make the announcement of truth come out of the mouth of a liar." ¹

In these words of a typical "true believer," the Russian religious mystic, Sergei Nilus, who was the first to publish "The Protocols of Zion" in book form, later explained why he stood by them, although at the time of their publication he admitted their "apocryphal nature" and that it was impossible to establish their authenticity.²

After their appearance in Russia in the early years of the twentieth century, the so-called Protocols were translated into German, French, English, and other languages of the Western world and soon became the sacred book of anti-semitic literature.

The Protocols purport to be a report of a series of twenty-four (in other versions, twenty-seven) meetings of the First Zionist Congress held in Basel, Switzerland, in 1897. At this congress plans were supposedly laid whereby Jews, working together with the Masonic lodge of the Egyptian Ritual (or "Mizraim"), were to disrupt the entire Christian civilization. In its place they would

erect a world state ruled by Jews and Freemasons. The most devious devices were to be employed as a means to this end: the use of liquor to befuddle the leaders of European opinion; the corruption of European womanhood; the fomenting of economic distress; and the physical destruction of the various capitals of Europe. In short, the Protocols are the main source of the fantasy of an "international Jewish conspiracy" which seeks nothing less than world domination. The Protocols are only some sixty years old and thus relatively recent compared with the Testament of Peter the Great, which imputes similar designs for world domination to tsarist Russia. But since anti-semitism is probably more widespread and a more permanent factor in world affairs than anti-Russian sentiment, the Protocols of Zion may well outlast the false will of Peter I. (This is especially likely because, at least in theory, the USSR has modified its revolutionary aspirations since the 1956 XXth Party Congress and now presents an image of itself as a status-quo rather than a "revisionist" power. In ideological left field today, only Communist China and her satellites continue to preach the Leninist line of "inevitable war" and revolution. Hence the Soviet Union no longer inspires the kind of free-floating anxiety that once caused the fearful and suspicious everywhere to ascribe to it grandiose designs for world domination, designs that were thought to be an inescapable part of Russia's tsarist heritage.)

Although, as will be seen later, the Protocols were fabricated by the tsarist political police for use as anti-semitic and anti-liberal propaganda, after the Bolshevik seizure of power in November 1917 they were soon exploited for anti-Bolshevik propaganda purposes by enemies of the new regime.

This unexpected boomerang effect of the Protocols is one of the many ironies of modern Russian history. Before Stalin's liquidation of his former comrades in the Great Purges of the late 1930's, one line of anti-Bolshevik propaganda stressed the alleged link between the Jews and communism by overemphasizing the number of Old Bolsheviks (such as Trotsky, Kamenev, Radek, Bukharin, Zinoviev, Sverdlov, *et al.*) who were of Jewish origin. Many of the anti-Bolshevik White Russian (or "White Guard") elements argued that "the Bolshevik movement was mainly or even exclusively Jewish, directed by Jews and by some sort of secret

organization in pursuit of special Jewish as opposed to Russian interests." ³

In the early 1920's this propaganda was so successful abroad that even as relatively unprejudiced an individual as Winston Churchill was affected by it. At an election speech in Dundee, Churchill described the Soviet regime as "a horrible catastrophe brought about by a band of professional revolutionaries, for the most part Jews." To avoid the anti-semitic implication, the London *Times*, in reporting the speech, changed the phrase to "this horrible catastrophe brought about by a little band of professional revolutionaries, among whom there are very few Russians." ⁴

Later, anti-semitic propagandists took elements derived from traditional Russian messianism, from the Protocols of Zion, and from Marxist-Leninist ideology and fused them into the fantasy of a "Jewish revolutionary conspiracy for communist world domination." This heady mixture became a principal ingredient of Nazi propaganda during the ascendancy of Adolph Hitler. A similar pseudo-Hegelian synthesis of false ideas has characterized right-wing extremist propaganda ever since. For example, a recent American edition of the Protocols exhorts its readers to be sure to read an appendix which points to the "deadly parallel . . . of the protocol plans with their actual fulfillments . . . under the Roosevelt Jewish-Radical regime," and a second deadly parallel "exposing the Jewish capitalistic cause of Jewish revolutionary communism." ⁵

From their first fabrication to the present, the Protocols have been linked with reactionary, anti-semitic elements in Russia and elsewhere. Where the original idea of forging them came from is still an open question. One theory is that they were meant "to influence and inflame" Tsar Nicholas II, whose attitude toward the Jews had already been formed by his tutor, Constantine Pobedonostev, Russia's most brilliant reactionary theoretician. This sinister figure, the head of the Holy Synod, once remarked that the Jewish problem in Russia was to be solved by the conversion to Orthodoxy of one-third of the Russian Jews, the emigration of one-third, and the death of the remaining third.⁶

The theory has been advanced that the original motive behind the fabrication of the Protocols was to impress the Tsar that the revolutionary upheavals of 1905 were the work of Jews, liberals,

and Freemasons, and to frighten him into resisting the constitutional reforms advocated by Count Witte, his moderate-liberal Prime Minister and, incidentally, a Freemason. For this reason, "those passages of the Protocols which are not plagiarized show how the author or authors took pains to make every constitutional concession appear insane and the struggle for autocracy a sacred duty." As evidence to support this theory, the claim is made that "the last six protocols, which deal with the economic system to be introduced by the Jews when their King rules over the earth, are plagiarized from a pamphlet aimed at Witte and written in the late 1890's." ⁷

During the winter of 1905, government troops suppressing the abortive revolution of that year were aided by a new proto-fascist, anti-semitic organization, the so-called "Union of the Russian People." Squads of rightist activists known as the "Black Hundreds" (prototypes of later Nazi and fascist "goon squads") took part in the organized pogroms, beating and killing Jews, liberals, and other intellectuals.

In *Babi Yar*, his famous poem attacking anti-semitism in the USSR, the contemporary Soviet poet Yevgeni Yevtushenko calls the adoption by this anti-semitic organization of the name, "Union of the Russian People," blasphemy since, according to his way of thinking, the Russian people "are really international at heart." It is also interesting to note that the article on anti-semitism in the official Soviet Encyclopedia ignores the persistence of anti-semitism in the USSR and defines it as "A weapon in the hands of the exploiting ruling classes in their struggle against the revolutionary masses," and claims that since World War II pogroms have been deliberately instigated in both Great Britain and the United States, where "Jews as a rule are excluded from government positions" (sic!).⁸

It was during this disturbed revolutionary period that, as previously noted, the Protocols were first published in book form by Nilus (1905). They were also included in George Butmi's anti-semitic tract, *Accusatory Addresses: Enemies of the Human Race*, which, significantly, he dedicated to the Black Hundreds.⁹

The early editions of the Protocols went virtually unnoticed in Russian literary and church circles. Only one newspaper reviewed them, and they went entirely unnoticed by the theological

reviews. Nilus, who did his utmost to propagandize them, was regarded by many authorities of the Russian Orthodox Church as a "crazed fanatic."¹⁰

The Protocols were reportedly first brought to Tsar Nicholas II's attention sometime between 1906 and 1908. He was deeply impressed by them and wrote such marginal comments as "What depth of thought! What foresight! What exact fulfillment of their program! Our year 1905 was certainly stage-managed by the Elders! There can be no doubt of their authenticity! The hand of Jewry, directing and destroying, can be seen everywhere!" Stolypin, Nicholas II's able Prime Minister, had a secret inquiry made into the Protocols and it was established that they were a forgery. On learning the results of the investigation the Tsar was very upset. In spite of his being a militant anti-semite, Nicholas II forbade further use of the Protocols for anti-semitic propaganda with the injunction: "The Protocols must be excluded. A pure cause must not be defended with foul means!"¹¹

A decade later, at the time of the revolution in 1918 and the civil war that followed, the Protocols figured prominently in anti-semitic propaganda disseminated among the Kuban Cossacks by what would today be called the "psychological warfare" department of General Denikin's White Guard Army at Rostov. The Protocols also figured in pogroms in the Ukraine and the Crimea, and were used to incite the troops to pillage and excesses which eventually contributed to their demoralization and defeat.¹² Scenes of this period are described in Isaac Babel's autobiographical story, *The Journey*, in such realistic terms that certain passages were censored in a 1957 edition published in Moscow.¹³

The first use of anti-semitism on a massive scale for political warfare purposes abroad was by Nazi propagandists in Germany. Robert Ley, leader of the Nazi Labor Front, openly boasted that it was "the second German secret weapon . . . because, if it is constantly pursued by Germany, it will become a universal problem which all nations will be forced to consider."¹⁴ However, more than two decades earlier a wave of anti-Catholic, anti-Jewish propaganda had swept the United States. In 1920 the *Dearborn Independent*, a newspaper owned by Henry Ford, Sr., and edited by W. C. Cameron,¹⁵ ran a series of articles based on the Protocols of Zion, twenty of which were reprinted in November 1920

as a book entitled *The International Jew—The World's Problem*. The *Dearborn Independent* reached a circulation of 700,000 and the book too had an enormous circulation both at home and abroad after translation into several languages. Seven years later, on June 10, 1927, Ford finally realized that the Protocols were “gross forgeries,” and in an open letter he apologized for the wrong done by his publication of them and asked “forgiveness for the harm I have unintentionally committed.”¹⁶

Ford's apology was not accepted in good faith, however, because the book was republished in England and new editions also appeared in the United States. Gerald L. K. Smith, perhaps the best known anti-Catholic, pro-fascist, anti-semitic propagandist in the United States, contended that Ford's confession was extracted under strong Jewish pressure and that his signature on it had been forged by one of his employees.¹⁷

Since the 1920's the Protocols have figured prominently in the extensive subliterate of hatred and bigotry that periodically floods the United States. In the mid-1960's the flood of hate literature had reached such a stage that even the John Birch Society (never known for its tolerance or moderation) reportedly expressed alarm at the “infiltration” of its membership by anti-semitic elements, and the spread of anti-semitism throughout its membership.¹⁸

Although from the early 1920's to the present the Protocols have remained a staple source of anti-semitic propaganda in the United States, they reached the height of their circulation and influence in Nazi Germany during the rise of Hitler and formed an integral part of National Socialist ideology. Hannah Arendt, in her classic study, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, claims that their circulation in Nazi Germany was exceeded only by Hitler's *Mein Kampf*¹⁹ and cites a French study of apocalyptic literature to the effect that the popularity of the Protocols was second only to the Bible.²⁰ Miss Arendt develops the thesis that the Nazis adopted the Protocols and transformed them in a curiously twisted way into a blueprint for their own bid for world domination:

. . . The popularity of the Protocols was based on admiration and eagerness to learn rather than on hatred . . . as in the case of

the famous slogan: "Right is what is good for the German people," which was copied from the Protocols' "Everything that benefits the Jewish people is morally right and sacred." Thus the Protocols presented world conquest as a practical possibility, implied that the whole affair was only a question of inspired or shrewd know-how, and that nobody stood in the way of a German victory over the entire world but a patently small people, the Jews, who ruled it without possessing instruments of violence—an easy opponent, therefore, once their secret was discovered and their method emulated on a larger scale.²¹

Since World War II, with its revelations of Nazi-inspired atrocities against the Jews, Western scholars have been virtually unanimous in their denunciation of the Protocols both as anti-semitic propaganda and as "one of the stupidest forgeries of all literary history."²² However, the fact that the Protocols went virtually unchallenged for nearly two decades, in spite of their clearly apocryphal character, is convincing evidence that they struck a responsive chord among people who *wanted* to believe them. Moreover, their spurious nature was first revealed not by scholars but by two journalists, the American Herman Bernstein and the Englishman Philip Graves, each working independently and publishing within six months of each other.

Herman Bernstein had been a correspondent for the *New York Herald* during World War I. Returning from the Far East in January 1919, he was requested to evaluate a copy of the Protocols by his managing editor. Two years later Bernstein published his first exposure of the Protocols. As he explains (in the preface to a later work):

In February, 1921, I presented documentary evidence in my book, "The History of a Lie," which showed that the notorious "Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion," published in Russia in 1905, were based on an absurdly fantastic work of German fiction, published in 1868, about a centennial secret midnight meeting of representatives of the "Twelve Tribes of Israel" in the ancient Jewish cemetery of Prague—a story which was part of a pseudo-historical romance entitled "To Sedan," one of a series of novels called "Biarritz-Rome," by Hermann Goedsche, a petty official of the German post office who turned to writing fiction after his dishonorable discharge for participation in the then scandalous Waldeck forgery case. I also showed how Goedsche afterward

transformed the "testimony" he had placed in the mouths of his fictitious "Elders of Israel" into an alleged speech said by him to have been delivered by an unnamed rabbi at a mythical Jewish congress in Lemberg.²³

Early in the spring of 1921 two English editions of the Protocols had appeared in London. One anonymous translation under the title *The Jewish Peril* was published by Eyre and Spottiswoode, and a second translation by V. E. Marsden, the late Russian correspondent of the *Morning Post*, was printed by the Britons Publishing Society. The *Morning Post* had carried a series of articles commenting favorably on the Protocols, and in the atmosphere of the day even the staid *London Times* carried an editorial which suggested that the various charges made should be investigated. Publication of the Protocols in France had produced a similar sensation.

Meanwhile, in Constantinople, Philip A. Graves, the resident correspondent of the *Times*, was given a copy of a book by a Russian landowner who claimed that he had bought it from an ex-officer of the Ochrana, the security or political police of the former tsarist regime. Graves's copy of the book was missing its title page, but he was struck by the similarity of many of its passages and the highly publicized "Protocols of Zion." His curiosity thus aroused, on returning to London Graves discovered that the author of the mysterious book was Maurice Joly, a Parisian lawyer who had lived under the Second Empire of Napoleon III. The correct title was *Dialogue aux enfers entre Machiavel et Montesquieu: ou la politique de Machiavel aux XIX siècle* ("Dialogue in Hell between Machiavelli and Montesquieu: or the Politics of Machiavelli in the XIXth Century"). Joly had written the book as a disguised political tract against the Emperor. In a pamphlet entitled *Maurice Joly, His Past, His Program Set Forth By Himself*, he explains that his motive in writing the imaginary *Dialogues* between Machiavelli and Montesquieu, the authors respectively of *The Prince* and *The Spirit of the Laws*, was to discredit Napoleon III's Second Empire. Joly states that he gave the manuscript to a Parisian printer, M. Bourdier, explaining that it was a translation from an English author named MacPherson. The printer, however, recognized Napoleon III at the end of three dialogues and refused to go on with the job. Joly left for Belgium and had

the book published anonymously in Brussels in 1864.²⁴ To protect himself, Joly had signed the book "by a contemporary." The French security police, however, were soon able to trace the book to its source. Joly was arrested, tried, and on April 25, 1865, was sentenced to fifteen months' imprisonment and a fine of 300 francs for "having committed the crime of inciting hatred and contempt of the government."²⁵

Pursuing his original idea, Philip Graves wrote a series of articles for the London *Times* (August 16-18, 1921) exposing the Protocols as an obvious plagiary adapted from Joly's *Dialogue*, frequently with very little change. Graves's evidence has never been successfully challenged. Bernstein welcomed Graves's discovery of plagiarism as "an invaluable supplement to the numerous evidences of forgery already known." The German novelist Goedsche was not the originator of the sinister plans he attributed to the Jews; he had merely pirated them from the work of Maurice Joly, changing them into his weird story of a Jewish plot for world domination.²⁶ Moreover, comparative content analysis, the method used by Graves, has since been applied by professional historians with the same result—the conclusion that the Protocols were for the most part plagiarized.

Like Graves, who first made the experiment, anyone who compares the content, passage by passage, of Joly's *Dialogue* with Nilus' *Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion* will also be struck by the similarities. There are twenty-four *Protocols* and twenty-five *Dialogues*, so that not all the *Protocols* resemble *Dialogues* bearing the same number. However, the order in which the various subjects are treated is similar, and in many passages the phrasing and imagery is almost identical. These parallels end with the twenty-first *Dialogue*, as the last four deal with French or Parisian affairs under Napoleon III and thus have no corresponding passages in the *Protocols*. The American historian John S. Curtiss, in his *Appraisal*, produces and analyzes several pages of parallel columns from the Joly *Dialogues* and the *Protocols* and includes an Appendix of further examples, although he makes no attempt rigidly to "quantify" such evidence. However, in fifty pages of the *Protocols*, Dr. Arthur Baumgarten, a professor of criminal law at the University of Basel, Switzerland, counted 176 passages that

were fabricated word for word from the Joly text by simply substituting the word "Jews" where Joly wrote "Napoleon." ²⁷

The following excerpts from Professor Curtiss' *Appraisal* illustrate his method of comparing parallel passages and the reasoning employed in concluding that plagiarism is demonstrated:

DIALOGUES

. . . you do not know the unfathomable cowardice of humanity . . . servile in the face of force, pitiless in the face of weakness, implacable before blunders, indulgent before crimes, incapable of supporting the contrariness of a liberal regime, and patient to the point of martyrdom before all the violence of bold despotism, breaking thrones in its moments of anger, and giving itself masters whom it pardons for violations the least of which would have caused it to decapitate twenty constitutional kings.—p. 43

After having covered Italy with blood, Sylla could reappear in Italy as a private individual; no one touched a hair on his head.—p. 199

MACHIAVELLI: . . . I shall count on a devoted organ in each opinion, each party; I shall have an aristocratic organ in the aristocratic party, a republican organ in the republican party, a revolutionary organ in the revolutionary party; an an-

PROTOCOLS

The unfathomable meanness of the *Goyim* peoples, crawling before force, merciless to weakness, without pity for mistakes and indulgent toward crimes, not willing to endure the contradictions of a free order, enduring to martyrdom before the violence of a bold despotism—this is what aids our independence. From contemporary premier-dictators they tolerate and endure abuses, for the least of which they would have beheaded twenty kings.—p. 337

Remember the instance where Italy, drenched in blood, did not touch a hair of Silla's head, who had shed that blood; Silla in the eyes of the people was deified by his power . . .—p. 366

Our newspapers will have all possible tendencies—aristocratic, republican, revolutionary, even anarchistic—as long, of course, as the constitution exists. . . . They, like the Indian god Vishnu, will have a hundred hands, of which each will

archist organ, if necessary, in the anarchist party. Like the god Vishnu, my press will have a hundred arms, and these arms will stretch out their hands to all possible shades of opinion over the whole surface of the country.—p. 141

MONTESQUIEU: Now I understand the apologue of the god Vishnu; you have a hundred arms, like the Hindu idol, and each of your fingers touches a spring.—p. 207

feel the pulse of some one of the opinions of society.—p. 360

Our empire will be an apologue of the god Vishnu, in whom is found its personification—in our hundred hands will be the springs of the social machine.—p. 377

The last two quotations from the *Protocols* and the parallel quotations from Joly's *Dialogues* contain comparisons unusual enough to make it plain that the latter was the source from which the author of the *Protocols* derived much of his inspiration. It is improbable that two authors, writing independently of each other, would have used such an unusual simile in the very same way, and not once, but twice.²⁸

Herman Bernstein's *The Truth About "The Protocols of Zion"* includes a chapter entitled "Exhibit H, The Dialogues and the Protocols in Parallel Pages." Twenty of the most striking parallels are presented as proof "beyond any doubt whatever that the 'Protocols' were plagiarized from the 'Dialogues.'" Bernstein writes:

Most of the ideas in the first part of Joly's "Dialogues" are lifted entirely with but slight modifications, sometimes reproduced almost word for word and sentence for sentence. The only differences lie in the substitution of an alleged Jewish dislike for Gentiles, for Machiavelli's distrust and contempt for humanity as a whole, and in the substitution of a mythical Jewish organization for the imperial government of Napoleon III.²⁹

Excerpts from Bernstein's "Exhibit H" are given below. He observes that "the similarity is all the more striking when we bear in mind the fact that both documents are here presented in translation—the 'Dialogues' from the original French and the 'Protocols' from the Russian. . . . The close resemblance of the

ideas and phrases in these documents constitutes incontrovertible proof of the falsification.”

DIALOGUES

. . . All men seek power, and there is none who would not be an oppressor if he could. . . . What restrains these ravenous animals that we call men?

Has politics anything to do with morals?

I am less preoccupied by what is good and moral than by what is useful and necessary.

. . . you have in your mouth but two words: force and cunning. If your system reduces itself to the declaration that force plays a great role in human affairs, that cleverness is a necessary qualification for a statesman, you understand well that this is a truth that need not be proved. . . . Your principle is that good can come from evil, and that it is permissible to do evil when it will result in good.

Surprising as it may seem, neither Graves's exposure of the Protocols nor Joly's account of how he wrote the *Dialogues* on which they are based has prevented the continuing exploitation of this fabrication for anti-semitic propaganda purposes. On the contrary, although professional anti-semitic writers admit that the Protocols were based largely on Joly's *Dialogues*, by a curiously twisted reasoning process they argue that this fact strengthens their case. For example, Colonel Fleischauer, a leading Nazi

PROTOCOLS

Every man aims at power, everyone would like to become a dictator if he only could. . . . What has restrained the beasts of prey who are called men?

The political has nothing in common with the moral.

Let us, however, in our plans, direct our attention not so much to what is good and moral as to what is necessary and useful.

Our countersign is—Force and Make-believe. Only force conquers in political affairs, especially if it be concealed in the talents essential to statesmen. . . . This evil is the one and the only means to attain the end, the good.

“authority,” argues that while Joly was nominally a French Catholic, he was (so Fleischauer claims) descended from a family of Spanish Jews. Therefore, so the argument runs, although Joly made no reference to a Jewish plot in the *Dialogues*, he subconsciously revealed the sinister designs of Zion disguised as an attack on Napoleon III.³⁰ The same kind of irrational argument was used in December 1921 by an earlier French anti-semitic author, Roger Lambelin, a few months after Graves’s articles exposing the Protocols appeared in the London *Times*.³¹ With this kind of mystical nonsense and self-fulfilling prophecy we have come full circle to the argument of the Russian monk, Sergei Nilus, which was quoted in part at the beginning of this article. With the blindest ingenuousness Nilus asks: “Let us suppose that the Protocols are false; but couldn’t God have used them to reveal approaching iniquity? And didn’t the Ass of Balaam utter prophecy?”! ³²

Paradoxically, as recent psychological research in the field of cognitive dissonance has indicated, exposure of such prophecy as the Protocols merely strengthens the irrationally held faith of the “true believer” in their validity.³³ For this reason the Protocols will probably continue to be a staple source of anti-semitic propaganda for years to come.

Most reputable historians are in agreement with John S. Curtiss’ *Appraisal* that the Protocols of Zion are “rank and pernicious forgeries” concocted mainly from the *Dialogues* of Maurice Joly.³⁴ There is also no dispute as to the facts of publication, or that the most widely circulated version of the Protocols is the text published in the second (1905) edition of Sergei Nilus’ mystical work, *The Great in the Little (Velikoe v Malom)*. But evidence as to how the copy used by Nilus came into his hands, and who produced the “original” or first draft, is obscure, confused, and in part contradictory. As in the case of many other suspected frauds or forgeries (such as the so-called “Zinoviev letter” analyzed in Chapter Six), no original document or draft of the Protocols has ever been produced, nor have any witnesses testified to having taken part in or having witnessed the actual drafting.

Unlike most historical documents the Protocols of Zion figured prominently in a famous lawsuit in Bern, Switzerland, in 1934-1935. The Protocols had been circulated in Bern by Theo-

dore Fischer, a newspaper editor and former leader of the Swiss National Socialists, and by Silvio Schnell, the head of the Swiss National Front, an organization closely allied with the National Socialists. In the suit brought against these men they were charged with violating the local law against improper literature (*Schund literatur*). The plaintiffs produced a number of knowledgeable witnesses who testified that the Protocols were a forgery, and who shed considerable light on how the Protocols originated in the first place.³⁵ Among the witnesses were the Englishman Philip Graves, the *Times* correspondent who made the original discovery of the similarity between the Protocols and Joly's *Dialogues*, and a French Count A. M. du Chayla, who had spent the year 1909 at the Optyna Pustin, the famous Orthodox monastery where he came to know Sergei Nilus, the monk who published the standard text of the Protocols. The most extensive testimony at Bern came from Russian emigrés living in Paris, such as the famous historian Paul Miliukov, editor of the Paris *Poslednyia Novosti* ("Latest News"), and Vladimir Burtsev, editor of another Paris-Russian newspaper *Obshchee Delo* ("The Common Cause").

In a two-part article published several years before the Bern trial in *Poslednyia Novosti*, May 12-13, 1921, du Chayla wrote that while he was at the monastery the manuscript of the Protocols that Nilus showed him was in several handwritings, and in French, although mistakes in spelling indicated that the text was not the work of native Frenchmen. At that time (1909), Nilus claimed to have received the manuscript from a Mme. K. (Natalia Afanasievna) who had brought it from Paris and was then living at the monastery in the same house with Nilus and his wife. While in Paris, Mme. K. had obtained the manuscript from the Russian General P. J. Rachkovsky (1835-1911) who held important positions in the Ochrana (political police) outside Russia, 1885-1902, including the Paris branch office. Rachkovsky, in turn, reportedly "had removed the manuscript from the archives of the Freemasons."³⁶ Consistency may be the hobgoblin of small minds, but it clearly did not bother the mystic Nilus, who in the 1917 edition of his book, *The Great in the Small*, stated that the manuscript had been given to him by a Russian nobleman, a certain Alexei Nikolaievitch Sukhotin.³⁷ Aware of this discrepancy, du Chayla, in his article, explains it on the theory that ". . . he [Suk-

hotin] was no more than an intermediary or courier, who personally handed to S. A. Nilus the precious manuscript which he had received in Paris from Natalia Afanasievna [Mme. K.]. . . . Sukhotin was a shield, hiding Natalia Afanasievna from the reader.”³⁸

Among the several Russian emigrés who testified at the Bern trial, the star witness was Vladimir Burtsev, who prior to the Revolution of 1917 had edited the Russian historical journal *Byloe* (“The Past”), and after emigrating to Paris was editor of the newspaper *Obshchee Delo*. His book, “*Protokoly Sionskikh Mudretsov*” *Dokazannyi Podlog* (“‘The Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion’—A Proven Forgery”), is a principal source for the case against the Protocols and includes much of the trial testimony as well as additional evidence. As a prominent emigré historian and newspaper editor, Burtsev was in a favorable position to meet other Russians who also defected or emigrated, and who had information concerning the Protocols. For example, Burtsev writes that in 1920, shortly after his own escape from the Bolsheviks, he met in Paris A. A. Lopukhin, a recent defector, who had formerly been head of the Russian political police from 1902 to 1905. In reply to a direct question about the Protocols, Lopukhin stated that the fact of their forgery “had been no secret for a long time to anyone in government circles” and asserted that “Rachkovsky [head of the Paris office of the Ochrana] and his agents fabricated them abroad”³⁹ (thus confirming Nilus’ original report to du Chayla noted above).

Against these two reports indicating that the Protocols were a provocation of the tsarist political police produced in the Paris branch office under General Rachkovsky, Burtsev himself reproduces a letter that he received from General P. G. Kurlov (who, like Lopukhin, had also been head of the political police), who wrote that while the Protocols were indeed a fabrication, they were produced not in Rachkovsky’s time but much earlier, when Orzhevsky was Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs (a post which he held until 1894). Rachkovsky had promised Kurlov a full report on the Protocols when he returned from a day in the country. Kurlov writes: “He went to the country, but died, and I never again succeeded in talking about the matter with him or anyone else.”⁴⁰

The most striking evidence presented by Burtsev both at the trial and in his book clearly places the responsibility for the fabrication on Rachkovsky.⁴¹ This evidence apparently came from St. Petersburg, in part directly and in part by way of memoranda transmitted through an intermediary, a mutual friend, K. According to the Globachev account, the Protocols had been forged outside Russia sometime between the years 1896 and 1900 by an agent of the Russian political police, at a time when Rachkovsky was head of the Paris office.⁴² Against the Burtsev-Globachev testimony should be set the following caveat by Richard Wraga, Director of Research at the Institute on the Sino-Soviet Bloc of the Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford, California:

One must approach with great caution the revelations of Burtsev on the case, as, by the way, many of the actions of this remarkable man in the thirties. In those years, Burtsev was surrounded by Bolshevik agents, including Koltypin-Lyubski who served as go-between in Burtsev's relations with General Globachev.⁴³

Final testimony charging Rachkovsky with the undertaking was made at Bern by Professor S. G. Svatikov, who had been sent by the Provisional Government of 1917 to close up the office of the Russian Ochrana in Paris. There Svatikov made the acquaintance of Henri Bint, who had been left in charge of the Paris office and who had formerly worked as an agent for Rachkovsky on a number of forgeries, the last of which had been the Protocols, completed before Rachkovsky left his post in Paris in 1902. According to Bint, the task had been completed in either 1899 or 1901. Bint had acted as paymaster, whereas the main job of fabrication had been done by another agent named Golovinsky, using the Joly *Dialogues* as a model (Golovinsky had also been named by Lopukhin and another trial witness, Beletsky).⁴⁴

All the evidence produced by Burtsev and others at the Bern trial and in subsequent studies is from secondary sources. None of it is based on first-hand witnesses or documentation. Unless in the unlikely event the Soviet archives are opened to research on the subject, first-hand documentation is unlikely to be discovered. The library of the Hoover Institute contains files of the Paris

agency of the Ochrana only. A careful search of these archives has been made but nothing concerning the Protocols was discovered.⁴⁵ However, as summarized by Curtiss, the testimony of several reputable witnesses indicates that the Protocols were forged in the Paris branch of the Ochrana and that General Rachkovsky was the leading figure in the enterprise. In the absence of conclusive documentary evidence to the contrary, it is unlikely that these generally accepted findings will be reversed.⁴⁶

The Protocols of Zion are of no more than ordinary interest as examples of forgery. The source(s) from which they were plagiarized, although relatively obscure, would almost certainly have come to light in the course of scholarly research into their authenticity, although the first discoveries in this area were made by amateurs rather than professional historians. By the same token, there is nothing new in the method—comparative content analysis—by which the plagiarism was exposed.

The Protocols are of greatest interest as a contemporary form of a secular apocalyptic myth which has its religious counterpart in the belief in the coming of the Anti-Christ. This is the superstitious belief that since antiquity there has always existed, hidden behind the scenes, some sort of secret, conspiratorial, and revolutionary sect which seeks ultimate world domination. The form of this legend remains the same; only the identification of the sect itself changes. For example, the first important religious group identified with such an alleged conspiracy was the Jesuit order, with the publication in 1612 of *Monita Secreta*, which is sold on the streets of Paris today and is reflected in an extensive anti-Catholic subliterate of hatred in America. Henri Rollin, in his *Apocalypse of Our Times*, shows the similarity between this anti-Jesuit tract and the Protocols.⁴⁷

The next group to be identified as being the members of such a sect were the Freemasons who, within the overall framework of the conspiracy legend, were held responsible for the French Revolution and subsequent revolutionary disturbances of our times.⁴⁸

Later, the fixed goal of world domination was ascribed by Marx and Engels to "the Russian diplomatic corps [which] forms, so to speak, a modern Jesuit order. . . . It is this secret society,

recruited originally from foreign adventurers, which has raised the Russian empire to its present plenitude of power.”⁴⁹

Finally, the Protocols of Zion, as we have seen, combine elements from several variants of the conspiracy legend and have been broadly synthesized since the Bolshevik Revolution into the belief in a “Jewish-Freemason-Communist” conspiracy. In this regard, Hugo Valentin’s assessment of the Protocols is pertinent:

The so-called “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” are among the most politically significant and symptomatically interesting documents in the history of antisemitism. They are significant in that they were the chief means employed after the World War [I] to promote savage hatred of the Jews in Eastern Europe and Germany. It is no exaggeration to say that they cost the lives of many thousands of innocent persons and that more blood and tears cling to their pages than to those of any other mendacious document in the world’s history. They are symptomatically interesting from the fact that this gross fabrication in spite of its absurdities was taken seriously in such wide circles. . . . The very fact that people could believe for a moment in the fabled existence a powerful Jewish secret world-conspiracy, which had for its object the destruction of the Christian states and the foundation of a Jewish world-monarchy on their ruins, shows the truth of Shaw’s saying that our age is just as credulous as the Middle Ages, though its credulity finds other objects.⁵⁰

FRAUDS AND FORGERIES OF THE 1920's

G R E A T

political and social upheavals, such as the French and Russian Revolutions, are like tidal waves which sweep away established regimes and traditional social orders; as they recede they leave little pools of refugees, emigrés and “displaced persons” scattered widely abroad. The Bolshevik Revolution left little colonies of so-called White Russian emigrés not only in such European capitals as London, Paris, Vienna, and Berlin but also in such distant cities as New York, Chicago, and Buenos Aires.

Since many of these emigrés had previously belonged to privileged or professional classes, they did not easily find ready employment abroad and frequently were forced to “live by their wits.” A significant number of professionals were either recruited or offered their services as translators, propagandists, or political warfare and espionage agents for the various intelligence agencies of the host countries in which they found themselves.

Following in the tradition of the tsarist regime, which had an extensive secret police and intelligence network in Western Europe, the Soviet intelligence organizations also recruited many of their agents among the Russian emigration abroad. Thus there began the long and bitter warfare between the secret intelligence agencies

of the USSR and the other major powers which characterized the period between the First and Second World Wars. Something of this dramatic story of Soviet espionage, assassination, plot, and counter-plot has been recorded authoritatively in Geoffrey Bailey's *The Conspirators*¹ and forms the background of numerous romantic and espionage novels of the interwar period. Here we shall examine some of the outstanding forgeries produced by both sides in this struggle.

British Provocations and Black Propaganda— An Early Export to the USSR

Soviet secret police and intelligence organizations have received so much publicity that we may have the impression that these kinds of covert or clandestine operations are virtually a Soviet or Bolshevik invention. This impression is false. Not only tsarist Russia but also the other European great powers had elaborate security police and intelligence organizations, each with a long tradition, and in the case of Great Britain, with centuries of expertise. In addition to internal security matters, these organizations also engaged in secret political and propaganda activities at home and abroad, operations which frequently involved forgery. The same secret police or intelligence agencies that forged passports, personal documents, and the like for espionage purposes were often called upon to produce propaganda for political warfare purposes.

Most political propaganda is "white," that is, no attempt is made to conceal its authorship, source, or point of origin. Sometimes propaganda is non-attributed or confusing as to source—the so-called "grey" area. When it is deliberately misleading, especially when propaganda is produced so that it appears to be of "enemy" origin, it is called "black," and the operation is provocation. Successful provocations (like forged passports) require an intimate, detailed knowledge of "enemy" operations and are therefore mounted by secret intelligence or covert operational agencies that have the necessary expertise. Successful black propaganda is difficult to produce. The most familiar wartime examples are leaflets which imitate those of the enemy but have a peculiar twist or punch line of their own. Magazines or newspapers that have a phony or forged cover but contain open

enemy propaganda inside are also familiar examples of the art. Since the advent and widespread use of radio, black radio stations have become a familiar device. They are frequently able to deceive many of their listeners—but not governments, which by means of radio-direction-finding and detection devices can fix the approximate location of any station which is transmitting black.

By comparison with radio, black propaganda through printed media (books, pamphlets, newspapers, etc.) is difficult to produce and is often quickly exposed as fraudulent. The successful forging of a whole newspaper, or even an entire page, is rare. The insertion of single items is a much simpler matter; the planting by the regime of fraudulent stories in the controlled press of Nazi Germany is a matter of familiar historical record. During the propaganda build-up which preceded the Nazi invasion of Poland in September 1939, a large number of false accounts of so-called "Polish atrocities" on the German border were planted in the German newspapers. One such story, an account of the Gleiwitz incident (when Polish soldiers allegedly attacked a radio station five miles inside the German border) was actually used by Hitler as a pretext for the invasion and thus has become famous as "the incident which started the war." Government use of fraudulent news reports for political or propaganda purposes has become commonplace with totalitarian regimes and has been widely condemned as "immoral." Use of the same technique by traditionally democratic states is, by comparison, much rarer—or, at the least, instances have been infrequently exposed. Fraudulent reports such as the "cover stories" released to the press by U.S. agencies at the time of the so-called U-2 affair are the exception rather than the rule.

The Nazi or Soviet security police agencies have been known to plant fraudulent news stories in order to incriminate a prospective purge victim. Instances of comparable operations by established democratic regimes are extremely rare. However, a recent historical study, *The Cato Street Conspiracy* by John Stanhope, indicates that the government of no less a democracy than Great Britain was once deeply involved in a provocation comparable to similar operations conducted by police-state regimes such as those of tsarist or Soviet Russia and typical of Nazi Germany. The affair resulted in the public hanging and beheading for treason of

five men before a sullen mob at Newgate Prison on Monday morning, April 30, 1820. The local crowd showed more sympathy than condemnation, but the total effect of the several treason trials and their attendant publicity was to stampede moderate opinion so violently that it veered toward reaction and confirmed pious reactionaries of the day in their belief that all resistance to reform was direct aid to God's cause, and all reform a betrayal of religious truth.

The incident is dismissed in a few lines by standard English histories as the only known occasion on which a small group of penniless malcontents allegedly planned to murder the entire British Cabinet at one stroke on the evening of February 23, 1820. The day before, a meeting had taken place in the back room of John Brunt's quarters, Fox Court, Gray's Inn Lane. The only furniture was a fixed stove, round which the men stood or squatted for warmth, and two chairs; the only illumination came from the dull fire, as the conspirators were too poor to afford a light. At previous meetings the aims of the conspirators had been diffuse and had lacked unity of purpose other than plunder—until one of their members, a police spy named Edwards, repeatedly urged violent political action, planting the idea of assassinating the Cabinet and overthrowing the government in a wildly implausible *coup d'état*. Edwards arrived at the meeting February 22 with the unexpected news that there was to be a Cabinet dinner the next evening at the Earl of Harrowby's in Grosvenor Square. Since all such state dinners had been suspended during the period of mourning for the late king, this news seemed too good to be true. Edwards then produced a copy of the *New Times*, containing the announcement of the story. Of the six London papers available, the *New Times* was the only one which carried the report. (Testimony at the subsequent trial showed that the announcement was not written by the regular court reporter, who invariably sent identical copies of such news releases to all six London papers at the same time. The manuscript was in an unknown person's handwriting, a clear case of forgery, and the announcement itself was a fraud.)

The next evening about twenty men gathered by a man named Thistlewood from the dregs of London society assembled in a dingy room above a stable which still stands today in Cato

Street off Edgware Road. Thistlewood was in the process of distributing a crude assortment of arms to the group when the police broke into the meeting and a bloody battle ensued. One constable was run through with a sword and others were wounded before nine of the men were taken into custody and later charged with treason. Significantly, Edwards, the *agent-provocateur* of the conspiracy, was absent from the Cato Street mêlée, was not called to testify as a witness by the prosecution, and was never seen again.²

Over a hundred years had passed between April 1820 when the Cato Street conspirators were hanged, and May 1920 when the first emissaries of the USSR, a trade delegation, arrived in England. Meanwhile, the British intelligence community had lost none of its skill at provocations. Indeed, as subsequent events were to prove, black propaganda was one of Britain's earliest exports to the new Bolshevik regime.

The Soviet trade delegation under the chairmanship of M. Krassin arrived in London on May 26, 1920, and after almost a year of difficult negotiations, the first Anglo-Soviet trade agreement was signed on March 16, 1921.³

A major bone of contention that continued to plague these and later negotiations was the question of hostile propaganda emanating from both sides. The very first act of the new Soviet regime was to issue a ringing propaganda appeal, the "Decree on Peace." This was a call to the peoples of the Western powers to put an end to the war and to liberate the toiling masses of the world from every kind of slavery and exploitation. On the other hand, the Bolshevik seizure of power in November 1917 and the excesses of the period of War Communism and allied intervention had unleashed a flood of anti-communist propaganda from conservative quarters in Europe and the United States.

During the months when the British Foreign Office was patiently negotiating the 1921 Anglo-Soviet trade agreement, unknown to the negotiators another British agency was busily exporting black propaganda in the form of forged copies of *Pravda*, the official newspaper of the Communist party of the USSR. This operation was revealed in a story that broke on February 28, 1921 (about two weeks before the agreement was signed) in the *London Daily Herald*. The paper published photocopies of the

masthead of a forged *Pravda* which had been produced in London, and which bore in fine type on the last page the imprint of the local firm that had printed it. In this form the faked *Pravdas* complied with English law and would be classed as merely "grey" propaganda. Under the headline "PRAVDAS" PRINTED IN LONDON, the newspaper story, which created a sensation, explained how such "grey" propaganda was converted to a proper shade of black. The text of the article reads in part as follows:

Some little while ago there came into the *Daily Herald* office—never mind how or whence—a copy of a Russian newspaper.

The title heading of this paper (reproduced photographically below) is identical with the ordinary title heading of the Moscow "Pravda." It states that it is the official organ of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Communist Party, and that it was published at Moscow on Wednesday, September 22, 1920.

But the paper itself is *not* the ordinary "Pravda." It is full of anti-Bolshevik propaganda rather clumsily disguised as news. . . . At the bottom of the back page is the imprint (also reproduced below) of a firm of London printers.

The imprint, of course, was put on to comply with the law. But notice that it is placed well below the rest of the letter-press. . . . Now, how in the world did a firm of London printers come to be printing an imitation of the Moscow "Pravda"? For whom were they printing it? . . . just at the moment when the Government was hurling accusations about propaganda at the Soviet Government.

Interesting questions. And the answer is even more interesting.

It is that those imitation "Pravdas" (there was a whole series of them) were produced—the London firm acting only as printers in the ordinary way of business—by a group of the Russian emigres, with the connivance and assistance of the Special Branch at Scotland Yard.

The usual procedure was this:—The order for the printing was given by one or the other of the principals of this group. They received the invoices and they paid the accounts—in cash.

The papers were then delivered by the printers to a house in Pimlico.

So far, so simple. But now came a difficulty.

Before these papers could be used the imprint must be removed. It was there to comply with the law. No ordinary printer would remove it.

This is where the Special Branch comes into the story. For the Special Branch has a printing establishment of its very, very own.

There is, of course, the ordinary printing establishment at the Yard—everybody knows that. But there is also (and this is known to very few people indeed) an extra-specially-confidential and infinitely discreet establishment in Scotland House itself, where very private work is done for the Special Branch's own curious requirements, and also on occasion for the Foreign Office and War Office.

It was in that secret printing office in Scotland House that the "guillotining" of these imitation "Pravdas" was done under the supervision of Home Office officials.

When that tell-tale imprint had been cut off and burnt, the papers were taken down to Hull or Harwich by Special Branch men and dispatched to certain British officials in Helsingfors.

Right through the autumn months, during the very time when the Government was crying out about Bolshevik propaganda and hurling reckless charges of bad faith at the Moscow Government, this pretty game went on.

Once a fortnight these papers were printed and guillotined and sent on their way with the assistance of the Special Branch, presumably at the British taxpayer's expense. . . .

What are they up to now? Who is responsible for employing the men and machinery of a British Government Department in the service of the "White" Russians against the Soviet Government? Is it the Cabinet? Is it the Foreign Secretary? Is it Sir Basil Thomson? We commend the matter to Mr. Lloyd George.

As might be expected, the forged *Pravda* story led to several pointed questions in the House of Commons. The answers, both oral and written, were remarkably direct. They substantiated the essential facts publicized in the *Daily Herald* and indicated that neither the Home Office Secretary, Mr. E. Shortt, nor the Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, had been informed of the operation for which the Director of Intelligence, Scotland Yard, Mr. Basil Thomson, K.C.B., was responsible. (This is also one of the few known instances in which a British intelligence chief has been publicly named.) Meanwhile, the preamble of the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement which had just been signed called for reciprocal abandonment by both the USSR and England of such propaganda activities. Accordingly, the Home Office Secretary assured the House that "all necessary instructions have been given to Govern-

ment Departments and others concerned" to comply with the terms of the agreement.⁴

Anti-Comintern Forgeries

As previously noted, White Russian emigrés were politically active in several European capitals from the end of World War I on into the late 1920's. In effect, combined forgery and espionage centers sprang up in London, Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and such Baltic cities as Helsingfors and Riga, Latvia, under the auspices of a bewildering variety of emigré and anti-Bolshevik organizations. Soviet intelligence undoubtedly penetrated many of these anti-Soviet organizations and kept a close watch on the activities of others. As with most covert operations, direct proof of such penetration is extremely rare, but in the case of these forgery centers the indirect evidence is conclusive. In April 1927 there appeared in London a small book entitled *Anti-Soviet Forgeries, A Record of Some of the Forged Documents Used at Various Times Against the Soviet Government*.⁵ Much of the data and documentary materials in this study could only have been collected by an intelligence organization which had successfully penetrated the various forgery centers concerned. Although the book is non-attributed, internal evidence indicates that it was prepared under Soviet and/or Comintern auspices. The style is a mixture of righteous indignation and sober exposition reminiscent of *Communist Forgeries*, a CIA intelligence briefing presented to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and published thirty-five years later by the United States government.⁶ (See Chapter Seven below.) Like the CIA study, *Anti-Soviet Forgeries* is clearly based on extensive information derived from intelligence sources and in effect speaks for a government, in this case the USSR.

The need for such a publication as *Anti-Soviet Forgeries* is eloquent testimony to the dilemma in which the Soviet government found itself in the early 1920's in its relationships with bourgeois governments. By 1921 the fledgling Bolshevik regime, at enormous human and social cost, had lived through the period of civil war, allied intervention, and War Communism. Lenin had temporarily retreated on the economic front with his New Economic Policy, and the Soviet leaders now sought normalization of their relationships with the outside world in general, and specifi-

cally credits, trade, and diplomatic recognition from the major capitalist powers. But as communists the Soviet leaders were dedicated to the goal of world revolution and had set up the Comintern for the purpose of aiding and directing a series of abortive communist-led revolts in the immediate postwar period.⁷ The invitations to the first Comintern Congress in March 1919 were sent out by Soviet Foreign Minister Georgi Chicherin that month. By the time of its Second Congress in 1921 the Comintern had already identified itself as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy by proclaiming in its manifesto: "The Communist International has declared the cause of Soviet Russia to be its own cause."⁸ This was one side of the coin. A year later, the other was held up in a typical Comintern resolution of 1922: "It is the historical mission of the Communist International to be the gravedigger of bourgeois society."⁹

In their early diplomatic exchanges with Germany and Great Britain, the Soviet leaders found that Comintern propaganda and subversion were a stumbling block in the way of obtaining their diplomatic objectives—trade and recognition—and the subject of repeated, acrimonious protests. Although instrumental in founding the Comintern, from the very beginning Foreign Minister Chicherin had made strenuous efforts to dissociate Soviet foreign policy from the Communist party, and he answered these diplomatic protests with a bland denial of any official government responsibility for Comintern activities.¹⁰ The myth thus created was far too transparent a device to be convincing either at home or abroad. When, in response to a German protest, Chicherin, addressing a Soviet Congress in Tiflis in March 1925, said, "We are forced to declare once more before the German government that our government is not responsible for the Comintern and has nothing at all to do with it [*i ne imeet s nim nichego obschego*]," his audience burst into laughter, much to his confusion.¹¹ Abroad the myth was equally hollow. George F. Kennan observes: "I know of no political fiction more flimsy and absurd than that of the lack of responsibility of the Soviet authorities for the world revolutionary activities then centered in the Comintern."¹²

In addition to such bland denials of responsibility, the USSR frequently responded to diplomatic protests against Comintern activities with the counter-claim that such protests were based on

faulty intelligence reports, forged documents, or a combination of both. The publication of *Anti-Soviet Forgeries* was undoubtedly intended to support this kind of claim and the myth of the separation of the Soviet state and the Comintern. As set forth in the unsigned Preface:

The reasons for the publication of the present collection of anti-Soviet forgeries need no elaboration, for they may be summarised in a single sentence. Of late, some of the governments with which Soviet Russia enters into relationships have made use, frequent and persistent use, of forged documents designed to prove two things: first, that the Soviet Government is intimately connected with the Communist International; and, secondly, that the Soviet Government makes a practice of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. . . .

On March 16, 1921, the British and Soviet governments signed the first Anglo-Soviet trade agreement, by which England extended *de facto* recognition to the Bolshevik regime. At British insistence the preamble contained a clause obligating both signatories to refrain "from hostile action or undertakings against the other and from conducting outside its own borders any official propaganda direct or indirect against the institutions of the British Empire or the Russian Soviet Government respectively." In practice both sides violated this pledge even while it was being negotiated. As previously noted, the forging of bogus *Pravdas* with the connivance of Scotland Yard was a clear violation by the British. However, with the Comintern, a world-wide organizational weapon at its disposal, the USSR was in a clearly advantageous position in this political warfare struggle. British intelligence had nothing comparable with which to counter Soviet political warfare operations. On September 17, 1921, the USSR received a note dated September 7 from Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Minister, listing alleged breaches of the trade agreement. This first note anticipated the similar but much stronger "Curzon Ultimatum" of 1923 by two years. It complained against Comintern propaganda and subversive activities in general, and included special sections dealing with hostile activities in India, Persia, Angora, and Afghanistan. While recognizing that the offending "speeches and proclamations emanate no doubt nominally from the Third Interna-

tional as such, and not directly from the Soviet Government," the note continued, "But it is impossible for the latter to disprove its close association, if not its absolute identity, with the former."

The Soviet reply of September 27 was conciliatory in tone. It blandly denied any identification of the Comintern with the Russian government or any responsibility for its actions, and stated that "a cursory glance" at the British note was enough to determine "that the charges contained therein are either unfounded or based on false information or forgeries." The principal source of the alleged forgeries was identified as:

. . . a bulletin published in Germany under the title "Ostinformation," published by an anonymous group of detectives and supplied mostly to counter-revolutionary papers and to secret agents of various Governments anxious to obtain secret documents on Soviet Russia. . . . It is this bulletin that circulates the majority of forged sensational documents, such as instructions, circulars, personal letters, confessions, etc., from Soviet leaders. . . . It is surely no mere coincidence that the majority of the apocryphal reports and speeches of Stalin, Nuorteva, Karakhan and Lenin are to be found in the bulletin of the German detectives practically in the same wording as they are cited in the British note, as for instance, the alleged reports of Eliava (Appendix II), of Nuorteva, of Karakhan (Appendix III), of the speech of Lenin (Appendix IV).

The note then added condescendingly:

The Soviet Government feels sure that the British Foreign Office has been misled by a gang of professional forgers and swindlers, and that had it known the real dubious sources of its information the note of the 7th of September would never have been produced.¹³

In reply to these charges, Lord Curzon sent the Soviet government another note dated November 2, 1921, in which he stated that "His Majesty's Government had not made those charges without a prolonged and careful investigation in each case into the sources of their information—sources which it is necessarily impossible in many cases to disclose. They see no reason to recede from or even to qualify a single one of these charges now."¹⁴

Having thus indicated in diplomatic parlance that British

intelligence sources had provided the information on which the charges were made, Lord Curzon admitted one error in the previous note but denied that Russian emigré sources in Berlin had been used:

His Majesty's Government acknowledges one error in their note of the 7th September. A quotation was made from a speech by M. Lenin stated to have been delivered on the 8th June. M. Litvinof has denied the delivery of any such speech. It was in fact delivered by M. Lenin on the 5th July, and the words quoted in the British note were actually disseminated and broadcast to the world by the Russian official wireless news from Moscow. Further, none of the information on which his Majesty's Government based their note of 7th September or on which Lord Emmott founded his report was drawn from "Ostinformation," as conjectured by M. Litvinof. They [H.M.G.] have better and more reliable sources of information.¹⁵

Viewed dispassionately as a problem in intelligence evaluation, how should the charges and counter-charges be assessed? The British historian, E. H. Carr, accepts the Soviet charges without reservation, writing that "[The Curzon note of September 7, 1921] appears to have been somewhat lightheartedly compiled from reports of secret agents which did not withstand scrutiny, and were easily refuted in detail."¹⁶ In support of the Soviet position, Carr even goes so far as to state that "the official record of Lenin's speech at the third Congress of Comintern on that date [July 5, 1921] contains no passage resembling that quoted in the British note."¹⁷ The disputed passage from Lenin reads: "We must use this breathing space in order carefully to prepare the revolution in the capitalist states. A very important factor for the development of the world revolution is the awakening of millions of workers in the colonies and dependencies. This fact presents us with a most important task which consists in helping these enormous masses of backward individuals on the road to world revolution."¹⁸ The concept of *peredushka* (breathing space) was used by Lenin to justify the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Whether carried in the official Comintern record or not, it would be difficult to find a more "Leninist" passage than the one quoted. The British source, as indicated, was an intercepted broadcast, and of course the passage in question could easily have been omitted from the

Comintern proceedings published later. Only an examination of the wireless intercepts can finally settle this point. But Litvinov denied that the speech had ever been made. (By implication, E. H. Carr also supports this denial.) This kind of deliberate falsification of the record later became almost standard practice in Soviet propaganda.

Second, the USSR showed the British representative in Moscow, Hodgson, original copies of *Ostinformation* and attached "photographic copies of some pages of the bulletin" as well as four appendices to its note of September 29. None of this material (which the USSR presumably regarded as conclusive evidence for its case) was reprinted in the British White Paper, "A Selection of Papers dealing with the Relations between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government, 1921-1927." On the other hand, the pro-Soviet *Anti-Soviet Forgeries* also fails to reprint this material, an omission which indirectly casts doubt on its effectiveness. The question could be settled only by a comparative content analysis of the materials in these missing appendices and the relevant *Ostinformation* bulletins, which are also unavailable. Since this kind of hard intelligence on which to base a judgment is lacking, the Soviet charge can only be assessed as plausible, but not proven.

The fact that neither the British nor Soviet governments have provided data adequate to prove their charges makes the position taken by either open to question. Certainly the British denial that *Ostinformation* was a direct source of information for its note does not mean that it was not a regular intelligence source, one which may well have had an influence far out of proportion to its actual usefulness. Certainly during this period and later, *Ostinformation* was received regularly in the U.S. State Department and was a major source of information (and misinformation) about the USSR.¹⁹ As most intelligence agencies have since learned through bitter experience, emigrés are a notoriously poor source of information about revolutionary regimes, the most familiar example to American readers being the CIA experience with the Bay of Pigs fiasco.²⁰

To the intelligence analyst *Anti-Soviet Forgeries* is as interesting for what it does *not* reveal as for its exhibits of forged letterheads, stamps, seals, etc. For example, there are many refer-

ences to the most famous of all anti-Soviet forgeries, the "Zinoviev letter," and the longest account in the book (thirty pages) is devoted to it. Nevertheless, it is clear that the authors had no satisfactory explanation of this puzzling affair. So far as the authenticity of the Zinoviev letter is concerned, the study provides a fairly adequate summary of the evidence both pro and con but fails to analyze or evaluate it. The authors rest their case with the statement that the British Trade Union delegation (which went to Moscow to investigate the affair) "obtained proofs which must satisfy all broadminded people that the 'Red Letter' was a forgery . . . [and] that if a similar investigation were carried out in London it would undoubtedly be possible to establish clearly who was the author of the forgery."²¹ The line here, as in many references throughout the book, is that the Zinoviev letter was forged in London. Accordingly, any evidence to the contrary is ignored, although press reports indicating a Berlin source of the forgery had been published as early as November 1924, three years before the appearance of *Anti-Soviet Forgeries*.

The introductory chapter of the book has a section on the Berlin forgery center, which in 1924-1925 included such White Russian emigrés as Druzhelovsky, Gumansky, Sivert, and Belgardt. Both Druzhelovsky and Gumansky were arrested by the Berlin police in a raid in November 1924 and released shortly thereafter, but not before one of the officials, in response to a direct question on the Zinoviev letter, told the press: "We have evidence that several documents signed with M. Zinoviev's name were forged here. We feel certain that one of these letters caused the recent sensation."²² Ruth Fischer, the former German Communist leader, asserts that this raid, which she describes as "an elegant diversion," was deliberately manipulated by the Soviet secret police, the GPU, in order to cover their own responsibility for the letter by casting suspicion elsewhere, i.e., on Druzhelovsky and the other forgers active in Berlin.²³

Later the Berlin emigré center was linked with Zinoviev letters and other Red Scare forgeries on two separate occasions. First, in the summer of 1927, Druzhelovsky, who had returned to Russia illegally, was brought to trial in Moscow. He admitted working for the Polish and other intelligence services and suggested that the Zinoviev letter had been drafted in Berlin by

Zhemchuzhnikov, Gumansky, and Belgardt.²⁴ Second, following a police raid in Berlin in March 1929, Gumansky and another emigré, Vladimir Orlov, were linked with the Zinoviev letter. Gumansky first boasted about his part in the affair but later denied any connection with it.²⁵

Since the publication date of *Anti-Soviet Forgeries* is April 1927 and Druzhelovsky's trial in Moscow did not take place until later (May through July), it is clear that the forged documents attributed to him were either obtained through Soviet intelligence or as a result of raids on the Berlin forgery center. (Druzhelovsky was first arrested and released in November 1924 and was held again from June to November 1925, when he was expelled from Germany.) The collection includes several Druzhelovsky forgeries dealing with secret police (GPU) and Comintern activities in Germany, Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria, where a bomb exploded in the Sofia Cathedral on April 16, 1925, just one day after the date set in one of the "documents" for a communist-led uprising.

In addition to the forgeries exposed in *Anti-Soviet Forgeries*, others which have been attributed to Druzhelovsky (or the Berlin center) are:

(1) An alleged Comintern "Instruction to the Executive Committee of the Northern U.S.A.," headlined in a *Chicago Tribune* story as RUSSIA DONATES \$340,000 TO HELP PAINT U.S. RED, and in the *New York Times* as MOSCOW REDS PLAN BIG CAMPAIGN HERE . . . \$340,000 FUND SET ASIDE.²⁶

(2) A "Comintern Communication" to the French Communist party ordering the formation of special detachments in the French Army, reportedly sold to a French intelligence service.²⁷

(3) Fabricated material linking communists with a railway accident which took place in the Polish Corridor (the strip of land which at that time separated Germany proper from East Prussia and provided Poland with access to the sea at Danzig).²⁸

In his intelligence operations Druzhelovsky was a complete opportunist, selling his services to Polish, German, British, French, and Soviet agencies, and occasionally working as a double- or even triple-agent for more than one service at a time. The interesting hypothesis has been advanced that beginning in January 1925 Druzhelovsky worked exclusively for the USSR, forging anti-

Comintern documents which were deliberately filled with crude errors that would invite exposure. Such exposure would in turn support the line that *all* charges made against the Comintern were based on similar fake documents.²⁹ This twist was Druzhelovsky's main line of defense at his trial in July 1927, during which he pleaded that his work had been in the Soviet national interest, that in producing such crude and easily exposed forgeries he was actually "fighting on the Soviet side." As evidence in support of his plea, Druzhelovsky pointed out that he usually sold his fabrications for a "miserable price of 50-100 marks (20-40 rubles)." On the other hand, he reportedly received as much as \$3,000 for a single forgery from an agent of American counter-intelligence.³⁰

There are several reasons why this "provocation" hypothesis should be heavily discounted. First, *Anti-Soviet Forgeries* includes two GPU forgeries attributed to Druzhelovsky dated June 17 and March 26, 1924, and his testimony indicated that he was in the forgery business roughly two years before his hypothetical employment by the Soviets. There is little to distinguish these early forgeries from his later work: his fabrications are all equally clumsy. Moreover, if the Druzhelovsky forgeries were produced under Soviet direction for the purpose of exposing them later, surely the principal medium of such exposure, *Anti-Soviet Forgeries*, would include a complete catalogue and exhibit of his works. It does not. Finally, it should be noted that by 1925 (when Druzhelovsky theoretically started working for the Soviets) Comintern propaganda and subversion were no longer burning international issues blocking the normalization of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world. A year earlier, on February 1, 1924, the USSR had scored a major breakthrough by gaining diplomatic recognition from Great Britain, and "the log-jam of resistance to the formal acceptance of Soviet Russia as a member of the international community was broken."³¹ Italian recognition followed on February 7, Austria moved to renew diplomatic relations, and within a few weeks the USSR had achieved *de jure* recognition from Greece, Norway, and Sweden.³² To be sure, the Zinoviev letter incident blocked normalization of Anglo-Soviet relations for four more years, but this took place in October 1924, whereas Druzhelovsky's most active period was in 1925.

In October 1925, the British Government arrested, tried, and sentenced twelve communist leaders (including Campbell, Gallacher, Pollitt, Inkpin, and Hannington). A number of documents seized at party headquarters were published as a white paper and were used to inflame public opinion against the communists.³³ This white paper (Command No. 2682, *Communist Papers*, 1926) reproduced verbatim a wide variety of Soviet and Comintern communications (including letterheads, dates, addresses, signatures, etc.). Henceforth the Soviet propaganda line that all Western charges against the Comintern were based on forged documents could hardly be expected to carry much weight. The publication of authentic Comintern documents provided an accurate standard by which any future fabrications could be judged. Under these rigorous conditions, the forgery of such documents as a business fell off rapidly. Moreover, by the mid-twenties, Soviet political warfare was taken for granted, except in the U.S., as a continuing if unpleasant fact of international life. The situation has been aptly described by E. H. Carr:

The endless diplomatic debate about propaganda had become by this time [1925] a symptom rather than a cause of the bad relations between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries. Intervention in the affairs of these countries through the medium of their communist parties was maintained from the Soviet side as a means of embarrassing and weakening potentially hostile governments. The quarrel was kept alive by constant protests from the other side in order to embarrass and discredit the Soviet Government.³⁴

Senator Borah and the Berlin Forgery Center: An Attempt at Character Assassination

During the brief ascendancy of the late Senator Joseph McCarthy, Americans became familiar with the technique of character assassination by pinning the label "communist" or "communist sympathizer" on selected political victims. The virulent anti-communism practiced by extremists at the height of the Cold War has tended to obscure the fact that in the decade following World War I similar attempts at character assassination were also made against public figures who championed liberal causes in general and a U.S. recognition of the USSR in particular.

One of the more colorful congressional figures of the 1920's and 1930's, Senator William Borah of Idaho, soon found himself under attack by conservatives because of his vigorous but unsuccessful efforts to obtain diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union.

Presumably hoping to sell their products to American newspapers, Russian emigré forgers in Berlin soon produced documents designed to incriminate Senator Borah by linking him to alleged Comintern officials and operations. The first of these documents, dated March 9, 1925, is full of sensational material designed to appeal to the "yellow journalism" of the Hearst newspapers, which enjoyed a wide circulation at that time. Among others, this fabrication included the following items:

(1) The Soviet Foreign Office (Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs) thanks an alleged American Comintern "delegation" for its "active part . . . in the campaign for the recognition of the USSR by the U.S."

(2) As requested, \$20,000 is forwarded "from the secret service fund" for continuation of the good work.

(3) In its interference in the political affairs of the U.S., the IKKI (Executive Committee of the Comintern) "must endeavor . . . to maintain the decisive significance of Borah's group as a voting power in the Senate."

(4) "It will be absolutely essential to undertake the physical removal of Warren," President Coolidge's nominee for the post of Attorney General, with poisons ("infallible medico-chemical preparations must be procured from New York for the planned assassination").

The document is long, rambling, full of involved pseudo-sophisticated political analysis and allusions to covert operations. To give the reader an idea of the style and format, only a few excerpts from the text (in the translation given in *Anti-Soviet Forgeries*) are reproduced below:

Kremlin, Moscow

March 9, 1925

[emblem]

Strictly Private

No. 2271/Ts.

Copy No. 2

PLENIPOTENTIARY DELEGATION OF THE COMINTERN,

SECOND SECTION

Copies for the Foreign Delegations of the R.K.P. (b) in London, Stockholm, Paris, Berlin, and Rome.

(Exclusively for the Presidium)

Secret Instruction of the Ikki, No. B842.

In accordance with a communication from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, under date March 9, 1925, No. 3675, we have to inform you that, in view of your communication of February 24, 1925, No. 1752, the Council of People's Commissaries of the U.S.S.R. has decided:

(a) To express its gratitude for the active part you have played in the campaign for the recognition of the USSR by the United States.

(b) To comply with your request for the assignment of \$20,000 (twenty thousand American dollars) from the secret service fund for the extension of your work in the way you have indicated.

On its side, the Executive Committee of the Comintern, by its decision of March 9, 1925, No. 63 A Ts., confirms and approves your suggestion that it is essential to take active measures for the removal of the material obstacles in the way of the recognition of the USSR, even if this should inevitably imply the interference of the Ikki in the internal politics of the United States.

The Ikki, in its interference in the political affairs of the United States, must endeavour, without drawing attention to what it is doing, to maintain the decisive significance of Borah's group as a voting power in the Senate. Should there be a personal clash, an accentuation of hostilities, this group will inevitably lose its value as regards those matters which are important to the Ikki and the USSR. Furthermore, should this happen, Borah will forfeit the possibility of counting in the future upon the support of Coolidge. Without such support, he will be unable to give an increased vitality to the plans he entertains. These considerations have weight notwithstanding the fact that the creation of friction between Borah and Coolidge is favourable to the furtherance of certain aspects of the policy of the USSR towards the United States, a policy which down to the beginning of the series of incidents which opened with the prospective appointment of Warren, proved decidedly successful.

The Executive Committee of the Comintern naturally believes that (should the campaign continue) the physical removal of Warren from the possibility of his accepting the post of Attorney-General, must take its place as one of the primary elements of the series of circumstances likely to mollify the political situation. . . .

It is therefore incumbent upon you, in the first place, to send

at once to "ayet myok No. 27" in New York a sufficiency of the medico-chemical preparations at your disposal (with instructions how they can be used with infallible effect). The complete removal of Warren will get rid of the before-mentioned obstacles in the way of our acquiring further influence. In case of need, you must have recourse to the special deposit in order to open for "ayet" as large a current account as may seem to you advisable. The payments will be masked in the accounts of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade.

He must not let any opportunity slip. While observing all possible precautions and never relaxing his vigilance, he must maintain his conspiratorial activities at the topmost pitch; and he must continue to act upon "beyonka No. 19" in the name of the Nor. Am. Com. of Action. He must also act upon "ayet" No. 27, for the fulfilment of the instruction given to that organisation (to which he will consider himself to be linked). He must with the utmost care, and by word of mouth, control the code. He must accurately fulfil your instructions, and must never delegate final and actual powers to any person out of which the latter might gather a hint as to the true position of affairs. Report when you have this matter in train, and keep me informed about every step you undertake. In case of need, use the A.L.Z. code.

(Out of the copy.)

In view of the foregoing, the Executive Committee of the Comintern instructs the presidiums of the foreign delegations of the R.K.P. (b), without delay, and by all means at their disposal, to concentrate observation upon the activities of "myok No. 27, beyonka No. 19, and ayet," and, in due course, to send detailed information regarding the underground work of the American Foreign-Political Trio.

By order of the Executive Committee of the Comintern,
General Secretary of the Comintern,

DOROT.³⁵

In their critique of this fabrication, the editors of *Anti-Soviet Forgeries* observe that:

"The manifest aim of the foregoing document is to unmask the deadly machinations of the USSR, to discredit the Soviet Government in the eyes of the Americans. . . .

"The letter is written in an uneducated * but would-be offi-

* Translator's Note: The translator had no option but to touch up the style. Had the letter been literally translated, it would have been unintelligible.

cial style, upon forged stationery, the letter-head being one of those made by Druzhelovsky in Berlin.

"The following obvious blunders may be mentioned:

- (1) The Comintern has no office in the Kremlin.
- (2) The Comintern has no Plenipotentiary Delegations.
- (3) There are no 'Foreign Delegations of the R.K.P. (b).'
- (4) The emblem of the hammer-and-sickle is from Druzhelovsky's arsenal.

(5) The rubber stamp to the right of the emblem, on which the number 2561 has been written in pen and ink, is also of Druzhelovsky's manufacture, and is to be seen in many of his forgeries."³⁶

In addition to these blunders, the document contains several more errors which may be called Druzhelovsky "trademarks" since they occur in other forgeries identified as his work. Some of these typical errors are:

(1) Recommended use of the "A.L.Z. code" as an emergency measure.

(2) Use of the signature "Dorot" or "A. Dorot" (the Comintern has never had a general secretary, or secretary, called Dorot).

(3) "Dorot's" title is given as "General Secretary of the Comintern" on a document dated 9 March 1925, indicating that the forger was unaware that after the Vth Comintern Congress of July 1924 the Executive Committee of the Comintern had no general secretary.

(4) The Executive Committee of the Comintern did not have its quarters in the Kremlin, as indicated in the letterhead, but opposite the Kremlin at the corner of Vozdvizhenka and Mokhovaya Streets.

(5) There is no printed emblem at the top of Comintern blank stationery.³⁷

This first "anti-Borah" forgery dated 1925 apparently was never sold, or if it was successfully peddled to one of the Western intelligence agencies in Berlin, it was never released to the press. Otherwise, it would have received sensational publicity and would have been vigorously denied by its intended victim. When first published in April 1927 at the end of *Anti-Soviet Forgeries*, it attracted little, if any, notice. At the time (July 1927) of Druzhelovsky's show trial in Moscow, a photocopy of it was repro-

duced in a leading article in *Pravda*,³⁸ but it still went unnoticed by the American press. But other anti-Borah forgeries, the so-called "Hearst documents," soon received world-wide coverage. We turn now to these later forgeries and their exploitation by the Hearst newspapers.

From time to time throughout the year 1928, the Hearst papers had given front-page coverage to a so-called "Mexican scandal" involving Senator Borah. Sensational charges were made on the basis of the "Hearst documents" that three liberal Senators, Borah, George Norris, and Robert M. LaFollette, had received over \$1,215,000 from the "Revolutionary" Mexican government. Even Hearst's self-styled "experts" later admitted the documents were forged,³⁹ but the resulting furor caused the Senate to set up a special investigating committee headed by Senator David A. Reed to look into the case. After months of inquiry and analysis, the Reed Committee reported on January 9, 1929, that the so-called "Mexican documents" were forgeries and the charges groundless.⁴⁰

In the course of its research on these forged papers of supposedly Mexican origin, the committee had received several new "Soviet" documents which purported to show that Senators Borah and Norris had received \$100,000 each from the Soviet Ambassador in Paris. Photographs of these alleged documents had been sent to the committee by an anonymous citizen for "patriotic" motives while it was working on the Mexican bribery charges. After a year of intensive investigation, the committee reported that it had located the alleged originals of the "Soviet" documents in Paris:

They were offered for sale to us for \$50,000 approximately, the amount being stated in French money. The man who offered them for sale, in spite of repeated urgings on our part, had to admit that he could neither furnish us any evidence to prove their genuineness, nor any evidence to show that anything of the sort had ever occurred.⁴¹

The day after the Reed Committee findings were reported, Senator Borah announced that he had begun his own private investigation into the affair, and a few days later Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov cabled him that no present or former

Soviet Embassy employee had been involved, and that he would cooperate with the Senator in his inquiry.⁴²

Meanwhile, Hubert Knickerbocker, the Berlin correspondent of the *New York Evening Post*, had been approached by two "White Russian" emigrés, Michael Sumarukov (alias Peter Pavlonovsky) and Vladimir Orlov. The former had been an employee of the Soviet Ukrainian Mission in Berlin, while Orlov had once been a Counselor of State under the tsarist regime. These two individuals, who had heard about the Hearst "revelations," offered to sell Knickerbocker even more incriminating "documents" involving Senators Borah and Norris, and left a sample of such evidence with him long enough so that he could photocopy it. Knickerbocker then contacted the Berlin police and protracted his negotiations with the emigrés while they were put under surveillance. The trail led to Orlov's apartment where the police found three chests containing hundreds of rubber stamps, official Soviet stationery, seals, a valuable chemical laboratory, and about five hundred portraits of Russian and other communist leaders.⁴³

On March 24 the Berlin police charged Pavlonovsky and Alexander von Rossman, Orlov's private secretary, with espionage, claiming evidence that their Berlin office was the headquarters of an elaborate espionage organization with branches in Paris, London, and other Central European and Baltic cities. The organization allegedly served both the English and French governments. The sensational espionage trial which followed these charges was full of surprises, and apparently was terminated abruptly to avoid embarrassing the German police and intelligence agencies involved.

At the trial Orlov charged that the incriminating documents were "planted" on him by the GPU, the Soviet secret police, in order to compromise him.

On July 5 a German secret agent, P. Siewert, testified that Henry Ford had paid \$7,000 to one of the defendants for documents to be used in a law suit brought against Ford by Herman Bernstein. Payment was allegedly made through Boris Brasel, a Russian monarchist emigré in New York who traveled to Berlin in 1925 for that purpose.

On July 6 Hugo Muehleisen, head of a recently dissolved German intelligence agency, testified that he had heard reports that Orlov had boasted of his role in the Zinoviev letter affair.

Pressed to name his source he mentioned the word "Nuntia," the popular name of a German semi-official intelligence agency. At this point he was dismissed and the court was abruptly adjourned.

Four days later the charges against Pavlonovsky were dropped; the prosecution stated that its witness, the secret agent, P. Siewert, would be unable to testify further, and produced a physician's statement to the effect that "his nerves were completely shattered." Local communists claimed that the charges were dropped because the alleged connection of various government bureaus with the forgers was becoming too obvious. The next day, the 12th, the trial ended. Orlov and Pavlonovsky were sentenced each to four months' imprisonment but were ordered expelled at once as "undesirable aliens." The state attorney criticized the police, the Reichswehr, and the Foreign Office for employing espionage agents, thus admitting by implication that the trial had indeed been cut off abruptly because of official connections with the forgers.⁴⁴

On August 8, 1929, the American Embassy in Berlin sent Senator Borah a report of its own investigations and conclusions on the case, the text of which was released to the press on August 22. This report made it clear that the trial was indeed terminated and the defendants given "ridiculously lenient" sentences because of the threatened exposure of espionage operations involving several German agencies.⁴⁵

A *New York Times* story indicated that certain passages had been deleted from the Berlin Embassy's report on the affair before it was forwarded to Senator Borah. This fact was eagerly seized upon by Soviet newspaper editors and exploited to support the line that the U.S. policy of non-recognition was based on forged documents, namely the Steklov article on the USSR and the Third International, and the Zinoviev Instructions to the so-called Workers Party of America. On August 26, *Vechernaya Moskva*, under the headline WAS HUGHES A CLIENT OF ORLOV, stated that "the curtain is raised over the origin of other 'documents,' including also those about which Hughes, when he was Minister of Foreign Affairs, once declared that documentary information which the State Department had at its disposal, did not permit recognition of the U.S.S.R."⁴⁶ Although the Steklov article had been featured on the front page of the November

7, 1922, anniversary issue of *Izvestia*, this same newspaper now declared (August 27, 1929) that it "had never existed," and in turn the *New York Times* repeated the story without bothering to correct this deliberate falsehood.⁴⁷

Actually the only portions of the original embassy report deleted before it was sent on to Senator Borah concern sensitive intelligence relationships among various agencies in Berlin, and a reference to the notorious English Zinoviev letter affair, and had nothing to do with the speculations of the Soviet propagandists.⁴⁸

5

AMERICAN RECOGNITION OF THE USSR AND THE ZINOVIEV INSTRUCTIONS

I N T H E United States the Red Scare, which reached its climax in the period 1919-1920, was "primarily a domestic disease . . . a manifestation of the overwrought emotionalism of the war." ¹ Although individual American businessmen soon sought sweeping oil and other concessions from the Soviet government, the almost universal public reaction was one of fear and hostility toward the Revolution, its leaders, and the hard-pressed Bolshevik regime. On the U.S. domestic scene, "continued insistence upon ideological conformity, suspicion of organized labor, public intolerance toward aliens, and a hatred of Soviet Russia were but a few of the more important legacies left by the Red Scare." ² Many observers hoped and believed that bolshevism was an ugly but passing phase, and in the two-year period November 1917-1919, the *New York Times* predicted the probable fall of the Bolsheviks no fewer than ninety-nine times. ³ United States intelligence sources also repeatedly predicted the imminent collapse of the Soviet system during its early years. ⁴ In line with this kind of wishful thinking, the government under President Wilson distinguished between Russia as a state and the Bolshevik regime which supposedly held it captive. Cold War propagandists have also continued to refer to

the states of Central Europe and the Balkans as "captive nations" since the Soviet takeover after World War II. It is interesting to observe that this colorful epithet was originally applied to the Russian state, which it was hoped would soon free itself of its Bolshevik captors. However unrealistic this policy might prove itself to be in the long run, American refusal to recognize the new regime was a logical extension of these hopes.

In August 1920, in response to an official inquiry from the Italian government, Bainbridge Colby, President Wilson's last Secretary of State, formulated the U.S. position toward the Soviet Union in a widely publicized note which has long remained famous. With respect to any postwar settlement, the U.S. felt that Russia's interests should be "generously protected," and that, as far as possible, all vital decisions should be "held in abeyance" while Russia was "helpless in the grip of a non-representative government, whose only sanction is brutal force." On the other hand, it was "not possible for the government of the U.S. to recognize the present rulers of Russia as a government with which the relations common to friendly governments can be maintained." The responsible spokesmen of the USSR were said to have declared that the very existence of Bolshevism in Russia and the maintenance of their own rule depended on the outbreak of revolutions in all other great civilized nations, and that they intended to use every means to promote such revolutionary movements. Moreover, Colby's note added:

. . . the Bolshevik Government is itself subject to the control of a political faction with extensive international ramifications through the Third International . . . which is heavily subsidized by the Bolshevik Government from the public revenues of Russia [and] has for its openly avowed aim the promotion of Bolshevik revolutions throughout the world.⁵

In spite of this official position the colorful head of the wartime U.S. Red Cross mission in Moscow, Colonel Raymond Robins, waged a continuous one-man campaign for recognition after his return to the U.S. in June 1918. His efforts during the Harding administration, when he obtained the support of William Borah, the Senator from Idaho, were fruitless. The Colby note, "one of the most important papers in the history of American for-

eign policy," had firmly set that policy on a non-recognition course, and "undoubtedly expressed an important, although not always dominant, trend of American opinion since 1920." ⁶

Three years passed before the USSR made a premature and misguided overture to unfreeze official U.S. policy. In August 1923 a successful tour of Moscow and other Russian cities by a group of five American Congressmen led by Senator King renewed optimistic hopes on the part of both Robins and the Soviet Foreign Office.⁷ Following President Coolidge's first address to Congress in December 1923, Foreign Minister Chicherin sent him a message indicating his government's willingness to discuss "all questions raised in your message." Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes responded with a sharp rebuff on December 18, which stated flatly:

With respect to the telegram to President Coolidge from Tchitcherin of December 16th, the Secretary of State today made the following statement in reply: "There would seem to be at this time no reason for negotiations. The American Government, as the President said in his message to the Congress, is not proposing to barter away its principles. If the Soviet authorities are ready to restore the confiscated property of American citizens or make effective compensation, they can do so. If the Soviet authorities are ready to repeal their decree repudiating Russia's obligations to this country and appropriately recognize them, they can do so. It requires no conference or negotiations to accomplish these results which can and should be achieved at Moscow as evidence of good faith. The American Government has not incurred liabilities to Russia or repudiated obligations. Most serious is the continued propaganda to overthrow the institutions of this country. This Government can enter into no negotiations until these efforts directed from Moscow are abandoned." ⁸

Secretary Hughes's position that recognition would depend on payment of debts and claims was widely applauded by American newspaper editors. *The Literary Digest* observed that "the U.S. refuses to sell its honor for a pot of Russian gold." Other influential journals commended "the ring of righteous wrath" with which Hughes repeated Colby's position that the U.S. could never recognize a regime that abused the hospitality of friendly nations by sending abroad agents to foment communist revolution. The

Philadelphia Enquirer, for example, observed that "to ask us to embrace such brigands and murderers when we know that they are seeking to stab us in the back is to go on the assumption that the American people are both blind and feeble-minded." ⁹

On the day after the dispatch of Secretary Hughes's note, the State Department helped stimulate this kind of editorial reaction with the following press release, which includes the text of an American "Zinoviev letter" of instructions to the party in the U.S.:

*Press Release Issued by the Department of State,
December 19, 1923*

(For publication in the morning newspapers of December 20.)

The Department of State made public today the text of instructions given by Zinoviev, President of the Communist International and President of the Petrograd Soviet, to the Workers Party of America, the Communist organization in the United States. The Department of Justice has assured the Department of State of the authenticity of these instructions. The Communist International with headquarters at Moscow is the organ of the Communist Party for international propaganda. The Soviet regime in Russia is the organ of the Communist Party for the governing of Russia. As Steklov, member of the Russian Communist Party of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and editor of the *Izvestia*, official organ of the Soviet regime, has stated in this official paper:

"The close organic and spiritual connection between the Soviet Republic and the Communist International cannot be doubted. And even if this connection had not been admitted many times by both sides, it would be clear to everybody as an established fact. . . . This connection is not merely of a spiritual, but also of a material and palpable character. . . . The mutual solidarity of the Soviet republics and the Communist International is an accomplished fact. In the same degree as the existence and the stability of Soviet Russia are of importance to the Third International, the strengthening and the development of the Communist International is of great moment to Soviet Russia."

INSTRUCTIONS

"The Communist International notes with great satisfaction that the work of the W.P.A. [Workers Party of America] for the past year has been expressed in a satisfactory broad and real

revolutionary work. Particularly pleasing to us is the fact that all dissensions existing up to the present time in the ranks of the Party have finally been liquidated and we hope that the W.P.A., the advance guard of the revolutionary proletariat of the United States of North America, will now more successfully conduct its revolutionary work among the millions of American proletarians.

“For more intensive revolutionary work we suggest that the following instructions be adhered to:

“1. All the activity of the Party must at the present time be directed among the workers of the large industries, such as the railroad workers, miners, weavers, steel workers and similar workers engaged in the principal industries of the United States.

“2. Among these workers in the factories, mills, plantations, clubs, etc., there must be organized units of ten. The head of this unit of ten must in so far as possible be an old trusted member of the Party, who must once a week, together with his ten, study the Communist program and other revolutionary literature.

“3. These units of ten must be organized by occupation and nationality.

“4. The head of the unit must know intimately each individual member of his ten—his character, habits, the degree of his resolutionism, etc., and report everything direct to the central committee of the Party.

“5. Each of these units of ten must have their own fighting unit of not less than three men, who are appointed by the leader of the unit with the approval of the Central Committee of the Party. The members of the fighting unit in addition to all other matters, must once a week be given instructions in shooting and receive some instruction in pioneer work (sapper work).

“6. All the unit leaders of each district must meet once every two months to discuss the progress of their work and their plans for further activities in the presence of a member of the Central Committee of the Party.

“We are firmly convinced that work in the direction designated by us will give enormous results in the sense of preparing thousands of new propagandists, future leaders of the military forces of the Party and faithful fighters during the social revolution.

“With reference to the organization by the W.P.A. of the Federated Farmer Labor Party, the Communist International expresses its complete satisfaction and its approval to the Central Committee of the Party for its boldness and tact in putting this

idea into effect. We hope that the Party will step by step conquer (embrace) the proletarian forces of America and in the not distant future raise the red flag over the White House." ¹⁰

Naturally, the press release with the Zinoviev "Instructions" created a sensation. The *New York Times* carried a front-page story under the headline: HUGHES REVEALS NEW RED ORDERS FOR ACTION HERE; ZINOVIEV TELLS WORKERS' PARTY TO AIM AT FLYING RED FLAG ON THE WHITE HOUSE.¹¹

Hughes kept President Coolidge informed of each step of the action and was obviously gratified by the public response in support of his position. In a "Personal and Confidential" note to the President, he wrote in part: "The Department has a large number of communications with respect to the Russian matter and, evidently, the country is deeply stirred." ¹²

A flood of mail arrived at the State Department in response to the publication of the Zinoviev "Instructions" from patriotic organizations, private business concerns, and Russian emigré organizations, indicating widespread support for Hughes's action. But a discordant note was struck by one letter dated December 22 from Frank A. Mehling, Cleveland, Ohio, which shows that from the time of their publication there were doubts about the authenticity of the Zinoviev Instructions.

Dear Sir:

I noticed in the Press a few days ago your bitter comment on the Russian government's application to open up relations with us.

It struck me then that you were either prejudiced or not telling the truth, and since I read in this morning's paper Tchitcherin's challenge to you to produce the proof I am more than convinced that you are playing politics and of a very low sort at that.

I know one thing for certain and that is that I would rather trust men of the caliber of Tchitcherin and Lenin than men of the stamp of yourself, Fall, Dougherty, Hoover, etc., and I believe that the great majority of the people of the United States feel as I do.

If you were not making a bluff about the Russian interference in our government you will immediately have to produce the proofs to save your face, and the people will not take as a proof

any evidence of such men as the redoubtable Burns. Redoubtable is a charitable adjective to apply to him.¹³

Some members of the academic community were also disturbed by these events. In a letter to President Coolidge dated December 22, 1923, Jerome Davis of the Department of Sociology at Dartmouth College wrote:

It seems to me there is a serious inconsistency between your address to Congress about Russia and the note of Secretary Hughes to Chicherin. I believe that Mr. Hughes' statements about propaganda are based on Forgeries and have little or nothing to do with any Russian Government official. If you leave the Russian situation in its present state, as far as our country is concerned, I fear the Republican Party will suffer in the eyes of thinking people. I hope you may do something constructive.¹⁴

This letter gives a hint of the Soviet response which was immediate, angry, and perplexed. Moscow had completely misjudged American attitudes or it would not have made the bid for renewing negotiations in the first place. The story was given full and prominent coverage in both *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, the party and government newspapers. Steklov, who had been quoted in the U.S. press release on "the close organic and spiritual connection between the USSR and the Comintern," categorically denied the statements attributed to him in a lead article, "Provocateurs and Falsifiers," in *Izvestia*:

I swear that I never wrote anything comparable in either *Izvestia* or any other paper. I not only didn't write it but would be incapable of having done so. On the contrary, I affirm that on many occasions I have written the exact opposite. . . .¹⁵

For his part, Soviet Minister Chicherin denounced the Zinoviev Instructions as a "clumsy forgery" and in an "open letter" challenged the U.S. to submit the question of their authenticity to an "impartial authority" for evaluation. The Soviet newspapers pointed out that no dates or other identifying data were given for either the Steklov statement or the alleged Zinoviev Instructions.¹⁶

Chicherin's challenge was entirely ignored, but as if in reply to Steklov, the State Department promptly issued the full text of an article written by him more than a year before, for the November

7, 1922, issue of *Izvestia*, on "the 5th anniversary of the October revolution." Steklov, who had been an almost daily contributor to *Izvestia*, had walked into a carefully laid trap in denying the statement attributed to him. It had been strung together out of key phrases taken from the 1922 article (as indicated by the passages italicized in the State Department press release):

*Press Release Issued by the Department of State,
December 24, 1923*

(For publication in the morning newspapers of December 25)

REPUBLIC OF SOVIETS AND III INTERNATIONAL

"The coincidence of the date of the celebration of the 5th Anniversary of the October revolution and the opening of the 4th Congress of the Communist International is by no means an accidental or arbitrary occurrence. This coincidence has a deep significance, and flows out of the organic connection between two historical phenomena.

"The Soviet Republic celebrates today its 5th Jubilee; the Communist International convenes its 4th Congress. Thus the Communist International appears somewhat younger than its Soviet brother. And in fact, it was founded in the second year of the Soviet Republic, and, on the formal initiative and under the strong influence of the Russian Communist party. The majority of the Communist parties, entering into its composition were founded later than the Russian party. This has given cause to our enemies to affirm that the whole Communist International, as such is a creature of Moscow. But in fact it is not at all so.

"However paradoxical it may appear at the first glance, the October Revolution and the Russian Communist Party which realized it, from a broad historical point of view are themselves the product and creation of the Communist International. To be sure, as a complete and formal organization the Communist International arose later. But as an idea, it existed earlier than they. Before its formal proclamation, the Communist International existed in the consciousness of all revolutionary Marxists. Its fundamental elements were developed at the Conferences in Zimmerwald and Kienthal and in the inter-party disputes during the Imperialist War. As a categorical imperative and a directing spirit it was active long before the Constituent [sic] Congress of the III International. In particular, the Russian Bolsheviks as far back as 1914-15 looked upon themselves as part of the future III

International, acted in conformity with its principles, and in accordance with them carried out the October Revolution.

"But, however we may look upon the chronological succession of events and on their historical sequence, the very *close organic and spiritual bond between the Soviet Republic*, product of the October Revolution, *and the Communist International can not be doubted. And even if the connection had not been admitted many times by both sides, it would, nevertheless, be clear to all, and as an established fact.* It is clear to us as to our enemies.

"Comrade Kalinin in his speech at the opening of the last session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee remarked, that "in the general strength of the III Communist International, the strength of the Soviet federation has an enormous significance," and that "the workers and peasants of the Soviet Republic are one of the great component forces of the Communist International."

"That is a deep truth. The counter-revolutionary press makes sport over the Russian peasant being interested in the International. Regarding the Russian worker that press raises no quarrel. But in regard to the peasant the assertion of Kalinin is true. It is possible that the average Russian peasant has a very poor conception of just what the Communist International is, and even less understands its program. Nevertheless he knows very well about the Communist International and feels himself bound to it. Compelled for four years to defend themselves from the attacks of international capital, the Russian laboring masses on their own skin keenly felt the significance of the international solidarity of the workers. The laborers and peasant masses of the Soviet Republic, hitherto boycotted and blockaded by the Capital of the Imperialist powers understand perfectly that their daily material interests are closely bound up with the success of the International Revolutionary movement. And in this sense Russia is now the country most internationalistically inclined in its broadest masses.

"On this side the very close bond between the Soviet Republic and the Communist International is not subject to doubt. *This connection is not only of a spiritual, but also of a material and palpable character.* On its side the Communist International in the same measure is spiritually and materially connected with Soviet Russia. It is not a question of material support, about which the bourgeois press makes so much noise, and which, in the largest part, belongs to the realms of myths. In any case the material support, which, for instance, the workers of all countries extended

to the Soviet Republic during the famine of last year, is not less than the support extended by the Russian Communist Party to fraternal parties abroad.

"Of course, in event of the possibility arising, both sides will extend to each other the maximum assistance. But at present it is a question of a bond of another sort, preeminently of a spiritual political character.

"The Communist International rests on Soviet Russia. The very fact of the existence of the Socialist Republic, for five years repulsing attacks from all sides, maintains the revolutionary state of mind of the international proletariat and does not permit it to become depressed in its difficult moments, inspires it to unwearied struggle, assists the workers' organization everywhere. In the Soviet Republic the International proletariat has an inaccessible stronghold in which the elaboration of the international Communist Program and tactics is proceeding, and where the systematic accumulation of creative proletariat experience and the construction of a proletariat state are going on. Here there is a real asylum for all those who fight for social revolution, whither they can seek shelter from the vindictive persecution of the bourgeoisie and where they can in practice acquaint themselves with the process of the construction of a Communist society.

"The mutual solidarity of the Soviet Republics and the Communist International is an accomplished fact. In the same degree as the existence and the stability of Soviet Russia are of importance to the III International, the development and strengthening of the Communist International is of importance to Soviet Russia. In the past the International has helped Russia to ward off the attacks of world Capital. In the future its aid will prove more effective. The success of the Communist International will contribute to the consolidation of the political and economic position of Soviet Russia, and vice versa. The spiritual, moral, and material bond between them is based on the complete solidarity of interests."

"That is why the idea of opening the 4th Congress of the Communist International on the day of the celebration of the anniversary of the October Revolution was a happy one. It is a symbol, full of deep significance, speaking equally convincingly for enemies and for friends."¹⁷

As a result of Senator Borah's prodding, the Senate appointed a committee to inquire into recognition and Borah spoke in favor of it in the Senate on January 7, 1924, but to no avail. Robins had testified before an earlier (1919) Senate committee investigat-

ing communist propaganda, and in July 1926 he wrote an eloquent plea for recognition which likewise fell on deaf ears.¹⁸ Although the Red Scare in America also died a lingering death after the death of Lenin in 1924, the legacy of the Hughes note remained. As tersely summarized by George F. Kennan:

On this now corrupted and dubious foundation, the U.S. policy of nonrecognition continued to rest throughout the Republican era, down to the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933. F.D.R. . . . had as little interest in collecting debts from Russia as he did in Soviet propaganda or in the theory of the Soviet outlook on international affairs. He therefore promptly yielded the U.S. position on both issues, the valid one and the dubious one alike, and conceded to Moscow the recognition it sought without obtaining satisfaction on either count.¹⁹

Evaluation of the Zinoviev Instructions

1. *The Contemporary Problem.* How should the Soviet charge that the Zinoviev Instructions, now an integral part of the U.S. government's official documents series, *Foreign Relations of the United States*,²⁰ are a forgery be evaluated? The question is complex and there may be no definitive answer. At the time, in the absence of any "hard" evidence, the "Instructions" were either accepted as authentic simply because they were issued as part of an official government press release, or were viewed with skepticism. In Congress, Senators Borah and Norris were quick to point out that no proof that the alleged instructions were genuine had been offered by the U.S. government.²¹

The argument is a telling one. Although the authenticity of the Zinoviev Instructions was challenged, neither the State Department nor the Department of Justice ever produced anything that it claimed to be an "original" document or even a copy of an alleged original. Furthermore, none of what may be called normal pre-content data were shown, that is, no date, letterhead, addressee, signatures, etc., were ever produced, either at the time of the press release or later. Chicherin's challenge to submit the question of authenticity to an impartial "third party" or tribunal was also totally ignored. On the other hand, the Instructions might have been obtained through intelligence sources that could have required protection. For example, if they had been obtained by a Justice

Department agent who had infiltrated the so-called Workers party, such a source would have required protection for his own personal security. Moreover, if the identity of such a presumed agent had been revealed, he would have been of no further service to the Bureau of Investigation (now the FBI). Again, if the Instructions had been acquired through our own or a friendly government's intelligence agency, such a source would also have required similar protection according to standard "operational security" procedures.

2. *The Historical Record: Direct Evidence.* What evidence, for or against the authenticity of the Zinoviev Instructions, may be found in the National Archives today, some forty-odd years after they were so successfully exploited by Secretary of State Hughes to strengthen his stand against diplomatic recognition of the USSR? The answer, briefly summarized, is "surprisingly little," but what there is indicates that the Zinoviev Instructions have a very dubious pedigree indeed.

First, it should be noted that diligent search by the author and by the highly competent staff of research experts at the National Archives has failed to produce any "original" set of Instructions or even an alleged copy of such a document. Nothing more than copies of the press release remain in the files over which the State Department (and the National Archives) have jurisdiction.

Second, the press release stated that "the Department of Justice has assured the Department of State of the authenticity of these Instructions." Although descriptive records of all correspondence were carefully kept, there is no indication that any communication specifically evaluating the Zinoviev Instructions ever passed between the two departments. The action may have been handled by telephone, in personal conversation, or simply "hand carried." Nevertheless, the total absence of any memorandum indicating a careful evaluation of the Instructions is to say the least surprising.

Third, as previously noted, the affair was of such importance to Secretary of State Hughes that he kept President Coolidge informed during both the planning and operational stages of the action. On December 8, eleven days before the story broke, he sent a "Personal and Confidential" letter to Coolidge giving him the background of his contemplated action and summarizing the

contents of the press release that was published with the note to Chicherin on December 19-20. The note indicates that there was an enclosure, which may well have been whatever copy of the alleged Instructions was available in the State Department.

Significantly, the enclosure is missing from the Coolidge papers. Did Hughes later request that it be returned? Probably not, or the request would have been included in the letter, as was the case with other similar notes. In any case, the enclosure is not in the Hughes papers either.²² The fact that this key document is missing, when similar enclosures to comparable letters remain in either the Coolidge papers or State Department files, is to say the least extraordinary.

Fourth, for reasons of "operational security," Hughes may have felt obliged to publish the Instructions without any of the normal pre-content data (such as dates, signatures, etc.), which would have compromised an intelligence or counter-intelligence (Bureau of Investigation) source. But in such cases surely the President of the United States could have been trusted with specific background information as to how the Instructions were "seized" or "received" and evidence of their authenticity. None of this vital information is included in Hughes's letter to Coolidge mentioned above. In this confidential advance memorandum on the Zinoviev Instructions, the President was given no more information than was later released to the man in the street, unless, of course, such data were put in the missing enclosure!

3. *Indirect Evidence: Possible Intelligence or Counter-Intelligence Sources.* As previously noted, the two most probable channels through which the State Department acquired the Zinoviev Instructions were its own Intelligence Service (I.S.) reports, or through counter-intelligence operations conducted at that time by the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice. Let us examine the evidence in the National Archives with respect to each of these channels as a source of the missing document.

First, it should be noted that the sensational *New York Times* story on the Zinoviev Instructions contains the following statement (undoubtedly provided by an official source):

It is understood that the State Department is in position to furnish other documents showing that those in control in Moscow have not given up their original purpose of destroying existing

government [sic] whenever they can do so throughout the world. The facts [sic] stressed by the State Department are understood to indicate that if the efforts of the Moscow regime in this direction have been lessened in intensity during the past year it has only been by the reduction of the cash resources at their disposal.²³

These "other documents" were never made public, but Hughes made a strenuous effort to get them through Intelligence Service channels, and to obtain permission for their release and publication. The principal source of intelligence on the USSR and communist affairs at that time was the U.S. Consulate in Riga, Latvia. The State Department files contain literally hundreds of I.S. reports (signed Coleman) obtained principally through collaboration with British intelligence, which apparently controlled several agent networks staffed mainly by Russian emigrés. Such agents crossed the Russian border in both directions with some frequency, and their reports were highly regarded by both the British Foreign Office and the U.S. Department of State. Collaboration between the two intelligence services in Riga had been formally established three years earlier in 1920. Since the agent networks were controlled by a friendly power, the State Department was obliged to request the permission of British intelligence before releasing to the public any information received through its Riga I.S. station. A lively interchange of cablegrams between Secretary of State Hughes and Coleman (the American I.S. station chief in Riga) indicates that some of the "other documents" showing Comintern activities in the United States came from Riga. In April 1923 the Latvian police had searched the personal effects of a Comintern courier by the name of Katayama, obtaining an ingenious cipher key and other standard espionage materials. Hughes urgently requested Coleman to obtain the consent of British intelligence to use some of these materials as a basis of further sensational exposures similar to the Zinoviev Instructions. In order to protect their sources, the British politely refused, and no such revelations were made. The so-called "Katayama documents" have remained buried in the National Archives ever since.²⁴

For their part, the Soviets were apparently at a complete loss as to the source through which the U.S. obtained the Zinoviev

Instructions. They of course made an effort to find out. As a major emigré and espionage center, Riga, Latvia, was suspected as the point of origin by the INOGPU, the Foreign Section of the Soviet Security Police (GPU). Instructions were sent to Vigdor Kopp, the Soviet representative at Riga, to find out whatever he could about the presumed source. However, these instructions were reportedly leaked to the various intelligence services in Latvia with the result that the American representative, Coleman, believed that they were deliberately compromised to support the Soviet propaganda claim that all such Comintern revelations were based on forgeries.²⁵

The evidence thus briefly summarized strongly suggests that Secretary Hughes may have obtained the Zinoviev Instructions through I.S. channels, specifically through the Riga station. But the indirect evidence to the contrary is impressive. For obvious document control and security reasons, a meticulous logbook or record was kept of all State Department communications dealing with Soviet affairs. Prior to their publication there is absolutely no indication in the record (called "Purport Book") of any diplomatic communications dealing with the Zinoviev Instructions, and a search of the relevant cable files to and from Latvia reveals nothing.²⁶ The possibility exists that such traffic may have been removed from the record files "for security reasons," but this is most unlikely. There is no open indication of such transfer in the logbook, and if the removal were done secretly, the entire register for the years concerned (1923-1924) would have to have been recopied in order to cover up such a transfer.²⁷

In conclusion then, it stands to reason that contrary to expectation (and presumably Soviet suspicions) the Zinoviev Instructions came from a Department of Justice source. (At that time the counter-intelligence or security police functions of the department were part of the mission of the Bureau of Investigation.)

This hypothetical conclusion not only "stands to reason," but is also confirmed by the last two entries (Nos. 212-13, p. 25) in the State Department Purport Book or "List of Papers" dealing with "Bolshevik propaganda-U.S.," File No. 811.00B, reproduced on the next page:

212	Justice Dept.	Aug. 30,	Confidential File	Workers' Party of America; quotes in- structions to-by Zinovieff.
213	Justice Dept.	Dec. 20,	Confidential File	Gives further information regarding above instructions

The first entry, No. 212, has been officially described as "a copy of letter of August 30, 1923, from W. J. Burns, Director of the Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, to Norman Armour [Assistant Under-Secretary], Department of State (Record Group 59, Department of State Decimal File 811.00B/212). The Burns letter relates to a letter of instruction from Zinovieff to the Workers' Party of America."²⁸ (The second entry, No. 213, is undoubtedly a follow-up letter from the same source.)

These Burns letters are almost certainly the key documents on which Hughes's note and press release were based. As historical records, then, by every rule of reason and logic, they should belong to the State Department and form part of its important collection. (Indeed, as in the case of similar documents, the Burns letters presumably bear stamps such as, "Received in the Eastern European Division," and "Return to E.E.," indicating the department's proprietary interest in them.)

However, reason and logic seldom rule in bureaucratic disputes over the retention of documents, and since the Burns letters originated with the Bureau of Investigation, the FBI now claims jurisdiction over them.²⁹

Three separate requests were made to the FBI that the Burns letters "be declassified and released for access to historians and social scientists in the interests of academic freedom and the free pursuit of knowledge." The requests recognized that "at the time these letters were written [1923], it may well have been necessary to keep them classified as a matter of 'operational security' to

protect the source who provided the Bureau of Investigation with the 'Zinoviev Instructions.' However, after forty-two years, this source is presumably long since dead or has left the service and no longer requires such protection."³⁰

The requests were flatly refused by the FBI. The third request stated in part that "if after all these years the FBI still refuses to release the Burns letters when there are no valid operational security grounds for such refusal, this act will in itself be taken as evidence that the 'Zinoviev letters' are probably a fabrication. It will thus appear that the FBI is determined retroactively to cover up the understandable mistakes of a Bureau chief who operated forty-two years ago with commendable zeal but, in the case of the so-called 'Zinoviev Instructions,' with apparently a naive conception of what is required to establish the authenticity of suspect documents."³¹

Although the FBI may attempt to block the free pursuit of knowledge by denying access to the Burns letters, there are enough pieces of the puzzle left in the public domain that a logical whole may be reconstructed from them.

First, we know that the Burns letter of August 30, 1923, to the State Department must have included at least a copy of the alleged Zinoviev Instructions, since that was its subject matter. Second, Secretary of State Hughes's press release states flatly: "The Department of Justice has assured the Department of State of the authenticity of these instructions." Hence, the Burns letter must, at the very least, have included a statement to the effect that the Bureau of Investigation had received the Instructions "from a usually reliable source." Third, Hughes was challenged by both Senators Borah and Norris to produce an original document or any other "hard" evidence of authenticity. He failed to do so. He also ignored Soviet Foreign Minister Chicherin's challenge to produce such evidence and to submit the problem of authenticity to an impartial third party or court for decision. Forty-two years later, when any "operational security" considerations have long since vanished, the FBI also refuses access to the Burns letters by historians and social scientists. Together these factors are convincing (if indirect) evidence that neither the Bureau of Investigation nor the State Department ever had an original or even an authenticated copy of the Zinoviev Instructions. Fourth, instead

of making a careful evaluation and content analysis of the alleged Instructions, both the State and Justice Departments simply accepted them as "authentic" because of a blind trust in the reliability of the "confidential" source or agent who provided them. Let us turn now to some of the possible sources that such an evaluation would have revealed (if it had been made).

The Burns letter which transmits (i.e., "quotes") the alleged Zinoviev Instructions is dated August 30, 1923, but they were not released to the press until December 20. This gave the responsible officials and "experts" in the Eastern European Division of the State Department ample time (three and a half months) to study the Instructions and evaluate them by comparing them with the content of communist propaganda and what was known about the current tactics of the party. It should be emphasized that the State Department's case against recognizing the USSR was based in part on official objection to the flood of communist propaganda emanating from the Comintern in Moscow and from the local Communist party, which was then called the Worker's Party of America and which published a weekly newspaper, *The Worker*. Monitoring such propaganda was a departmental function, and from time to time Secretary of State Hughes sent President Coolidge personal notes including examples of it. When the alleged Zinoviev Instructions were received in the State Department (August 30, 1923), even a cursory content analysis of current communist publications would have indicated open sources from which parts of the Instructions could have been fabricated or pieced together. For example, according to *The Worker*, at the IVth Comintern Congress which had met in Moscow (November-December 1922), "Zinoviev praised the activity of the Worker's Party of America which showed that it had the insight and the will to lead the workers."³² On August 25 (five days before the Bureau of Investigation sent the alleged Instructions to the State Department) Zinoviev had expressed Comintern satisfaction with the W.P.A. in an open letter to *The Worker* stressing the need to convert the paper from a weekly to a daily. The first paragraph of this letter is reproduced below in parallel columns with the opening paragraph of the alleged Zinoviev Instructions:

THE WORKER

Dear Comrades—It is with great pleasure that the Communist International has learned of the progress that the Workers Party has made in the past few months. We are especially gratified at the militant spirit that has manifested itself in the Party since the Second Convention in December, 1922. The unity of spirit, the determination to work and the understanding of the path to be trodden and the general tactics to be applied, augur that, in the near future, the Workers Party will mature to one of the truly Communist mass parties of the world.

INSTRUCTIONS

The Communist International notes with great satisfaction that the work of the W.P.A. for the past year has been expressed in a satisfactory broad and real revolutionary work. Particularly pleasing to us is the fact that all dissensions existing up to the present time in the ranks of the Party have finally been liquidated and we hope that the W.P.A., the advance guard of the revolutionary proletariat of the United States of North America will now more successfully conduct its revolutionary work among the millions of American proletarians.

As chief of the Comintern, Zinoviev frequently sent similar exhortations to the member parties of the organization. Such propaganda blasts and calls to “intensified revolutionary work” were designed to raise morale. They were not taken seriously as estimates of current revolutionary capabilities by other Communist leaders in Moscow or by leaders of the local parties to which such stirring appeals were addressed. For example, Leon Trotsky was foremost among the Kremlin leaders in promoting the militant concept of “Permanent Revolution” by Communist parties abroad. But even Trotsky’s estimate of the revolutionary potential in the United States was very pessimistic indeed. In a leading article in *The Worker* for August 18, 1923, Trotsky wrote:

America came out of the war not enfeebled but strengthened. The internal stability of the American bourgeoisie is still very considerable. It is reducing its dependence on the European market to a minimum. *The revolution in America—considered apart from Europe—may be a matter of decades.* [Italics added.]

Trotsky’s low estimate of the revolutionary capabilities of the party in the U.S. was shared by one of the prominent Amer-

ican Communist leaders, James P. Cannon. After spending six months with the executive committee of the Comintern, Cannon had returned to the U.S. and embarked on a five-month speaking tour during which he surveyed the local parties everywhere. Writing in *The Worker* for September 1, 1923, he concluded:

If we cannot find the grounds for the optimistic hope expressed by Comrade Zinoviev in his letter that "In the near future the Workers' Party will mature to one of the truly Communist mass parties of the world," we can say, confidently, that the party is going forward at a good rate of speed, and that it will give a good account of itself in the next year.

Even Cannon's modest forecast proved overoptimistic. In the 1924 presidential elections the Communist candidates, William Z. Foster and Benjamin Gitlow, received only 36,000 votes.³³ Faced with this crushing defeat, Zinoviev himself reportedly exclaimed: "Probably there are fewer than 5,000 Communists in America upon whom we can really depend."³⁴

Given these facts, it is difficult to believe that responsible officials in either the Bureau of Investigation or the State Department could accept the last sentence of the alleged Zinoviev Instructions as genuine: "We hope that the Party will step by step conquer (embrace) the proletarian forces of America and in the not distant future raise the red flag over the White House." The new tactical line called for in the alleged Zinoviev Instructions—a return to illegal or underground work with an emphasis on paramilitary training—should have immediately raised the suspicions of the "experts on communism" in both the Bureau of Investigation and the State Department.

During the 1919-1920 Red Scare the Communist party had been reduced "to a cottage industry" and had been driven underground. By 1923 it was just beginning to emerge again, a comeback symbolized by the successful campaign to publish a daily *Worker* beginning with the issue of January 13, 1924. However, it was certainly in no shape in the summer of 1923 to begin intensified secret military training for a revolutionary seizure of power as called for in the alleged Zinoviev Instructions. Such tactics, if pursued, would only have resulted in further repression. In fact, by August 1923 the party had been placing increased emphasis on open or legal rather than clandestine activities. As it

did so, "Its followers soon forgot most of their absurdities, dropped their ridiculous Russian titles, and dispensed with their wild revolutionary tirades. . . . Their emphasis was no longer so much on revolution as on 'questions of bread and butter, on housing, on labor organization, on wages and hours.'" ³⁵

These facts were well known by both the Bureau of Investigation and State Department experts and should have weighed heavily against the credibility of the alleged Zinoviev Instructions. Asked to comment on them, Robert J. Branigan, an ex-federal agent who had worked for the Bureau of Investigation within the Communist party, made his own evaluation in a lengthy, obviously well-informed statement for the *New York World* (January 6, 1924):

The idea of the Communist Party in America engaging in shooting practice and raising the red flag over the White House by armed revolution is a farce; there is a real radical menace, but it is not that. . . . The aim of the Communists is primarily to overthrow the capitalist system. That this would mean overthrowing the government too, is secondary with them. They are working toward their aim not in a military way but by means of education and manipulation within all radical and labor organizations—and any other organizations they can get a foothold in for that matter. . . . They want a revolution and they teach that violence will be necessary, but they know perfectly well that they can never win by force of arms and so they have adopted the plan of working within other organizations to create conditions out of which chaos and revolution might grow.

Referring specifically to the alleged Zinoviev Instructions, Branigan observed:

It is true that the Communist Party is organized by groups of ten, as stated in the Hughes document, but I'll have to be shown before I will believe that it is planning any shooting. Instructions received from Zinovieff while I was working in the Communist organization were all along the line I have described. In the first place, the entire Communist Party in America does not number 3000. A quarter of the force of the New York police could handle any "armed revolution" they could put up. . . .

The Zinovieff document given out by Secretary Hughes is in most respects a very typical one. Zinovieff's remarks about "dissensions having been liquidated" refers to splits in the party . . .

and the W.P.A. that he speaks of is the Workers' Party through which the Communists work for political purposes. The fifth paragraph, however, directing "shooting practice" was not in the instructions sent us by Zinovieff, with which I am well acquainted. The term "fighting unit" was often used, but it means the men who were to go out and do the hard work—that is, the fighting in the trade unions. "Social revolution" was often spoken of, and the Communists admit that revolution means violence, but they have no illusions about being able to bring about revolution by violence. They are going at it in another way.³⁶

Finally, even if Zinoviev had decided that the time was ripe for the Workers Party of America to go into intensive secret training for a revolutionary seizure of power, it is most unlikely that he would have risked putting inflammatory instructions to this effect in writing. The Comintern was well aware that the Workers party had been penetrated by agents (such as Branigan) of the Bureau of Investigation. Rather than take a chance that written orders would be seen and exposed by federal agents within the party ranks, it would have been much more sensible and secure to have them transmitted verbally by a trusted courier, or by an American Communist leader, such as James P. Cannon, who had recently served with the executive committee of the Comintern in Moscow.

As noted above, Secretary of State Hughes refused to be satisfied with anything less than irrefutable authentication of the "other documents" exposing Comintern activities which he planned to use. But he apparently accepted the Zinoviev Instructions as genuine simply because they were received by the Bureau of Investigation from a "usually reliable source." Such acceptance implies either a willful suspension of disbelief, since Hughes wanted very much to exploit the Instructions to support his position, or a naive trust in intelligence sources, which is decidedly misplaced in a Secretary of State. Perhaps both of these factors entered into the picture. Time and again the history of frauds and forgeries illustrates that a will to believe on the part of the receiver will make almost any alleged "document" acceptable. The Zinoviev Instructions were both "too good to be true" and "too good not to be used." Unfortunately, these are precisely the characteristics of suspect documents that should indicate the greatest caution.

6

THE BRITISH ZINOVIEV LETTER: An Intelligence Evaluation

O N OCTOBER 9, 1924, the British Parliament was dissolved and the Labor government of James Ramsay MacDonald (who also held the post of Foreign Secretary) was plunged into an election campaign, the third in two years. A day later, on October 10, unknown to either MacDonald or his Conservative opponent, Stanley Baldwin, British intelligence in London acquired a highly suspect document, the so-called Zinoviev letter. Its publication by the Foreign Office during the last week of the campaign caused a tremendous sensation, added fuel to a growing "Red Scare," and rightly or wrongly was blamed by MacDonald for the defeat of the Labor government at the polls on October 29.

The document was signed "Zinoviev," the head of the Communist International, or Comintern, and purported to be a typical appeal to the British Communist party "to stir up the masses of the proletariat" and to increase the tempo of propaganda and organization in the army and navy so that in case of war it would be possible, hopefully, "to paralyze all the military preparations of the *bourgeoisie* and make a start in turning an imperialist war into a class war."

The confused circumstances surrounding the publication of the Zinoviev letter and the inflammatory charges made during

the heat of the election campaign quickly caused it to become a *cause célèbre* in British political life. Moreover, the incident had important international repercussions. As summarized by George F. Kennan, "the Zinoviev letter episode set back the normalization of Anglo-Soviet diplomatic exchanges for just about five years."¹ A series of inconclusive inquiries and parliamentary questions in the three years following the incident merely added to the controversy. Finally, on March 19, 1928, after a full day of heated debate in the House of Commons, a Labor motion for a full inquiry was defeated by a vote of 326 to 132. The Conservatives were thus able to sweep the controversy under the rug, so to speak, in spite of MacDonald's impassioned charge in putting the motion that the letter "was the subject of what is generally admitted to be a political fraud—a fraud perhaps unmatched in its cold calculation and preparation in our political history."²

Historians have heretofore treated the Zinoviev episode as an exclusively Foreign Office affair, concentrating on MacDonald's dual role as Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary in handling (or mishandling) the matter.³ This traditional approach overlooks the important consideration that the Zinoviev letter was first and foremost a matter of intelligence processing and action. As a result of this processing, the suspect document was forwarded to the political side of the Foreign Office and Sir Eyre Crowe, the permanent civil service head of the Foreign Office, sent it on to MacDonald. It was published, with a strong note of protest, on October 25, during the last week of the election campaign. The key figure in this chain of events, the chief of the British Foreign Office Intelligence Division, has been entirely overlooked by historians. He has never been named. By long established British tradition, both his anonymity has been protected and his crucial role covered up, even in the heat of the parliamentary debates and the bitterness of partisan controversy stirred up by the affair.

Although intelligence operations are closely guarded secrets in British public affairs, nevertheless by careful examination of the historical record it is possible to reconstruct a close approximation or model of what took place. Such an examination should serve to cast new light on MacDonald's handling of the affair by demonstrating the narrow limits imposed on his actions by the agency responsible for his being "seized with the problem" in

the first place. Both as Prime Minister and as Foreign Secretary, MacDonald had to rely on the British intelligence community for the information (or lack of it) on which he based his actions. The available evidence indicates that, like President Kennedy during the Bay of Pigs incident, MacDonald was badly served by a key element in that community, in his case by the Intelligence Division of the British Foreign Office.

In theory, the intelligence agencies of the great powers are staffed by both civil servants and military officials, a combined staff of technicians, research analysts, and area experts who serve the national interest impartially, without regard to partisan political interest or prejudice. They are literally the first line of defense of the modern state. As civil servants they expect and usually receive protection from outside political pressures. In the U.S., for example, even the late Senator Joseph McCarthy, in his self-appointed communist-hunting mission, was unable to make effective inroads against CIA or military intelligence personnel. (Abandoned by their chief, John Foster Dulles, such individuals in the Department of State were less fortunate in this regard.) But intelligence personnel are not impersonal machines; they are human beings, and when political passions and tension run high, in bitterly contested national elections, for example, or in crises which threaten war, they are inevitably caught up in the atmosphere of the period. For this reason the political conditions which prevailed in England on October 10, 1924, when the Zinoviev letter arrived in the Intelligence Division of the British Foreign Office, are important, as they undoubtedly affected the processing and handling of this explosive document.

One of the first diplomatic acts of the Labor government had been to extend *de jure* recognition to the Soviet Union on February 1, 1924. In the intervening months before the election, it had negotiated with the USSR both a commercial and a general treaty aimed at settling outstanding issues and providing the basis of a loan to the Soviet government. The treaty also contained a clause affirming the intention of both powers to live in peace and friendship and to refrain from acts (meaning propaganda and agitation) endangering the tranquility of either or embittering their relations with other nations. The treaty had not yet been ratified by Parliament and became one of the two main issues of

the 1924 election campaign. The other issue was socialism. The Conservative strategy was to hammer away at the idea that the Labor party was a tool of the world communist movement. The press, largely Conservative, mounted a heavy-handed "Red Scare" campaign during the last week of the campaign, and *Punch* carried a cartoon which, under the caption "On the Loan Trail," depicted a Russian in the guise of a dirty sandwich-man carrying placards reading "Vote for MacDonald and Me." ⁴

The Conservative argument that all socialists and communists are fellow-travelers on the same bus leading to Soviet world domination led an indignant cabinet official to point out that a communist "is no more a Left Wing Labor man than a Mohammedan is a Left Wing member of the Church of England." ⁵ Keeping in mind the "Red Scare" atmosphere that prevailed when the Zinoviev letter arrived at the Intelligence Division on Friday, October 10, 1924, let us reconstruct what happened to it.

First, on Saturday the 11th, as a matter of mutual interest, information copies of the letter were presumably distributed to the other intelligence agencies concerned for evaluation. MacDonald, in his statement to the House of Commons, is explicit on this point: "The circulation that took place was not a circulation between political departments, but circulation between the Intelligence sub-departments of the various big offices concerned." He later named these offices specifically—the Home Office (controlling the Secret Service and roughly equivalent to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation), the Admiralty Office (U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence), and the War Office (U.S. Army Intelligence, G-2). ⁶ (There is an indication in a parliamentary question by Colonel J. C. Wedgwood that the War Office did not receive its copy until October 22, which, if true, is evidence that circulation was either deliberately held up in Foreign Office Intelligence or put on a very low priority routine basis.) ⁷

Next, according to MacDonald's record, "Inquiries began to be pursued regarding the letter on the 11th." In other words, each of the intelligence agencies began to evaluate the suspect document to determine whether it was authentic or a forgery. How was it assessed? Here again, MacDonald is explicit: ". . . I say that the heads of the Intelligence Departments who received that letter thought it was nonsense, that they described it to me later

as 'blank' . . . tripe." (In deference to public sensibilities, MacDonald suggested that the honorable members of Parliament could "supply the adjective themselves.")⁸ This kind of agreement among rival intelligence agencies is remarkable. The consensus of the intelligence community was that the Zinoviev letter was a fake. Moreover, this was not a careless evaluation. It was made only after thorough study of the suspect document by a number of technical experts in all four branches. We know from the parliamentary record that in one of the intelligence agencies the Zinoviev letter was examined by no fewer than seven persons, and, having been dismissed as a routine forgery, was not even brought to the attention of the military heads of the department.⁹ This evidence, presented by Colonial Secretary James H. Thomas, was never challenged by the Conservative government, and probably corresponds very closely to the facts, so far as the intelligence processing of the Zinoviev letter is concerned.

Also noteworthy is the fact that British intelligence had already had a considerable backlog of experience with similar suspect documents, which made the task of evaluating the Zinoviev letter relatively simple and routine. In this regard MacDonald later observed that:

. . . no controversy of our time has enlisted the services of a greater number of blackguards than the Russian controversy. Documents were flying about like leaves, and in refreshing my memory, as I have during the last week, with some letters, memoranda and notes that I have under very careful lock and key, I was amazed to discover the number of photographs of forged documents which I have had come into my possession from time to time, and the forgery of which was so plain on the face of them.¹⁰

British intelligence was fully aware of the existence both at home and abroad of political organizations working as forgery centers for producing such documents as the Zinoviev letter. After the election defeat MacDonald warned his colleagues in Commons:

If it falls to the lot of any hon. Member to have any authority at the Foreign Office and to look into the authenticity or otherwise of the origin of documents relating to the present Russian situation, the very first thing he will come across is an elab-

orate, an unbelievable . . . a hellish system of forgery, of lies, of corruption, of all manner of things. [Interruption.] There is a centre in London, one in Amsterdam, one in Warsaw; there is a centre in Reval, and so on. . . .¹¹

MacDonald's successor as Foreign Minister, Austen Chamberlain, in response to a specific question about such forgery centers in London (called "paper mills" in current intelligence jargon), replied that "His Majesty's Government are well aware of the existence of agencies for forgery and are not deceived by them."¹²

From the above evidence we know that the British intelligence community regarded the Zinoviev letter as worthless, as one of many similar forgeries that had come to its attention. The evaluation processing began on Saturday the 11th. When was it completed? (As will be seen later, this point is important.) Probably not on the first day, nor on the following Monday the 13th, when we know from MacDonald's careful record that "the responsible official in the Foreign Office [the Intelligence Division] made up his mind that he should regard the matter as a 'live affair.'"¹³ In other words, an Intelligence Division official, presumably at the top level, decided to forward the Zinoviev letter to the political side of the Foreign Office *before it had been properly evaluated*.¹⁴ There is no other rational explanation of why the document was sent forward instead of being filed in the "dead file" along with other similar worthless documents on which no official action would be necessary. Presumably the same Intelligence Division official recognized the explosive political potential of the Zinoviev letter and sent it forward "for information only," to alert the responsible officials on the political side of the Foreign Office. (There is a remote possibility that the Zinoviev letter had already been evaluated as a forgery, and that the Intelligence Division official deliberately removed the evaluation before sending it forward. Such an act of gross malfeasance or sabotage on the part of a responsible intelligence officer in the British Civil Service is, to say the least, most unlikely.)

In any case, since it was a classified document requiring special handling, the Zinoviev letter was "registered in" from the Intelligence Division and received in the Foreign Office proper on October 14. According to MacDonald, "It was not until the

morning of the 14th that it was decided that the letter was of such a nature as to be ultimately communicated to me—not at that time; not to be communicated to me on the 14th, but ultimately to be communicated to me.” MacDonald first saw the Zinoviev letter among the papers in “several despatch bags” when he arrived in Manchester (in the midst of his electioneering trip) about midnight on the 15th. This means that in fact the responsible action officers who received the unevaluated “information copy” of the Zinoviev letter on the morning of the 14th had at least a day and a half to decide what to do with it. (The train time from London to Manchester is roughly four to five hours, and we know that the despatch bags were there about midnight on the 15th.)

What action did these responsible officers take on this explosive document which had been under close scrutiny to determine its authenticity for at least three and a half days (the 11th, 13th, 14th, and 15th)? The record is clear: first, it was sent on to MacDonald, who was in the midst of a strenuous and absorbing election campaign, without any “red flag,” marker, or covering memorandum to call it to his attention and to alert him to its politically explosive potential. Second, at a time when a professional intelligence evaluation must certainly have been completed within the Intelligence Division of the Foreign Office (and possibly in all four agencies of the British intelligence community), it was sent to MacDonald *without any evaluation whatever of its authenticity*. MacDonald is explicit on this point: “I never had a particle of evidence one way or the other, presented to me before I came back from the election.”¹⁵ Although it was already after midnight on the 15th, before going to bed MacDonald went to work immediately on the Zinoviev letter and wrote the Foreign Office that the letter “assuming that it was authentic and that its authenticity was proved, ought to be dealt with definitely, decisively, and without any shilly-shallying.” He recommended publication of a protest note to the USSR, which he then drafted, requesting “that the greatest care would have to be taken in discovering whether the letter was authentic or not. If it was authentic, it had to be published at once.”

MacDonald’s draft of the protest note and his instructions to obtain a careful evaluation of authenticity before publication

went back to the Foreign Office on the 16th. A revised draft of the protest note was sent to him on the 21st, which means that the case folder remained in the Foreign Office for at least four days (from the 17th through the 20th). *During these four days the responsible Foreign Office officials, i.e., the action officers on the case, although specifically instructed to do so by their chief, failed to obtain and attach to the file any intelligence evaluation of this explosive document from any one of the four intelligence agencies to which the Zinoviev letter had circulated!*

In retrospect, the kindest thing to be said about this failure to obtain an intelligence evaluation of the Zinoviev letter and to inform MacDonald at once is that it represents gross incompetence or bumbling inexcusable at the top level of any civil service bureaucracy. This pattern persisted throughout the week. Although the revised protest note left the Foreign Office for MacDonald's approval at Port Talbot (a designated point on the Prime Minister's itinerary), he was gone that day and actually did not deal with it until about midnight on the 22nd. He made some changes in the wording because, in his own words, "It did not appear to be strong enough or pointed enough to meet the circumstances. Therefore, I sent it back, and it reached the Foreign Office on the 24th."¹⁶

MacDonald did not initial this second revision of the protest note (which would have been the normal indication of approval), and was clearly expecting to receive it back again with proofs of authenticity before anything was published.¹⁷ Not only did MacDonald not receive proofs of authenticity, but publication took place without his prior knowledge or approval. The decision to publish was made on Friday the 24th by Sir Eyre Crowe, the permanent civil service head of the Foreign Office. The next morning, the 25th, in a sensational article from an official release, the London *Times* carried the text of the Zinoviev letter and the second revised draft of the protest note, signed by J. D. Gregory, the head of the Russian (or Northern) Section of the Foreign Office. The protest note was addressed to Christian Rakovsky, the Soviet charge d'affaires in London. The protest note thus signed by a Foreign Office official implied approval of publication by MacDonald and established the authenticity of the Zinoviev letter in the public mind. Publication was thus an irreversible step and

ensured that the most serious interpretation would be placed on this diplomatic and political "bombshell."

It is also clear that MacDonald was never warned by any of his Foreign Office staff about the politically explosive consequences of either withholding or publishing the Zinoviev letter. Two of his Cabinet members, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Snowden, and the Colonial Secretary, James H. Thomas, telephoned him the morning the story appeared in the *Times*, and he obviously had not been briefed on the strange series of events which had been taking place in London during his absence. Snowden reports in his memoirs that "He [MacDonald] still did not know whether it was a fake or genuine," but "he was making inquiries and would refer to the matter in a speech" ¹⁸ at Swansea that evening. According to Mr. Thomas' emphatic testimony, repeated for emphasis, the Prime Minister telegraphed London to ascertain the facts concerning publication and "received a reply from the Foreign Office saying, 'You initialled it.' He knew he had not." ¹⁹ No wonder that MacDonald was speechless at Swansea, and delayed making any comment on the letter until Monday afternoon, October 27, in a speech at Cardiff. Even then, he had still received no evaluation from the Foreign Office and it is understandable that the Liberal, Lord Asquith, said of MacDonald's Cardiff speech that he could not remember "a more distracted, incoherent, unilluminating statement in the whole of his political life." ²⁰

MacDonald had left two trusted political officers, Sir Henry Ponsonby and Lord Haldane, in charge of the Foreign Office during his election tour. They were not informed when the protest note was signed by Gregory and the text released for publication. According to Colonial Secretary J. H. Thomas, Gregory deliberately bypassed these senior officials: "[He] knew that the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs [Sir Henry Ponsonby] was in the Foreign Office and had not been consulted, knew that Lord Haldane, who had been left in charge, was never consulted, and never heard a word about it." ²¹

Nevertheless, true to the British tradition of defending the civil service, MacDonald publicly explained the release of the letter and note to the press as due, not to bungling or malfeasance, but to nothing more than a "misunderstanding." Three and a half

years later, when the Zinoviev affair was reopened in the House of Commons in March 1928, MacDonald still deemed it his duty as former Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary to defend his officials. James Maxton, the Chairman of the Labor party, addressed MacDonald directly and thought that such loyalty was:

. . . profoundly mistaken. I say here quite brutally and bluntly to him that he has been much more loyal to them [Gregory and Crowe] than they have ever tried to be to him. In support of that fact, I not only bring about their absolute incompetence at the time when this matter was at a crucial stage, but I bring forward this further point, that . . . although the officials concerned knew that their chief was away in a far distant part of the country, and moving about, and difficult to get into contact with, they deliberately, designedly and with malice aforethought concealed the knowledge from the Under-Secretary [Mr. Ponsoyby], who, as Under-Secretary, had been the man in charge of all the negotiations with reference to the Russian Treaty.²²

Mr. Maxton's harsh judgment of Gregory and Crowe reflects strong partisan bias, as might be expected under the circumstances from a Labor Party leader. Nevertheless, there has always remained the suspicion that although theoretically nonpartisan civil servants, Gregory and Crowe may have been strongly prejudiced against the Labor party's Russian policy. Certainly their actions (or inaction) would not have been otherwise had they in fact been Conservative party agents. Caught up in the "Red Scare" atmosphere of the campaign, they may have rationalized their refusal to obey direct orders as a form of "higher patriotism" and may have felt it their "sacred duty" to expose the Moscow-directed "machinations" of the Communist party at any cost. The upper echelons of both Foreign Office and intelligence bureaucracies tend to be staffed by conservative, and in some cases, reactionary personality types. This is a fact of life with which executive leadership must learn to live. The Zinoviev letter affair was not the last time in which anti-Labor party prejudice would be exhibited by civil servants in positions comparable to those of Gregory and Crowe. During the post-World War II British election of February 1950, a senior American intelligence official gathered his staff around him and warned them to keep a special watch "on those

Marxian Socialists in England, because we may be fighting them someday.”

Whatever the motives of Gregory and Crowe may have been, the Zinoviev letter affair is certainly a dramatic illustration that under crisis conditions the Chief Executive and/or Foreign Minister of the state may become virtual prisoners of their permanent civil service staffs.

The events which took place outside the Foreign Office during the period October 10-24, and which have a direct bearing on the intelligence evaluation of the Zinoviev letter, may be briefly reconstructed from the parliamentary debates stirred up by the affair. During these debates (held in December 1924 and again in March 1928), the new Conservative Prime Minister, Austen Chamberlain, sought two objectives: first, to establish after the event that the Zinoviev letter was authentic, and second, to stifle a full inquiry into the affair, as moved by the opposition. The inquiry was blocked, but the carefully contrived evidence presented by Chamberlain added little that was not already known. Chamberlain first stated (in 1924): “. . . the letter was received and destroyed by the Communist Party in this country.” He later (in 1928) added a highly significant date: “It was on the 10th of October that this letter had already been discussed by the executive committee of the Communist Party.”²³ In both debates Chamberlain indicated that his sources were “traitors” within the ranks of the Communist party. Joyson-Hicks, head of the Home Office (Secret Service), stated that “the names of the people concerned” could not possibly be divulged “for reasons of safety to individual life.”²⁴ Later, a direct question as to whether these sources were paid informers of the British intelligence community was not answered.²⁵

Chamberlain’s testimony about these sources was presented to the House of Commons as evidence of “authenticity” of the Zinoviev letter. When analyzed from an intelligence processing viewpoint, this is hardly the case. There were four sources, each operating independently and unknown to the others. The first transmitted a copy of the Zinoviev letter to the Foreign Office (the Intelligence Division); the second reported “information of the existence of the letter”; and the third and fourth sources brought

“further confirmatory evidence.” From the intelligence analyst’s point of view, such background information reports are “nice to know,” but they are not likely to provide the kind of hard information with which a suspect document can be properly evaluated. Such reports could only be presented as evidence of authenticity to an audience almost wholly unfamiliar with intelligence evaluation techniques (which was indeed the case with the House of Commons or any similar legislative body). Chamberlain’s testimony has apparently left historians with the impression that the supply of copies of the Zinoviev letter “was seemingly inexhaustible.”²⁶ This was by no means the case.

How many copies of the Zinoviev letter were there, and where did they come from? First, there was the “official” or Foreign Office copy which it released to the *London Times* for publication. This copy was dated September 15, 1924, and carried the signatures “Zinoviev” and “McManus.” Arthur McManus represented the British Communist party in the Comintern and was a member of the Presidium of that organization. During most of September 1924 he had been living “side by side” (almost in the same room) with Zinoviev in a dacha outside Moscow.²⁷

Next, the *London Daily Mail* acquired two copies, one of which was identical with the official Foreign Office draft. It was obtained by Thomas Marlowe, the Conservative editor of the paper, through a series of contacts or “cut-outs.” The key agent who acquired the original draft was a “patriotic” businessman, Conrad im Thurn, who received it from an unidentified source at about 9:30 A.M. on October 9. This source indicated that he knew Zinoviev as “Apfelbaum” and thus was presumably a Russian emigré. Thurn, in written testimony, stated that he then turned one copy over to the government department mainly concerned (presumably the Intelligence Division of the Foreign Office) and arranged to have a second delivered personally to the *Daily Mail* for publication. The timing of these moves squares perfectly with the fact that the Foreign Office copy was acquired on October 10 and indicates an identical Russian emigré source.²⁸

But Marlowe writes that on first hearing about the letter he secured a second version through a *different* set of contacts, a copy which he received by mail. He compared the two versions and found “only such trifling differences as would arise from a

lengthy document being transcribed by different hands.”²⁹ There was, however, an important and essential difference: *the second, variant copy was not signed by McManus but addressed to him!* Obviously the same letter could not have been both signed by McManus and sent to him, but this *prima facie* evidence that both copies were forgeries did not deter Marlowe from his intention to publish on the election weekend of October 25-26! The best explanation of why there were two drafts was provided by the Communist M.P., Mr. Saklatvala:

. . . the White Russians who, in conjunction with the Conservative party, started the idea of this forgery stunt . . . learned to their surprise that McManus [who had been with Zinoviev in Moscow] was preparing to leave for London, quite unexpectedly . . . they saw that it would not be proper to keep McManus' signature, as he would be sure to challenge it, and so a second draft was produced a few days later . . . making the draft appear to be addressed to McManus.³⁰

In summary then, it appears that there were probably no more than four copies—one to the Foreign Office, two variant drafts to the *Daily Mail*, and a fourth copy to the Conservative party headquarters. The evidence presented in the Marlowe letter and in Conrad im Thurn's testimony also points to a single transmitting source, one of the anti-Bolshevik Russian emigré organizations in London. This stands to reason. If the letter had actually been sent from Zinoviev to McManus, Soviet (or better, Comintern) security was such that certainly there would not have been so many leaks. On the other hand, if the letter were a provocation, the forgers would also seek to reduce the number of copies to a minimum for the same reason, that is, to gain credibility for their fabrication.

This explanation is accepted in principle by Ruth Fischer, who was in England at the time as a Central Committee delegate of the German Communist party, and whom Zinoviev later told that “he had suspected the letter was a GPU [Soviet Secret Police] forgery but had been unable to prove it.”³¹

According to MacDonald, “During the whole time that paper [the *Daily Mail*] had that letter it never approached the Foreign Office to ask what was being done with it. It never asked . . .

because it was keeping it up its sleeve [for political purposes].”³² MacDonald ably summarized these political purposes in his 1928 testimony:

[In addition to the two copies acquired by the *Daily Mail*] there is very good reason for believing that one copy went to the Conservative headquarters, by the middle, or even the beginning of that week [October 13-20], and was acted upon. In any event, Fleet Street during the week was in possession of the news of the existence of the thing, and on the 23d the *Daily Mirror* had a paragraph on the coming “bombshell,” naming Zinoviev and something written by him as being something that was to be sprung upon the Labour Government before the election came on. In at least two provincial papers [the *Manchester Evening Chronicle* was named specifically], the London letter contained a reference to the coming bombshell, and at least in one other case a journalist stated that journalists were invited to come to Conservative headquarters on the Tuesday [the 22nd], and were informed that they should keep themselves ready for something that was going to happen at the weekend.³³

The reader may well ask, “Where was the British intelligence community throughout this two-week period (October 10-24) during which existence of the Zinoviev letter was becoming a progressively more open secret among Conservative circles in London?” Here was a bombshell that, when released, set back the normalization of Anglo-Soviet relations for five years. It was being evaluated by each of the agencies concerned, a process which should certainly have taken no more than three days of the two-week period. The heads of these intelligence agencies all admitted to MacDonald later that their evaluation could be summed up in one word—“forgery.” This crucial judgment which the Prime Minister had repeatedly called for, would probably have caused him to cancel the draft protest note and to expose the entire provocation. As rumors about the letter spread through London during the last week of this period, it must surely have occurred to some of the intelligence officials who worked on the evaluation that this was no routine forgery, but one fraught with such political implications that MacDonald should have been fully briefed on the developing situation. Yet not one of the intelligence officials picked up the telephone and called the Prime

Minister, nor were any telegraph messages sent. This evidence suggests that MacDonald was badly served not only by Gregory and Crowe but by his "first line of defense," the British intelligence community, as well.

As indicated earlier, the main responsibility for this failure to act lies with the chief of the Intelligence Division of the Foreign Office. It may be that MacDonald's repeated requests for an evaluation of the Zinoviev letter were deliberately blocked by Gregory and Crowe, i.e., that they were never relayed to the agency. In this case the chief of intelligence, technically speaking, would have had no requirement to act. Nevertheless, as political tension mounted and rumors about the Zinoviev letter circulated in the city and in Fleet Street, three obvious courses of action should have occurred to him. First, he could have sent forward his evaluation of "forgery" with a request that it be forwarded as a matter of urgency to the Prime Minister. Few civil servants, even if so politically inclined, would have the temerity to turn down such a request made through regular channels. Second, he could have briefed the political officials, Ponsonby and Haldane, whom MacDonald had left in charge, on the situation. It is clear from the record that they were kept pretty much in the dark about the crisis as it developed, or they would certainly have been in touch with MacDonald. Third, on his own initiative he could have told the Prime Minister the results of his evaluation and could have warned him of the approaching "bombshell" by telephone or telegraph.

Apparently the chief of the Foreign Office Intelligence Division did none of these things which, to use Sir Conan Doyle's famous expression, should have seemed "purely elementary" to one in his position. His role in the Zinoviev affair has thus far been overlooked by historians, and it is hoped that the evidence presented here may thus shed new light on the confused Zinoviev letter affair. On balance, this analysis suggests that MacDonald was more to be pitied than censured for what appears on the surface to have been the confused and bumbling manner in which he handled the Zinoviev letter. During a critical two-week period, in the midst of a strenuous election campaign, vital information was withheld from him, in spite of his repeated requests for it, by his civil service staff within the Foreign Office and by its

Intelligence Division. Had he received this information promptly—and this is the essence of the intelligence community's function—the Zinoviev letter might well have been defused before it had a chance to explode.

The Immediate Evaluation Problem

As noted, a copy of the Zinoviev letter reached the Intelligence Division of the Foreign Office on October 10, 1924. Routine circulation of the suspect document to the other three agencies of the British intelligence community (the Home Office, the Admiralty, and the War Office) presumably began on the 11th, the date on which the Foreign Office, the agency of primary responsibility, began its evaluation. This primary intelligence analysis necessarily excluded much of the information and speculation that has since developed as a result of historical hindsight. In reconstructing a model of this analysis of the Zinoviev letter while it was "a live affair," all the debris of information that has accumulated as a result of post-mortem inquiries and examination must be rigorously swept aside.

The salient facts bearing on the problem of evaluating the Zinoviev letter as of October 11, 1924, can be briefly summarized: first, the suspect document was not an original letter. It was nothing more than a typewritten copy of either an alleged English original or a translation of the original. Hence the usual rigorous tests, such as physical examination of the paper and ink used, examination in search of erasures or alterations, etc., could not be applied. The probability of fabrication in such cases is much higher than in the case of alleged original documents or photocopies of originals.

Second, the Foreign Office had for some time been deluged with a flood of similar documents produced by forgery centers which were well known to the British intelligence community. There was nothing that physically distinguished the Zinoviev letter from a host of similar documents known to be forgeries.

Third, on the other hand, the letter had been acquired through "a usually reliable source," and three other such sources had independently confirmed its existence. Far from being taken as evidence of authenticity, this background information should

have aroused further suspicion. It is standard procedure in covert operations to build up the credibility of a source or sources before they are used in a deliberate provocation. For this reason, in intelligence evaluations one occasionally finds the description, "a frequently reliable source, but one known at times to have been used to transmit false or misleading information."

Fourth, the Zinoviev letter contained a number of gross textual errors in format, signatures, etc., all of which were *prima facie* evidence of forgery. The following is a check list of typical errors which the Foreign Office intelligence should have been able to detect within a maximum of three days, either by reference to its own files or to those of its affiliated agencies:

(a) *Addressee*. The letter was addressed "To the Central Committee, British Communist Party," whereas in standard Comintern practice it should have been addressed "To the Communist Party of Great Britain."

(b) *Addressor*. The letter reads "Executive Committee, Third Communist International, Presidium," whereas Comintern circulars referred to the organization as simply "The Communist International," since the First and Second Internationals were socialist, not communist.

(c) *Signature titles*. Here there are two errors. The letter reads "Zinoviev, President of the Presidium of the IKKI," whereas he always signed as simply "President of the Executive Committee." The letter also reads "Secretary, Otto Kuusinen," whereas Kuusinen, who was actually a subordinate member, always signed such Comintern documents with the phrase "For the Secretariat."

(d) *Personal signatures*. Here there were three errors. The letter reads simply "Zinoviev," whereas he invariably signed as "G. Zinoviev." Instead of simply "McManus," the British member of the Presidium always used either "A. McManus" or "Arthur McManus." Similarly, instead of "Kuusinen," he used the signature "O.V.," his first initials.

(e) *Abbreviations used*. Whether the letter was supposedly a translation or a copy of an original written in English, throughout the abbreviations "S.S.R." for USSR are used as well as "I.K.K.I." for E.C.C.I. (Executive Committee of the Communist Interna-

tional). Such editorial clumsiness would have been unlikely in an authentic Comintern communication in English, but might have occurred in a hasty translation.

(f) *References to non-existent apparatus.* In addition to the incorrect abbreviations noted above, the letter made several references to "the military section" and to "military cells" of the British Communist party at a time when it had neither within its organization. Since the party had been penetrated by Home Office (Secret Service) agents, these errors should have been obvious to any of the intelligence agencies.

The fifth circumstance affecting evaluation was the question of security, timing, and lack of necessity. The Zinoviev letter was a highly compromising document which, if exposed, would do great harm to Anglo-Soviet relations. It was highly unlikely that the Comintern would put such instructions in writing and thus needlessly assume the risk of "documentary" exposure, especially at a critical time (on the eve of the British election) when such exposure would cause the greatest possible damage. Moreover, there was no necessity whatever for written instructions. McManus, who had recently been with Zinoviev in Moscow for some weeks and had just returned to England, was quite capable of relaying instructions orally, with much less risk of compromise.

All of the above facts or considerations bearing on the evaluation of the Zinoviev letter could easily have been checked out by any one of the four intelligence agencies working on the problem, in a single day if the case were urgent, and certainly within a maximum of three days of even the most desultory analysis. Hence the generally agreed evaluation of "forgery" could have been forwarded to the Prime Minister either through formal or informal channels in ample time for MacDonald to have exposed the letter as a fabrication. Since in the first three days after acquiring the letter British intelligence may have been unaware of the fact that the *Daily Mail* had a second variant of the letter which was not signed by, but rather addressed to, McManus, this conclusive evidence of fabrication has been excluded from the reconstructed situation.

Post-Mortem Evaluation

It is highly significant that, with one exception, none of the "facts bearing on the problem" of the immediate evaluation of the Zinoviev letter were ever challenged by Conservative party spokesmen in their attempts to convince the House of Commons of its authenticity. The exception concerns the use of the term "Third Communist International" as the addressor in Comintern communications, instead of "The Communist International." On December 15, 1924, during the first parliamentary debate on the subject, the new Conservative Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain, held up two copies of the Russian newspaper *Izvestia*, one dated a few days earlier and the other five days after the Zinoviev letter. He asserted that the phrase "Third Communist International" appears in official documents of that body, published in *Izvestia*, which is itself the official organ of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union." In response to repeated questions as to whether these papers were themselves forgeries, he assured the House that they were genuine, i.e., "manufactured in Russia."

A close reading of microfilm photocopies of *Izvestia* for the month of September does *not* confirm Chamberlain's testimony, which was presumably prepared for him by Soviet "experts" from British intelligence. As might be expected (since the Soviet government had repeatedly disclaimed any official connection between itself and the Communist International), there were no "official documents" of that body published in *Izvestia* during September 1924. On September 28 the paper carried a second-page spread of the 60th Anniversary of the *First* International, including a feature article by Kolarov in which the Third International was mentioned several times. Again, from September 26 through October 1, under the title *Three Internationals*, *Izvestia* carried a series of articles by Karl Radek which were originally delivered as lectures at Sverdlovsk University.³⁴ Either the copies of *Izvestia* held up as exhibits by Chamberlain were indeed forgeries, or these Anniversary feature articles were deliberately misrepresented as official Comintern documents. In either case, it is clear that not only Prime Minister MacDonald but also his Conservative suc-

cessor was badly served by elements of the British intelligence community.

Three and a half years after the event, during the 1928 House of Commons debate, Chamberlain presented some new "evidence of authenticity" based on intelligence gathered in Moscow at the time of the affair. Since he offered to let MacDonald examine this evidence privately (for obvious security reasons), Chamberlain's exact testimony merits close analysis:

Let me just remind the House of this. When the letter came to England, what was the reaction in Moscow? According to our evidence Moscow was for a moment in a state of panic. Why? Because the Russians could not make out whether the Zinovieff letter had been sent from Moscow by someone who had betrayed the Russian Communists, or whether they had been betrayed by an English Communist in London. On the evening of 24th October, M. Rakovsky telegraphed, not in cypher, to Moscow, the contents of the document, and I think also the despatch. Immediately after that, according to information which we have, M. Tchitcherin told his colleagues that he questioned Zinovieff concerning the letter. Zinovieff admitted that the letter had been sent to the Communist party, but he was at a loss to know how the British Government had got a copy of it. He presumed that the leakage was due to treachery either in Moscow or in London. The text of the document, he said, was in some places slightly mutilated, but M. Tchitcherin said that it would be impossible to accuse the British Government of having mutilated the document, because that would be equivalent to a confession of authenticity. The only course they could take was, at once, to denounce it as a forgery. . . .

About a month later, Tchitcherin told his colleagues that after the Communist party in England had received the original it had been destroyed by a gentleman named Mr. Inkpin. This, Mr. Tchitcherin said, will enable our Government—that is the Soviet Government, to insist on an investigation into the matter, because no actual copy had ever been produced. . . . Not very long after the Zinovieff letter appeared in England, a Russian in Moscow was apprehended by the Soviet Government. They had every reason, I understand, to believe that he was connected with the giving away of a copy of that letter and he was shot on that account. . . . I have several names of those who have a prior right to claim that honour, and I think it will interest the House

to learn them. Druzhilovsky, Zhemtchevzhnikov, Pantziurkovsky, Bernstein alias Henry Lawrence, alias Lorenzo and Shreck. . . .³⁵

Against this evidence should be set other seemingly contradictory considerations. First, the Soviet government twice requested the British to submit the question of authenticity to an impartial arbitration by court, and was turned down.

Second, in 1925 the USSR permitted the British Trades Union Congress to send a special delegation to Russia to investigate the question. The delegation was versed in intelligence work and had a knowledge of Russian and German. The investigation has been described by Robert Warth as follows:

They had gained access to the archives of the Comintern, including its correspondence with the British Communist Party. Among the items examined was a daily ledger of outgoing messages containing hundreds of entries in Russian and German in many different handwritings and which it would have been impossible, they maintained, to tamper with. After careful scrutiny of the ledger and everything else which seemed pertinent, the delegation satisfied itself that "as far as the negative can be proved . . . no 'Red Letter' ever left the Comintern."³⁶

On the basis of this report, combined with Soviet willingness to arbitrate the whole question, it may be safely concluded that if in fact an alleged Zinoviev letter was sent to the British Communist party, it was not, as alleged, a genuine Comintern communication.

Third, although there is every reason to believe that British intelligence in Moscow did in fact receive the report summarized in Chamberlain's testimony, this does not mean the report is true. It may well have been deliberately "planted" by a Stalinist faction that was striving to wrest control of the Comintern from Zinoviev and use the incident to discredit him.

This line of reasoning leads directly to Ruth Fischer's hypothesis that the Zinoviev letter was a GPU provocation. She observes:

In Britain, the Zinoviev letter had been an important factor in returning the Tories to power, and its effect in Russia was hardly less. It divided not only the Tories from Labour but in the Russian Party the Conservative from the revolutionary wing.

Zinoviev was defended in all official statements against the foreign attack, but inside the Party, and particularly in the higher brackets, the incident was used to intensify the campaign against the Comintern and its leaders . . . such a document would compromise Zinoviev as one disturbing the improving relations between Britain and Soviet Russia; Stalin, unscrupulous, eagerly sought any weapon that would serve in his fight to gain control of the Comintern. To say that it was clearly to the political advantage of the two groups involved—the Tories in Britain and the Stalinist faction in the Russian Party, both of them in the midst of a struggle for power—to have the Zinoviev letter printed, is to say that in all probability both groups were involved in its fabrication.³⁷

(Since “fabrication” here implies that the British Conservatives took part in the actual drafting of the letter, the term “exploitation” better describes their actual role).

On balance, this hypothesis best accounts for most of the contradictory evidence which has been brought to light. Whereas pro-Labor accounts emphasize the “Tory Conspiracy” aspect of the incident, a close look at the evidence will show that while the Conservatives eagerly seized on the letter and exploited it for campaign purposes, they did so in response to a series of initiatives which were not entirely their own. Within a week after the original Russian emigré source provided the *Daily Mail* with a copy of the letter, references to Zinoviev began to appear in the Conservative press and in speeches with a frequency that could hardly have been coincidental. For example, on October 20 in a speech at Southend, the Conservative leader, Stanley Baldwin, in a touching demonstration of concern for his Labor opponent, said: “It makes my blood boil to read of the way in which Mr. Zinoviev is speaking of the Prime Minister of Great Britain today.”³⁸ On October 21 a Russian emigré, who claimed that he “had been sentenced to death by Zinoviev,” appeared at the Conservative Central Office. The claim was absurd since Zinoviev had never been in a position to sentence anyone to death, but both the *Daily Mail* and *Morning Post* carried feature articles on Zinoviev the next day, October 22. This was the same day as the final ploy in the propaganda build-up—the reports in the provincial papers that a mysterious bombshell connected with Zinoviev would burst “before next polling day.”³⁹

This obviously orchestrated pattern of events does not mean that Baldwin, other Conservative leaders, and the Tory press knowingly collaborated with Stalin's secret police in their campaign propaganda keyed to exploiting the Zinoviev letter. In covert operations it is frequently the most patriotic groups of "true believers" who are most easily duped because they want to believe the worst of "the enemy."

The theory that the Zinoviev letter was forged by Russian emigrés in Berlin (or elsewhere) merits brief examination at this point. After the Bolshevik revolution, as we have noted, colonies of "White Russian" emigrés settled in West European capitals and many of them engaged in anti-Soviet propaganda, espionage, and forgery for the intelligence services of the major powers. One such group in Berlin included the notorious Druzhelovskiy and other agents such as Gumansky, Sivert, Belgardt, and Zhemchuzhnikov. They were raided by the Berlin police in November 1924 and again in March 1929. In both instances the press carried stories indicating that one or more of these emigrés had had a hand in forging the Zinoviev letter. Moreover, in 1927, Druzhelovskiy, on trial in Moscow, admitted working for Polish Intelligence and suggested that the Zinoviev letter had been forged in Berlin, naming Zhemchuzhnikov, Belgardt, and Gumansky.⁴⁰

Since the Berlin forgers had been known to work for British intelligence, the theory that they produced the Zinoviev letter at Scotland Yard's behest to aid the Conservative cause in the election is an appealing one. However, the new Conservative Foreign Secretary, Chamberlain, specifically named the Berlin group with considerable derision as the most likely candidates to be named by *Labor* as the forgers. (See the testimony quoted above.) It is extremely unlikely that he would have done so if any of the Berlin emigrés had in fact been employed by British intelligence for this purpose.

It is also unlikely that the Berlin emigré group, in which several individuals worked as "double agents" for different powers, would have been able to maintain security if they had in fact had a hand in the forgery. Gumansky's reported version of the affair (in which he first boasted about and later denied having forged the Zinoviev letter) made good copy for the *New York Times* and other papers, but is hardly credible.⁴¹ Moreover, it is most

unlikely that the Comintern, which exposed so many of the anti-Soviet forgeries of Druzhelovsky and Co., would not have made a similar exposure of the Zinoviev letter, if the evidence were available that it had been produced in Berlin.⁴²

Let us briefly review the other seemingly contradictory elements in the Zinoviev affair which suddenly make sense in the light of the hypothesis that the letter was a GPU provocation. A letter signed "Zinoviev" was in fact discussed in the British Communist party and afterward destroyed by a certain Mr. Inkipin. This event was observed by a Secret Service agent within the party ranks and reported on by other "usually reliable sources" serving the British intelligence community. The same White Russian emigré (who was clearly a double agent since he was a "generally reliable" British source) probably provided the Foreign Office and the *Daily Mail* with identical copies of the "official" draft of the letter on the same date, October 10. However, it appears that an independent GPU source provided the *Daily Mail* with a variant draft of the letter addressed to, rather than signed by, McManus. This obvious evidence of forgery might have proved fatal to the operation if Marlowe's "patriotism" had moved him to transmit this intelligence to Ponsonby and Haldane at the Foreign Office, who had been deliberately excluded from the picture by the permanent civil service staff. But Marlowe wanted to believe that the Zinoviev letter was authentic in spite of any evidence to the contrary, and his determination to publish was probably a factor in Eyre Crowe's decision to print both the letter and the protest note without MacDonald's consent or without informing the political officers, Ponsonby and Haldane, who had been left in charge of the Foreign Office during the Prime Minister's election tour. MacDonald was right in his suspicion that the Zinoviev letter affair was "a political fraud—a fraud perhaps unmatched in its cold calculation and preparation in our political history." But he was wrong in his implication that the fraud was first conceived in the inner circles of the Conservative party and then implemented by the Tory press. Chamberlain, the Conservative Foreign Minister, was sincere in his protestations of innocence, but ironically, so was Zinoviev who knew the letter had not been sent by the Comintern, as open examination of the communication log books demonstrated.

Finally, it should be emphasized that the British intelligence community was correct in its evaluation of the Zinoviev letter as a forgery. But it must share with Gregory and Crowe the responsibility for not providing MacDonald promptly with this evaluation. This failure racked Anglo-Soviet relations and contributed significantly to the Labor party's defeat in the "Red Scare" election of October 1924.

The Zinoviev letter has been described by one political tactician as a perfect example of effective surprise in a political campaign,⁴³ and "to many a staunch Labor man it left bitter memories of electioneering chicanery, which was to remain unavenged until the crushing defeat of the Conservatives in the general election of 1945."⁴⁴ In the light of the above analysis, this distorted image needs to be corrected. From this viewpoint the Zinoviev letter forgery appears to be rather a perfect example of a Soviet provocation, comparable to the British intelligence deception, Operation Mincemeat, mounted as a preliminary to the invasion of Sicily during World War II.⁴⁵ MacDonald's suspicions of a Conservative "conspiracy"—suspicions that have been shared by Labor sympathizers ever since—were misplaced.

Far from planning the operation for weeks in advance, the Conservatives literally stumbled onto the letter at the same time as the Foreign Office, and without looking at a gift horse too closely decided to ride it to victory in the coming election. It is clear from the record that Chamberlain never had the first clue that he had been duped. Ironically, elements of the British intelligence community, which had already evaluated the "Zinoviev letter" as a forgery, later supplied Chamberlain with reliable agent reports that a letter signed "Zinoviev" had in fact been received by the Communist party. This intelligence support provided the new Prime Minister with a plausible basis for defending the Conservative course in the House of Commons. But it is clear from the debates that neither Chamberlain nor his Home Office supporters realized that the letter was a Soviet provocation, as were additional reports on the incident fed to British intelligence in Moscow.

Historians have overlooked the fact that in its inception the Zinoviev letter was primarily a problem in intelligence processing and evaluation. This oversight has obscured the fact that delib-

erate mishandling of the document at this preliminary stage later made it impossible for Prime Minister MacDonald to avoid the affair. The responsibility for thus narrowly circumscribing MacDonald's field of action lies primarily with the civil servants Gregory and Crowe, but must also be shared directly by the Foreign Office Intelligence Division chief and the other members of the British intelligence community. MacDonald's defense of these civil servants—a defense imposed on Cabinet officials by British tradition—has obscured their key role in making the incident inevitable. Preoccupation with the effects of the Zinoviev letter on MacDonald and British politics has deflected attention from its equally important effects on Zinoviev and the power struggle within the Kremlin in the initial stages of Stalin's rise to supreme power.

**FRAUDS AND FORGERIES
OF THE CLASSIC
COLD WAR PERIOD**

DURING the classic Cold War period, 1947-1953, at the height of the Stalinist era, communist propagandists spoke with one voice and with an assertion of infallibility which it can never match again. The de-Stalinization campaign depicted Stalin as both a tyrant and a fool, and later official attempts to restore his tarnished image have been unsuccessful. Even Stalin's heirs have suffered a continual drumfire of criticism from such *enfants terribles* of the postwar generation as the poet Yevtushenko. Moreover, since the Sino-Soviet split, Communist China has been denouncing Khrushchev and his present heirs as traitors and cowards with the kind of venom and intensity previously reserved for attacks from either Moscow or Peking against the West.

During the postwar Stalinist era communist propaganda sought to portray the United States as solely responsible for the Cold War and U.S. atomic arms as a major menace to peace. Major political warfare campaigns were thus waged against the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—campaigns that included not only propaganda but aggressive political action in the form of strikes, demon-

strations, programmed subversion, and, in such areas as Greece, the support of local guerrilla forces.

Direct action attempts to sabotage the Marshall Plan and NATO, its military shield, failed, and Western Europe was well on its way to political and economic rehabilitation by 1950. Soviet propaganda made little if any use of forged documents during this immediate postwar period.

The first collections of captured German documents published in 1948 by both the Russian Foreign Office and the U.S. Department of State were equally authentic, and no claims of forgery or fraud have been made against them. In the same year, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs published two small volumes of *Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War*.¹ The collection has been described by the British historian Lewis B. Namier as a "concentrated, misleading tale of political villainy." The first volume tells the story of "how Czechoslovakia was sacrificed by the Western Powers and stabbed in the back by Poland" and exposes "the hostility or distrust which in 1938 the Western Powers and Poland evinced towards the Soviet Union." Namier notes that these feelings of mistrust may well have been ill-timed and impolitic but were hardly unjustified.² The second volume is a selection from the papers of Herbert von Dirksen, German Ambassador to London from May 1938 till the outbreak of war. By disclosing certain approaches of Chamberlain to the Nazis through non-diplomatic channels, it suggests that he would have made a deal with Hitler had he been given a chance.³ In this regard it is interesting to note that a recent Soviet study of British policy during the last months of the Chamberlain administration, the so-called "phony war" period, makes no reference to either volume of these documents.⁴

The publication by the United States of a more extensive collection of documents from the archives of the German Foreign Office, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*,⁵ was denounced by Soviet propaganda as another blow in the Cold War, but the authenticity of the documents themselves was not seriously challenged. However, the later publication by the United States of a large collection of Yalta documents was another matter. These were denounced as "forgeries" by Soviet and East German propaganda, but again no evidence was produced to sustain the charges.⁶

During the period of increasing tension which followed the Berlin airlift and the beginning of the Korean War, Soviet propaganda sought to prove that the United States was plotting a general war against the USSR, and used every unguarded statement by United States high-ranking military personnel for this purpose. A careless oversight by Major General Robert W. Grow, United States Military Attaché in Moscow, provided them with a golden opportunity which they were quick to exploit. While attending a military intelligence conference during June 1951 in Frankfurt, General Grow left his personal diary unguarded in his hotel room. It was apparently photocopied by a Soviet agent, and later excerpts from it were widely disseminated in East Germany. The story drew world-wide attention. Alleged facsimile entries and other extracts from the diary were reproduced in a patently propaganda book entitled *On the Path to War*, published by a British writer, Richard Squires, who described himself as a "former British officer living in East Germany."

General Grow was convicted by a general court-martial for failure to safeguard military information, and on July 30, 1952, the army released parts of the diary showing how the most widely quoted excerpts had been falsified, distorted, and misinterpreted. The army statement said that one of the most widely publicized extracts from the diary had been completely falsified. It was: "War! As soon as possible. Now!" According to the army release, this and other highly propagandized statements simply did not appear in the original diary.⁷

Western propagandists were much less fortunate than their Soviet counterparts in obtaining similar documentary materials for Cold War propaganda purposes. But some propaganda mileage was obtained from at least two "documents" of doubtful origin and validity. The first of these was "Protocol M," reportedly a "blueprint" for communist sabotage against West German armament and heavy industries, especially in the Ruhr area. This alleged document was first published in summary form in Berlin in the French-licensed newspaper *Der Kurier* on January 14, 1948, and in full the next morning in the British- and American-licensed papers. The story of alleged communist sabotage plans coincided with a genuine "Ruhr crisis" during which 140,000 workers went on a twenty-four-hour protest strike against food shortages in the British Occupation Zone. This critical situation received

world-wide coverage and was linked with the Protocol M story, although British official sources emphasized that the work stoppages had no political implications that could be drawn from the so-called "Plan M."⁸ The "document" was released to the press by the British Foreign Office which, according to its spokesmen, had obtained a copy several days earlier. The British government made copies available to "certain other Powers, but not to Soviet Russia, before it was published."⁹ The Protocol M story was exploited to the hilt for its Cold War propaganda value. Previously there had appeared in France and Italy vague stories of "alleged Cominform plots" against the European Recovery Program,¹⁰ but here was actual "documentary evidence," backed by the prestige of the British Foreign Office! As might be expected, local East German and Soviet propaganda sources (Radio Moscow) denounced Protocol M as "a clumsy forgery." In East Berlin the *Täglicher Rundschau*, the organ of the Soviet military administration, variously ascribed the origin of the document to the British Secret Service (drawing a parallel with the famous Zinoviev letter) and to the Social Democratic party in West Berlin, which might stand to gain most from its acceptance and from any anti-communist action that might be founded on it. *Neues Deutschland*, the newspaper of the Socialist Unity (Communist) party, suggested that the document represented so serious an accusation against the Communist party that it should be taken up by the Allied Control Council.¹¹

Nothing ever came of this or similar suggestions, and within a few weeks Protocol M was allowed to die a quiet death by the Cold War propagandists who had first exploited it with such enthusiasm. There was good reason for their being disenchanted with Plan M. Its authenticity had been challenged in the British House of Commons on January 19 in a question put to an under-secretary in the Foreign Office, Hugh McNeil, by a Communist M.P., Mr. P. Piratin. Mr. McNeil stated that he had "nothing further to add" to the information that the text of the "M plan" had been released to the press, "except that His Majesty's Government believe this document to be genuine."¹²

This confidence turned to embarrassment and then anger in mid-April when Cyrus L. Sulzberger published an article in the *New York Times* which revealed that the same British authorities

who had formerly insisted that Plan M was authentic were now convinced that it was a fraud.¹³ A week after this disturbing news reached England, there was another parliamentary question on the affair, this time by Mr. Emrys Hughes, and the Foreign Secretary was obliged to explain that "before taking any steps," the British government "had been making inquiries to test the reliability of this document. . . . These eventually led us to a German, not employed by His Majesty's Government, who, after questioning, volunteered that he was the author of the document. I have read a summary of his statements and I must tell the House that they are not convincing and that they are in parts conflicting. . . . My right honorable Friend wishes it made plain that after these further investigations we can only conclude that the authenticity of the document now lies in doubt. . . . [However] even if the document is not authentic, it has been compiled from authoritative Communist sources, and this is corroborated by information already in our possession."

After this embarrassed explanation, the following exchange took place:

MR. EMRYS HUGHES: "Before my right honorable Friend assures the House in the future that such documents are genuine, will he consult his right honorable Friend about the Zinoviev letter, the forged 'Pravda' and similar forgeries? Will he tell us why it was necessary to have the disclosure of this document as a forgery brought to our notice by a New York newspaper?"

MR. MC NEIL: "I fiercely resent the implications which have been made. . . . The investigations were initiated and carried through weeks before any newspaper report was available in New York or elsewhere."¹⁴

Fanned by left-wing propaganda, the uproar over Protocol M continued in the British press with charges implying that the British government, in its political warfare policy, was following the "big lie" technique of Dr. Goebbels, the sinister chief of Hitler's Ministry of Information. These charges were reflected in another parliamentary question-answer exchange between Mr. Hughes and the British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Christopher P. Mayhew. Mr. Mayhew said in the House of Commons that the German believed to have written Protocol M was not a Nazi and would not be brought to trial. He admitted that "There has been

much criticism of the Government for having given its sanction at first to a document that many British critics had thought dubious from the beginning.”

MR. HUGHES: “Is the Under-Secretary aware that a reputable paper, the *Yorkshire Post*, has published a leading article describing the publication of this document as a calamity to this country; and does he not think that a full statement to this House would reassure the people that we are not just carrying on Dr. Goebbels’ propaganda, and that though the doctor is dead his soul does not go marching on?”

MR. MAYHEW: “No, sir, I do not think Dr. Goebbels ever paid so much attention to securing truth in these matters as we have done. . . . It is true that we know the name of the German [source] but, as we have already said, we cannot be certain he is the author of Protocol ‘M.’ In these circumstances we cannot assume his guilt, and we do not, therefore, wish to expose him or his relatives to possible reprisals.”¹⁵

The “true facts” about Protocol M are locked in the files of British intelligence where they will probably remain. This does not mean that the official explanation of the British Foreign Secretary need be accepted at face value in all its details. Apparently the document was acquired through normal intelligence collection channels, was forwarded to the Foreign Office and to the Cold War equivalent of the Political Warfare Executive, which directed British psychological warfare operations so successfully during World War II. At a critical period when the fate of the European Recovery Program literally hung in the balance, Protocol M must have seemed like manna from heaven to the “psy-warriors” who directed its release and propaganda exploitation. Even if they may have had some doubts about its authenticity, these were apparently swept away by the feeling so aptly expressed in the Italian proverb, *si non è vero, è ben trovato* (even if it’s false, it’s a lucky find!). Indeed the decision to release the document before fully assessing its authenticity (and the *bona fides* of the source) may well have been a calculated risk. It remains an open question, or value judgment, whether the risk was worth the public embarrassment that resulted when it was later admitted to be a fabrication. Certainly the British information services, especially the BBC, had built up a reputation for accuracy and credibility surpassing that of any

other major power. The public furor over Protocol M in the British press was probably motivated by a determination to protect and preserve the high standards of British communications as much as by a partisan desire to embarrass the government in power.

The deservedly high reputation of the BBC continues into the present, and was only temporarily damaged by the Protocol M affair. The candor with which the British Foreign Office admitted its error undoubtedly did much to sustain the continuing credibility of the British information services. Nevertheless, the fact that public memory is short and that the British government ultimately emerged from the crisis with little damage to its reputation for telling the truth does not minimize the risks taken at the time Protocol M was released. Significantly, the experience was not repeated. Perhaps the most important lesson to be drawn from the incident is that until a sensational "document" has been thoroughly evaluated as genuine, the temptation to exploit it for propaganda purposes should be resisted, otherwise credibility may be severely damaged following exposure. This maxim applies particularly to governments that pride themselves on employing a "strategy of truth" and that hope to project this kind of image.

How was Protocol M evaluated by the other Western powers to whom copies were sent before its release? Here again direct evidence is locked in the files. The alleged "document" naturally caused a minor flurry (a "flap" in American jargon) in the intelligence agencies of the allied powers, but apparently no official evaluations were leaked to the press. The most that the U.S. Department of State released was a statement that it had "no comment" to offer, a prudent stance that offered little support to the initial British propaganda effort but saved the department from embarrassment later.

The text of Protocol M, as it appeared in the *New York Times* on January 16, 1948, is reproduced below:

The coming winter will be the decisive period in the history of the German working class. Through persistent battle and in conjunction with the working class throughout Europe, it will conquer the key positions in production.

This battle is not concerned with ministerial posts but is for starting positions for the final struggle for the liberation of the proletariat of the world. The unconditional prerequisites for the

impending final victory of the working class are the maintenance of discipline among the comrades and the unscrupulous employment of all functionaries.

There must be no doubt that in order to achieve this final victory all the weapons of the proletariat are utilized. The home of socialism, the Soviet Union, can and will support this battle against the monopoly-capitalist powers with every means at its disposal.

The Communist Information Bureau in Belgrade will coordinate the common battle of all Socialist movements in Europe. Although the German party is not yet a member of this bureau, it has nevertheless a key position in the impending battle it will have to fight for the center point of European production, the Ruhr.

The working classes of all nations will provide the necessary assistance. The task of the German party is to utilize this assistance unscrupulously wherever it will produce the best results:

The main objective of the winter battle is to break the attack of the monopoly capitalists, which they are launching through their so-called Marshall Plan.

The comrade functionaries, after mature reflection, have arrived at the following decisions:

PART 1

The centers of the mass struggle are:

- (a) The Ruhr district and its production.
- (b) Means of transport in northwest Germany.

For tactical purposes it is necessary that the comrade functionaries are not in the front line in the impending outbreak of strikes. It must be insured, however, that in accordance with plan "A" the workers' risings occur simultaneously in transport and productive concerns. The trades unions of the transport and metal workers will carry out the succession of strikes.

The party must refrain from direct participation under all circumstances. It must take into account that the military authorities will attempt to liquidate the party. It is therefore necessary to implement the new organization as soon as possible.

In the light of previous experience it must be taken into account that Ruhr workers, owing to the considerable privileges which they enjoy, will reject the idea of strikes from opportunist motives. Here the transport worker must play his part.

Dortmund is Strike Center

Special importance is attached to the railway Bremen-Dussel-

dorf and Hamburg-Bielefeld. The center of the transport workers strike is Dortmund. Essen must not be allowed to achieve prominence through wild strikes. This would upset the whole plan.

Reliable reports indicate that the military authorities are already building up transport reserves that could be quickly brought into action if the railways or civil transport should break down. It is important to reconnoiter all possible routes and to try by all possible means to prevent the smooth running of their supply services.

It is not essential to destroy food supplies but merely to hinder their timely arrival. The timely coordination of delays in the arrival of food transports and the organization of wild strikes leading to loss in production is an essential feature of the operation.

Comrades Rau, Perleberg, Siegmund and Krajewski have been in prearranged positions. The security of these positions has been assured by the "cadres" as also the financing of the workers risings.

The same principle as before applies to all other strikes in the West, namely they must aim at the unity of the working class.

PART 2

From the organizational point of view the center of gravity is in the Metal Workers Union. In this connection the possession or at least the control of all union treasuries must not be overlooked. Up to now almost all attempts to achieve the aim have been in vain. Should it not be possible to win over sufficient agents ["vertrauensleute"] in the time remaining, then steps must be taken to insure that these tasks can be carried out by Social Democrat members.

In this case the party has the task by means of agitation of impeding the freedom of action of [Dr. Kurt] Schumacher's followers so that the "R men" below can adhere to the timetable. The unity of the working class must be achieved at once even if it means the elimination of over-all power.

The "cadres" have the special task of finding out weak points in the mass organization of the SPD [Social Democratic party]. These must then be relentlessly exploited. Internal trade union discussions must be started forthwith. The attempt must be made even at the cost of sacrificing positions to control the Metal Workers Union at least from the organizational point of view.

The appointments have already been completed. Comrades Honitzer, Draba, Jablowski, Ludwig, Grossenheim, Kroegh and

Pilz have the powers of the executive committee for Operation Ruhr. They can be reached at all times through the recognized code numbers.

PART 3

The propaganda agitation will be conducted uniformly by the Central Executive Committee. It has the following aims:

(a) The Marshall Plan is a plan of enslavement by the monopoly capitalists of the U.S.A.

(b) The strikes in all monopoly capitalist controlled countries are signs of the increasing decay of the capitalist society.

(c) The steady and constantly progressing development of the Eastern European economy under the protection of the Soviet Union.

Press polemics must make use of all protests against the dismantling in the West, which are made by non-Communists. They are a means of creating and protecting the capitalist controlled markets of the future. As the prohibition of all party organs in West Germany must be reckoned with, radio stations and a developed courier net will insure a constant supply of propaganda and information material. It must be guaranteed that all receiving sets are installed in good time and in secure places.

The agitation cadres [agitation-kaders] 7, 11 and 14 are entrusted with popularizing a plebiscite and the socialization of the Ruhr. It is necessary that this be used as a common basis for initiating a campaign of demonstrations in connection with the SPD.

The unity of the working class will be furthered through united propaganda for a plebiscite. It is altogether in the interests of the central executive committee if, to begin with, the SPD occupy the important positions in a United Action Committee.

PART 4

Timetable:

(a) Until the end of December the achievement of a common SPD-KPD basis to bring about a plebiscite.

(b) Until the end of February thorough organization of strike "cadres."

(c) From the beginning of March the organization of general strikes.

The timetable can be altered according to the situation. The Central Executive Committee is in permanent session and will

always be in a position to supplement or enlarge upon the timetable.

PART 5

Supervision is in the hands of "M. A-cadre." And "47,109" apply to these. It must guarantee that comrade functionaries obey all orders of the cadres in every case and instantly.

V. I. Lenin. "The man who places at the top of his program political mass agitation embracing all the people before even his tactics and organization runs the least risk of missing the revolution."

The Intelligence Evaluation of Protocol M

Even before the text of Protocol M was officially forwarded by the British Foreign Office "to certain other governments" (excluding the USSR), it was almost certainly made available to the French and American intelligence agencies in Berlin. The covering memorandum prepared by British intelligence in Berlin almost certainly contained an immediate "spot" evaluation divided customarily into two parts: first, a rating of the individual agency or personal source from which the document was obtained, ranging from "source unknown" (and therefore cannot be judged) to "usually" or even "thoroughly reliable" (on the basis of information previously supplied). Second, the British intelligence unit in Berlin must have rated the contents of the "document" as either "possibly true" or even "probably true." In any case, before it was released for propaganda exploitation, British intelligence in London almost certainly made some such assessment in view of the risks involved in case it should later be exposed as a fabrication. To have acted otherwise would have been both rash and irresponsible, two character traits that, even in wartime, have never been associated with British intelligence.

The early confidence apparently shown in the source indicates that the document was acquired from either a friendly intelligence agency or a "paper mill" which had supplied at least "fairly reliable" information in the past. (The operation of such sources in Berlin is discussed in the next chapter.) Such raw intelligence, like gold bullion, is where you find (or buy) it, and the business of the agency in the field (in this case, Berlin) is to col-

lect as much reliable information as possible without asking too many questions about the sources that supply it. To the field collection agency, "the little black things called facts" are like diamonds: they have an intrinsic value whatever the source. By definition, stolen documents, like stolen goods, are usually acquired through a "cut-out," who may be a double-agent for two or more powers at the same time.

So far as the field intelligence stations were concerned, an excellent case could be made for evaluating the overall contents of the document as "possibly" or even "probably true." After all, the Cominform, the Communist Information Bureau in Belgrade, had been set up in the fall of 1947, in the words of the alleged Protocol, "to coordinate the common battle of all Socialist movements in Europe." Communist-led mass strikes and demonstrations had already occurred in France, and certainly the Ruhr district was ripe for demonstrations and work stoppages which did in fact materialize in April. Moreover, the propaganda guidelines in the first paragraph of Part 3 (see the text above) had in fact been followed by communist propaganda in Western Europe for at least a year. (Indeed, the theme, "Economic and working conditions in the East Zone are good and improving," figured as number 7 among the twenty themes most frequently used by Soviet-controlled broadcasts as late as June 1949.)¹⁶

However plausible Protocol M may have seemed at first glance to the agencies in Berlin, a closer analysis by the British and other intelligence centers should have led to a reassessment indicating that it was probably a fabrication, not so much on the basis of content *per se* as on the tactical recommendations that it makes. Repeatedly, Protocol M calls for close collaboration (while "boring from within") with the Social Democratic party in the Western Zones under the general tactical formula of "working class unity." For example, the second paragraph of Part 2 ends with the sentence, "The unity of the working class must be achieved at once even if it means the elimination of over-all power." Again, the last paragraph of Part 3 reads: "The unity of the working class will be furthered through united propaganda for a plebiscite. It is altogether in the interests of the central executive committee if, to begin with, the SPD [Social Democratic party] occupy the important positions in a United Action Committee."

This kind of close collaboration by the Communists with the Socialist or Social Democratic parties for local tactical objectives had characterized a thirteen-year period beginning with the Popular Front slogans and tactics and ending abruptly with the establishment of the Cominform in September 1947. However, the Cominform called for a return to the "hard line" set by the VIth Comintern Congress in 1928, a line which emphasized division of the world into "two camps" and called for direct frontal attacks against the Socialist parties. For the first time since 1934, the European Socialist parties were again attacked in communist propaganda as "social fascists" or "socialist traitors."¹⁷ These attacks had begun in the fall of 1947, more than a year before Protocol M was acquired by British intelligence. That the East Zone Communist party (called the Socialist Unity party, SED) was following the 1947 Cominform line was demonstrated by its response to Protocol M. It called the document a provocation designed to further the interests of both "monopoly-capitalists" and the Social Democratic party.

These basic facts bearing on the problem of evaluating Protocol M should certainly have been known to British intelligence and the British Foreign Office. An excellent study of Soviet strategy and tactics, presumably written by an outstanding authority, the late R. N. Carew Hunt, was already being widely circulated in allied intelligence circles by June 1948.¹⁸ Under these circumstances it is difficult to believe that the British Foreign Office, contrary to its public statements, actually evaluated Protocol M as an authentic Cominform document at the time of its release. Rather, the evidence points to a decision "to play the situation by ear" and to exploit the document for its Cold War propaganda value, with the assumption of a "calculated risk" that it might later be exposed as a fabrication. In the sequel, the cost of paying the piper, which had to be met in the form of parliamentary questions and the ensuing uproar described above, was probably higher than anticipated. It might well have done serious damage to the credibility of British communications.¹⁹

In addition to Protocol M, an allegedly communist *Document on Terror* was published in the January 1952 issue of the Radio Free Europe magazine, *News from Behind the Iron Curtain*. Even the introductory note and summary of contents which accom-

panied its publication were not likely to inspire confidence in the authenticity of the document as an historical source. The text of this Introduction follows:

The Origin of the Document

The *Document on Terror* reproduced on the following pages came to the National Committee for a Free Europe from a former Baltic cabinet minister, favorably known to us. This man received the document in 1948 from a Ukrainian refugee in Germany. According to the Ukrainian, the document, printed in Polish, had been found on the body of a dead NKVD officer in Poland in 1948. It was smuggled into Germany where it was lent to the Ukrainian for 24 hours. During this period the Ukrainian made a shorthand copy of the document, later translated into German. The man who lent the document to the Ukrainian has disappeared. All subsequent efforts to find him have failed. The Baltic minister describes the Ukrainian (with whom he had spent several years in a Nazi concentration camp) as "wholly reliable."

The Question of Authenticity

No means of conclusively establishing the authenticity of the *Document on Terror* is known to us. The NKVD officer is dead, and no irrefutable link between him and the document can be proved. Certain facts, however, support the belief that the document is a genuine product of Communist theory. First, the trend of thought and method of presentation are typical samples of dialectic materialism. Second, the application of a pattern of terror methods similar to or identical with those described in the monograph did in fact occur in widely separated countries in Eastern Europe as well as in China. The theory has been put into practice by the Communists. Third, the integrity of the man who gave it to us is of the highest order.

Translation

The German translation given to the former Baltic minister is all that now remains. Unfortunately, it is incomplete, lacking a title page and ending so abruptly that it seems almost certain that several pages are missing. In addition, the German translation itself is poor, although it does have the advantage of being a literal translation, even to the extent of following the Polish syntax. The English translation has retained the style of the German except where this would promote misunderstanding. A few obvious inaccuracies have been corrected.

The Reason for Printing It

It is not without misgivings that this manuscript is being made available to our readers, since the question of authenticity is by no means resolved. It is our feeling, however, that the document is of such interest and potential importance that it warrants publication. We therefore proceed in the hope that the professional scholars and journalists whom this magazine reaches will themselves give it their thoughtful evaluation and draw their own conclusions.

Synopsis of the Contents

Two distinct categories of terror are analyzed in the document. General terror, based on overt acts of violence, is for use against the entire population and is aimed at achieving command over the will of the people. In the ideal terror campaign the people are led through five phases of terrorism: stimulated activity, deep insecurity, mounting fear, paralysis of will and, finally—with the aim of the terrorist reached—a period of consolidation. General terror is most effective if applied only once, for sustained application (called chronic terror) may produce immunity to fear, and mass fear may turn to mass hatred of and resistance to the perpetrators of terror. The “psychological” methods of general terror include publishing lists of executed persons, holding hostages, and public beatings. The “direct attack” methods are aimed at producing a “psychosis of white fear,” crippling the terror object’s will to resist.

Enlightened terror is a refinement of general terror, more subtle and more effective. It is based on five principles. First, the terrorist must camouflage his maneuvers so as to apply terror not in his own name, but in the name of the opponent. Second, the terrorist acts in a dual role: overtly before the eyes of the world in a constructive manner, while secretly he directs public suspicion against his opponent. Third, the terrorist converts his environment into a spontaneous assistant and accessory, in ignorance of its role. Fourth, the terrorist must use his knowledge of psychology, of the instinctive, original reactions of human beings, to manipulate them into desired situations. Finally, by infiltration of the opponent’s ranks, the terrorist can cause infinite damage and conflict by the very fact of his opponent’s confidence in him.

The weapon of enlightened terror is not limited to force, but includes any means of producing the planned psychological effect. The methods of enlightened terror, when applied within the terrorist’s own “field of force,” first comprise the establishment of a

complete information network (through infiltration, front groups, etc.). Second, direct or preferably indirect action, performed by a camouflaged agent of the terrorist, with the aim of isolating and destroying the opponent. Third, the fullest possible exploitation of the action, through the adroit use of propaganda media. The methods of enlightened terror to be applied outside the terrorist's own field of force are aimed at the disintegration of the opponent's sphere of influence. (Here the document ends abruptly.)

The statement that "the trend of thought and the method of presentation are typical samples of dialectical materialism" is contradicted by internal evidence in the *Document on Terror* itself. Even the most cursory examination of the *Document* demonstrates that:

(1) There are no Marxist-Leninist political stereotypes of the kind that would almost certainly appear in a lengthy theoretical analysis written by a communist-trained official. For example, such phrases as "class struggle," "enemies of the people," etc., are totally lacking. The one sentence that contains a sweeping sociological generalization reads as follows:

The feeling of this duty [to provide information to a hypothetical terrorist organization operating in a target country] stems from a consciousness of belonging to a racial, national, class, professional, religious or ideological group, which often includes a very broad field. (p. 54)

The sociological analysis implicit in this kind of statement is purely "Western," and quite atypical of either a Marxist-Leninist trend of thought or of dialectical materialism.

(2) Throughout the text there is strong evidence that the author (or authors) of the *Document* has a Western rather than a Soviet political and social background. For example, there is a section called "The Principle of Personal Danger (threat)" which recommends that in recruiting intelligence agents "the information service of enlightened terror should place the recruit in a position of personal danger from which only the organization can protect him." The rationale behind this type of agent control is explained as follows:

The beneficial properties of personal danger derive from the fact, well-known to every lawyer, that the defense counsel learns

more from the defendant in the period of a few minutes than the police and court learn during a long investigation. This phenomenon may be easily explained by the psychological status of the defendant. Rightly or not, the defendant feels that his most cherished possessions are threatened, and in the person of the defense counsel he sees his only trustworthy advisor. (p. 54)

Although undated, the *Document on Terror* was presumably written during World War II or shortly thereafter, a period of rigid police-state controls in the Soviet sphere. However much "socialist justice" may have improved since then, from what is known of the long record of purge trials, the relationship of the accused to his defense counsel hardly corresponds to the idealized image of implicit trust portrayed in the above quotation. On the contrary, such trust is more likely to be found in an open society in which the basic rights of the individual are protected, not merely by law but by the kind of operative political consensus which breathes reality into the formula, "a government of laws, not of men."

Indeed, in addition to the evidence already given, the substantive content of the alleged *Document on Terror* points to a Western rather than a Soviet or communist origin. Specifically, there are clues to indicate that the author may have been active in one of the Nazi secret police or related terrorist organizations (such as the *Sicherheitsdienst*, or one of the notorious SD or SS "action groups").

The final fragmentary section of the *Document* begins as follows:

All methods of external conflict are called by the general name "disintegrating action," because this action is aimed at breaking up and disintegrating the opponent's gravitational field ["internal sphere of influence"] with the aid of forces which exist within this field. (p. 57)

The concept of demoralizing or disintegrating operations appears frequently in captured German documents dealing with covert operations. A military (*Abwehr II*) memorandum describes them as follows:

Morale operations (*Zersetzung*) are carried out by agents seeking to demoralize enemy troops with the aid of whispering

propaganda or leaflets which must not reveal their German origin, but create the impression that they are the work of disaffected Russian nationals.

This paragraph is, of course, merely a formula for black propaganda, but the memorandum (signed by Baron Freytag von Lovinghoven) goes on to spell out all kinds of sabotage, insurrectionary operations, and provocations, and assigns disintegration operations "for political purposes" to the civilian *Sicherheitsdienst* (Security Service).²⁰

Throughout the *Document on Terror* the term "enlightened terror" is used for what are in fact a wide variety of provocations or "black" operations which are disguised to appear as if they were mounted by the enemy or "opponent." Provocations are, of course, a favored device of covert operational agencies and were widely employed by the Soviet NKVD, the German *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD), and the *Abwehr* before and during the Polish and Russian campaigns. The *Document on Terror* describes a typical provocation "in the Polish-Ukrainian border regions" which is ascribed to "the competent Bolshevik organs" (unnamed, it should be noted in passing). The incident might well have been provoked by either the NKVD or the SD. The same observation applies to another provocation which, according to the *Document*, allegedly took place in the Lublin district of Poland.

The kind of rough content analysis illustrated above should be adequate to indicate that the so-called *Document on Terror* is probably "fraudulent," i.e., clearly not what it is represented to be, and is presumably German rather than communist in its inspiration and origin.

The Biological Warfare Fraud

In the area of "peace propaganda," the USSR scored some notable successes during the Cold War period, working through a deliberately nebulous front organization, the World Peace Council, set up in April 1949. This organization issued a series of appeals calling for the banning of nuclear weapons during a period of pronounced Soviet inferiority in this field. The appeals were highly successful. The first and most highly publicized, the Stockholm Appeal of 1950, collected millions of signatures from the world over, and Soviet propaganda claimed 600 million signatures

for the succeeding Warsaw Appeal of 1951 and 650 million for a similar Vienna Appeal of 1955.²¹

The World Peace Council (now more usually known as the World Council of Peace) was also used to launch the germ warfare campaign on a world-wide scale in March 1952. This "Hate America" campaign, which reached a peak of intensity during the Korean War, was given an impressive "documentary base" by an international scientific commission which was handpicked and sent to North Korea and northeast China "for the investigation of the facts concerning bacterial warfare in Korea and China." The six principal scientists spent the summer of 1952 in the area interviewing scores of people and gathering material for their 665-page, 330,000-word report which weighed two and a half pounds and included some ninety photographs and twenty maps. The full report (with 600 pages of appendices) was made available in Prague in November in limited numbers only, but the original sixty-five-page pamphlet was given world-wide circulation during September and October. This report, later supplemented by forced "confessions" of American aviators, such as Major Bley and Colonel Schwable, was the key to the whole bacterial warfare campaign. In spite of the fraudulent nature of the "documentation," the hearsay evidence presented, and the obviously fake exhibits of bacterial "bombs" and other paraphernalia, the campaign as a whole was a major propaganda triumph. Even today, more than a decade later, many of the target audiences still suspect that there may have been some factual basis for the outlandish charges made.²²

As with other Soviet propaganda campaigns, the credibility of the charges was enhanced by the support of leading communists and fellow-travelers in the West. For example, at its meeting in East Berlin in July 1952, the World Peace Council heard a long report from a leading French Communist, Yves Farge, on his "on-the-scene investigations." Two weeks later, in a classic example of what has been called "the Stalinoid Syndrome,"²³ the Very Reverend Hewlett Johnson, Dean of Canterbury, returned from Korea with his own eyewitness account of germ warfare as he had seen it.²⁴

Some of the supporting stories in the satellite press claimed to be based on documentary evidence, which if it existed at all was

certainly forged. For example, one such story, which strains the credulity of all but the most wilfully blind, appeared in the July 1952 number of a Polish Navy journal. Clews gives the following account of this absurd fabrication:

An even stranger story, which again was not repeated elsewhere, appeared in the July 1952 number of the Polish Navy monthly *Morze*. Written by a Slawomir Sierecki, it purported to deal with an American action called Operation Sea-Serpent and was based on the supposed diary of a Captain Barnes, U.S.N. The diary started in April 1952 when Captain Barnes was transferred to the submarine SS-313. This submarine, wrote Sierecki, had the job of approaching Chinese mainland waters and spreading them with plague-infected flies. A special snorkel device was fitted by which the flies were to be ejected and carried by the wind to the shore. But as the submarine neared the Chinese mainland west of Hainan it was engaged by some communist patrol boats, which dropped depth charges. The container holding the infected flies was broken and the flies were released inside the submarine. For seven days the members of the crew died, one after the other. One evening the writer of the diary—the submarine commander, Captain Barnes—tried to escape by dinghy with another crew member. The dinghy was washed ashore empty on the beach of Hainan, with only a cap and the diary in it. That was the end of the story.²⁵

COLD WAR PAPER MILLS AND PERSONALIZED INTELLIGENCE

IN ADDITION to collecting and evaluating information, the intelligence agencies of the major powers frequently provide part or all of the information which goes into "background briefings" for the press. On the basis of these reports, the more privileged and trusted members of the Fourth Estate can then file stories using "official," or even in rare cases "intelligence," sources. This practice has led to the aphorism that "governments are the only vessels that leak from the top rather than the bottom."

Not all the information thus divulged is necessarily genuine. Foreign offices frequently plant stories as "trial balloons" to test domestic or foreign reaction. Moreover, for political warfare and propaganda purposes, both government and private information agencies rely on intelligence support for the substratum of "facts" that lend credibility to their output in times of crisis and tension. False or misleading reports may be fed to agents who are known suppliers of information (or misinformation) to foreign intelligence or news agencies. This kind of operation, whether conducted by a government agency or by private intelligence entrepreneurs, is called a "paper mill" in intelligence jargon. These standard political warfare operations are familiar in key trouble spots or

espionage centers such as Bern or Lisbon during World War II, Vienna or Berlin during the classic Cold War period.

In the perennial and relentless warfare between the intelligence services of "enemy" powers, the paper mills are constantly at work. But only rarely does an actual operation receive any publicity, and then usually in connection with the espionage trial of some important agent who has been apprehended. One of the most famous cases, "which may well be regarded as the climax of the struggle between the German and the Polish Intelligence Services, the Sosnovski affair . . . occurred in 1935." It has been described in Paul Leverkuehn's authoritative study of German Military Intelligence:¹

Sosnovski, a good-looking man, elegant in appearance and polished and suave in manner, first appeared in Berlin in 1927, where he set up house in a most lavish style and claimed to be the representative of a "Supra-national Committee for the Combating of Bolshevism." He very quickly gained the entree into Berlin society, entertaining regally and spending, on his own admission, more than a million marks a year—a sum which exceeded the whole annual expenditure of the Abwehr Service of that time. With a certain divorcee, Frau von Falkenhayn, he formed a liaison which, on the lady's side, blossomed without any doubt into deep and sincere love. A letter she wrote shortly before her death was conclusive proof of the effect he had had upon her. For Sosnovski, however, she was merely a tool for the furtherance of his espionage activities. With her assistance he made friends with two women working in the German Ministry of Defence. They became frequent visitors to his house, and succumbing to the charm of his personality, allowed themselves to be persuaded to give him copies of important documents relating to Germany's plans of operation against Poland.

Apart from the amorous liaisons which were of use to him in his capacity as an intelligence officer, he also formed an attachment with Lea Niako, a ballet dancer of the German Opera House; and here he met with more than his match. In a moment of weakness he let drop hints about his real activities; through the intermediary of a highly placed friend, Lea Niako passed on this information to the Abwehr, and then the struggle between the Intelligence Services was joined. Piece by piece the whole mosaic gradually took shape, until at last the moment for action arrived.

The Abwehr struck, and Sosnovski was arrested—at one of his own parties.

The case against all the accused was heard in the People's Court. In the difficult situation in which he found himself Sosnovski was most skilful in his own defense and most considerate to those accused with him. But Frau von Falkenhayn and one of the women of the Ministry of Defence were sentenced to death, while the other woman was condemned to fifteen years' penal servitude and Sosnovski received a life term. Of it, however, he served but little. The Polish Government opened negotiations, as a result of which he was exchanged for four German agents—one of them a woman—who had been arrested in Poland.

About the time of Sosnovski's return to Poland, the Polish General Staff had received a German plan of invasion which had been suitably doctored by the Abwehr and played into their hands. The Poles believed that this bogus plan was genuine and that the plan brought to them by Sosnovski—it was, in fact, genuine—was a forgery, compounded with his knowledge and assistance. As a result the unfortunate Sosnovski was sentenced to twelve years' servitude by the Poles, and Germany emerged from the whole affair unscathed.

It is extremely difficult for the historian or intelligence analyst to disentangle fact from fiction when the paper mills of the major powers have been busily at work over an extended period of time in connection with such a focal point of Cold War crisis as Berlin. Even the intelligence agencies themselves may be deceived by the miasma of rumors and reports—part fact and part fantasy—that are produced and exploited in propaganda and counter-propaganda campaigns. With respect to Berlin, a review of the Index to the *New York Times* from 1947 to 1953 indicates the dimensions of the problem, one that is widely recognized in the more sophisticated intelligence agencies as a serious distortion factor in the evaluation of raw information reports.² The *New York Times*, the *London Times*, and other responsible newspapers of the Western world are, of course, caught in an inescapable dilemma in such areas as Berlin. Eager for news, but virtually cut off from the Eastern sector or zone, they are forced to rely largely on "official" sources and to make their own evaluations without benefit of the enormous classified files available to gov-

ernment intelligence agencies. Responsible newspapers, anxious to preserve their credibility, try to avoid being "taken in" or exploited, even incidentally, for propaganda purposes. But it is inevitable that they should respond occasionally to the efforts of Western paper mills. Although concrete instances are difficult to document, such a case apparently occurred in the fall of 1953 in the aftermath of the June Berlin riots.

In late October 1953, the West Berlin newspapers gave wide publicity to sensational reports that a brave band of Czech "partisans" was fighting its way to Berlin. The story made excellent Cold War propaganda. On October 29 the London *Times* carried the following account under the headline REPORTED CLASHES IN EAST GERMANY "PARTISAN" ACTIVITY:

Unconfirmed rumours of clashes between units of militarized "peoples police" and "partisan" groups, some of which may include Russian deserters, are reported from the area of Cottbus, near the Polish frontier, where four members of the police were killed about 10 days ago in fighting Czech "terrorists." . . .

The scale of the police measures taken recently would suggest that these irregulars are a substantial and well-armed force. In addition to the four policemen killed 10 days ago, another seven are said to have fallen in more recent fighting. In spite of the most elaborate search, and the putting of a price on their heads, the original Czech "terrorists" have not yet been traced. The explanation may be found in other reports which emphasize that the "partisans" are being supported by the local population, in spite of warnings by the local police that severe penalties would be meted out to anyone who did so. On the basis of the information available so far, the disturbances do not bear any resemblance to an organized movement or insurrection.³

Three days earlier (October 26, 1953), the *New York Times* had carried a story with different emphasis under the headline EAST ZONE REDS ASK ANTI-SABOTAGE DRIVE. The lead paragraph stated that "East Germany's Communists have opened a new drive to enlist the population in their fight against sabotage and other anti-Communist activities." The next sentence discounted the "partisan" story, using "allied officials" as a source:

Allied officials nevertheless say they have no evidence to support West Berlin press reports that a band of anti-Communist

Czechs is fighting its way across East Germany to Berlin. These reports say that large numbers of additional Soviet and East German forces had been deployed around Berlin to prevent the escape of the Czechs to this city. . . . There was no reliable evidence of troop reinforcements around Berlin. The border normally is heavily guarded.⁴

The substratum of fact behind the “partisan” fantasy was not revealed until the first week in November, when three Czech refugees (of a group of five) arrived in Berlin after a twenty-eight-day trek from Prague. The story of their escapade was promptly exploited by Radio Free Europe in Munich, and the London *Times* of November 4 carried a story on their broadcast in part as follows:

The three, one badly wounded, said “that they were the survivors of a band of partisans who decided to flee to the West after listening to allied broadcasts. Two fellow countrymen were killed or captured during their escape attempt. . . . The men said they left Prague on October 3 and crossed the East German border the next night. They carried three pistols and 52 rounds of ammunition.” [There were several, at least four, clashes with police enroute.]⁵

East Berlin authorities also exploited the incident for their own propaganda purposes, distorting the kernel of truth beyond all recognition. At a special “press conference” held in East Berlin on November 8 to expose Western espionage activities, Colonel Bormann of the East German secret police referred to the case of the seven Czechs who had recently been sent into the German Democratic Republic to carry out “mass murder of people’s policemen” and were recruited through the son of a former “Benes general named Massin.” The U.S. was charged with being “the real wire-puller” behind the activities of the Gehlen and other organizations, which it financed under the name of foreign aid.⁶

“Personalized” Intelligence: From the Oracle of Delphi to Kenneth de Courcy

The mounting tensions of the Stalinist era, the massive propaganda exploitation of recurrent “crises” in the East-West struggle, and the scarcity of reliable information from behind the Iron Cur-

tain all created a demand for knowledge about Soviet bloc affairs which neither the resources of the news media nor those of scholarship could adequately supply.

Moreover, in the first postwar decade, 1945-1955, the development of thermonuclear weapons and delivery systems (both long-range bombers and missiles) by the Soviet Union created an omnipresent "balance of terror" which has conditioned the atmosphere ever since. The realization has dawned that civilization as we know it is threatened with extinction in a nuclear holocaust. These kinds of conditions—a dearth of information about the "dark forces" at work in the camp of "the enemy" and a perceived threat of imminent destruction—have produced certain instinctive and similar responses in a wide range of cultures, from the most primitive to the most technologically sophisticated.

One response is intensified intelligence collection or espionage to provide a rational basis for an estimate of "enemy" capabilities and intentions. A second response is a demand for prophecy, the Delphic function, a forecast of things to come. In primitive or traditional societies, this latter function is performed by a local shaman or witch doctor, or a Delphic oracle. In the United States the postwar period has seen an expansion and centralization of intelligence collection activities under the CIA. The "community" provides a highly sophisticated equivalent of the Delphic function in the form of National Intelligence Estimates, to which the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the State Department also contribute.

However, National Intelligence Estimates in the United States or any other country are classified Top Secret. Distribution is closely restricted to a few selected policy-making and executive officials on a strict "need-to-know" basis. The intelligent layman, the scholar, and the broad public must look elsewhere for "inside information" and a reading of the augurs and omens. But the demand persists and is partially satisfied by "depth reporting" in the major newspapers, capsulized predictions or forecasts in the weekly news magazines, and private intelligence services. These private sources range from sensation-mongering sheets put out at irregular intervals by self-styled "international private eyes," to the "confidential" bulletin published by the London *Economist*, which has consistently rated as probably the best of the private

intelligence services. In connection with a content analysis of *Competitive Broadcasting to Germany*, the *Economist* proved to be one of the most reliable sources—government intelligence agencies included—on events in Germany during a critical nine-month period of high international tension.⁷

The best known of the “personalized” intelligence services, one that has flourished over a period of years, is *The Intelligence Digest*, published monthly in London by Kenneth de Courcy. This magazine deserves attention since de Courcy obviously has a devoted clientele and readership. Otherwise he would not have survived¹ as long as he has—since 1938, when he began publication of a monthly *Review of World Affairs*. De Courcy’s active interest in foreign policy began in the mid-1930’s when he became the honorary secretary and chief observer of an Imperial Policy Group of Conservative members of Parliament. During World War II he served as an adviser on war intelligence to United Steel Companies, Ltd. In addition to *The Intelligence Digest*, he owns *The Weekly Review*, *World Science Review*, *The Weekly Religious Review*, is chairman of the Fact Foundation and director-general of the Bureau of Political War Problems, and thus reaches a rather wide audience.⁸

De Courcy’s principal claim to credibility rests on his prediction made in January 1949 that the USSR would explode an atomic device sometime during the year. When President Harry S. Truman announced on September 23 that the Soviets had indeed done so, de Courcy’s reputation as a prophet reached its zenith.⁹ Dizzy with success, he repeated the performance a year later with another prediction on Thursday, January 5, that the USSR would explode another atomic bomb at 7:00 P.M. on Saturday, January 7, 1950. His forecast prompted President Truman to make a public statement that “he had no advance information” on the subject.¹⁰ Nevertheless, de Courcy stated that the blast had indeed taken place (but at 4:00 P.M. EST rather than 7:00) “in South Central Asia between Alma Ata and the Chinese province of Sinkiang,” according to word allegedly received from a secret area outside Russia where “an advanced method of detection” was used.¹¹ Unfortunately, however, the Stuttgart seismograph, one of the most sensitive in Europe, did not record an atomic explosion that night.¹² Unabashed by this discrepancy between

fact and fantasy, de Courcy reported a month later that, according to his sources, the Russians had already built three hydrogen bombs and had exploded one.¹³ This was followed by a statement on April 15, 1950, that the "Unidentified Flying Objects" (the mysterious "flying saucers" that were again the subject of much speculation) were spent cartridges of Russian supersonic guided missiles. Those seen in the United States might come from secret Russian bases in Central America or from submarines.¹⁴

With the momentum of such flights of imagination behind him, in November 1950 de Courcy visited the United States, where he was "de-briefed" in the Pentagon and spoke to the National Press Club, American University, and the Executives Club of Chicago, among others. This last address, which was reprinted in *Vital Speeches of the Day*, illustrates the techniques used in his *Intelligence Digest*.

First, de Courcy prefaced his Chicago speech on "Russia's Next Move" by saying that while in Washington he had talked at length with "one of the most important personages in this country" and was "very well informed as to the situation from the official point of view." According to de Courcy, when he told this unnamed official what he planned to say to his Chicago audience, the latter looked at him "very, very thoughtfully afterwards and said: 'You know, you have a very important assignment in saying publicly what you have said to me just now.'" Having thus established the VIP nature of his sources and contacts, and having created an atmosphere of expectancy, de Courcy proceeded to make a rough "intelligence estimate" of Russia's strengths and weaknesses. After quoting the usual order-of-battle figure of 175 divisions, he added that the USSR had "a potential of twenty million men available, without China, which would make 600 divisions in case of war," with "50,000 tanks available at the moment." As if this grossly exaggerated figure were not frightening enough *per se*, he quoted "an officer of the British intelligence who had just left the service" as saying that the number should be four times as large! Against this distorted spectre of Russian strength, however, de Courcy set "a contrasting story of weakness, of dissatisfaction, of rumblings, political and otherwise." He had gained these insights through "some very interesting talks with Soviet officers who have deserted from the Russian army and who

have come over to our side.” He placed the number of officers at “not less than 1,000 . . . including six generals” in the period 1945-1950.

De Courcy’s final proposition, one that he declared to be a personal goal which “warrants very careful consideration,” was an impassioned appeal for a preventive war against the USSR. Having stated flatly that “the Russians have fired the first shot in the Third World War,” he asked the rhetorical question, “They having made the first strike, what can we do to destroy the possibility that looms before us, an endless ghastly war that might ruin the whole world?” His answer was breathtaking in its simplicity and follows closely the curious blend of fantasy, wishful thinking, and chop-logic that characterized Adolph Hitler’s rationalization of his attack on the Soviet Union a little more than a decade earlier:

. . . The whole source of Russian strength at this moment lies concentrated in the small, highly vulnerable area, the whole source of Russia’s military power, the whole guts of Russia, the thing upon which she relies for everything, is in this one single, vulnerable area, the oil producing areas of the Soviet Union. She is already short of oil. She can’t store great quantities of oil at secret bases because she is desperately short of oil, and the whole of that oil is in an area which could be destroyed by atomic bombs—not high explosives—that is no good. In one single week, if not sooner, that could be done and the whole of Russian agriculture would come to pieces, the whole of her industry would be paralyzed. Those great forces I have described, the tank forces, would never move. Her great air forces would never take to the skies. Those submarines would never go to sea. The forces in Asia could never be supplied. The whole rotten, aggressive system would crumble in the shortest period of time, and we have the power to paralyze and destroy this great force before they have the power to retaliate against us in any large way.¹⁵

In the decade of strategic thermonuclear deterrence that followed de Courcy’s Chicago speech, the doctrine of preventive war has lost much of its former attraction for even the most militant of the “hard-liners.” But the kind of fraudulent intelligence on which such special pleading was based continues to characterize the *Intelligence Digest* and similar publications that appear and disappear from time to time, some of them specializing in “intel-

ligence" from particular geographical areas.¹⁶ This is the principal characteristic that such personalized intelligence publications have in common: the "secret" reports they circulate are vehicles for special pleading or thinly disguised propaganda. These amateur and often irresponsible services tend to discredit the work of official government intelligence agencies, which perform a vital function in an increasingly professional, scientific manner.¹⁷ The personalized intelligence publications are a constant irritation to official government agencies for this reason. Their fraudulent reports reach top-level personnel in many agencies, since the policy-making elite is usually on the mailing lists of the private bulletins.

De Courcy's *Intelligence Digest* has a world-wide circulation to direct paid subscribers and to a mailing list of "key opinion-makers" who receive gift subscriptions. In this regard, the flyleaf of the September 1965 issue claims that "during 1962 and 1963, subscribers to this service provided a fund which made it possible for 283,370 copies of *Intelligence Digest* to be sent to key opinion-makers in different places who would not otherwise have seen or read the facts which we have been able to publish." However exaggerated such circulation claims may be, the fact that the *Digest* continues to appear although its creator is in prison, bespeaks a remarkable pertinacity on de Courcy's part. In the early 1960's he apparently carried over his sharp practices in the so-called intelligence business into other affairs. In connection with a property development scheme in Southern Rhodesia, de Courcy was sentenced by a British Court in 1963 to seven years' imprisonment on multiple charges of fraud, forgery, and perjury. He made a dramatic escape from custody six months later but was speedily recaptured and returned to Old Bailey.¹⁸

Once such reports as de Courcy's have been read by the policy-makers, intelligence analysts on the working level are frequently required to come up with an evaluation and/or refutation. This disruptive process wastes many thousands of expensive professional man-hours. The most dramatic illustration of this effect was President Truman's public statement on de Courcy's 1950 prediction of a Soviet atomic explosion. Considerable interdepartmental staff work is required to coordinate such an action at the presidential level, and the indirect cost to the Amer-

ican taxpayer is by no means negligible. In addition, there is a direct loss of the professional man-hours wasted on fraudulent trivia, time which should have been spent on essential tasks directly affecting the national security interests of the United States. De Courcy's personalized "intelligence" service has also disrupted British public affairs in much the same way. In 1950 Prime Minister Attlee publicly criticized the *Digest* as "mischievous," and again in 1952 the Marquess of Reading, an Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, was obliged to deny sensational allegations that the government was suppressing a full investigation of "Russian spies in Britain."¹⁹

Finally, by circulating grossly exaggerated estimates of Russian military strength and capabilities, the *Intelligence Digest* unwittingly supports a major and continuing Soviet propaganda theme—that the USSR has overtaken and surpassed the United States in the fields of military and space technology. Perhaps it is no accident that a Russian emigré and a prolific author of fraudulent Soviet memoirs, Gregori Bessedovsky, is reportedly one of de Courcy's principal "inside sources."²⁰

For the period 1946-1961, de Courcy had an American counterpart who in the mid-1950's proved to be a serious rival in the production of fraudulent "secret intelligence"—a retired U.S. Air Force Colonel, Ulius ("Pete") Amoss, who had served with the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) early in World War II. He later became the Chief of Staff of the 9th Air Force and, before his retirement in 1946, was assigned to special duties with the Air Force General Staff. Placed on the reserve list, he continued to use his title until his death on November 9, 1961.²¹ On retiring from the air force, he and his wife, whom he met in Cairo during his OSS days while she was reportedly assigned to monitor his activities for British intelligence, organized the International Services of Information (ISI) as a non-profit foundation for which some dozen private investors reportedly put up \$10,000 each. Together they issued a four-page "secret intelligence" bulletin called *Inform*, for which an estimated 1,100 subscribers paid a yearly fee of \$25. ISI hired a press agent, published sensational issues of *Inform*, and built up an image of Colonel Amoss as "the world's leading private eye," the director of "a one-man OSS" and "a co-belligerent with the United States in

the Cold War on the Soviet Union." Feature articles on his alleged exploits appeared in such periodicals as *The Reporter* (February 2, 1954), *The Saturday Evening Post* (May 21, 1955), and *Newsweek* (November 17, 1961).

Colonel Amoss claimed to have a vast network of unpaid espionage agents consisting of seven thousand secret "correspondents," most of them within the Soviet orbit, a smaller number of "collectors" to round up their data, and a select group of "couriers," who at the risk of their lives would break through the Iron Curtain in order to cable in their precious reports. All these alleged "operatives" worked without pay, at great peril to their lives, especially the couriers, of whom Amoss reported in 1955 that "eleven have been killed so far, and seven are missing."²² The absurdity of these claims was matched only by the style and content of the *Inform* reports themselves. These mimeographed bulletins mailed out at irregular intervals in envelopes stamped "CONFIDENTIAL" were grotesque caricatures of intelligence reporting and evaluation enlivened by lurid personal accounts of Amoss' quixotic "special operations." A typical example is the bulletin dated June 17, 1953, which begins: "GEORGI MALENKOV IS DEAD." This sensational scoop is followed immediately by the disclaimer: "This is a rumor from ISI sources—repeat, this is a rumor. It is not a fact."²³

Like his competitor, Kenneth de Courcy, Colonel Amoss also reported on Soviet atomic developments. In the summer of 1953, for example, he put out a special *Inform* bulletin which quoted in full, this time without qualification, an alleged cable from Aachen, Germany, which ended: "MALENKOV HYDROGEN BOMB CLAIM IS WITLESS HYSTERICAL PROPAGANDA. AMERICA EXPLODES, THEN TALKS. MALENKOV TALKS, DOESN'T EXPLODE." The "cable" was dated August 11, 1953, and was signed with the cover name "Janisi." Unfortunately for *Inform's* credibility, according to one reporter, August 11, the date of the cable, "was three days after Malenkov's announcement that the United States no longer had a monopoly on the hydrogen bomb, and just one day before the Russians are known to have set off their first nuclear fusion explosion as was confirmed on August 19 by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission."²⁴

Colonel Amoss made national news in March 1953, when he

claimed that his organization had engineered the escape into Denmark of a Polish flyer, Lt. Franciszek Jarecki, in his MIG-15 jet, said to have been the first of its type to fall into allied hands after the outbreak of the Korean conflict. Sensational publicity concerning the incident was such that Air Intelligence (A-2) in the Pentagon pointedly dissociated itself from Colonel Amoss, and Allen Dulles, director of CIA, stated that he had seen no evidence to support the colonel's claims. The pilot himself stated flatly that the flight was entirely his own notion: "Nor is there any truth to the claim of a retired American colonel that his worldwide spy network helped in my escape."

Fortunately, the potential international complications that might have developed from Colonel Amoss' fraudulent pretensions never materialized. But they were of such seriousness that the Danish Foreign Minister, Ole Bjoern Kraft, felt it necessary to issue a warning statement: "Americans who claimed to be behind it [the escape] may have done the young Pole great harm. They have succeeded in spreading doubt about his status as a bona fide political refugee. Their fantastic tale may provide a God-sent argument for the Polish Government, which may now demand that he be handed back as a thief and a spy."²⁵

The Bluebird Papers

As might be expected, Colonel Amoss also got into the suspect documents business as a by-product of one of his more grotesque adventures, "Operation Sonny Boy," a comic-opera attempt to kidnap Vasily Stalin, the son of the then Soviet dictator. The undertaking, which he directed from a suite in Munich's Four Seasons Hotel, aborted after costing one of its backers, a New Jersey millionaire, Clendenin J. Ryan, \$50,000. (Why anyone should have wanted to liberate "Sonny Boy," a hopeless alcoholic who died in disgrace in April 1962, was never made clear in the first place.)

However, Colonel Amoss did not return to the United States entirely empty-handed from Munich, where he had previously reported in a "Special Personal Letter," dated July 5, 1953: "I am a virtual prisoner," constantly shadowed by mysterious unspecified agents simply referred to as "they." While in Munich he met an agent whom he believed to be a defector from the Russian

zone and, on his own admission, paid him \$3,000 for a 150-page "document" written in German but bearing an official USSR stamp. To Colonel Amoss, whose knowledge of German left much to be desired, the document, which he called "The Bluebird Papers," appeared to be nothing less than "a Communist master plan for world-wide sabotage." It listed as targets twenty-six American cities and fifteen industrial concerns, the names and addresses of fifty couriers, and indicated that almost three thousand newly trained saboteurs were already enroute to their assignments.

Returning to the United States "amid blazing guns" (as he described his departure in an *Inform* letter), Colonel Amoss tried to offer the alleged "document" to various government agencies but could not find a buyer at any price. A Department of Defense official reportedly stated that "the papers were crude fakes of the sort that are being peddled in Germany every day."²⁶

It is not clear what the "Bluebird Papers" were meant to represent, whether they were produced by an individual document peddler or by an official "paper mill." But in any case, even after being officially disillusioned as to their value, Colonel Amoss continued to use them as a basis for further *Inform* predictions, writing hopefully that "The Bluebird Papers may well turn out to be the most revealing blueprints yet uncovered by the Western Powers for the world-wide web skillfully being plotted and woven by the agents of Soviet Russia."

The late Colonel Amoss was one of the most colorful Till Eulenspiegels of the intelligence business. He once defended his merry pranks and fraudulent bulletins in terms that may provide a rationale for future soothsayers who can be expected to play a similar role. After generously conceding that "the quality of government intelligence isn't bad," nevertheless "many valuable informants simply won't talk to official agents the way they will talk to us." He argues further that government agencies are too secret, that Americans are entitled to more inside information on world affairs than they are getting, and that CIA is either incompetent or holding out on the taxpayers. Furthermore, his argument runs, collection and distribution of intelligence through official channels is too cumbersome and too slow: "By the time the stuff is processed, it may be history. . . . I've known some commanding generals to be pretty bitter about this. As for the average citi-

zen, he has no clue whatever to the plans of foreign powers until they become events. Now, ISI is often able to get intelligence where it's needed in time to be acted upon." ²⁷

Naturally, the intelligence community takes a different view. It holds that the collection, evaluation, and distribution of intelligence is properly a government function, like delivering the mail. It would object to the private intelligence entrepreneur on principle, even if his reports and prophecies were accurate rather than false or misleading, as was certainly the case with most of ISI's *Inform* bulletins. In this regard, typical State Department, CIA, and Department of Defense comments run from "I can't think of a single time when Amoss was right" to "a total loss."

The "personalized intelligence" agent and his services merit attention more as a cultural phenomenon than as an intellectual curiosity of interest to the historian or political analyst. In a sense, one can apply to a Colonel Amoss or to a Kenneth de Courcy, Voltaire's aphorism with respect to the Deity: "If he did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him." In times of great international stress and tension, society creates a demand for someone to fulfill the Delphic function, and some enterprising individual will almost certainly step forward to read the omens.

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND POLITICAL WARFARE FORGERIES

A C C O R D I N G

to a briefing given by Richard Helms, assistant director of the Central Intelligence Agency,¹ the Soviets have been active for many years in the production and propaganda exploitation of forgeries. But it was not until 1957 (a year after the XXth Party Congress had proclaimed a new era of "peaceful coexistence") "that they first began to aim them frequently against American targets, to turn them out in volume, and to exploit them through a wide-flung international network." Helms reported on "no fewer than thirty-two forged documents designed to look as though they had been written by or to officials of the American Government."

In spite of its title, *Communist Forgeries*, the CIA presentation is mainly an analysis of Soviet political warfare objectives, anti-United States propaganda themes, and the techniques used to give such themes the widest possible dissemination. Soviet forgeries are produced and propagandized with three main objectives in view: (1) "to discredit the West generally, and the U.S. and its Government specifically in the eyes of the rest of the world; (2) to sow suspicion and discord among the Western allies, and especially between this country and its friends; and

(3) to drive a wedge between the peoples of non-bloc countries and their governments.”²

According to the CIA study, twenty-two of the thirty-two forged documents were designed to demonstrate American imperialist plans and ambitions. In this category, eleven were offered as proof of U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of Asian or Southeast Asian countries. For example, one was a forged secret agreement between the U.S. Secretary of State and Japanese Premier Kishi “to permit the use of Japanese troops anywhere in Asia.” Four others offered forged proof that the United States, despite official disclaimers, was either secretly supplying anti-Sukarno rebels with military aid, or was directly plotting the overthrow of the Indonesian president. Two more announced that Americans were plotting to assassinate Chiang Kai-shek!

Five of the thirty-two forgeries analyzed by CIA supported the charge that the United States planned to suppress all national independence movements in the Middle East, uproot French and British interests there, and move in as the new master of the house. For example, two spurious orders directed American diplomatic missions to help in overthrowing the United Arab Republic. Another forgery was keyed to the landing of troops in Lebanon in 1958 “for fifteen months,” and added that their purpose was installing atomic and other military bases and “wiping out millions of Arabs.”

According to CIA, the first Soviet bloc forgery dealing with Africa appeared in August 1960 in the guise of a letter from the State Department to Ambassador Timberlake in Leopoldville. It represented Premier Tshombe as a paid and probably reliable agent of the United States government. And it added a dash of racist venom with the words, “but Gó d knows what these blacks will do!”³

Helms notes that, as is standard practice among the major powers:⁴

Covert psychological warfare operations, including those featuring fabricated documents, are planned and carried out by the foreign intelligence services of the bloc. “The Big Three of Fraud” are the Soviet Committee of State Security, the KGB; the East German service, operating through its foreign intelligence branch; and the Czech intelligence service. A number of fraudu-

lent documents have gone directly from the headquarters of a bloc intelligence service into free world channels. . . . The preparation of a bloc forgery demands a different skill than counterfeiting. The purpose is not to create an exact duplicate but to produce a variant which veers from true north to Communist north by just as many degrees as world credulity will allow. The raw material is an invention or a perverted truth designed to support a bloc propaganda theme. Sometimes very little raw material is used. For example, the bloc publishes a mere fragment of a false State Department cable or a bit of innocuous documentary text and then depends upon editorial elaboration to make the sale. More frequently it interlards a concocted text with several fat layers of propaganda. . . .

Whatever the raw materials, the finished product must be reasonably well packaged. A forged State Department cable must look enough like the real thing to fool most readers. Each bloc forgery that we have seen has in fact been prepared with enough care to pass a lay inspection. Their experts know very well that they cannot deceive the governments that they mean to victimize, and so they do not take infinite pains or pursue perfection.⁵

As an illustration of the kinds of mistakes frequently found in Soviet bloc forgeries, the CIA presentation used the so-called "Rountree Circular." This fabrication purported to be a circular cablegram sent by Assistant Secretary of State Rountree to all United States diplomatic posts in the Middle East on April 18, 1958. It included a number of technical mistakes in language and format which could be readily spotted by intelligence analysts, but which were likely to slip past the casual reader, unfamiliar with U.S. diplomatic communications. Among other errors, the most obvious are: (1) use of an obsolete cable form—the printed cable form reproduced had been replaced by another three years earlier, in 1955; (2) obsolete security classification—the classification "Confidential . . . Security Information" had been dropped in favor of another system in 1953 (five years earlier); (3) wrong date-number grouping for the message—the fraudulent cable, "Circular 11," was dated April 18, 1958 (there was a real circular Number 11, but it was dated July 20, 1957, a year earlier, and concerned a different subject); (4) wrong communications nomenclature—the fraudulent text begins with the words, "This

circular letter,” but there is no “circular letter” in State Department nomenclature; (5) wrong signature—the forgery is signed “ROUNTREE.” The use of capital letters is correct, but a cable to an embassy would be signed in the name of the Secretary of State, or in his absence, the “Acting” Secretary of State. Since Rountree did not hold either of these positions, his name would not have been used.

Clearly, the Rountree Circular forgery was technically something less than “fiendishly clever” as a fabrication, but in terms of general content it was sufficiently plausible to deceive the Middle Eastern target audiences of Soviet and Egyptian propaganda.

In a follow-up to the study *Communist Forgeries*, there appeared in the U.S. *Congressional Record* for September 28, 1965, a brief study of Soviet defamation and forgery operations entitled “The Soviet and Communist Bloc Defamation Campaign” (reproduced in Appendix 2). Although this new study is mainly an exposé and analysis of what the Soviets call “disinformation” operations, the concluding section on forgeries indicates that since the publication of the original CIA briefing “fourteen new instances of forged U.S. official documents have come under scrutiny by the end of July 1965. . . . Although CIA has not been omitted from some of these spurious documents, the principal purpose of such forgeries has been to discredit U.S. policies and the representatives of other U.S. agencies overseas, such as the Department of State, USIA, the Peace Corps, the Armed Forces of the United States and American political leaders generally.”

In addition to these fabrications analyzed by CIA, certain other cases have occasionally been sufficiently important to merit widespread news coverage during the period 1960-1964.

On September 3, 1960, the *New York Times* reported on a forged “Rubottom Airgram,” which at the time was being circulated by *Prensa Latina*, a Cuban press service with communist leanings. The document purported to be a circular airgram signed by Roy Rubottom, former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American affairs. Classified “Secret,” it gave detailed instructions to United States missions for exerting pressure on Latin American countries to prevent them from participating in a conference on

underdeveloped nations scheduled to be held in Havana. It was thus clearly designed to support the Soviet propaganda theme of American 'imperialist intervention' in Latin American affairs.

An official State Department announcement that the document was "an unscrupulous forgery" noted the same kinds of errors in format as in the case of the Rountree Circular. First, the "airgram" (dated February 5, 1960) was under the signature of Douglas Dillon, Under-Secretary of State. Not only was Dillon not in Washington on February 5, but his signature would not have been used in any case, since regulations require that all dispatches be approved by either the Secretary or Acting Secretary of State. Second, the series number of the purported message, "E-679," was one that was never used for circular airgrams. Third, the address, "All Diplomatic Posts / American Republics," did not follow the standard form. In addition to such technical mistakes, there is at least one major substantive error in the forged airgram. Although dated February, it contains an internal reference to "the failure of the Summit conference," which did not break up in Paris until May.⁶

On August 18, 1961, in support of the charge that the United States menaces world peace and threatens its allies with atomic destruction, the Soviet Foreign Ministry invited foreign correspondents in Moscow to a Tass news agency exhibit of photocopies of alleged "documents" dated February 3, 1958. The exhibit was labeled "Nuclear Target Study," and the documents shown were attributed to the headquarters of the former Baghdad Pact, which was reorganized in August 1959 as CENTO, the Central Treaty Organization. (The members of CENTO are Britain, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey, with the United States as an associate, but not a full, member.)

The copies of alleged "top secret documents" in this exhibition were cropped in such a way that there was no indication of their country of origin, and there was no means of determining whether they were authentic or wholly or in part forgeries.⁷ This represented an improvement in presentation technique, since a plausible case could be made that they may have been drawn up three years earlier as part of routine contingency planning by the Baghdad Pact powers to meet a hypothetical Soviet invasion of the Middle East.

A central feature of the Tass exhibit was a Soviet map which showed mushroom cloud symbols on purported CENTO target areas in regions of Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan bordering on the USSR. These areas were described as "interdiction targets," and the entire area was earmarked to be turned into a death zone.

The following day Iranian officials in Teheran stated that the USSR had used "definite forgeries" in the exhibit, adding: "It is incredible for any government to agree to annihilate its own country merely to create a vacuum between itself and foreign sources." Other Iranian officials denounced the documents as "a complete concoction" aimed at stepping up the war of nerves between the USSR and Iran.⁸

In December 1962 the USSR attempted to blacken the reputation of the German General Adolph Heusinger, who at that time was chairman of the permanent Military Committee of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in Washington. Heusinger, whose revealing book of war memoirs is appropriately entitled *Befehl in Widerstreit* ("Command in Opposition"),⁹ was the object of a concerted Soviet propaganda campaign which attempted to portray him as a "war criminal." The campaign, which made use of falsified photographs and documents, backfired and caused the Soviets considerable embarrassment, thanks to repeated blunders. For example, first the Soviet Army newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* ("Red Star") published a photograph in its issue of December 13, 1961, which purported to show General Heusinger's troops burning a village in the Ukraine in 1942. The same picture had previously appeared in a Soviet textbook with a caption describing Japanese soldiers burning a Chinese village in 1932. After the *New York Times* published the story and photograph during the first week in January 1962, *Krasnaya Zvezda* acknowledged the fraud, attributing it to "the mistake of a man working in the photographic department."¹⁰

Second, in a series of papers against Heusinger sent to the United Nations and various Western governments, the Soviets included a document purportedly relating to "Operation Tannenbaum," a plan for a Nazi attack on Switzerland which never came off. According to Colonel Gerd Schmueckle, a Bonn Defense Ministry spokesman, this "document" was dated August 26, 1940, a time when Heusinger was on leave from the army. It was signed

not by Heusinger but by an "Oberst I. G. Mueller." "Oberst I.G." means colonel of the general staff, and the signature is identical with that of the late Lieutenant General Vincenz Mueller, who was Chief of Staff of the East German Army!

A similar blunder in the use of a fake photograph was made by the Communist party of the U.S. On November 19, 1961, *The Worker*, official newspaper of the CPUSA, published prominently on its front page a dramatic "photograph" showing a United States jet plane juxtaposed against the figure of a coolie with arms upraised and fists clenched, symbolizing outrage and resistance. The caption read: "U.S. War Planes Invade Vietnam Skies." On January 12, 1962, the *Washington Post* reproduced the front page of *The Worker* with the so-called photograph in context, with an explanation of why it was obviously a fake. Experts had pointed out that both the plane and coolie were in perfect focus, although obviously separated by considerable distance, whereas some bushes seen indistinctly at the bottom of the photograph were in very poor focus. Moreover, it was pointed out that the shadows on the plane and the shadow of the coolie's arm across his hat also did not match!¹¹

This kind of fabrication has nevertheless continued unremittingly, especially in such areas as the Federal Republic of Germany, where the West German armed forces and their activities have been the chief targets. In December 1964 a federal criminal police report estimated that approximately three million forged letters, disguised (grey or black) propaganda, and similar materials are produced and sent out by the Soviet and East German intelligence services every year. These provocations range from scurrilous or compromising personal letters to false military orders and fatality reports. They cause considerable temporary harassment, but the results have been rated by West German authorities as grossly disproportionate to the enormous effort and the millions of dollars expended.¹²

The long and bitter Sino-Soviet doctrinal dispute, with its running battle of charges and counter-charges, has apparently at times been stimulated by Western intelligence agencies. At least in one instance even experts in the French Communist party were evidently deceived by a skillfully planted forgery. According to Victor Zorza, a British Kremlinologist and Soviet expert, the

semi-official French newspaper *Le Monde*, early in March 1963, published an alleged letter attacking Soviet doctrine from the Chinese Embassy in Bern, Switzerland. The fraudulent letter stated that a copy had also been sent to the organ of the French Communist party, *France Nouvelle*, which apparently believed it genuine but because of its contents withheld publication. The letter, which *Le Monde* published in good faith, appears to have been a skillful forgery. After one or two phrases aroused suspicion, the *Manchester Guardian* correspondent in Geneva checked with the Chinese Embassy in Bern, which replied that the letter was "completely false," and that it had never sent out anything of the kind.¹³

Two months later, in June 1963, Zorza reported on another, much cruder forgery designed to capitalize on the Sino-Soviet dispute. This fabrication appeared in Ceylon in the form of a letter allegedly from the "Soviet Ministry of Trade" to booksellers in Colombo. The letter urged them not to stock or distribute "a new work by Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the People's Republic of China, bearing the title 'Stalin on World Revolution.'" The booksellers were warned that the book could only confuse sincere communists and induce schisms in the socialist camp, because it manifested "a provincial and immature distortion of sacred Leninist principles." According to Zorza: "Phrases of this kind, which show ignorance of Soviet terminology, make it possible to conclude that the letter is a forgery of which a respectable organization like the United States Central Intelligence Agency would be ashamed." In conclusion he speculates that "the cruder 'experts' from such places as Taiwan are getting in on the act and spoiling the market for the more sophisticated forgeries produced with loving care by the 'real' experts."¹⁴

"Books for Idiots": False Soviet "Memoirs"

Although official Soviet propaganda and forgery mills have been very active indeed, they have been more than matched for brilliance of performance and acceptance of their products by a small group of private forgers working in Paris since the early 1950's. This group of "historians" is known as "the Bessedovsky school," after Gregori Bessedovsky, its self-acknowledged leader. It has produced an astonishing number of false Soviet memoirs,

biographies, etc., which have been so skillfully fabricated that even such Sovietologists as Isaac Deutscher and the British historian E. H. Carr have been deceived by them.

The various books written by the Bessedovsky team have been highly successful commercially, and most have been translated from the French into English, and occasionally into German, Italian, or Swedish. In a letter to Rysard Wraga (Niezbrzycki), a Polish emigré living in Paris, Bessedovsky defended his trade of "falsifier of history" as follows:

As for myself, sir, I write books for idiots. Do you imagine that anyone in the West would read what you call my apocryphal works if, in quoting Kaganovitch, Zhukov, Mikoyan or Bulganin, I tried to be faithful to the manner, sense and form of their speeches? . . . But when I portray Stalin or Molotov in pyjamas, when I tell the dirtiest possible stories about them—never mind whether they are true or invented—rest assured that not only all intellectuals will read me, but also the most important capitalist statesman, on his way to a peace conference, will pick up my book before going to sleep in his pullman . . . Allah has given money to the stupid in order that the intelligent can live easily.¹⁵

Formerly a *chargé d'affaires* at the Soviet Embassy in Paris, Bessedovsky became one of the early Russian defectors by dramatically jumping over the embassy wall in October 1929. Within two years he had produced two volumes of memoirs, *On the Road to Thermidor: Memoirs of a Former Soviet Diplomat*,¹⁶ published originally by the emigré press as *Na Putyakh k Termidoru: Vospominanii Byvshago Sovyetskogo Diplomata*, Paris, 1931.

But it was not until the outbreak of the Cold War in the fall of 1947 that there began to appear in Paris a whole series of fraudulent works which have since been ascribed to Bessedovsky. The first of these was the false memoirs of General Vlassov, the brilliant Soviet commander who, after being taken prisoner by the Germans, led a largely mythical Army of Russian Volunteers who fought on the German side during World War II and liberated Prague, only to be turned over later to the Soviets by the United States occupation forces.¹⁷ The book appeared under the pen-name Cyrille Dimitrievitch Kalinov, with the title *I Chose the Gallows (J'ai choisi la potence; Paris, 1947)*. The title is

reminiscent of the memoirs of an earlier Soviet defector, Victor Kravchenko's *I Chose Freedom*.¹⁸

Bessedovsky next turned his fertile imagination and facile pen to the production of a second memoir describing the career of an imaginary Soviet colonel, Ivan Nikititch Krylov, *Ma carrière à l'état-majeure soviétique* (Paris, 1949). An English translation by Edward Fitzgerald under the title *Soviet Staff Officer* appeared two years later (London, 1951). The *London Times* review noted that this book was "extraordinarily reminiscent" of an earlier propaganda vehicle, *Russian Campaign of 1941-43* by Allen and Muratov. The review added that "this similarity starts . . . about one-third of the way through the book, and can be traced through whole paragraphs until thirty pages from the end. . . . All this, and the author, too, may quite well be genuine. But such methods do not encourage the reader to believe it."¹⁹ Thus forewarned, and after finding forty-five almost identical paragraphs, the American publishers, The Philosophical Library, New York, canceled their edition. But this kind of plagiarism did not prevent the publication of an Italian edition (Milano, 1950).

Within a year Bessedovsky, reverting to his former pen-name, Cyril Kalinov, produced a third fabrication, *The Soviet Marshalls Speak (Les maréchaux Soviétiques vous parlent, Paris, 1950)*. The book was an instant success and soon appeared in both German and Italian editions. The idea of writing such a book may well have been taken from Liddel Hart's, *The Other Side of the Hill: Germany's Generals, 1939-45* (London, 1950). But here the parallel ends. Liddel Hart's work is a serious military study based on solid documentation. Bessedovsky's, although plausible and well written, was largely fantasy and was repeatedly denounced by Boris Souvarine and other emigré experts in Paris as "a fabrication which no one takes seriously."²⁰ Unfortunately, this was not entirely accurate. Based on *The Soviet Marshalls Speak*, France's most serious military review drew significant deductions from an alleged thesis on political warfare which Marshall Bulganin never wrote.²¹ In the United States the book was read with great interest by one of the top experts in the State Department's intelligence agency, and an English translation was given wide circulation as an important "document" by the military intelligence service of an important NATO power. These observations indi-

cate how little hard intelligence (on which an accurate evaluation could be based) was available to the major Western intelligence services during this period. Even Boris Souvarine and other experts in Paris had written that Bessedovsky's earlier work, *My Career as a Soviet Staff Officer*, "contains precise information which makes it an interesting historical document"! ²²

Shortly after *The Soviet Marshalls Speak* was circulated through official intelligence channels (apparently the only English translation), it was evaluated as a forgery by U.S. Army Intelligence. As the credibility of works by such figures as Colonels Kalinov and Krylov began to wear thin, Bessedovsky hit upon the idea of inventing a different kind of imaginary personage, one who would be a close relative of a high Soviet official and thus presumably privy to "inside" information. Thus began the short-lived literary career of Budu Svanidze, an alleged nephew of Stalin, whose first work, *My Uncle, Joseph Stalin*, was published in Paris in 1952 and followed by German, English, and American editions a year later. To add an extra touch of authenticity, in a signed introduction, Bessedovsky, in his role of Soviet expert, certified that he had "personally made the acquaintance of the author." For Bessedovsky this required nothing more than looking at himself in a full-length mirror. The book was certainly a commercial success. A review in the *San Francisco Chronicle* of February 22, 1953, observed that "Apart from its obvious importance as a historical document, 'My Uncle, Joseph Stalin' is a thoroughly readable, absorbing book that will hold your interest from the first to the last." However, such Soviet experts as Philip Mosely, Alexander Dallin, and Harry Schwartz were obviously skeptical. Schwartz went so far as to observe, in the *Saturday Review* of February 7, "The question of the book's honesty is therefore crucial. On this issue, therefore, several doubts must be expressed, though this reviewer is not prepared to say the volume is made out of whole cloth."

Thus encouraged in his literary efforts, the imaginary Budu Svanidze published a second book, *Conversations With Stalin (En parlant avec Staline)*, Paris, 1954), and a third on Malenkov, published in England under the title *Georgiy Malenkov* (translated by Vera Shiliga, London, 1954). Before he was allowed to disappear (after a series of exposés in Boris Souvarine's Paris journal,

Est et Ouest) Budu Svanidze had also written a series of articles under the title "Who Is Khrushchev?"²³

After Svanidze was dropped in France and Beria was liquidated in the USSR, an alleged nephew of Beria, the famous head of the Soviet secret police, appeared on the Paris literary scene. Again, as in the case of the missing Svanidze, Bessedovsky certified on his honor in a German newspaper that he had obtained his customary "exclusive" revelations directly from conversations with the newly discovered nephew, a certain "David Ivan Beria."

When Malenkov was dismissed in 1955, similar discoveries were made of an alleged "confidant," Ilya Morin (*J'étais le confident de Malenkov*), and a certain A. Martynov, his "secretary," who also had much to reveal. Finally, when problems of Soviet military strategy and atomic weapons began to receive wide publicity in 1955, two more volumes, also attributed to Bessedovsky, appeared in the Paris bookshops: *Zhukov, Chief of the Red Army*, and *Kapitza, Father of the Soviet Atomic Bomb*, the latter under the pen-name of A. M. Biev.

Bessedovsky's most sensational *coup de plume*, the fabrication of Litvinov's "Diary," is discussed as a separate case study below. During this same period he also concocted a famous "Testament" of Stalin, for which a Paris newspaper almost paid 500,000 francs. When the deal fell through in France, the merchandise was peddled in Germany.²⁴

Since 1955 Bessedovsky's pen and imagination have apparently been inactive. But his place has been taken by a gifted pupil of the same school, Victor Alexandrov.

Like others of the Bessedovsky school, Alexandrov is also of Russian origin but a naturalized American citizen, reportedly a relative of the New York impresario, Sol Hurok. Alexandrov's literary production, like that of his model, has been prodigious (fourteen books), has enjoyed wide commercial success, and has served to further confuse fact with fantasy in the area of Soviet affairs. He frequently cites Bessedovsky as a source, and flattering praises of his patron saint are scattered throughout his work, from his earliest, *Journey Through Chaos (Les Apatrides, Paris, 1955)*, to his recent *The Bear and the Whale (L'ours et la baleine, Paris, 1958)*. A number of his books have appeared in English, German, Norwegian, and Swedish editions.

In the prologue to his most recent fabrication, *The Tukhachevsky Affair*, Alexandrov describes his method in terms which apply to all his works:

In this account, in story form, I have included as far as possible only material supported by oral testimony or reliable documents. I have kept conjecture to a minimum. The conversations, though not necessarily verbatim in all cases, have been based as far as possible on actual records consistent with the characters and their situations.²⁵

This sounds fair enough until one examines rather closely the kinds of sources Alexandrov consults and his use of them. Of the twenty works listed in his bibliography for *The Tukhachevsky Affair*, only one, John Erickson's authoritative *The Soviet High Command, 1918-1941*, gives a scholarly account based on a critical examination of the available evidence of Tukhachevsky and the Red Army purges.

Briefly summarized, *The Tukhachevsky Affair* is the story of how the Nazi Security Service, the *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD), forged documents which implicated the Soviet marshal in a plot against Stalin and thus touched off the massive Red Army purges of 1937-1938. One of Heydrich's subordinates, SS Major Alfred Naujocks, was an action officer in the case. In his "Appendix 2: Sources," Alexandrov states that, "In *Naujocks, L'Homme qui Déclanča La Guerre* [Gunther Peis, *The Man Who Started the War*, London and Paris, 1960], I found the story of the forgery in Naujocks' own words." What he does not add is that the book is a lurid, journalistic pot-boiler by Gunther Peis, and that Naujocks' testimony even under oath at the Nuremburg trials has been proven false or misleading by recent historical research.²⁶

A comprehensive review article by Boris Souvarine, "V. Alexandrov, An 'Historian' of the Bessedovsky School" (*Est et Ouest*, June 1-15, 1958), throws additional light on his historical methods. One technique that Alexandrov employs frequently is to cite as historical "witnesses" persons invented by Bessedovsky, such as Martynov, "the private secretary of Malenkov." Another is the pseudo-scholarly citation of nonexistent sources, such as "a Soviet newspaper" (without giving the title or date), "the Yugo-

slav press," or mysterious witnesses such as "a Russian refugee who arrived in Rio de Janeiro via West Berlin and designated only by an alias."

A third technique used by Alexandrov is to call upon the dead as sources for many of his sensational revelations. Dead witnesses, of course, cannot set the record straight. Sometimes these defenseless spirits are called upon for impossible feats of "testimony." For example, in *The Bear and the Whale*, Alexandrov makes the late Yugoslav Communist, Pijade, reveal "confidential information" to "a French Socialist friend in Paris a few days before his sudden death." Unfortunately, Pijade was not in Paris during the period preceding his death. He arrived by plane from London at Le Bourget airfield on March 15, 1957, at 2:00 P.M., and died in Paris four hours later without having the leisure time to reveal confidential information to anyone.²⁷

Souvarine concludes his evaluation with observations on the role which the "Bessedovsky school" has played in the Cold War:

If the fabrication factory, Bessedovsky, Alexandrov and Company were motivated only by commercial considerations, no great harm would be done. But these imposters do not lie by chance, and in fabricating what Bessedovsky has called "books for idiots" they observe one invariable rule: Never attack the Soviet Union and always present the masters of the Kremlin in a sympathetic and favorable light.

A close scrutiny of the content of their works (which is beyond the scope of this study) will support the accuracy of Souvarine's observation.

By all odds the most sensational "document" now generally attributed to Bessedovsky is the purported diary of Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Foreign Minister (People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs) from 1930 until May 1939, when he was dramatically replaced by Molotov in a move which prepared the way for a diplomatic bombshell, the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 22, 1939.

The alleged diary was sponsored and published with an introductory essay by the distinguished British historian E. H. Carr (*Notes for a Journal*, London, 1955). A later American edition was also published with an introductory note by General Walter

Bedell Smith, a former Director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency and at the time an Under-Secretary of State in the first Eisenhower administration.

The doubtful circumstances surrounding the origin and acquisition of the "diaries" are described at length in Carr's introduction:

The Russian typescript here presented in an English translation purports to consist of notes dictated by Maxim Litvinov, partly from memory and partly from manuscript notes which he afterwards destroyed; it covers, with many gaps and interruptions, the period from 1926 to 1939; and there are a few brief and isolated entries for later years down to 1950. At the request of the publishers I have attempted to investigate the origin of the document with a view to ascertain whether, and how far, it is likely to be genuine. The paucity of authentic information about everything that has gone on behind the scenes in the Soviet Union since 1928, and the appetite in foreign countries for such information, has led to the publication in recent years of a number of memoirs written, or purporting to be written, by witnesses of these events or participants in them. These books have been of a variable, and sometimes highly dubious, character. Some have been unquestionably genuine, though the strong prejudices of the authors, or the desire to produce sensational stories, may detract from their value as first-hand evidence. Others appear to be simple forgeries, inspired by either political or by commercial motives. Others—perhaps the most numerous class—have a genuine substratum of fact, but have been written up or "ghosted" by journalists or professional writers, who, in putting them into literary form to give them a popular appeal, have overlaid the facts with an enormous superstructure of fiction, thus offering an apparently insoluble puzzle to those anxious to extract the grains of truth which they contain. It is against this background that the Litvinov Journal, the most sensational work of its kind yet published (to whichever of these categories it may belong) must be considered.

When the first part of the typescript (down to the year 1936) was submitted to me last year, I visited Paris, whence it had reached London, in an attempt to obtain detailed and accurate information about its provenance. According to statements made to me in the course of my investigations, the main entries were dictated by Litvinov in the later 1930's or early 1940's from notes made earlier by Litvinov himself in a personal cypher or

an illegible handwriting. The greater part of them were dictated, apparently at different times and places, abroad; and the typescript was deposited in two copies with Madame Alexandra Kollontai, the Soviet Minister in Stockholm and a trusted friend of Litvinov. Only the concluding sections were dictated by Litvinov in the Soviet Union after his return from Washington in 1943. These were also handed to Madame Kollontai, then on a visit to Moscow from Stockholm. But when she read these sections, she found parts of them so compromising that she was afraid to take the risk of carrying them across the frontier. These parts she destroyed; and this was said to account for the fact that the sections for the middle 1930's are much briefer and less informative than the earlier sections. When Madame Kollontai finally left Stockholm for Moscow on her retirement in March 1945, she left the document in the custody of another person with the injunction that nothing should be published till after Litvinov's death. Litvinov died in January 1952, Madame Kollontai in March 1952.

The supposition that the journal consists of material dictated some years after the events described from notes made at the time, and not revised by the author, may explain some of its peculiar characteristics. A few of the items carry a specific date and read like entries in a diary; most of them have no other heading except that of the year to which they belong. Litvinov is said to have dictated hurriedly and nervously, frequently interrupting himself and abruptly changing the subject, sometimes instructing the secretary to leave a gap with the intention of returning and filling it later. These deliberate gaps are marked in the text by the word "omission," other interruptions in the sequence of thought by dots.

The above account of the origin of the document was given to me, in part orally, in part in writing, by Russian intermediaries through whose hands the documents passed, and whom I interviewed in Paris. Answers have been furnished in writing to further questions put by me. But I have been unable to interview either the person to whom the notes are said to have been dictated by Litvinov or the person to whom the document was entrusted by Madame Kollontai when she left Stockholm (who is himself said to have died since). In these circumstances, it has been impossible for me to establish the genuineness of the document, or the authenticity of the account given to me of its origin. The problem was further complicated after my return to London by the receipt of another instalment of the typescript which had not been previously available—the whole section from 1937 on-

wards. This section, like the latter part of the original typescript, was markedly inferior in interest to the earlier sections, and contained at least one gross error of fact such as could hardly have been committed by Litvinov himself. No explanation was forthcoming of the origin of this later section or of the reasons for its omission from the original typescript, which now forms Chapter Four of the work.

Carr admits that external evidence on which he might establish the authenticity of the *Notes for a Journal* is lacking, and thus he turns next to what he calls "the uncertain ground of internal evidence":

. . . The hypothesis of a complete forgery or fiction cannot be dismissed out of hand. If this hypothesis is correct, the motive has been commercial, not political. While particular statements in the journal may be regarded as favourable or hostile to the regime, the document as a whole serves no apparent propaganda purpose; the author appears as in many respects ambivalent in his judgments on the events described, and, in particular, in his attitude to Stalin. This gives the document, whether genuine or not, a certain value for the historian. If it is a fiction, it is a fiction written without *parti pris*, and much of it written by someone intimately concerned with party and with diplomatic events; many passages betray close and detailed knowledge which can be checked from other sources. That it is not marked by any depth of thought, that it contains many trivialities, some improbabilities, and some demonstrable inaccuracies, that it exhibits a strong tendency to "show off" and, considering the position of the supposed author, an extraordinary degree of independence, does not necessarily constitute an argument against its genuineness. . . . The conspicuous incoherence of the document, and the abrupt changes of subject, mood and style, are perhaps an argument in its favour. Whatever its origin, it cannot, I think, be doubted that a large part of it fairly represents Litvinov's outlook and standpoint during this period.

Continuing with his analysis of internal evidence, Carr suggests that "at least two hands" worked at producing the document. This theory conveniently accounts for the trivia and certain major inaccuracies which are otherwise inexplicable if the journal were entirely the work of Litvinov:

On the other hand, it must be admitted that numerous and extensive passages bear the mark of having been retouched or invented for the supposed purpose of giving the document a popular appeal; and the tone and style of some of these differ so noticeably from that of the more serious passages referred to above that, whatever other conclusions may be formed, it is difficult to avoid the hypothesis that at least two hands have been at work on the document. Broadly speaking, the more serious passages, whether they are to be ascribed to Litvinov or to some other well-informed participant in public affairs, predominate in the earlier sections; in the later sections the hand of the gossip-writer becomes gradually more and more prominent, and in the last section of all appears to take exclusive possession. The increasing interest in recounting petty personal scandals, the farcical account of events in the Paris Embassy in 1930, the references to an alleged Russian proclivity for stealing watches (reflecting gossip current all over Europe in 1945) and, finally, the emptiness and triviality of the entries from 1937 onwards seem to be characteristic products of this second hand. It is this last section which contains the gross error of misdating the trial and execution of Tukhachevsky and his fellow generals by one year (it is placed not in 1937, but in 1938, after the trial of Bukharin, Krestinsky and Rakovsky)—an error which could not possibly have been made by the competent and well-informed writer (whether Litvinov himself or some literary “ghost”) responsible for many of the earlier sections of the document.

In the course of time further evidence may be forthcoming which will explain the origin and character of this strange—and, if my hypothesis is correct—composite document; or it may long remain a puzzle for the historical detective. My present belief is that it contains a substratum of genuine material emanating in some form or other from Litvinov himself. But parts of it are certainly accretions added later by another hand or hands; and, while some of the accretions may be the authentic recollections of someone closely associated with Litvinov, others appear to be pure fiction. These uncertainties do not, however, deprive it of its value as a picture of an outstanding figure in the Soviet foreign relations of the period. Even considered as a historical romance, it would be a work of considerable insight and imagination as well as of a high degree of literary talent.

When the book first appeared, *Notes for a Journal* was enthusiastically reviewed by the British historian A. J. P. Taylor:

Suddenly Litvinov, an old Bolshevik who was at the heart of Soviet foreign policy for more than twenty years, speaks from the dead. Here, it seems, are his random notes from 1929 to 1950. No wonder Professor Carr calls them "the most sensational work of its kind yet published." Even this is too weak: there is nothing else "of its kind." If it is genuine, it is a sensation without parallel. . . . It is a good thing to have some uncertainties in life; and the real truth about this book will probably never be known.²⁸

Other reviewers expressed reservations. For example, W. C. Jaskiewicz in the *New York Herald Tribune Book Review* for October 30, 1955, observes that "the actual value of the 'Notes' is debatable . . . Mr. Carr has done his best to establish the authenticity of the 'Notes,' but has not really succeeded."

The *London Times Literary Supplement* of September 9, 1955, was the most forthright in its appraisal:

In spite of the vast number of absurdities, these Notes have that spuriously vivid local colour which is usually found in apocryphal work. The impression they convey is that they are the work of someone who has certainly spent some years, but hardly any after 1930, in Soviet diplomatic service in some subordinate position from which he had no real access to the policy making centers, but from which he could obtain just a few remote glimpses of the Commissar. . . . All in all, this book adds to our understanding of Soviet affairs and of Litvinov's personality about as much as a forged banknote adds to our wealth.

The *London Times* review was the first to hint that the author of the *Notes* may have been Bessedovsky, who rather neatly fits the description of "someone who has spent some years, but hardly any after 1930, in Soviet diplomatic service."

In reviewing the American edition of the *Notes*,²⁹ the distinguished American Soviet expert Philip Mosely was much more specific in indicating Bessedovsky as the probable source. The key paragraphs in Mosely's evaluation include the following comments:

The greater part of the notes contains information which is readily available from standard sources or contemporary newspapers. For example, an entry for the year 1926 describes in detail a proposal advanced by Lenin in 1922, to lease extensive concessions in the Kamchatka Peninsula to American interests, in order to enlist American pressure for the evacuation of Japa-

nese troops from the Russian Far East. This account adds nothing to the published Soviet materials. . . . The major part of the material represents a none too skillful use of easily available newspaper and later information spiced up by the frequent practice of "up-dating" the initiation of events.

A second component consists of large doses of Moscow gossip. Rumors concerning the extravagant lives of the Soviet leaders, widely whispered, are "confirmed" by the entries in the "diary." The affairs of Soviet politicians and generals with their ballerinas are set forth, as well as juicy stories of spiritualist cliques, drinking bouts and debauchery.

By coincidence the reports of Moscow gossip are fairly detailed down to 1929 when Grigori Bessedovsky, then Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Paris, broke with the Soviet Government, sought political asylum in France, and embarked on a new career as an expert on the Soviet Union.

A third part of the mixture consists of reports of Litvinov's conversations with Stalin, Trotsky, Molotov, Voroshilov, Yagoda and many other Soviet figures. Naturally, there can be no independent check on these conversations. . . .

In general the composer of this curious document has shown a substantial knowledge of both generally available materials and of Moscow gossip for the period down to 1929, which, as noted above, happens to be the time when Bessedovsky left Soviet service.

It has now been a decade since the apocryphal Litvinov diary made its sensational appearance. From this vantage point, are there any reasonable hypotheses which might serve to explain why it was so eagerly seized upon and welcomed, in E. H. Carr's words, as a "document" which was "in spite of its speculative character, well worth publishing"?

Perhaps part of the answer to this rhetorical question may be found in one of the many cynical aphorisms scattered throughout the *Notes* themselves: "There is no limit to human stupidity and much less to that of diplomats. . . . And there is also the psychological element. . . . Those who want to be cheated do not see that they are."³⁰

Periods of open warfare or of great international tension, such as the classic Cold War period, heighten the urge to self-deception on the part of intelligence and propaganda agencies

which may seek to exploit sensational purloined or suspect documents for political warfare purposes. The reverse of this proposition may also become an operative factor for the individual historian or analyst. The fact that a "document" is not readily adaptable to propaganda exploitation may influence the individual scholar to accept it as "a contribution" in spite of serious reservations about its overall authenticity. From his analysis of internal evidence quoted above, it is clear that this factor weighed heavily in Carr's appraisal of *Notes for a Journal*.

A second factor that may have influenced Carr's decision to introduce the diaries is the curious light they shed on German-Soviet relations, the subject of a book by that title which he had published four years earlier (*German-Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939*, Baltimore, 1951). In his introduction to the *Notes*, Carr singles out as a "sensational item" the suggestion that in December 1928 Stalin had instructed Soviet officers to contact their German counterparts with a proposal for joint resistance against the Communist party and a mutually arranged military *coup* to set up a pro-German regime in the USSR, in return for reciprocal aid by the German officers in foiling supposed German plans for a bloc of Western powers oriented against the Soviet Union. Carr suggests that such a fantastic story may provide a "plausible" explanation for the great purges of the 1930's, in which a majority of the Soviet high command (Tukhachevsky, Yakir, and Kork are named in the journal in this connection) were liquidated. "On this hypothesis" (and Carr gives the impression that he is prepared to accept it), "the treasonable acts for which the generals were executed had in fact been committed by them, but committed on Stalin's secret orders."

This speculation was of course written a year before Khrushchev's famous "secret speech" to a closed session of the XXth Party Congress on February 25, 1956, and his closing remarks two days later. In the first of these speeches Khrushchev referred to "excellent military cadres which were unquestionably loyal to the Party and the fatherland," and to their loss "as a result of the baseless and false mass repressions of 1937-1938." In his closing remarks he specifically singled out, among others, Tukhachevsky, Yakir, and Kork as examples of "praiseworthy men" and "prominent military leaders" who were victims of such repression.

As for the earlier alleged "secret plot," after exhaustive research, the English historian John Erickson, in his study, *The Soviet High Command*, states flatly: "No trace of this has been left on any German record to hand, either by way of confirmation, repudiation or vague hint."³¹ It is precisely this kind of "secret plot," for which no evidence exists, that is the hallmark of so much that is sensational in the Bessedovsky school of historical writing. Little harm would be done if such writing were presented frankly as the fiction or fantasy which, for the most part, it undoubtedly is. But bad money tends to drive out good, even if the forged banknotes carry no propaganda message. As Bertram Wolfe said some years later of the spurious Litvinov journal: "These spicy, disjointed, bemusing, bedtime story concoctions tend to drive out of circulation the more serious studies of the secretive and real nature of the Soviet systems."³²

Disinformation and "The Penkovskiy Papers"

In the early 1960's the intelligence services of both the U.S. and USSR began to make increasing use of frauds, forgeries, and fabrications for political warfare and propaganda purposes. Both sides in this competition used the term "disinformation" to describe such activities. As previously noted, there are indications that the Sino-Soviet dispute has been exacerbated by the skillful use of fabricated documents, "black propaganda," and provocations. The success of such efforts was apparently such that by 1965 Soviet Premier Kosygin said that "the imperialists" were counting on being able to sow dissension among the communist countries, "shrinking from no means" to undermine their unity. Turning directly to Western disinformation activities, he charged that "the "imperialist intelligence services use disinformation, slander, blackmail and other provocations, hoping to cause discord between the Socialist countries. They seek all possible ways to set the Socialist countries against each other, and to tear at least some of them away from the Socialist family."³³

From the U.S. side, on September 28, 1965, Congressman Melvin Price introduced into the *Congressional Record* a follow-up to the earlier briefing on *Communist Forgeries*. This brief analysis, "The Soviet and Communist Bloc Defamation Campaign," is reproduced in Appendix II. The section on forgeries indicates that since

publication of the original briefing “fourteen new instances of forged U.S. official documents have come under scrutiny by the end of July 1965. Although CIA has not been omitted from some of these spurious documents, the principal purpose of such forgeries has been to discredit U.S. policies and the representatives of other U.S. agencies overseas, such as the Department of State, USIA, the Peace Corps, the Armed Forces of the United States, and American political leaders generally.” Presumably to add support to this theoretical analysis and to score a number of political warfare points, the controversial *Penkovskiy Papers* were published simultaneously in England and the U.S. with sensational advance publicity—including lengthy excerpts in the *London Observer* and the *Washington Post*.³⁴

On May 16, 1963, after a highly publicized show-trial, the USSR executed Soviet Colonel Oleg V. Penkovsky, who had reportedly provided U.S. and British intelligence with important military-scientific information over a two-year period. At the same time Greville Wynne, one of Penkovsky’s principal British contacts, was sentenced to eight years imprisonment in Russia but released in April 1964 in exchange for the Russian agent Gordon Lonsdale (Konon Trofimovich Molody), who at the time was serving a twenty-five-year sentence for espionage in Britain.³⁵

Like his most famous British counterpart, George Blake, a foreign service officer and trusted intelligence agent who served the USSR undetected for nine years, Colonel Penkovsky is a classic example of the “defector in place.” In my previous book, *The Strategy of Subversion*, using Penkovsky as an example, I appraised the value of such ideological defectors in the following manner:

. . . the subverted individual who remains in place and faithfully serves a foreign power is far more valuable than one who is forced to flee (when threatened by imminent exposure and arrest) or who defects for other more immediate personal reasons, such as escape from a nagging wife, mistress, or plant supervisor. “The defector in place” stays on the job but reports regularly to the controlling agency, usually through one of its agents who enjoys diplomatic immunity. Reportedly, the U.S. has had unusual success with such defectors inside the USSR and its East European satellites. For this reason, former CIA director Allen Dulles pre-

fers to call defectors "volunteers for the West" and recommends a policy of making it clear "that they are welcome and will be safe and happy with us." Following the publication of Dulles' book [*The Craft of Intelligence* . . . the Penkovsky defection] shook Soviet and satellite security services and supported the claim that some defectors from the communist side had been "working in place as agents for long periods of time" and others "have never been 'surfaced' and for their own protection must remain unknown to the public."³⁶

The Penkovsky affair illustrates the principle that such a defector may be exploited for anti-Soviet political warfare purposes even after his death, by the publication of his so-called "testament." In an enlightened foreword to the October 1963 issue of *Holiday* magazine, an issue devoted entirely to Russia, the editors observed that "there is a constant pressure here by a loud and rabid minority, including many in high places, who want no words said or written about Russia unless they are loaded with hate and provocation." As "men of good will," the editors of *Holiday* could hardly have foreseen that some two years later, under CIA auspices, the American public would be exposed to the so-called *Penkovskiy Papers*, a book which is literally "loaded with hate and provocation" and which became a best-seller overnight. The book's appearance at a time when U.S.-Soviet relations were already strained over the muddled situation in Vietnam may have been purely accidental, or it may simply have been another case of "the right hand of government not knowing what the left is doing"—as amply illustrated in a previous best-seller, *The Invisible Government*, by David Wise and Thomas Ross. But the leaders in the Kremlin exercise close supervision over all Soviet publishing, and presumably even tighter control over the political warfare or "disinformation" operations of their own intelligence agencies. Hence, Soviet officials were not likely to be impressed by bland disavowals that the U.S. government was not directly involved in the publication of *The Penkovskiy Papers*, especially since Victor Zorza, in a famous review article, stated flatly that "the book could have been compiled only by the Central Intelligence Agency."

In any case, the Penkovsky incident is another illustration of the maxim that covert operational agencies can create situations

of fact to which national policy, regardless of what it might have been, must later be readjusted, frequently under crisis conditions. Classic examples of such crises are the U-2 spy plane incident of 1960, which led to the abortion of the Paris Summit Conference, or the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April 1961. By comparison, the Penkovsky affair was a low-key tempest in a teapot.

The serial publication of excerpts from the *Papers* was made a matter of official diplomatic protest by the Soviet ambassadors in both London and Washington. Acting on earlier informal threats of retaliation, the USSR declared the *Washington Post's* able Moscow correspondent, Stephen S. Rosenfeld, *persona non grata* on November 25, 1965. In regard to Rosenfeld's expulsion, the Soviet news agency, Tass, stated that publication of *The Penkovskiy Papers* by the *Post* could "only be regarded as an attempt to vilify the Soviet Union and as a premeditated act in the spirit of the Cold War." In reply to the Soviet action, the *Post*, in a remarkably restrained editorial, called the expulsion itself "a deplorable exercise of arbitrary power," adding:

In conformity with the best prevailing American newspaper practice, *The Washington Post* also published attacks on the views of Penkovsky and the authenticity of the papers—including criticisms of the Soviet Embassy in Washington. It proposes to deal in the same way with interesting and significant material about the Soviet Union that may come to hand in the future—but it is not in the midst of any "campaign" of denigration aimed at the Soviet Union and will not be plunged into one by this misguided effort at press coercion by Soviet officials.³⁷

Another "fringe disbenefit" presumably associated with Soviet pique over publication of *The Penkovskiy Papers* was the reported placing of a six-weeks' quarantine on movements of British and American military attachés in Moscow, a restriction reportedly lifted by the end of December 1965.

At the time of their publication, Soviet sources produced almost no evidence to support the charge of "forgery," and the case against the authenticity of the documents was made by Victor Zorza, the distinguished Soviet expert of the *Manchester Guardian*. Zorza had apparently obtained a pre-publication manuscript of the work and in October had written Vladimir E. Semichastny, chairman of the Soviet State Security Committee, asking

for evidence to support his impression that the papers were forgeries. On November 13 an official of the Soviet Embassy in London met Zorza and declared that the book was "a fabrication from beginning to end." But the Soviet official gave only a single piece of evidence—an inconsistency of dates—to support his claim, something less than an impressive performance in the way of homework. In line with custom (and local ground rules), officials at the Central Intelligence Agency, whose agents dealt with and interrogated Penkovsky, refused to pass judgment on the authenticity of the papers, stating that they reviewed them only to determine whether publication would compromise intelligence sources.³⁸ Zorza states his position tersely in the opening paragraphs of his article in the *Washington Post*:

"Their authenticity," says the introduction to the Penkovsky Papers, the memoirs of the Anglo-American spy in Russia, "is beyond question." It is not.

Indeed, the book itself contains the evidence showing certain parts of it to be a forgery even though other sections of the book are evidently made up of intelligence information provided by Penkovsky long before his arrest.³⁹

Zorza's position and his supporting evidence were challenged by both Frank Gibney, the editor of *The Penkovskiy Papers*, and Peter Deriabin, the translator, in the first round of the controversy over the documents.⁴⁰

A review of the reasoning and evidence adduced by both sides of the controversy should be useful in appraising the authenticity of the so-called "Penkovsky legacy."

In the first place, Zorza challenges the editor's claim that the *Papers* consist of "hastily written notes, sketches and comments" made by Penkovsky, kept in a secret hiding place in his two-room apartment, smuggled out of the Soviet Union to an Eastern European country about the time of his arrest, and passed to Peter Deriabin, himself a former officer in the Soviet Security forces, who defected to America in 1954 and who undertook the long preliminary work of translation and selection. Zorza's argument that Penkovsky could hardly have had the time or the opportunity to produce "the manuscript of what is now a sizeable book" is a telling one:

The most important part of the information he sent out consisted of some 5000 photographs of documents, sketches, etc., taken with a miniature camera. Yet we are asked to believe that this highly professional and valuable spy added to the great risks he was already running by keeping a detailed account of his activities and views, virtually every page of which contained enough secret information to send him straight to the firing squad.

In the foreword we are told that "throughout the period during which Penkovsky was turning over information to the West, he sat up night after night composing a journal." Yet in a passage that has the ring of truth Penkovsky himself makes it clear that this is just what he could not do. He has to write hurriedly, he says, "for the simple lack of time and space."

When he writes at night in his two-room flat he disturbs his family's sleep: "Typing is very noisy." During the day he is "always busy," "running like a madman," in a typically Russian phrase, between the offices of his two employers, the Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research, and the Military Intelligence Headquarters. His evenings are generally occupied, nor can he write while visiting his friends in the country:—"Someone may always ask what I am doing." At home, at least, "I have a hiding place in my desk." On his own showing, he is hardly likely to have produced in these circumstances the manuscript of what is now a sizeable book.⁴¹

To this argument against the alleged "private journal" origin of the *Papers*—lack of time and opportunity—may be added another which is equally pertinent: the physical problem of smuggling such a bulky manuscript out of the Soviet Union. In his introduction to the *Papers*, Gibney writes of "the wealth of personal documentation which accompanied them—family pictures, Communist Party membership cards, copies of official orders." This documentation, together with the lengthy manuscript of the "notes, sketches and comments" of the journal itself, must have made up a rather bulky package, even on microfilm (the usual form in which Penkovsky transmitted intelligence). Moreover, we are told that the *Papers* were smuggled out "in the autumn of 1962, about the time of Penkovsky's arrest." It was precisely at this time that Penkovsky was under such heavy surveillance that on some occasions he found it impossible to transmit vital military intelligence reports. Under these circumstances, although by

no means impossible, it would appear highly unlikely that Penkovsky did in fact succeed in transmitting the bulky *Papers* (and accompanying material) at the time claimed by the editors. Why at that time should a skilled espionage agent, who knew that he was under heavy surveillance, risk detection by passing a lot of family pictures, Communist party membership cards, and other personal trivia which he could easily have transmitted two years earlier with little or no risk? Until this question is satisfactorily answered by the editor (perhaps in a subsequent edition), the alleged "personal journal" or "testament" origin of *The Penkovskiy Papers* must remain highly suspect.

A much more plausible theory of the origin of the *Papers* is suggested by Zorza, namely that they are "evidently made up of intelligence information provided by Penkovsky before his arrest." But, as Zorza correctly emphasizes, "the book does not, in fact, claim to be made up of Penkovsky's intelligence reports to the West. On the contrary, it is said to be quite distinct from them. . . ." It is in this sense that *The Penkovskiy Papers* is considered a "forgery" by Zorza. He does not believe they are in fact the personal journal or "testament" that the editor claims them to be. There will undoubtedly be other reviewers who will find Zorza's arguments convincing and who will reason along similar lines. This does not mean, as implied by Deriabin, the translator of the *Papers*, that such critics are "determined to degrade Penkovsky's legacy as the Soviets sought to degrade Penkovsky." ⁴²

In the second place, Zorza observes that the editor, translator, and publisher (Doubleday and Company, New York) have thus far refused to produce the Russian manuscript of the *Papers* for publication in the original language. His argument here is also convincing. If the editor and translator have nothing to hide and can substantiate their claim that the *Papers* are in fact Penkovsky's "memoirs," they must meet this objection fairly and squarely and produce an original manuscript which will bear the closest academic inspection. Otherwise their claim must remain suspect by the scholar and historian. In the pre-publication phase of the controversy, Deriabin, the translator, failed entirely to meet this argument, simply stating without explanation that the Russian original was not made available "because I do not wish

to release it in its original form.”⁴³ Zorza writes that a small Russian emigré publishing house in West Germany wrote the American publisher in New York for permission to publish the original text, “but after several weeks and repeated requests . . . the Russian text has not been made available, and it looks as if it never will be.” In response to an urgent telephone call from Frankfurt to New York seeking a final answer, the emigré publisher was told by R. E. Banker for Doubleday that they were still unable to provide a Russian text, but to go ahead with publication if he were willing to retranslate the Penkovsky text from English back into Russian. “As for the Russian ‘original,’ Banker said, they had twice asked the ‘State Department’ about it, but were still not able to provide it.”⁴⁴

Third, Zorza turns to content analysis of the *Papers* and finds indications of forgery in terms of (1) overall style, (2) certain expressions which he claims a native Russian author would probably not have used, and (3) certain errors of fact or date which a person in Penkovsky’s position would not be likely to make. A typical passage from Zorza’s review article will serve to illustrate this type of analysis and the kinds of questions to which it gives rise:

Indeed, the style of the memoirs is often discursive, verbose, almost conversational—the very opposite of what one would expect from a man writing in Penkovsky’s difficult circumstances. At one point, when discussing Soviet military maneuvers, he is made to ask, “What is the point of these exercises”—and then proceeds to give a detailed reply.

Would he really write like that whether in an intelligence report, or in his memoirs? Or was it, perhaps, a question put to Penkovsky by one of his interrogators, and then, inadvertently, allowed to remain in the edited transcript of the conversation that might have formed the basis of this passage in the book?

The “conversational” origin of a number of passages is betrayed in similar ways, thus giving the lie to the claim that the book is made up of Penkovsky’s written “notes.”⁴⁵

Gibney replies to this argument by admitting the point but declaring:

I am sure any expert on Russian-English translation would have his own pet way of rendering them [Penkovsky’s writings]

into English—just as Mr. Deriabin, the translator, and I have ours. But this discursiveness hardly detracts from their authenticity. . . . Neither Mr. Deriabin nor I felt we had the right to add any literary or factual embellishments to the words of a brave man, who wanted to get his own language out to the world.⁴⁶

Zorza comments on a major error of fact in the *Papers* as follows:

The report attributed to Penkovsky that Marshal Chuikov, the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, was dismissed from this post in 1961 and appointed chief of civil defense is wrong. It is true that he got the civil defense job at that time, but he continued as the commander of the ground forces—and the Soviet military press referred to him repeatedly as such.

It was only in 1964 that he lost this post, nearly two years after Penkovsky's arrest. It would appear that someone compiling the "Papers" more recently has confused the two events and dates, making Penkovsky report something that occurred after he was executed in 1963.⁴⁷

To this (and to similar points) Deriabin, the translator, replies, "About Marshal Chuykov: Mr. Zorza is correct in saying that Penkovsky was in error. . . . However, I have simply translated what he wrote."⁴⁸

Obviously, with an air of final authority, the editor-translator team can continue indefinitely to reply to all such criticisms of style and expression with the flat statement, "This is what Penkovsky wrote." They can hardly expect Soviet experts and historians to believe them, however, until they produce the complete Russian manuscript for actual inspection.

Zorza concludes with an appraisal of the evidence derived from his content analysis and his theory of the origin of *The Penkovskiy Papers* as follows:

It may be that some of the errors pinpointed in this article are not necessarily evidence of forgery, but the cumulative weight of the evidence is too great to support any other interpretation.

The book could have been compiled only by the Central Intelligence Agency. No other organization in the West, apart from British Intelligence, and certainly no individual, could have had access to the information of which the book is made up. British

Intelligence officers did at one time entertain the idea of building Penkovsky up posthumously as something of a hero, but permission to proceed was withheld.

The CIA has been repeatedly stung and provoked by the attempts of the Disinformation Department of the Soviet intelligence organization to discredit its activities throughout the world. The Penkovsky Papers are the CIA's answer. But in psychological warfare of this kind the intelligence agencies of the democratic countries suffer from the grave disadvantage that in attempting to damage the adversary they must also deceive their own public. It is the function of a free press to uncover such deception. Some of my best friends are in the CIA, but if they want their psychological warfare efforts to remain undiscovered, they must do better than this.⁴⁹

Zorza's position that the book is a partial forgery will probably be accepted by other scholars for essentially these reasons. No other judgment is possible; either the book is what it is represented to be, that is, "notes, sketches and comments" written as a secret journal by Penkovsky, or it is not, and was compiled from such notes, plus interrogation reports and additional materials not actually written by Penkovsky but sent in by him as part of his espionage activities.

An examination of the first three chapters of the book provides striking evidence that *The Penkovskiy Papers* were in fact artificially put together after his execution rather than having been written as a journal in Moscow. Such evidence appears in the first chapter entitled, "The System in Which I Live." Beginning on page 27 and extending through most of page 54, this chapter has the ring of immediacy and authenticity. It is an autobiographical sketch of the kind any defector would write who was volunteering his services and seeking to establish his *bona fides*. (We are told by the editors that Penkovsky was unsuccessful in his first approaches to British and American contacts.) Beginning with the last paragraph on page 56, there is a distinct break in the narrative, both in style and apparently in the time of writing. Penkovsky has already begun his espionage work and refers to "my new friends," obviously in the British and American intelligence services. Here also begins the tortuous process of self-criticism and self-justification for his defection, a syndrome familiar to those who have dealt with defectors or read their

reports. Here too begin the melodramatic exaggerations that characterize the rest of the book: "I praise our leaders but inside me I wish them death . . . I have lived in a nuclear nightmare . . . I know the poison of the new military doctrine . . . the plan to strike first at any costs." The first part of this chapter, the autobiographical sketch, may well have been written in Moscow and certainly dates from before Penkovsky's defection. But the last three pages are of a later period and were probably written (or dictated) abroad during a visit to London or Paris. It is most unlikely (a point also noted by Zorza) that an intelligence officer like Penkovsky would needlessly have jeopardized his position by writing or retaining such highly treasonable material in his room, even in an allegedly "secret compartment" of his desk.

The same kind of inspection applied to Chapter Two, "The Dark World of the GRU," leads to similar observations. Some of the material was written in Moscow prior to his defection in an attempt to establish contact and offer his services, but the bulk of it was apparently completed later, either written abroad or passed by microfilm to British or American contacts. Penkovsky indicates that he had collected "over 500 pages of notes," which he almost certainly reduced to microfilm to avoid discovery of such bulky material. As in the first chapter, here too unqualified exaggerations abound, such as the statement that "there is no institution in the USSR that does not have in it an intelligence officer of either the GRU or KGB." Does this include *every* nursery, kindergarten, or botanical garden? Perhaps the most valuable aspect of the chapter is the insight it provides into the bitter, institutionalized rivalry between military intelligence personnel and the KGB, or Security Police. This kind of rivalry characterizes most intelligence communities but is usually staunchly denied in the interest of projecting the image of a "united front against the enemy" to the outside world.

The third chapter of *The Penkovskiy Papers* consists of a lecture by Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Prikhodko on "Characteristics of Agent Communications and of Agent Handling in the U.S.A." At this stage the editorial pretense that the book consists of Penkovsky's "notes and jottings" has worn so thin that it is almost openly dropped, since obviously these sixty-odd pages were not written by Penkovsky. True to their formula, however, the editors, in a passage of introductory comment, pretend that they

can only speculate on how the lecture somehow got into the book: "We assume that Penkovsky sent copies of this lecture and any other material of a similar nature to his Anglo-American intelligence contacts."

Surely such assumed innocence is not only an insult to the intelligence of the lay reader but also to the agency which made the material available for publication. This "let's pretend" approach is characteristic of the entire book and makes *The Penkovskiy Papers* a "substandard forgery" by even the most charitable criteria. To continue a chapter-by-chapter analysis of this kind of childish deception is unwarranted. There is little point in playing games with a concoction of "vintage Penkovsky" and extraneous materials. Clearly, the evidence is overwhelming that the book is not what it is represented to be.

However, the fact that *The Penkovskiy Papers* are not what they are represented to be does not mean that they are, as the Soviets claim, "a complete fabrication from beginning to end." Such denunciations from official sources are routinely predictable when any of the great powers are embarrassed by the publication of documents obtained through normal channels or intercepted and collected by intelligence agencies. In this regard the point should be emphasized that the USSR was given an opportunity to provide evidence to support its charge of total fabrication and failed to do so in the pre-publication phase of the controversy.

Far from being "a clumsy forgery," *The Penkovskiy Papers* appears in the light of Zorza's analysis to be a skillful compilation for political warfare purposes, that is, "much of the book seems calculated to show the Soviet system in the worst possible light."⁵⁰ The sensational publicity surrounding the publication of the book demonstrates that the presumed editorial format (presenting the *Papers* as a "secret journal") was a shrewd merchandising device well calculated to exploit the public taste for spy stories and thus assure wide sales and circulation. These short-term factors must have prevailed over the "calculated risk" of exposure as a "partial forgery." From the point of view of the historian and scholar, this Madison Avenue approach is regrettable. Except in terms of length and format, the *Papers* do not differ materially from the series of scholarly reports, "The Soviet Bloc as Reported by Former Nationals," published by the State Department after careful screening to protect the identity of the source and similar

sensitive information. Each publication of these important "interview reports" is prefaced by the statement, "The material in this series . . . is released by the Department of State in order to make available to students of Soviet affairs basic data for their research from sources not readily accessible."

Why did the editors choose the dubious format of a "secret journal"? It would appear that the old army motto, "Stop! There must be a harder way!" (of doing something) was converted by agents of deceit into "Stop! There must be a more devious way!" Surely Penkovsky himself, who knowingly died for his convictions, deserved better than this from those who profited by his legacy.

By means of a book-length supplement to the scholarly State Department series, the so-called "Penkovsky legacy" of interviews and related materials could have been presented as an unimpeachable historical source. Instead the *Papers* were published in a form which at once cast grave doubts upon their authenticity. Moreover, both in tone and content the book is almost totally lacking in balance. Like many other defectors, Penkovsky paints a very dark picture of Soviet society in order to rationalize his defection and to justify to his conscience such an irreversible step. The image of Soviet life presented does not differ materially from that of Stalinist Russia at its worst—as if time had literally stood still for the last decade or more. After the first trauma has been overcome, most defectors introduce a certain balance in their writing. The reader of *The Penkovskiy Papers*, however, is left with the impression that either the subject never got beyond the initial stage of overcompensation in his reporting, or that only the exaggerations of his early reports were selected for publication.

The same kind of bias characterizes the material selected on military affairs. The Soviet military establishment is presented as working almost exclusively to prepare a devastating nuclear first-strike against the United States. The implication is that Soviet military strategists are irrevocably committed to the doctrine of preventive war and to an unlimited arms race. The partial nuclear test-ban treaty and Soviet concern with arms limitation and control have already demonstrated the imbalance of such views. It is as if Penkovsky's main concern was to provide ready-made ammunition for hard-line propagandists in the West. Thus not only because of the private journal format, but also due to the

selection of materials, *The Penkovskiy Papers* must be regarded as a self-serving political warfare vehicle rather than as a valid historical source.

The formula for the selection of the materials used appears to have been: "Always attack the Soviet Union and always present the masters of the Kremlin in the most unsympathetic and unfavorable light." This propaganda pitch characterizes most anti-Soviet propaganda but in the case of *The Penkovskiy Papers* reaches extremes which are grotesque. The entire political and military elite of a society which prides itself (rightly or wrongly) on high standards of "socialist morality" is condemned as a collection of moral degenerates. The picture is all black and white, with almost no exceptions. After writing that he had "intentionally omitted the subject of moral degradation and drunkenness among the top military personnel—because there are already too many dirty stories on this subject"—Penkovsky proceeds to describe drunken orgies of the military elite and overprivileged "Golden Youth." Following this extended walk on the seamy side of Soviet life, he makes the absurd statement: "I know one thing for sure, though, all our generals have mistresses and some have two or more."

The USSR had every right to protest that this kind of offensive muckraking was "in the worst traditions of the Cold War." Moreover, *The Penkovskiy Papers* came as a deliberate affront to the Soviets at a time when the latter had been giving the West in general and the U.S. in particular "a good press," so far as the portrayal of Western society in their literary journals was concerned.⁵¹ Viktor Nekrassov's remarkably objective article on the U.S., "Both Sides of the Ocean," was published in *Novy Mir*, the outstanding Soviet literary journal, in December 1962. It created a sensation in the USSR, and the fact that it was denounced by Khrushchev only increased its appeal. Moreover, Nekrassov and other writers of "the social protest school" defiantly continued writing. Again in July 1964 *Novy Mir* published three sympathetic sketches of life in New York, New Orleans, and Chicago ("Iz Amerikanskix Vstrech") by Vera Panova. Even Lev Nikulin, an old-line party stalwart, has published three lightly amusing "Short Stories from the 'Free' World" (*Oktyabr*, November 1964). Under these circumstances the Soviet leaders must certainly have regarded *The Penkovskiy Papers* as small

thanks for having permitted their controlled press to portray Western society in a sympathetic light.

As previously noted, the serial publication of the *Papers* resulted in the expulsion of the *Washington Post's* correspondent in Moscow at a time of increasing coolness in U.S.-Soviet relations due to the escalation of hostilities in Vietnam. On balance it would appear that by expelling the *Post* correspondent the Soviet authorities over-reacted to the publication of *The Penkovskiy Papers* and suffered a net political warfare loss. They gratuitously presented the world with another striking example of "how they behave like Russians," and thus created a regrettable international incident out of a minor affair which might better have been ignored and allowed to die a natural death with a minimum of publicity.

However, in the light of the Soviets' disinformation activities (see Appendix II), their protests against *The Penkovskiy Papers* call to mind the familiar figure of the pot calling the kettle black. Escalation of the Vietnam conflict in the winter of 1965-1966 significantly raised the level of reciprocal recrimination and abuse, not only in U.S.-Soviet propaganda exchanges but in the Sino-Soviet "dialogue" within the communist world as well. By early 1966 escalation by the U.S. of both the military and political warfare effort in Vietnam had, according to George F. Kennan, resulted in "a grievous misplacement of emphasis on our foreign policies as a whole." In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (February 10, 1966), Kennan particularly emphasized the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations (of which the Penkovsky affair was symptomatic) with the observation: "Our relations with the Soviet Union have suffered grievously, as was to be expected, and this at a time when far more important things were involved in those relations than what is ultimately involved in Vietnam, and when we had reason, I think, to cultivate those relations."⁵²

Under such circumstances publication of the provocative *Penkovskiy Papers* could certainly have been regarded as a strategic disservice to all concerned. Indeed, the whole incident raises the question of whether, in Professor Samuel Sharp's words, "psychological warfare, an oversold endeavor supported by a well-heeled interest, must go on, even if against one's own people, always the handiest target."⁵³

**THE OCCUPATION FUND DOCUMENTS:
Fresh Historical Evidence**

I N JULY - August 1892 a Bulgarian newspaper, *Svoboda* ("Freedom"), published in Sofia, the capital, printed a score of highly incriminating documents which exposed Russian intervention in Bulgarian internal affairs, including revelations of huge expenditures from the so-called "Occupation Fund" to finance tsarist intelligence and political warfare operations. These included the sensational kidnaping of Alexander of Battenberg (1885), an attempt to overthrow his successor, Ferdinand of Coburg, the murder in Constantinople of Bulgarian Foreign Minister Dr. Vulkovich, and, in March 1891, an attempt on the life of Stefan Stambulov, the Prime Minister, which killed his Finance Minister, M. Belchev, who was with him at the time.¹

After the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, Bulgaria was occupied by Russian administrative authorities and required to pay for the costs of the occupation, a period of constant and frequently irritating interference by Russian officials in Bulgarian internal affairs. Many Bulgarians claimed that the money paid Russia for occupation costs was used to finance Russian intrigues, and when the *Svoboda* articles appeared exposing such

plots, it was with intentional irony that the documents were called "Occupation Fund Documents."

Several months after the story broke, a Russian edition of the documents was published by D. Petkov, editor of *Svoboda* in 1892, and a year later the same documents, carefully edited with notes and indexes, were published in Berlin in excellent French and German translations. The French text, which is the most readily available, bears the title *Documents secrets de la politique russe en Orient, 1881-1890* ("Secret Documents Concerning Russia's Eastern Policy, 1881-1890").²

From the moment of their first appearance the documents were widely publicized in the European press and created something of an international scandal. They were, of course, immediately denounced as forgeries by official Russian spokesmen. A controversy over their authenticity has raged among scholars and historians ever since.³ Adding further depth and complication to the controversy, in 1935 the Soviet regime published another collection of 182 similar (and in some cases identical) documents under the title, *Adventures of Russian Tsarism in Bulgaria (Avant-jury russkogo carizma v Bolgarii, P. Pavlovich, editor, Moscow, 1935)*.

Taken together, these two collections comprise some 423 documents covering fifteen years of aggressive Russian intervention in Bulgaria (1881-1896). They provide valuable insight into the types of national policy and operational problems involved when a major power uses political warfare, both open and covert, as an instrument of policy—in this instance a vain and protracted attempt by the tsarist regime to carry out its "liberating mission" in Bulgaria. These considerations make the controversy over the Occupation Fund documents of more than usual historical or academic interest. If they are indeed authentic, then the value of the principles and operational lessons that can be drawn from them far surpasses their usefulness in establishing the chronicle of historical events of the period.⁴

In conducting covert operations, such as kidnaping and political assassination, government agencies of course keep any correspondence to a minimum, and such records as may be kept are classified top secret and are closely guarded. This being so, how did the newspaper *Svoboda* get hold of the incriminating

documents which created such a sensation in the summer of 1892? The immediate or sub-source was Stambulov, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, who had narrowly escaped assassination by tsarist agents, and who made effective use of the "revelations" for anti-Russian propaganda purposes. But the primary source or agent was Mikhail Jakobson, a political defector or turncoat, the same type of person who later gained world-wide attention during the Cold War period by going over to the other side, either "free world" or Soviet. As in the case of many defectors, almost nothing certain is known about the reasons or motivation (usually complex) behind Jakobson's defection. However, the essential facts of the case have been authoritatively summarized as follows:

In 1891 Mikhail Jakobson, a former Russian official, offered to provide Stambulov with documents which would justify the Prime Minister's anti-Russian stand. After the Russo-Bulgarian break of December, 1886, the Russian consulate archives in Bulgaria had been left under the surveillance of the consulate dragoon at Rushchuk. Jakobson held that position until 1889, when he was transferred to Bucharest. He was able to follow the activities of his government, not only because of his official position, but also through his participation in some of the intrigues. He had, for instance, together with Mikhail Khitrovo, the Russian minister in Bucharest, been implicated in the Panica plot to overthrow Prince Ferdinand. When he was ordered to return to Russia in 1891, he refused and instead sought refuge in Bulgaria. He soon got in touch with Stambulov and offered to supply him with documents from the secret archives of the Russian consulates in Rushchuk and Bucharest. Jakobson promised that the material would unveil Russia's role in the conspiracies and plots against the Bulgarian government, and he was ready to sell them for the reasonable price of 10,000 francs.⁵

The situation is a familiar one which has been repeated frequently since World War II. Numerous officials of the USSR and Soviet satellite states, when ordered to return to their homelands, have sought political refuge in the West, presumably bringing with them much valuable intelligence information which may also be exploited (like the fact of the defection itself) for propaganda purposes.

But what about the stolen documents that such defectors bring with them? How should they be evaluated, that is, either authenticated or exposed as forgeries? In the case of Jakobson and his collection of Occupation Fund documents, the controversy over their authenticity has demonstrated two widely differing methods. One is the traditional academic or historical method of investigating the dubious circumstances under which the documents were obtained, combined with an appeal to authority, that is, to the judgment of officials concerned with the documents or to reputable historians who have later had occasion to study them. But the appeal to authority is only possible long after open publication has taken place and various historians have had time to pronounce their judgments. As a method, the appeal to authority is thus clearly excluded at the time when an allegedly stolen collection of documents is acquired. The immediate evaluation problem which then arises is of more than academic interest. It is a perennial intelligence problem. Foreign offices, intelligence agencies, journalists, and even legislative investigating committees frequently acquire (or are propositioned to buy) various "stolen documents." Some of these may be authentic, others may be forged, either by amateurs or by relatively skilled counter-intelligence agencies, for purposes of deception or provocation, but all of them must be evaluated.

This brings us to the second method of evaluating suspect documents: intelligence evaluation, the wide range of techniques employed by intelligence agencies when faced with such problems. Included within this spectrum is a thorough background investigation of the source and circumstances in which the documents were acquired. This study of dubious persons and circumstances differs from similar research by the historian only in that the intelligence agency may have extensive information provided by its own counter-intelligence service, information that is "sensitive" and protected by a cloak of "operational secrecy" which is rarely lifted for the historian.

Also within this spectrum are analytical techniques with which the historian will probably be unfamiliar, unless he has had operational experience in certain specialized types of intelligence. One of these techniques, communications analysis, will be applied to the Occupation Fund documents in the next chapter.⁶

Arguments for and against the validity of the Occupation Fund documents date from the period 1953-1955. Since then new historical evidence has been discovered which makes it clear that much of the early controversy over the Occupation Fund documents was based on misconceptions arising from a lack of both essential data and an understanding of the kind of evaluation problem that the case presents. The new evidence was found among German documents seized by the Allies at the end of World War II. It consists of a special file (hereafter called the Sofia file) kept mainly by Baron von Wangenheim at the German Legation in Sofia, Bulgaria. The file deals exclusively with the Occupation Fund documents and related affairs from March 17, 1891 (more than a year before the story broke in mid-summer 1892) until June 16, 1894, some months after the publication in 1893 of the full collection of *Documents secrets*. Baron Wangenheim obviously took a keen interest in the case, and the file is a model of intelligence reporting. It includes clippings from the more important Russian, Bulgarian, and European newspapers, and even relevant "Letters to the Editor" columns.

The fresh material in the Sofia file makes it clear that the previous controversy over the authenticity of the Occupation Fund documents was largely unreal, since the original charges of "forgery" were made against a few articles which first appeared in the Bulgarian newspaper, *Svoboda*, and not against the collection as a whole which appeared several months later in the carefully edited French and English editions.

Nevertheless, there are useful lessons to be learned from a review of the earlier arguments for and against the authenticity of the Occupation Fund documents, since they illustrate vividly contrasting methods of evaluation.

The Case Against the Validity of the Occupation Fund Documents

Let us turn first to a review of the case against the documents. It consists, first, of a searching look into the dubious circumstances in which they were acquired, and second, a compilation of "authoritative" statements denouncing them by "persons in a position to judge" their validity.⁷

The Jakobson affair was studied "on the spot" by those who were in Bulgaria for the purpose of gathering political intelligence. The reports of the British agents in Bulgaria are among the best evidence we have that the Jakobson collection is of dubious character. If Stambulov had been in possession of the original documents or even of what looked like good copies, it stands to reason that he would have shown them to the representatives of Great Britain, the principal adversary of Russia at the Straits and in the Near East. Vitaly interested in information of Russian conspiracy and activity in the Balkans, the British agents at the time of the publication of the documents made repeated attempts to obtain further information. A study of the series of despatches written in this connection reveals their failure. Let us, therefore, consider exactly what they wrote about the events in question.

The first despatch of interest is dated April 13, 1891. Stambulov at this time informed O'Connor that Jakobson was seeking asylum in Bulgaria and that he offered in return to supply information on the conspiracies involving Khitrovo, the Russian agent in Bucharest. It appears from the wording of the report that Jakobson had not yet at this time delivered the documents, but that he had told Stambulov that he had

"the means in his power of proving the participation of Monsieur Khitrovo in these proceedings [the conspiracies against the Bulgarian Government] and he was ready to establish facts and dates. He had not however any documents with him, but he knew enough to expose the whole organization of the secret service in these countries and the annual expenditures it involved. He was willing under certain conditions to place this information at the disposal of the Bulgarian Government."

Stambulov said further that Jakobson's belongings were searched at the railroad station when he came to Bulgaria, but that no documents were found in his possession. This despatch also reveals the fact . . . that the Russian Government through the German consulate requested that Jakobson's effects be searched "for papers alleged to have been stolen from the Russian legation at Bucharest." * The latter statement is the only clear evidence that we have that something was taken from the Russian archives,

* Great Britain, Public Record Office, Political Despatches, *O'Connor to Salisbury, F. O. 78/4377*, No. 36, secret (Sofia, April 13, 1891). (Hereafter cited as F.O.)

but it must be balanced against the information which will be presented below.

The second despatch comes almost a year later, on August 11, 1892, a month after the publication of the documents in the newspaper *Svoboda* had commenced. Here Stambulov told Brophy that he had paid 10,000 francs for the collection and added that "I cannot be absolutely sure of their [the documents] authenticity in every point, only I have taken enormous pains to sift the facts to the best of my ability by corroborative evidence and I can find nothing to show that they are concocted. The man seems to have been very diligent in noting down all that passed in Bulgaria and concerning it, for in our many conversations he brought forward facts that I had performed in former days and words I had pronounced, which had not been reported and which I had long since forgotten. But when these were thus brought back to my memory I at once recognised them as correct." *

On August 16 and 25 Lowther had similar conversations with both Ferdinand and Stambulov in which both the Prince and the Prime Minister spoke of the collection as if there could be "no doubt" of its authenticity. †

From the despatches given thus far, it can be seen that Jakobson delivered the documents for positive considerations, money and political asylum. It also shows that he was a student of the Balkan political scene as well as an active participant in the events of the time. As witnessed by the last statement of Stambulov, he had an active and retentive mind. There was little chance that he would make any obvious errors in compiling a forgery.

The first report in which the authenticity of the documents is directly questioned comes on September 6, 1892. In this Lowther comments that no foreign representative had yet seen any of the documents and adds:

"I believe that the Bulgarian Government only professes to have very few original documents and those indeed of not much importance, and nearly all the papers they have are copies of official papers made at the time or written down

* Brophy to Blech, No. 18, secret (Varna, August 11, 1892), in *Lowther to Salisbury, F.O. 78/4444*, No. 122, secret (Sofia, August 17, 1892).

† *Lowther to Salisbury, F.O. 78/4444*, No. 121, confidential (Sofia, August 16, 1892); *Lowther to Rosebery, ibid.*, No. 124 (Sofia, August 25, 1892).

from memory afterwards. The Russian cypher which also came into their hands has, it seems, given no assistance in completing the disclosures." *

The above "on the spot intelligence estimate" agrees completely with the opinion of the authors. . . . A further confirmation of the correctness of the report comes from the despatch of September 12. At this time Lowther put directly before Stambulov the fact that no one had seen the documents. Stambulov replied that he no longer had them, but that they were in the possession of *Svoboda*. The Bulgarian Prime Minister then added the damaging confession that he did not wish to have anything more to do with them "and indeed frankly admitted that all the documents were probably not genuine, though he could not doubt but that many of them were." Lowther added that this admission was "in striking contrast" to the language previously used by Stambulov.†

The question which now should be decided by the reader is what judgment should be made of a series of documents which was acquired and handled in this manner. Jakobson, a political refugee, sold what he claimed to be original documents to a prime minister who needed political ammunition to combat Russian activity against his regime. The documents provided precisely strengthened.¹ The Jakobson collection must therefore in the last what he needed: evidence of Russian conspiracy throughout the Balkans. It will also be noted that Stambulov did not publish the documents until a year after their acquisition and after the assassination of his friend Vulkovich. The documents themselves were never shown to reliable witnesses. The British representatives, who strongly supported Bulgarian resistance to Russian pressures, were not able to obtain precise information about them. We do not have a direct statement from a single person in a position to judge that the documents are reliable. Stambulov himself "frankly admitted that all the documents were probably not genuine." It must be stated again that the problem at issue is not the content of the documents; it is rather whether Jakobson delivered original documents or a mixed selection of genuine, concocted and reconstructed items.

The authors believe that a consideration of the events of the time, the character of Stambulov and the British despatches establish the questionable circumstances under which the collection was acquired.

* Lowther to Rosebery, *ibid.*, No. 128 (Sofia, September 6, 1892).

† Lowther to Rosebery, *ibid.*, No. 131, confidential (Sofia, September 12, 1892).

It is important to note that the preceding review of the dubious circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the Occupation Fund documents concerns only the revelations published in *Svoboda*. Neither Stambulov nor the resident British agent, Lowther, had anything else in mind, and, of course, at that time could not possibly have evaluated the 241 documents in the *Documents secrets* collection published two years later.

Any evaluation of suspect documents that concludes that they are forged should have some theory as to how they were produced. The Jelavich case against the authenticity of the Occupation Fund collection concludes with an ingenious explanation of how the defector Jakobson assembled or "drew up the documents" *after* he defected, instead of simply taking them with him at the time: ⁸

Although the exact steps by which the Occupation Fund collection was assembled will probably never be known, it can safely be concluded that Jakobson drew up the documents from what he could remember of the despatches and reports which he had seen when in Russian service. He probably also had been able to take some of these, or verbatim copies, with him when he left for Bulgaria. However, since it appears that at least the majority of the documents are forgeries, the entire series must be rejected as a valid historical source. Fortunately, material of a reliable nature, covering roughly the same field, is available. It must be remembered, moreover, that the documents originally were published with only one aim—to discredit Russian diplomacy in the public eye. To that end they were a remarkable success. Stambulov saw them receive general acceptance both in his country and abroad, and his position in regard to Russia was considerably strengthened.* The Jakobson collection must therefore in the last analysis be regarded only as a partisan political pamphlet which served the purpose for which it was designed.

Thus far the case against the validity of the Occupation Fund documents consists of (1) a review of their dubious origin and equivocal statements made about them when the first revelations were published in *Svoboda*, and (2) the theory that the defector, Jakobson, "drew them up from what he could remem-

* In December, 1892, the Bulgarian national assembly granted Bulgarian citizenship to Jakobson, *Lowther to Rosebery*, F. O. 78/4444, No. 179 (Sofia, December 13, 1892).

ber of the despatches and reports he had seen when in Russian service." The third element in the case is the traditional appeal to authority. An eloquent appeal along these lines is made in a second Jelavich article as follows: ⁹

To complete the review of the basis on which the rejection of the collection was made, it is necessary to consider the judgment of those who were in a position to know what Jakobson had actually taken, if anything. In this regard we have the statements of three witnesses, the Russian foreign minister, N. K. Giers, his secretary, V. N. Lamzdorf, and S. Skazkin, a Russian historian.

Giers' estimate of the documents is to be found in *Die Grosse Politik*. As quoted in footnote 22 of the original article, the Russian Foreign Minister in a conversation with G. Kalnoky on May 1, 1893: "*Die Echtheit einiger dort veröffentlichten Schriftstücke nicht angezweifelt hat*" but added that "*die meisten Schriftstücke seien aber gefälscht.*" * Here then is another clear statement of the position that the authors believe should be supported. Giers did not deny that some of the documents were correct transcripts, or that the events described did not occur, but he stated that most of the series was falsified.

The second, and even stronger statement, comes from Lamzdorf's diary. D. A. Kapnist, the director of the Asiatic Department at the time of the publication of the documents, wished to send a circular to the Russian diplomatic representatives instructing them that they could formally announce that all of the documents appeared to be the work of a falsifier. Under the date of August 15, 1892, Lamzdorf wrote in his diary that he saw little value in such a declaration "when we know that even if the falsified documents published by *Svoboda* do not exist, nevertheless, unfortunately, there is a large quantity of documents of an identical character which do exist in actual form." † It would be difficult to challenge the Lamzdorf commentary. Again no denial is made of the information contained in the documents, only of the claim that they are genuine. The frequent devastating comments made on the Tsar and the royal family are evidence that the diary was not designed for immediate publication. It is difficult to imagine the circumstances under which Lamzdorf would have been

* Johannes Lepsius, *et al.*, *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914* (Berlin, 1924), VII, 435, *Reuss to Caprivi*, No. 117 (Vienna, May 1, 1892).

† V. N. Lamzdorf, *Dnevnik 1891-1892* (Moscow, 1934), p. 355.

led to make a complete misstatement of fact on a matter such as this in his personal diary.

The third, and most extreme, estimate of the unreliability of the collection has been made by S. Skazkin, who judged the series "a crude and ignorant forgery, which, like any forgery, of course, is sufficiently probable, but nevertheless it remains a forgery." In a footnote Skazkin adds: "It is easy to convince oneself of this by collating the published documents with the records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." We therefore have a clear statement by the only historian whom we know has used the Russian archives for the period. His book is not propaganda. It is based on the published documents of all the countries concerned and it contains complete citations, including the date, despatch number and bundle number, of the records of the Russian Foreign Ministry. There is no evidence that Skazkin was a careless reader. Certainly, he knew how to use documentary material and he would not make a mistake on a point on which he was so emphatic. There is also no apparent reason why he should state a complete falsehood. *Avantjury*, Skazkin's book and the Jakobson collection all tell the same story of Russian intrigue. There is no quarrel on "interpretation" of history. Tsarist diplomacy is pictured as incompetent in all the accounts. The Skazkin version is also confirmed by Giers, Lamzdorf and the British representatives, who are certainly poles apart in political conviction. The motives and the reasons behind any lack of accuracy in the statements of Skazkin must first be explained before his judgment that the *Documents secrets* are a forgery can be discounted.

The Case for the Validity of the Occupation Fund Documents: Part I, The Traditional Approach

As will be apparent later, the new historical evidence in the Sofia file shows that the case against the Occupation Fund documents (i.e., the entire collection of 241 *Documents secrets*) is clearly based on a misconception of the problem. Nevertheless, the Jelavich articles are a classic example of a very convincing appeal to authority in evaluating suspect documents. They also illustrate one of the pitfalls of the evaluating process, that is, making a premature assumption of either authenticity or forgery. Once such an assumption is made, the case unconsciously is prejudged before all the relevant facts are considered. It may then

be necessary to do violence to common sense in another vital step of the evaluating process, namely, constructing a plausible theory of how the suspect documents were produced (and frequently by whom). Prejudging the case for or against validity produces a blind spot in the evaluator, such that even the most contrived theory can later be accepted as long as it supports the position taken. This situation is clearly illustrated in the case against the validity of the Occupation Fund documents by the theory of how they were fabricated. In this regard, the Jelavich reasoning may be summarized briefly in two propositions: (1) a few of the documents may be originals or copies thereof, but most of them are reconstructed, and thus at least by implication are "forgeries"; (2) "It may be safely concluded that Jakobson drew up the documents from what he could remember of the despatches and reports which he had seen in Russian service. . . . Jakobson, in the years in which he was attached to Russian consulates, made notes on some of the despatches to which he had access, and took either verbatim copies or the originals of others."

Both these propositions rest on assumptions which are logically inadmissible. The first is that a political defector who had ample time and opportunity to select and purloin original documents from archives left under his sole surveillance, would rely on making notes and on his memory. It is impossible to believe that in making a collection of documents for sale, the value of which depends on their authenticity, any espionage agent or defector would choose to rely on notes and memory when he had free access to cable files. Logically, this first assumption is as inadmissible as the proposition that a thief in robbing a safe would prefer to take only a few samples of bank notes and negotiable securities, flee the country, and then set about forging before selling them at a discount on the black market.

The second assumption underlying the Jelavich theory of how Jakobson produced the Occupation Fund documents is that in the normal course of diplomatic affairs, embassy officials take notes on their communications as a standard operational procedure, rather than maintaining regular cable files. It is conceivable that some disorder may have prevailed in the files of the Russian

Consulate at Rushchuk and of the Ministry in Bucharest. Events were fast-moving and exciting, and some messages may well have been lost in the shuffle between "in" and "out" baskets. But it hardly seems plausible that the files from which Jakobson made his collection of documents consisted *for the most part* of fragmentary minutes, memoranda, or notes, rather than the texts of actual messages themselves. The most elementary security precautions require that diplomatic posts register and receipt for incoming and outgoing classified messages—and most of the Jakobson collection, as indicated by its title, *Documents secrets*, were secret communications. The new evidence in the Sofia file makes it clear that the Russian diplomatic posts in Rushchuk and Bucharest followed these standard procedures.

As dragoman or chief clerk of the Russian consulate at Rushchuk, Jakobson kept a daily journal or operations logbook, in which incoming or outgoing messages were registered along with various official memoranda for the record. At the time of his defection, Jakobson took his journal with him. The German legation in Sofia quotes "a usually well-informed source" to this effect.¹⁰ Both the British Foreign Office records¹¹ and the Sofia file¹² indicate that at the time of his defection Jakobson also delivered a cipher to Stambulov. The delivery of such ciphers and/or code books is frequently an important consideration in the asylum and financial rewards provided political defectors. With the aid of Jakobson's logbook and the Russian code or cipher systems, Stambulov was presumably able to identify correctly and to decrypt (that is, decode or decipher) the Russian messages filed as cryptograms in the telegraph office at Rushchuk. Obviously, until this information leaked out, he was vitally concerned if possible to conceal from the Russian Foreign Office the real extent of its losses. This concern, and the technical job of deciphering or decoding the cryptograms filed at Rushchuk, explains the lapse of roughly a year's time between Jakobson's defection and the first *Svoboda* "revelations."

Stambulov must have been badly torn between two conflicting objectives: to extract as much political warfare value as possible from the "revelations," as they were called, and yet to conceal how much information he could derive from Russian

communications. In squaring this circle the Bulgarian Prime Minister was apparently in part successful. It was not until several weeks after the story broke in *Svoboda* that the *Neue Freie Presse* printed an article indicating that Jakobson had delivered a Russian cipher to Stambulov, "a fact never publicly acknowledged."¹³ Meanwhile, Stambulov had done his best to minimize the importance of this fact, and to throw both the British and German diplomatic representatives off the track by stating to the latter that the cipher thus obtained had proved to be of little value, since the local telegraph office at Rushchuk retained encrypted file copies for only three years (which may or may not have been entirely accurate).¹⁴ That Stambulov's tactics and conversations with the British agent, Lowther, were similar to those with Baron von Wangenheim has already been noted above.

The theory that Jakobson reconstructed the Occupation Fund documents from notes, memoranda, etc., breaks down rapidly on inspection. Is there a more plausible explanation that still accounts for the evidence that Jakobson apparently did not in fact bring over the entire collection neatly arranged and ready for publication at the time of his defection? The answer is yes, and the new evidence in the Sofia file clears up most of the apparent contradictions. Let us turn briefly to this new evidence which provides a radically different range of "facts bearing on the situation."

In mid-September 1892 Jakobson granted an interview to a Danish correspondent in which he listed his sources as: (a) copies in clear text, (b) enciphered copies, and (c) a few handwritten originals to increase the value of the collection as a whole. To the objection that he could have invented his own cipher and key, he replied that his copies of the enciphered texts could be compared with those in the telegraph office files at Rushchuk.¹⁵ It should be noted in passing that Jakobson's interview was granted a month after it had become common knowledge that he had also delivered a Russian cipher, so that no breach of security was involved.

Now, however "disturbed" Jakobson may have been personally at the time of his defection (and most such defectors are understandably quite upset) there is absolutely no evidence that

might cast a reasonable doubt on the accuracy of his statement of sources. The authenticity of the materials—the cipher, encrypted and plain text messages, logbook or journal, etc.—that he turned over to Stambulov can also not be seriously questioned. How then did the controversy over the Occupation Fund documents arise in the first place, and how could such “reputable witnesses” as the Russian Foreign Minister, N. K. Giers, and his secretary, V. N. Lamzdorf, denounce them as “forgeries”?

The Sofia file makes the answer fairly simple by providing details as to the form in which the documents first appeared and the circumstances surrounding their denunciation. As to the first point, a total of twenty-two documents were published in successive issues of *Svoboda* between July 9 and August 2, 1892.¹⁶

The first issue in which the story broke, and in which there appeared a “summary account” of the large payments made from the Occupation Fund to Russian agents in Bulgaria and elsewhere in the Balkans, of course created a sensation. This summary account was clearly not an “original document,” nor was any such specific claim made for it at the time. It was apparently drawn up by the editorial staff of *Svoboda*, probably with Jakobson’s assistance, from the latter’s journal and financial records. Indeed, one newspaper reader of the day, apparently a Russian civil servant familiar with official accounting methods and pay scales, wrote a letter to the editors of the *Neue Freie Presse* ridiculing the round numbers given in the summary account and pointing to the lavish travel allowances, per diem, etc., which were undoubtedly far in excess of the official Russian allotments as he knew them. The letter is touching in its naiveté and shows that even a presumably well-informed civil servant may have no concept of how lavishly confidential funds, for which there is no public accounting, can be spent on subversive operations.¹⁷

Other, more important, figures also took exception to the summary account: The Orthodox Metropolitan Michael, himself a beneficiary of Russian largesse, angrily attacked the article, denying everything except (as noted in a Belgrade newspaper report) that he did in fact receive money from the Fund.¹⁸

If, as seems probable, in preparing the articles for publication in *Svoboda*, the editors worked in part with encrypted messages,

it is inevitable that as Bulgarians they would make a number of errors in syntax and grammar in decrypting such texts, especially as they had to make publication deadlines. Hence, the authorities in St. Petersburg could, with some show of conviction, deny that "original" texts were published. Indeed, the semi-official *Moniteur orientale* of September 10, 1892, charged that, "Numerous and gross mistakes both of grammar and spelling due to the ignorance of the forger prove that they could never have been drafted in the offices of a Russian ministry."¹⁹ It is, of course, most unlikely that an intelligent and literate ex-Russian consular official would draft messages in his own language with numerous clumsy mistakes in grammar and spelling, thus indicating that the *Svoboda* texts were in fact produced not by Jakobson but by the editors of the newspaper.

Moreover, a cardinal fact bearing on the *Svoboda* articles must be emphasized here. As previously noted, Stambulov was vitally concerned to keep from the Russian Foreign Office as long as possible absolutely certain knowledge that he had obtained a Russian cipher from Jakobson. Now, a basic security regulation regarding the publication in clear text of classified messages is that *they must be carefully paraphrased after they have been decrypted*, so that only in rare instances (namely, unfortunate "security breaks") do such messages as published conform exactly, i.e., word for word or "in actual form," with the encoded originals. This standard security procedure, with which all diplomats are familiar, was probably applied *in reverse* by Stambulov to protect for as long as possible his acquisition of the Russian cipher and/or code book. The editors of *Svoboda* were thus presumably instructed to paraphrase all messages before printing them. Such paraphrased messages may well have appeared as "clumsy and ungrammatical" when compared with the texts filed in St. Petersburg. This fact in no way lessens their value as historical sources.

In a similar case ten years prior to the *Svoboda* disclosures, the Sofia newspaper, *Pester Lloyd*, had acquired, under equally dubious circumstances, a copy of Foreign Minister Giers's instructions to A. M. Kumani, then Russian Consul-General in Sofia. The "document" was published on August 11, 1882 (*Pester Lloyd*, No. 231), and four days later S. V. Arsenyev, the Russian

diplomatic agent in Sofia, telegraphed Giers, asking him to expose the publication as "falsified." Giers's notation on this cable is significant: "This [denunciation of the *Pester Lloyd* document as a falsification] would be difficult because collation with the original document shows it to be true enough."²⁰ If the historian were to reject *ipso facto* all such paraphrased texts as valid historical evidence, he would drastically limit his sources. Literally thousands of official statements based on secret communications which require paraphrasing would automatically be rejected by the historian searching for the will-o'-the-wisp of an absolutely immaculate "original source."

Giers's frank, private admission with respect to the *Pester Lloyd* article was closely paralleled a decade later by his secretary, V. N. Lamzdorf, at the time of the publication of the *Svoboda* articles. As noted in the Jelavich case against the validity of the Occupation Fund documents, Lamzdorf wrote in his diary on August 15, 1882, that D. A. Kapnist, the director of the Asiatic Department, had proposed sending out a circular telegram to Russian diplomatic agents authorizing them to declare all the *Svoboda* articles to be the work of a "falsifier." Lamzdorf then stated his private opinion that such a declaration would be of little value "when we know that even if the falsified documents published by *Svoboda* do not exist, nevertheless, unfortunately, there is a large quantity of documents of an identical character which do exist in actual form."²¹ It is astonishing that Lamzdorf's diary reference to the *Svoboda* articles *alone* should be repeatedly cited by Jelavich as "proof" that the entire Jakobson collection is a "forgery," a collection which the editor, R. Léonoff, carefully compiled, annotated, and published several months later. There is a world of difference between a few articles hastily translated and exploited by a newspaper, and the *Documents secrets*. Many of the early translations of captured German records used as evidence at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials were extremely clumsy. This fact does not make later editions of the same documents less authoritative.

As indicated by the quotation from the *Moniteur orientale*, the Russian press heaped scorn on the documents as published in *Svoboda*, and the government issued a statement charging for-

gery. But it is significant that Russian Foreign Minister Giers never publicly and officially committed himself. For, as the *Pester Lloyd* noted in an article datelined August 31, 1892, it was not Giers but Chichtin, his deputy, who made the original "official" statement that the documents were "falsified." Giers himself was conveniently unavailable, presumably stricken with a sudden diplomatic illness at the time.²² Other European newspapers, such as the authoritative *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* and the *Kölnische Zeitung*, were quick to observe that Chichtin had himself once been head of the notorious Asiatic Department (at that time the equivalent of the CIA) during part of the time covered by the documents, and thus would naturally be first to deny their validity. Denial from such a source, it was pointed out, could only be taken as further proof that the documents were indeed authentic.²³

All these charges and counter-charges recall the uproar caused when the U.S. Department of State unilaterally released the Yalta papers. In an article analogous to the earlier Russian attack on the *Svoboda* revelations, the official Soviet newspaper, *Pravda*, charged that the Yalta papers were "concocted" from "all kinds of memoranda, recommendations and suggestions of American officials once prepared for the directors of U.S. foreign policy, casual records of talks at the conference made from memory after it ended by interpreters or secretaries of the American delegation, and the like."²⁴ Accusations of "vulgar forgery" and "outright falsification" were also made.²⁵

A major portion of the case against the validity of the Occupation Fund documents rests on an appeal to the judgment of three authorities, Russian Foreign Minister Giers, his secretary Lamzdorf, and the historian Skazkin. As we have already observed, Lamzdorf wrote not about the collection as a whole but only about the *Svoboda* articles, and Giers refused to comment officially when the story broke. Some months later, when the original Russian edition of the *Documents secrets* appeared in Sofia, Giers did make a statement about them in a confidential conversation with the Hungarian Count Kalnoky. By a strange perversion of the natural logic inherent in such a political situation (a logic apparent to most West European newspaper editors of

the day), Giers's testimony is repeatedly cited as evidence of forgery in the Jelavich case against the documents.

Unfortunately, Giers's testimony has been badly mutilated in the Jelavich citation. The full text of Giers's reported statement follows (only the fragments in italics are quoted by Jelavich):

Count Kalnoky was greatly astonished to hear that his interlocutor (Giers) *did not doubt the authenticity of some of the documents published there*. He admitted that unfortunately several of these letters originated with employees of the Russian Foreign Ministry, but that the same were written without his knowledge or approval, and therefore he must deny any responsibility for them. *Most of the documents, however, were forged*: this is already proven by the circumstance that Mr. Jakobson published them, for the language is more Jewish than Russian.²⁶

In his fractured quotation of this conversation, Jelavich has suppressed the only "proof" of forgery brought forth by the Russian Foreign Minister—a disparaging bit of anti-semitism, but one which may nevertheless have been calculated to please his listener. This type of slur reflects greater discredit on the source than it does on Jakobson.

Perhaps Giers expected Kalnoky to believe everything in this statement. But it is too much to ask historians to do so today, when the facts can be readily checked. Take for example Giers's vague statement admitting that "unfortunately several of these letters [sic] originated with employees of the Russian Foreign Ministry," but denying "his knowledge or approval and therefore . . . responsibility for them." What are the facts with respect to a typical example, such as the documents concerning Major Panica, a Bulgarian citizen acting as a Russian agent? The Moscow archives (the *Avantjury* collection) show that of eleven early messages concerning the Panica case (dated August 10–December 20, 1887), five were addressed to Giers personally and six others to Zinoviev, head of the Asiatic Department within the Foreign Office. Giers personally addressed a "most devoted report" to Tsar Alexander III on the Panica case (*Avantjury* No. 70). *Six of these early messages were also published in Svoboda*, although Giers's "devoted report" to the Tsar was, of course, not available

to either Jakobson or to the editors of the *Documents secrets* collection. Thus it is clear from the record, which any historian can readily consult, that the Russian Foreign Minister was deliberately deceptive when, in the first part of his statement to Count Kalnoky, he denied any responsibility for these messages. Why should Jelavich or any other historian accept the end of Giers's statement as somehow "authoritative" when the heart of it is demonstrably false?

It should be noted in passing that, given the sensitive nature of covert operations, any other foreign minister or chief of state making a statement in similar circumstances would probably have denied knowledge or responsibility in much the same manner. (The most notable exception in recent times to this standard procedure is former President Eisenhower's public admission of responsibility for U-2 "spy plane" flights over the USSR.) Thus, coming from such a biased and clearly unreliable source as the Russian Foreign Minister, the charge of forgery is understandable but hardly authoritative.

But what of the judgment of the Russian historian, S. Skazkin, repeatedly cited by Jelavich as "proof" that the *Documents secrets* are not a valid historical source? To answer this question three brief observations are indicated. First, Skazkin's expression "clumsy and ungrammatical" indicates that, like Giers's secretary, Lamzdorf, he may possibly have had in mind the articles which first appeared in *Svoboda*. Skazkin cites as his authority (note 3, p. 295, of his *Konets Austro-rusko-germanskogo Soyuz*) M. H. Pokrovsky, *Diplomatia i voiny Carskoi Rossii v XIX Stoletii*, p. 348 [sic]. However, Pokrovsky clearly had in mind the original Russian edition of the Jakobson collection, *not* the first articles that appeared in *Svoboda*. In note 1 on p. 346 of Pokrovsky (not p. 348 as cited by Skazkin), the author writes as follows:

The Russian Foreign Ministry officially denied the authenticity of the documents published in the collection, having at that time begun a lawsuit against the person who handed them over for "theft" (but not for "forgery") of the official documents entrusted to him. The actors of the drama, directly compromised by the disclosures, did not for a minute, in their private correspondence, doubt the authenticity of the major portion [*bolshoi chasti*] of the

documents. (Compare Golevine, *Fuerst Alexander I von Bulgarien*, Vienna, 1896, p. 495.)

It is clear from Pokrovsky's repeated citations to the collection that he evidently regarded it as a valid historical source. This raises a serious question as to whether Skazkin had not actually misread Pokrovsky.

Skazkin's footnote stating that one can easily be convinced of forgery "by collating the published documents with the records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs" appears to be conclusive, since he made extensive and careful use of such records as source material. In presenting the case against the validity of the Occupation Fund documents, Jelavich emphasizes that: ²⁷

His [Skazkin's] book is not propaganda. It is based on the published documents of all the countries concerned and it contains complete citations, *including the date, despatch number and bundle number* of the records of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

This is a sweeping and impressive statement, but one which will not hold up when the facts are examined. Actually, Skazkin makes approximately 175 footnote citations to messages filed in the Russian Foreign Ministry or Asiatic Department archives.²⁸ Of these references, a careful count will show that only fifty, i.e., less than one third, give the actual despatch numbers of the messages cited. Further analysis of Skazkin's use of the Russian archives indicates that he searched them for documents bearing on major policy decisions with respect to the Austro-Russian-German alliance, rather than on Russian intervention in Bulgarian internal affairs *per se*, the principal subject matter of the *Documents secrets*. Hence there is no a priori reason to believe that Skazkin even saw what Lamzdorf describes as "the large quantity of documents" dealing with Russian intrigues in Bulgaria at the local agent level. There is certainly no evidence in Skazkin's book that he ever made a direct comparison of the material in the *Documents secrets* with the records stored in Moscow—the kind of collation that he suggests in his note cited above. To have done so would have required painstaking research through records in which he had at best only a "nice-to-know" interest, records such as the local message files of the Russian diplomatic posts at Sofia or Rushchuk in

Bulgaria, and, later, the local records from the Russian diplomatic agent in Bucharest, Rumania.²⁹

In the second place, Skazkin's cut-off date is roughly 1884; he thus had no occasion to consult the Russian archives for the years 1887-1888, in which case he would have found direct evidence, i.e., identical documents concerning the assassination in Rushchuk of the Bulgarian official, Mantov, and the intrigues of such Bulgarians as Panica, Novikov, or Nabokov acting as Russian agents.³⁰

As for the condition of the Soviet archives with which Skazkin worked, the Soviet Marxologist, D. B. Ryazanov, once remarked with respect to a similar collection of materials: "*Hier herrscht Ordnung, durch russische Schlumperei temperiert*" (Here Order rules, tempered by Russian slovenliness)! Under these circumstances, Skazkin's failure to find documents identical to those in the *Documents secrets* collection is understandable, even if he searched for them, which, as noted above, is improbable. Moreover, Skazkin wrote in 1928. He could hardly foresee that in 1934-1935 a research team of other Soviet historians would have access to the same archives and publish the *Avantjury* collection. (This should serve to correct the obvious error, twice repeated in the Jelavich articles, that Skazkin was "the one man who has had access to the files for the period.")

Finally, regardless of what Skazkin may have looked for or found in the archives made available to him, he could not possibly have collated the documents using the new scientific techniques of communications analysis which have since been developed.³¹

In conclusion, the case against the authenticity of the Occupation Fund documents rests on (1) assumptions that are clearly inadmissible, namely, that a political defector with unlimited access to diplomatic cable files would reconstruct them largely "from what he could remember"; (2) an appeal to the authority of official spokesmen and historians, which clearly breaks down upon close scrutiny; and (3) a misconception of the problem, since the "authorities" appealed to addressed their remarks to something else—the first items in *Svoboda*. Jelavich's conclusion that the *Documents secrets* collection must "in the last analysis be regarded only as a partisan political pamphlet" is clearly untenable.

On the contrary, as illustrated above, the new historical evidence in the Sofia file conclusively demonstrates the validity of the Occupation Fund documents as an historical source, and clarifies the original dispute over their authenticity. It is abundantly clear that the many vociferous and partisan charges of "forgery" made at the time and repeated uncritically since are essentially unreal, since they were for the most part leveled at the first sensational items appearing in the columns of the newspaper, *Svoboda*, and are not applicable to the *Documents secrets* as a whole.

THE OCCUPATION FUND DOCUMENTS: Pre-Content and Communications Analysis

A S I N D I C A T E D

in the preceding chapter, one of the evaluating techniques available to the intelligence specialist in assessing suspect documents is "communications analysis." Like modern content analysis, this research technique was developed for military intelligence during World War II, and only historians with highly specialized intelligence backgrounds have had practical experience with it. For this reason (within the limits set by security considerations), the application of elementary communications analysis to an evaluation of the Occupation Fund documents may serve as a useful introduction to this new research tool for both the historian and the general reader.

Paradoxically, what in this study is called communications analysis may be described as essentially pre-content or non-content analysis, and begins where traditional approaches end. For centuries historians have concerned themselves with analyzing the texts or contents of documents as a means of determining their validity. Most of the documents that concern historians are communications (diplomatic notes, government decrees, etc.), and interest is centered on what they contain, internally, i.e., their content. The communications analyst turns his attention primarily not to the message itself but to *external* or pre-content data, such

as the heading (time, place, date, despatch number, etc.) and other indicators which are normally produced as an inseparable part of the communications process itself.

The Occupation Fund documents are primarily diplomatic correspondence. So here we shall narrow the broader field of communications analysis to this area, and, again due to security considerations, we shall confine ourselves to the types of data and their interrelationships which are present in the normal exchange of messages between a Foreign Office (in this case, tsarist Russian) and field stations or posts abroad (in this example, Russian diplomatic, military, and security police offices in Bulgaria or neighboring countries).

We shall be working mainly with two sets of documents which expose tsarist covert political warfare operations in Bulgaria during the period 1881-1896: (1) the "Secret Documents Concerning Russia's Eastern Policy, 1881-1890," in the 1893 French edition edited by R. Léonoff and referred to by the short title *Documents secrets* (abbreviated as *D.S.*), and (2) "Adventures of Russian Tsarism in Bulgaria," edited by P. Pavlovich (*Avantjury russkogo Czarisma v Bulgarii*, Moscow, 1935), referred to simply as *Avantjury*. Finally, from time to time we shall introduce supporting data from comparable diplomatic documents in the Russian archives. Even though access to these archives has been (and still is) denied to Western scholars, Russian historians such as S. Skazkin have used them, and numerous footnote citations to them in Skazkin's study, *Konets Austro-russko-germanskogo Soyuz*a (Moscow, 1938) provide a wealth of useful data which communications analysis can use to produce valuable evidence about certain Russian documents still withheld from historians. Standard diplomatic histories frequently give extensive footnote citations to whole series of diplomatic communications. When these citations give accurate dates and despatch numbers, this data may prove a useful tool in establishing the authenticity (or lack of it) of suspect documents which are alleged to be from the same or a comparable series, even though physical access to the originals is excluded.

The most important conclusions of this case study may be summarized at the outset:

First, the evidence presented fully supports the common-sense conclusion that it is extremely difficult to fabricate whole collec-

tions of diplomatic documents without the forgery becoming readily apparent.

Second, on the basis of plausibility of content and its agreement or consonance with established facts, historians are almost certain to expose extensive forgeries by careful study of the actual texts. However, communications or pre-content data (external message indicators, cross references, etc.) may provide a valuable supplementary tool in establishing authenticity or forgery.

Third, in any extensive collection of diplomatic correspondence, technical pre-content data are of such complexity that the problem of their deliberate fabrication can be solved only by advanced statistical techniques, presumably including the use of computers. It is most unlikely that a single individual (or even a team of gifted amateurs) can fabricate extensive, technically consistent pre-content data that will not break down under close scrutiny by specialists trained in communications analysis techniques.

In the preceding chapter it was established that in 1891 Mikhail Jakobson, a defector, selected the 241 documents which make up the *Documents secrets* and sold them to Stambulov, the Prime Minister of Bulgaria. Many of them were cryptograms. The fact that in the process of decoding or deciphering, slight editorial changes (by comparison with the originals on file in St. Petersburg) may have taken place in no way detracts from their validity. Such changes, and indeed complete paraphrasing of entire messages, are part of standard operational procedure in the release of secret government communications to the public. Of course, the ultimate test of the validity of the *Documents secrets* would be a comparison of each message with its presumed counterpart in the Moscow archives, to which Western scholars have been denied access. However, a group of Soviet scholars was permitted to work with original documents covering many of the same events that form the subject matter of the *Documents secrets*, and published its own selection of documents, also for the purpose of discrediting tsarist diplomacy in Bulgaria (the familiar *Avantjury* discussed above).

This event added a new dimension to the evaluation problem and makes possible the application of communications analysis to both collections. In other words, with the publication in 1935 of the *Avantjury* collection covering the years 1885-1896, an

assessment of the validity of the *Documents secrets* could be lifted from the stage of immediate intelligence evaluation to that of a direct comparative examination and analysis, for at least the five-year period (1885-1890) during which the two collections overlap. It should be emphasized that the two collections are by no means parallel, nor are they meant to be. The *Documents secrets* are merely a numbered sequence of documents arranged and published chronologically, beginning with number 1 in 1880 and ending with number 241, dated September 15, 1890. The *Avantjury* documents, although numbered serially from 1 to 182, are arranged topically under sixteen different chapter headings from "I. The Dethronement of Prince Alexander of Battenberg by Tsarist Russia" (1885) to "XVI. Change of Policy: Recognition of Ferdinand of Bulgaria," the last document, number 182, being dated March 8, 1896. Within each of the sixteen chapters the documents are arranged chronologically, and for the most part the events in the individual chapters follow in roughly progressive time sequence, with occasional gaps ranging from four or five days to as many years.

Given these facts, how could any overlapping or interlocking of the two documents series be expected? The answer lies within the following logical limits: A priori it might be assumed that if a given operation or event took place in, or was directed from, either Bucharest or Rushchuk, some record of it might be expected in the *Documents secrets*, since Jakobson had access to the files in these two places. If the operation called for an exchange of telegrams or cables between the Foreign Office in St. Petersburg and the local offices in Bucharest and Rushchuk, copies of the more important action cables involved might also be expected to turn up in the *Avantjury* collection. Similarly, copies of important circular telegrams from St. Petersburg might be expected to turn up in both the Moscow archives and the local files.

A careful collation of the two record collections shows that all these expectations or conditions are actually fulfilled. Thus, if one collection, the *Avantjury* group, for example, is accepted as genuine, it logically follows that the *Documents secrets* are equally valid. It is quite inconceivable that even the cleverest forger, working in 1891, could fabricate documents which are identical with those found in the Moscow archives and published fifty years later. Such a prodigious feat of clairvoyance is quite beyond

the limits of the possible. A brief schematic comparison of the two collections in the case of the Russian negotiations with Major Panica, an acknowledged military and political leader of the local Bulgarian "resistance," will serve to illustrate these facts. The illustration is offered as direct evidence that the *Documents secrets* are a valid historical collection.

COMBINED PANICA FILE

<i>Date</i>	<i>Avantjury Collection</i>	<i>Documents secrets</i>	<i>Topic</i>
1887			
10 Aug 1887	No. 63 identical with	No. 163	Early plans for military revolt
7 Oct 1887	No. 64	Missing	
10 Oct 1887	No. 65 identical with	No. 164	
18 Oct 1887	No. 66 identical with	No. 165	
26 Oct 1887	No. 67	Missing	
2 Nov 1887	No. 68 identical with	No. 166	
4 Nov 1887	Missing	No. 167	
3 Dec 1887	No. 69 identical with	No. 169	
5 Dec 1887	Missing	No. 170	
7 Dec 1887	No. 70	Missing	
20 Dec 1887	No. 71 identical with	No. 171	
1888			
12 Feb 1888	Missing	No. 176	Early military sup- port dropped
3 Mar 1888	Missing	No. 178	
5 Apr 1888	Missing	No. 179	
1889			
17 Sept 1889	Missing	No. 210	Combined Panica- Kolobkov Operation
20 Sept 1889	Missing	No. 211	
23 Sept 1889	Missing	No. 212	
26 Sept 1889	Missing	No. 213	
6 Oct 1889	Missing	No. 214	
8 Nov 1889	Missing	No. 215	
2 Dec 1889	Missing	No. 216	
5 Dec 1889	Missing	No. 217	
27 Dec 1889	Missing	No. 220	
31 Dec 1889	Missing	No. 221	

1890				
1 Jan	1890	Missing	No. 222	
19 Jan	1890	Missing	No. 223	
19 Jan	1890	Missing	No. 224	
19 Jan	1890	Missing	No. 225	Panica arrested
24 Jan	1890	No. 72	Missing	Rumanian Foreign Minister reports Panica arrested
25 Jan	1890	Missing	No. 226	Kolobkov arrested
26 Jan	1890	Missing	No. 227	
28 Jan	1890	Missing	No. 228	
15 Feb	1890	Missing	No. 229	
14 Mar	1890	Missing	No. 230	
15 Mar	1890	Missing	No. 231	
1 July	1890	No. 73	Missing	Panica executed

In the first place, pre-content analysis (that is, inspection of the table without reference to content), will indicate that the two series of documents together probably form a single complete file of action cables. In the 1880's the average time required for a telegram to go from St. Petersburg to Bucharest or Rushchuk was two or three days. Inspection of the table will show that this is a frequent time interval between documents in either series. Even if the texts of the message themselves were entirely blank or written in Etruscan, a chronological arrangement of them would indicate strongly that they represent a file of despatches with a transmission interval of two or three days between serial messages of the query-answer type. With the added knowledge of the place of origin or despatch of the messages, this hypothesis is strengthened; and when the actual contents of the messages are examined, it is entirely confirmed. For example, *Avantjury* No. 68 (identical with *Documents secrets* No. 166) is a request for guidance from Bucharest to St. Petersburg. In a footnote the Soviet editors of *Avantjury* state the following: "Answering the telegram published in the text, Zinoviev wired that it would be desirable to make the negotiations between Villamov and Panica personal, and to arrange for their interview in one of the coastal towns of Rumania." The complete telegram thus summarized appears as No. 167, the next in sequence, dated two days later, in the *Documents secrets* series.

This is only one example of the sort of *direct* internal evi-

dence indicating the interdependence of the *Avantjury* and Jakobson collections. Further collation will indicate other examples of identical documents, both isolated and in series, and of oblique cross references. In addition, there are many instances in which the authenticity of the *Documents secrets* is confirmed by *indirect* evidence. For example, No. 109 of the *Documents secrets*, dated September 5, 1886, summarizes and evaluates an earlier intelligence report, dated May 19, 1886, which, since it originated in Philippopolis (Plovdiv) instead of Rushchuk or Bucharest, and thus was not accessible to Jakobson, is missing from the latter's collection. The missing report was published fifty years later, however, in the *Avantjury* series (No. 9), thus providing another striking confirmation of the authenticity of the *Documents secrets*—unless one accepts the unlikely hypothesis that, in this and similar instances, Jakobson was a consummately skilled forger endowed with clairvoyant powers of a decidedly parapsychic nature.

From this comparison of content, let us turn to the supporting use of pre-content analysis as a means of providing additional evidence that both collections are genuine.

Diplomatic messages are not random personal correspondence. They originate as a matter of daily business routine between foreign offices and field posts, or between one embassy and another, and they may be expected to increase significantly in crisis situations which may require daily or even hourly progress reports. This pattern is clear from both the *Documents secrets* and *Avantjury* collections. For analytical purposes, diplomatic messages may be divided into two parts: (1) the heading or pre-content, and (2) the body or content, that is, the text of the message itself. Frequently the first line or sentence of any single message in a series of question-and-answer type communications will also contain cross references to previous notes, such as, "Reference your secret telegram No. 25 dated 1 July 1880." Although these cross references are actually part of the body of the message, for analytical purposes they are classed along with other pre-content or external indicators. The most important indicators produced as an inevitable part of the communications process are: (1) place or office of origin, or both, (2) date, (3) message or despatch number, (4) security classification (Secret, Personal, Confidential, etc.), (5) miscellaneous (by special courier, code, or cipher, etc., and special registry, logbook, or "control" num-

bers used to keep accurate records of the number of copies of classified documents).

Pre-content, external indicators may not be present, or only a few of them may be reproduced in published collections of documents. (Code or cipher indicators, for example, are almost always removed as an elementary security precaution.) When external indicators are present they may provide important clues as to the authenticity of a document collection, even before the contents of the documents themselves are analyzed or even known. For example, if in an allegedly "authentic" collection of diplomatic documents, an answer from the field to a query from a foreign office is dated before the two messages could have been physically transmitted and received by the means of communication used, either the dates are in error or the messages are probably forgeries. Fortunately in the case of the *Documents secrets*, not only are many of the messages dated but the scattering of seventy-five local despatch numbers provides a valuable analytic tool which may be used even before the messages themselves are examined. These despatch numbers should fall into several meaningful serial patterns if the collection as a whole is in fact what it is alleged to be.

The first step in this sample communications analysis is to distribute the messages into tables according to place of origin, addressees, and type of message (circular letters, point-to-point, etc.), and examine the resulting tables. Do the despatch numbers indicate the kind of serial sequence and periodicity which is inseparable from the actual communications process? If the answer is affirmative, the collection is probably genuine.

A second step is to study the apparent (or real) anomalies or irregularities in the serial patterns indicated. A certain number of clerical, publication, or transmissive errors can be expected to produce minor discrepancies in the serial patterns. If there are a large number of major anomalies for which there is no reasonable explanation, that fact may be taken as evidence of fabrication.

A third step is to compare the serial message data, present with what if anything is known from comparable documents of the same period in the Moscow archives. If the serial systems are

identical or comparable, the fact of such consonance is further evidence of authenticity.

A fourth and final step taken here is to analyze technical cross references in the documents to dates and despatch numbers of other documents which compare in time, place, and series. Here again, consistency is *prima facie* evidence of authenticity.

Step One: Distribution Tables

In the following tables the entire collection of *Documents secrets* is redistributed into tables which indicate that at least six major serial systems were used when the messages were sent and received. The data is explained following Table 7.

TABLE 1
St. Petersburg (Asiatic Department) Circular Despatches

<i>Documents secrets No.</i>	<i>Asiatic Department No.</i>	<i>Date</i>
32	1835	18 May 1882
34	2325	5 Aug 1882
35	2443	9 Sept 1882
37	2643	20 Sept 1882
38	2703	29 Sept 1882
39	2704	3 Oct 1882
40	2708	4 Nov 1882
41	2802	15 Dec 1882
45	1074	4 May 1883
48	1430	20 Aug 1883
109	2078	5 Sept 1886

TABLE 2
St. Petersburg to Rushchuk

<i>Documents secrets No.</i>	<i>Asiatic Department No.</i>	<i>Date</i>
56	1686	28 Nov 1883
57	169	20 Feb 1884
60	857	10 Apr 1884
61	930	4 May 1884
67	1469	5 May 1885
73	1056	31 Aug 1885
80	1074	23 Sept 1885
81	1078	24 Sept 1885
82	1106	2 Oct 1885
83	1124	10 Oct 1885
84	1184	23 Oct 1885
85	1205	25 Oct 1885
86	1210	27 Oct 1885
90	1283	2 Dec 1885
91	4875	3 Dec 1885
		(Slavic Benevo- lent Society)

TABLE 3
St. Petersburg to Bucharest

<i>Documents secrets No.</i>	<i>Despatch No.</i>	<i>Date</i>
149	234	26 Mar 1887
168	106	18 Nov 1887
171	3159	20 Dec 1887
180	1056	25 June 1888
185	2305	13 Dec 1888
189	402	15 Feb 1889
195	879	22 June 1889
206	1033	8 Aug 1889
207	1124	28 Aug 1889
209	1208	15 Sept 1889
213	1253	26 Sept 1889
215	1345	8 Nov 1889
219	3289	16 Dec 1889
221	3406	31 Dec 1889
238	5325	11 June 1890
		(State Police)
239	1358	15 June 1890

TABLE 4
Local Messages from Bucharest to St. Petersburg

<i>Documents secrets No.</i>	<i>Despatch No.</i>	<i>Date</i>
152	152	20 May 1887
159	206	2 July 1887
164	515	10 Oct 1887
173	67	23 Jan 1888
177	132	16 Feb 1888
184	405	7 Nov 1888
188	104	5 Feb 1889
193	198	14 June 1889
203	248	29 July 1889
205	272	5 Aug 1889
208	304	5 Sept 1889
211	479	20 Sept 1889
214	378	6 Oct 1889
220	610	27 Dec 1889
234	172	10 May 1890
235	173	11 May 1890

TABLE 5
Local Messages from Rushchuk to St. Petersburg

<i>Documents secrets No.</i>	<i>Despatch No.</i>	<i>Date</i>
42	805	20 Dec 1882
62	146	3 Apr 1884
92	45	20 Mar 1886
94	258	28 July 1886

TABLE 6
Local Messages from Sofia to Rushchuk

<i>Documents secrets No.</i>	<i>Despatch No.</i>	<i>Date</i>
49	458	28 Aug 1883
58	157	3 Apr 1884
68	458	20 June 1885
69	835	25 Aug 1885
70	840	28 Aug 1885
110	917	14 Sept 1885

TABLE 7
Miscellaneous Local Messages

<i>Documents secrets No.</i>	<i>Despatch No.</i>	<i>Origin—Destination</i>	<i>Date</i>
51	478	Rushchuk—Sofia	25 Sept 1883
71	155	Bucharest—Rushchuk	31 Aug 1885
136	4	Rushchuk—Bucharest	6 Jan 1887
139	8	Rushchuk—Bucharest	1 Mar 1887
237	479	Paris—Bucharest	7 June 1890

To the trained intelligence eye, even the most casual inspection of these tables indicates a high degree of probability—especially since the local despatch numbers appear at random—that the *Documents secrets* are an authentic collection. The local despatch numbers show a remarkable consistency within the several systems present. This is a first step in any communications analysis study of comparable collections of suspect documents.

Step Two: Analysis of Anomalies in Distribution Tables

A corollary step is to study the more obvious anomalies present in distribution tables derived from a collection of documents. There are a number of them in the *Documents secrets*. A first striking anomaly or apparent inconsistency appears at the end of Table 2 as follows:

<i>Documents secrets No.</i>	<i>Asiatic Department No.</i>	<i>Date</i>
86	1210	27 Oct 1885
90	1283	2 Dec 1885
91	4875	3 Dec 1885 (Slavic Benevolent Society)

Clearly, the jump from the series 1283 to 4875 is entirely inconsistent with the serial pattern indicated in the table for the other messages originating in St. Petersburg. The explanation, of course, lies in the fact that the originator is not the Asiatic Department but the Slavic Benevolent Society, using an entirely different serial system. A close study of the documents will show that the Russian military and state security police messages which originated in St. Petersburg also bear relatively high serial numbers, an indication of the larger volume of messages transmitted by these agencies and/or differing serial systems.

With this fact in mind, a second anomaly near the end of Table 3 becomes less real than apparent:

<i>Documents secrets No.</i>	<i>Despatch No.</i>	<i>Date</i>
213	1253	26 Sept 1889
215	1345	8 Nov 1889
219	3289	16 Dec 1889
221	3406	31 Dec 1889

D.S. 219, Despatch No. 3289, is a military message, and D.S. 221, Despatch No. 3406, was probably sent in the same series and channel rather than as a part of the regular Asiatic Department series.

A third anomaly appears at the end of Table 3:

<i>Documents secrets No.</i>	<i>Despatch No.</i>	<i>Date</i>
238	5325	11 June 1890
239	1358	15 June 1890

To the historian unfamiliar with communications analysis, it stands to reason that "No one who has anything to do with an archive

is going to present a document from March and number it 67 and then bring out a second from April with the number 23.”¹ The section of Table 3 reproduced above is an example of precisely this sort of apparent “blunder,” one which, paradoxically, provides additional evidence of the authenticity of the collection. A close reading of the documents reveals the following facts: (1) *Documents secrets* No. 233 dated April 30, 1890, refers to a State Security Police telegram of April 28, No. 4279. (Since *D.S.* No. 233 does not have a despatch number, it is not included in Table 3 above.) (2) *Documents secrets* No. 238, dated June 11, 1890, Despatch No. 5325, is also another State Police telegram to Bucharest. Clearly, the dates and despatch numbers of these two messages are consistent. But the very next item given, *Documents secrets* No. 239, dated June 15, 1890, bears the Despatch No. 1358! The numerical discrepancy between 5325 and 1358, the despatch numbers of two messages separated by only four days’ time, is enormous. It is due to the simple fact that the high message number (5325) belongs to a different serial system, the one used by the State Security Police.

A fourth anomaly appears also at the beginning of Table 3:

<i>Documents secrets No.</i>	<i>Despatch No.</i>	<i>Date</i>
149	234	26 Mar 1887
168	106	18 Nov 1887
171	3159	20 Dec 1887

Here the serial number 106 is clearly out of line. A careful check with the original *Russian* text from which the French edition was made reveals one of the relatively few editorial or typographical mistakes with respect to despatch numbers in the *Documents secrets*. The number as given in the original Russian is 1068, a figure which is quite consistent with the other data present.²

A fifth anomaly appears in Table 7:

<i>Documents secrets No.</i>	<i>Despatch No.</i>	<i>Origin—Destination</i>	<i>Date</i>
136	4	Rushchuk—Bucharest	6 Jan 1887
139	8	Rushchuk—Bucharest	1 Mar 1887

Examination of the *Documents secrets* shows that these were secret reports drafted by Jakobson and sent by courier rather than by enciphered telegrams. Hence the low and seemingly anomalous numbers.

Each of these "discrepancies" might be mistakenly cited by an historian untrained in communications analysis as evidence that the collection of *Documents secrets* was obviously the work of a "clumsy falsifier."

Step Three: Comparison of Pre-Content Data with Known Serial Systems

The following question is a legitimate one in all such evaluation problems as the one illustrated here: Are the serial message data present in the above *Documents secrets* tables comparable to what, if anything, is known of the serial systems actually used at the time, as indicated on records in the Russian archives? The answer is yes, and ironically the data on which it is based come to us mainly from S. Skazkin, the Soviet historian who described the collection as a "clumsy and ungrammatical forgery." In his well-known historical monograph, *Konets Austro-russko-germanskogo-Soyuza* (Moscow, 1928), Skazkin gives actual despatch numbers on Russian documents of the period in 50 out of roughly 170 footnote citations. Many of these citations are too widely scattered in terms of date and geographical point of message origin to be significant for communications analysis purposes. However, the volume of messages cited in certain exchanges is adequate to establish clear serial patterns which are consistent with those found in the *Documents secrets* collection.³

Step Four: Analysis of Technical Cross References

Thus far in evaluating the *Documents secrets*, communications analysis has been applied only to such external technical evidence as despatch or message numbers, serial systems, etc. Now, as previously observed, in any serial cable file, in addition to such data in the message headings and marginalia, successive messages frequently begin by referring to previous communications by such identification indicators as date, classification, despatch number, originator, or addressee. Such references may be called technical cross references. Although they are a part of the

messages themselves, they usually appear in the opening sentence and may be analyzed as purely *technical* evidence apart from (and independently of) the substantive content of the message.

There are fifteen random examples of such technical cross references in the 241 items appearing in the *Documents secrets* and seventeen in the 182 documents of the *Avantjury* collection. For example:

D.S. No. 42 (Rushchuk to Asiatic Department), 20 December 1882, No. 805, refers to "order No. 2802" of the Asiatic Department (*D.S.* No. 41, Asiatic Department Circular, 15 December 1882, No. 2802). The reference is consistent with the serial system of such circulars; see Table 1 above.⁴

Now, the reader may surmise that for such random cross references to indicate authenticity, much more is required than merely consecutive numerical consistency. Each despatch number cited should correspond to or be consistent with the distinct serial numbers system to which the reference communication belongs. This consistency is especially striking in the three examples of technical cross references to State Security Police and military traffic (see Notes, items 2, 3, and 12), where it would be least expected if the collection were assembled by a "forger" working on the unsophisticated assumption that only "a consecutive arrangement" is required.

Even more striking evidence of authenticity are cross references to messages which themselves are *not* included in the collection, but which are nevertheless correctly numbered in such references for the particular type of serial system to which each belongs (see Notes, items 4 and 12). Such accuracy is hardly coincidental. Moreover, all the cross references in the *Documents secrets* are consistent with what we know to be the actual serial systems employed from similar references in the *Avantjury* documents taken from the Moscow archives.

Does anyone seriously believe that these results could have been produced by a "forger" working in 1891, before the type of complex interrelationship involved had ever been studied or used in communications analysis? Such an achievement, of course, is not beyond the realm of the possible. If a prospective forger of diplomatic documents is handy with time, money, and a 564 or

705 computer, he may achieve plausible solutions to the complex problems involved. It is unlikely that Jakobson, the alleged forger of the *Documents secrets*, a minor Bulgarian official, working in 1891, disposed of such resources. Fortunately, in evaluating similar documents of doubtful origin, the historian or intelligence analyst may also dispense with the services of a computer. The elementary communications analysis techniques illustrated here may prove reasonably adequate in most cases, and entirely so in the case of the Occupation Fund documents, one of the few authentic collections of official secret documents dealing with covert operations available to the historian and the political scientist.

CONCLUSIONS:**Frauds and Forgeries in Political Warfare**

A S P O I N T E D
out in the Introduction, the various case studies of fraud and forgery in this collection are either of Russian origin, such as the Protocols of Zion, or are concerned with Russian or Soviet foreign affairs. With few exceptions all have their origin in the active role which the Russian state—either tsarist or Soviet—has played in international relations as Russia developed from one of the most backward nations of Europe to one of the two super powers of the world in the mid-1960's.

Many suspect documents originate with the secret intelligence agencies as part of their clandestine operations. They are evaluated by such agencies and are frequently exploited for political warfare or propaganda purposes. However, by polite (and useful) convention, the great powers publicly disavow the kind of clandestine or covert political operations in which fraud and forgery have played a significant role. Accordingly, as in the case of covert operations in general, political scientists have neglected analysis of forgeries for political warfare purposes. On the other hand, historians have for the most part concerned themselves with research into the origin of legends (such as the Testament of Peter the Great) or with the technical problem of accepting or

rejecting specific documents or collections (such as the Sisson or Occupation Fund documents) as historical sources.

Since most suspect documents involve covert operations, the documentary base for drawing any general conclusions about the use of fraud and forgery for political warfare purposes is necessarily thin. Historians and political scientists rarely have access to intelligence and covert operational records. However, on the basis of the case studies in this collection (which are probably typical), certain tentative general observations may be drawn.

First, the incidence of political frauds and forgeries will probably vary directly with the intensity of political (and military) conflict among the great powers. Periods of intense political and ideological conflict may be generated by the rise to prominence of an aggressive power, such as the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and more recently Communist China, which threatens the established order. Such periods are likely to be characterized by the widespread use of forgeries as instruments of political warfare by the intelligence agencies of the great powers.

Second, the disturbed conditions which generate official pressures within a government establishment to engage in aggressive covert political operations also create a ready market for the private entrepreneur who may sell his forged or fraudulent wares to sensation-mongering newspapers, to rival intelligence agencies, or to an alarmed public seeking the "inside information" provided by such personalized "intelligence" services as those of Kenneth de Courcy or the late Colonel Amoss.

Third, forgeries such as the Protocols of Zion, although repeatedly exposed, will persist as part of the recurrent "apocalyptic myth of our times." Ignorance, superstition, fear, and hatred based on ethnic or combined racist and religious prejudice are relatively permanent factors which plague even "enlightened" civilizations. In Western Europe these dark and irrational forces have for centuries nourished the myth that there has always existed behind the scenes a conspiratorial religious (or secular revolutionary) sect which seeks ultimate world domination. The form of the legend remains the same while the identification of the sect changes. Within this framework three principal groups, the Jesuit Order, the Freemasons, and the Jews, have been targets of the subliterate of hatred produced by fanatical believers in

this conspiratorial myth. The most notorious historical forgery in this area, the so-called Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion, has been exploited for political warfare purposes by Nazi Germany and has been given an anti-communist twist since the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia. Repeated exposure of this forgery has failed to prevent its continuous exploitation by hate-mongers. Belief in the conspiratorial theory of history and legends that support it is a hallmark of the fanatic, and no amount of rational demonstration can erase it. The apocalyptic myth is so deep-rooted that while its specific content may change, it is unlikely to be extirpated in our time, and forgeries such as the Protocols will continue to attract a following of true believers.

In addition to these general observations, the case studies in this collection suggest certain principles or conclusions about the relative advantages and disadvantages in the use of frauds and forgeries for political warfare or propaganda purposes.

First, like all forms of deception, the political use of frauds and forgeries is subject to the law of diminishing returns. In the long run, historical truth, like murder, "will out," and sooner or later even the most skillful political forgeries are likely to be exposed by the patient historian or researcher seeking the truth and probing the validity of his sources. This fact of life is unlikely to restrain an unprincipled aggressor such as Adolph Hitler, whose statement concerning the provocations that he used as a pretext for attacking Poland has since become a classic:

I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war; never mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be asked later on whether he told the truth or not. In starting or making a war, not right is what matters, but victory.

However, powers which seek to project an image of themselves as operating on a "strategy of truth" would do well to weigh the effect on that image of the ultimate exposure of suspect documents before using them for political warfare purposes. The so-called Zinoviev letters to both the American and British Communist parties are cases in point. The Sisson Documents also fall in this category (see Appendix I).

Second, the decision to exploit a suspect document for political warfare purposes should be made only after a thorough,

scientific evaluation of its authenticity. Several of the case studies in this collection illustrate this principle. Whether produced by private entrepreneurs or by government intelligence agencies, the model suspect document will be both "too good to be true" and "too good not to be used." In an atmosphere of ideological Cold War or political crisis, the temptation or pressure to exploit such a document immediately, without waiting for a careful evaluation, may be so intense as to be overwhelming. Such pressures were apparently operative in the handling of the British Zinoviev letter and such Cold War forgeries as "Protocol M" and the so-called *Document on Terror*.

Third, the intelligence (or security) agencies, through which suspect documents are usually acquired and forwarded to the Foreign Office and the Executive, have an evaluation responsibility which in practice has not always been adequately discharged. The national interest requires the highest standards of competence and efficiency in this area. Certainly in the case of the British Zinoviev letter, Prime Minister MacDonald was ill served by his intelligence community and by career civil servants in the Foreign Office. In the case of the Zinoviev Instructions to the Workers Party of America, Secretary of State Hughes apparently accepted without question what should have been regarded as a highly suspect document simply because it came from a presumably "reliable" Bureau of Investigation source. In this case the State Department should have demanded a thorough evaluation, although there is no evidence that Hughes had any second thoughts about accepting the "document" without a close examination.

Fourth, the evaluation function properly belongs within the intelligence community, but the decision to exploit a suspect document for political warfare purposes should rest with the Foreign Office and the Executive because of the risks involved. Frequently a covert operational agency or counter-intelligence branch of the intelligence community will acquire a suspect document and may urge its political exploitation as part of its covert operations. Executive management and control of such operations is a national security problem which has only recently attracted the attention of American political scientists, following the U-2 affair and the Bay of Pigs fiasco. As analyzed in this study, the British Zinoviev letter incident pointedly demonstrates that in a

fast-moving crisis involving covert operations (in this case a Soviet provocation), the Executive and Foreign Minister (MacDonald held both cabinet posts) was unable to command the kind of support from either his intelligence officers or civil service staff that would have permitted him to expose the letter and to continue to implement national policy. In the aftermath, the Labor government was swept out of office and the normalization of British-Soviet relations was delayed for roughly five years.

Fifth, a better understanding of the role of intelligence in foreign policy decisions and more attention to it on the part of historians may add greater depth and perspective to the treatment of specific incidents. For example, historians have overlooked the fact that in its inception the British Zinoviev letter affair was primarily an intelligence processing and evaluation problem. Analysis of how this famous suspect document was mishandled during this preliminary stage casts the entire incident in a new light. Further study of the record from the perspective of the intelligence analyst supports the theory that the letter was a Soviet Security Police (GPU) provocation designed to discredit Zinoviev and strengthen Stalin's hand during the initial stages of his rise to supreme power.

So far as methods of evaluating suspect documents are concerned, certain additional observations or guidelines may be drawn from the case studies in this collection.

First, it should be emphasized that the immediate evaluation problem of the intelligence agency which is asked to pass judgment on the authenticity of a given document (or document collection) is different and frequently more difficult than that of the historian, although many of the methods and techniques used may be identical. The intelligence analyst must work with nothing more than the material at hand, whereas after the passage of several years the historian will frequently have the benefit not only of hindsight but of accumulated data in the form of official records, memoirs, and such, including, in some cases, the judgment of other historians or even of official investigating bodies. On the other hand, the intelligence or counter-intelligence agencies presumably have adequate scientific laboratory facilities for the physical inspection and study of allegedly "original" documents, facilities also used for the police detection of fraud and forgery in ordinary

criminal cases. A battery of chemical, X-ray, microscopic, and other tests can usually determine whether paper, ink, handwriting, type faces, etc., on an allegedly "original" document are in fact what they should be. The same factors work in reverse, however, when a document has been fabricated by experts working with the technical facilities of a modern covert operational agency. In such cases individual forged documents, such as identity papers, may be indistinguishable from the genuine article.

Second, in the case studies considered, content analysis stands out as the most useful single method of evaluating suspect documents. Comparative content analysis of equivalent texts will frequently demonstrate conclusively that one was taken from the other, as was the case with successive drafts of the Testament of Peter the Great and the Protocols of Zion. Sometimes the personal style and idiosyncracies of an individual forger will serve to identify the probable source of successive forgeries, as was the case with Druzhelovsky and the Berlin forgery center. Governments can usually expose forged official communications by comparing the suspect document with authentic messages with respect to such pre-content data as letterheads, forms of address and signature, cable serial numbering systems, etc. This task is relatively simple for the intelligence analyst who has full access to official communications, but may be much more difficult for the historian unless he is granted such access. In the evaluation of extensive collections of diplomatic documents, such as those obtained through espionage or brought over by political defectors, communications analysis of pre-content data may provide conclusive evidence of authenticity. Indeed, the complexity of such data virtually precludes the successful forging of extensive collections of diplomatic documents by anything less than a team of technical experts. Communications analysis is a new research tool which can provide both the intelligence analyst and the historian with valuable information, in some cases even about collections to which official access may be barred.

Finally, the case studies presented here indicate that the least reliable method of evaluation is the traditional appeal to "authority" and investigation into the doubtful circumstances surrounding the origin of suspect documents. This is especially true of documents used for political warfare or propaganda purposes.

Investigation of the background or pedigree of a suspect document is, of course, a useful first step, and may produce convincing circumstantial evidence that it is genuine or fraudulent. But most politically embarrassing or incriminating documents are obtained through espionage and counter-intelligence agents or defectors under circumstances which are almost by definition highly dubious. Moreover, in the case of provocations, the intelligence source may be a "usually reliable" agent or double-agent whose reputation has been carefully built for precisely the purpose of deceiving the recipient. Intelligence paper mills are adept at this sort of thing, so that in evaluating a suspect document there is no substitute for a thorough content analysis of the document itself, regardless of the circumstances of origin. Statements from "people in a position to know," i.e., "official sources," should be treated with the greatest reserve. Embarrassing political documents—even such a relatively innocuous collection as the Yalta papers—are almost certain to be denounced as "clumsy forgeries" by the government directly concerned. The Soviet record in this regard is especially noteworthy. Time and again Soviet spokesmen have blandly denied the existence of articles published in *Pravda* or *Izvestia*, thus demonstrating the axiom that in political warfare, as in wartime, the first casualty is truth.

APPENDIX 1:
The Sisson Documents
by George F. Kennan

In the winter of 1917–18 the Committee on Public Information, which was the official American propaganda agency of World War I, stationed in Petrograd a special representative, Edgar Sisson, formerly an editor of *Cosmopolitan Magazine*. In February and March 1918, Sisson purchased and removed from Russia a number of documents and photographs of documents purporting to prove that the leaders of the Bolshevik government were paid agents of the German General Staff. Translations of sixty-nine documents of this nature, accompanied in some instances by facsimiles of the originals, were published in the fall of that year by the Committee on Public Information in a pamphlet which formed a part of its official "War Information Series."¹ The following is an effort to appraise, in the light of evidence available today, the authenticity and significance of these documents.

I. The Nature and Background of the Documents

Sisson arrived in Petrograd at the end of November 1917 and remained there throughout the winter. At the beginning of February there came into his hands a set of documents which were just then being surreptitiously circulated in Petrograd. They consisted of what appeared to be some official circulars of the German government from the early period of the war and some private communications exchanged between individuals in Scandinavia in the summer of 1917. The general tendency of these documents was to suggest that the Bolsheviki were serving as paid German agents, although in certain instances the relevance even to this thesis was obscure.

Some of these documents, or their content, had been first brought to notice at the time of the Petrograd disorders in July 1917. A portion of the material had been leaked to the Petrograd press at that

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time by Minister for Justice Pereverzev, as a means of discrediting the Bolsheviki. The documents had then been published in full, in December 1917 and January 1918, by newspapers in the anti-Bolshevik Don Cossack territory. It was shortly after this that copies of them began to circulate in Petrograd. Such copies came to Sisson's attention from several sources; he was able to obtain sets both in Russian and in English translation. He was much interested in their implications. Care should be taken not to confuse this older material, included only in Appendix I to the official American pamphlet, with the main documents to be discussed below.

Shortly after Sisson learned of this first body of material, the American ambassador, David R. Francis, told Sisson (February 5) of a visit he had received from a Petrograd journalist, Eugene Semenov, who had provided him with a photograph of what purported to be an official and confidential document in the Soviet files: a letter from a member of the Soviet delegation at Brest-Litovsk (Joffe) to the soviet of people's commissars in Petrograd. In the ensuing days Semenov brought to the ambassador photographs of two or three other documents, similarly supposed to be in the Soviet files. Sisson then got in touch with Semenov, himself, and succeeded in purchasing from him, during the remainder of February, photographs of a number of other such documents. Whereas the initial series (the ones published in the newspapers in the Cossack territory) had contained material relating only to the period prior to the Bolshevik seizure of power, the documents now being supplied by Semenov related to the period subsequent to November 1917 and showed the Bolshevik leaders as taking orders, most abjectly and at that very time, from secret offices of the German General Staff situated in Russia.

Sisson pressed to obtain the originals of these documents. He was told that for this purpose a raid would have to be carried out on the official files at the time the Soviet government began to move to Moscow in early March. On March 3, he was given to understand that the raid had been successfully conducted. He met later that day with Semenov and a number of the latter's associates and was supplied, in return for generous cash payment, with what purported to be the originals of fourteen of the documents he had seen.² For the rest, he had to be content with photographs.

Sisson, convinced that the material was of enormous importance, left at once for the United States, with a view to placing it in the hands of the American government. He brought with him both sets of documents: the earlier ones, already published in Russia, and the ones he had obtained from Semenov. After a long and arduous journey, he reached Washington in early May. To his amazement and anger, the

department of state (to which he was first required to address himself) failed to show much enthusiasm or interest in his documents and declined to authorize their publication at that juncture. For a time the matter was stymied; but in September 1918 the Committee on Public Information, by-passing the department of state, succeeded in obtaining the president's personal authority for publication of the material. Release of the documents to the American press began on September 15, over the protest of the state department, which was apprehensive for the effect on American personnel still in Russia.

Most of the American press, relying on the government's implicit endorsement, accepted the material as genuine.³ Sharp questions were raised, however, in some quarters, particularly in the *New York Evening Post*. The Committee on Public Information had intended, in any event, to follow up release of the documents to the press by publishing the entire collection in pamphlet form. In view of the questions raised as to authenticity, it was now decided to obtain expert opinion to reinforce their credibility. The National Board for Historical Service agreed, on request, to give such assistance. The board appointed J. Franklin Jameson, founder and long-time editor of the *American Historical Review* and director of the department of historical research of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, and Samuel N. Harper, professor of Russian language and institutions at the University of Chicago, to inquire into the authenticity of the documents.

In the brief space of one week, Harper and Jameson studied the sixty-nine documents the committee proposed to publish and drew up and presented a 2,300-word report of their findings. Of the fifty-four documents which constituted the main body of the collection⁴ and related to the period after the November Revolution (i.e., those produced for the first time by Semenov in Petrograd), they said: ". . . we have no hesitation in declaring that we see no reason to doubt the genuineness or authenticity of these fifty-three documents." In the older documents, relating to the period preceding the November Revolution, they saw "nothing that positively excludes the notion of their being genuine, little in any of them that makes it doubtful . . ." but felt they had insufficient means of judgment and could make no confident declaration. In the case of two of the alleged German circulars for which—alone—German originals were available, Harper and Jameson said that while they did not consider these to be "simply forgeries" they did not consider them ". . . in their present shape, documents on whose entire texts historians or publicists can safely rely as genuine."

Jameson appears never to have doubted the correctness of this judgment. ". . . I firmly believe the main series of fifty-three Russian

documents to be genuine," he wrote to a friend in 1919, "and nobody ought from the phrases Harper and I used to draw the inference that we do not so believe." Jameson, it should be noted, knew no Russian, could not read the documents, and described his role in the investigation as that of "vulgar innocence."⁵ The burden of investigation had thus fallen on Harper alone.

In his posthumously published memoirs,⁶ Harper commented as follows on the background of this advisory opinion:

We flatly refused to comment on Sisson's conclusions as to what the documents proved, namely, that Lenin not only had had contacts with the German general staff when he journeyed across Germany but had been and still was a German agent. Jameson and I were ready to state that in the given circumstances, by starting a social revolution in Russia, Lenin was objectively aiding the enemy from a military point of view. We were told that such a statement would not help to promote that emotional upsurge necessary for the mobilization of all our resources to be thrown into the struggle. We stood our ground, however, as our statement on the pamphlet will show. But the general view current at this time was that we had declared all the documents genuine beyond any question. In addition, Sisson's conclusions as to what the documents showed were also laid upon our shoulders. This last phase gave me much concern at the time. With his country at war, the academic man, when called upon by his government to use his academic talents for a war purpose, often faces a problem of duty in two directions and finds difficulty in properly protecting himself.

The original draft of Harper's memoirs contains a further passage, not included in the published edition, which makes even clearer his unhappiness over this incident:

My experience with the Sisson documents showed clearly the pressure to which University men are subjected in time of war. My position was particularly difficult because my area of study was under the control of a new group which was talking peace, and I felt it was my academic duty to explain why the Bolsheviks were working against a continuation of the war, not only on the part of Russia but in general. Thanks to the support of Professor Jameson I was able to hold out to a certain degree against a complete abandonment of the rules of the student but it was impossible for a University man not to make a contribution to the development of the war spirit, even if this involved the making of statements of a distinctly biased character.⁷

The governmental pamphlet containing the documents, together with the report of Jameson and Harper, appeared at approximately the end of October 1918. Its effect on public opinion seems to have been largely lost in the excitement over the simultaneous ending of World War I.

Since doubt continued to be thrown on the authenticity of the documents from a number of sources, the department of state, at the urging of Sisson (who was sure further investigation would support his belief in their genuineness), proceeded in 1920 and 1921 to make further inquiry into the background and substantiality of the documents. A good deal of contributory evidence was assembled from various sources. But efforts to obtain the originals of the documents from President Wilson, to whom they had been delivered after the pamphlet was published, were sharply rebuffed by the president. He sent back word that at the moment he did not have time to lay hands on the documents but would "make the proper disposition of them" when he did.⁸ When Wilson left the White House in March 1921 the incoming White House secretary was unable to find any trace of this material. In view of the unavailability of the originals, the official investigation was dropped and never resumed.

In December 1952, as President Truman was preparing to leave the White House, the originals of the documents were found in a White House safe. Those who found them naturally had no idea what they were. They were sent to the National Archives, and are now in the justice and executive section of the legislative, judicial, and diplomatic records branch. The file of materials about the Sisson documents, accumulated in the course of the state department's abortive 1920-21 investigation, gathered dust in various department offices for thirty-four years. It was finally delivered in January 1955 to the National Archives, where it is now in the foreign affairs section of the same branch.

Other documents, plainly emanating from the same sources as those supplied by Semenov, were procured by British intelligence officers in Petrograd; and a further number were delivered, after Sisson's departure, to other American representatives in Russia. Of the former, at least two and possibly more were identical with ones that appeared in the published pamphlet. Of the additional American holdings, only one was published in the Sisson series; the remainder (some thirty-seven documents) were kept with the investigatory material.

Of the fifty-four documents published in the main body of *The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy* pamphlet, the most numerous group is made up of eighteen communications purporting to emanate from a subordinate office of the German Great General Staff (*Grosser Gen-*

eralstab), entitled "Nachrichten-Bureau." While the stationery of the Nachrichten-Bureau does not indicate the seat of its activity, the inference from the content of the documents is that it was situated in Petrograd. Sisson himself seems to have drawn, and never to have questioned, this inference.

The next most numerous category was composed of fifteen documents purporting to emanate from the chiefs of the counterespionage bureau at the old Russian army field headquarters (*Stavka*), which continued a sort of rudimentary existence for some time after the revolution.

A third series, of eight documents, bears the letterhead of a "central division" (*Central Abtheilung*) of the German *Grosser Generalstab*; and these are signed by one who gives his title as "chief of the Russian division." Again, the seat of this entity is not indicated; one is permitted to infer that it was in Russia and almost certainly in Petrograd.

Of the remaining documents, several purport to emanate from other German offices, and four bear the letterhead of the "commissar for combatting the counterrevolution and pogroms."

All these documents, including those from the official German military offices, are in the Russian language. The dates run from October 27, 1917 to March 9, 1918.

Appendix I consists of translations of eight German governmental circulars from the years 1914 to 1916, and six letters supposed to have passed between individuals in Scandinavia, Switzerland, and Germany in the summer of 1917. Appendix II consists only of one intercept of a telegraphic conversation between Chicherin, at Petrograd, and Trotsky, at Brest-Litovsk.

II. Evidence as to Authenticity

A. GENERAL HISTORICAL IMPLAUSIBILITY. The state of affairs suggested in the main body of the documents is of such extreme historical implausibility that the question might well be asked whether the documents could not be declared generally fraudulent on this ground alone.

Whoever credits the authenticity of these documents must be prepared to accept the following propositions:

1. That at all times between the November Revolution and the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Soviet leaders actually stood in a position of clandestine subservience to the German General Staff—a relationship which they succeeded in concealing not only at the time but for decades to come from even the most intimate of their party comrades;

2. That this subservience went so far that the German General

Staff actually controlled the elections to the central executive committee in January 1918 and dictated the election of a large group of people, including most of the Communist leaders;

3. That the German General Staff secretly maintained, during this period, two full-fledged offices in Petrograd (one of them being its own "Russian division") which succeeded in establishing and observing such fantastic security of operation that no hint of their existence ever leaked out from any other source; and

4. That the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, together with the negotiations conducted simultaneously in Petrograd by Count Mirbach and Admiral Keyserling, were an elaborate sham, designed to deceive public opinion everywhere, the Soviet negotiators being actually under clandestine German control the entire time through other channels.

It hardly needs to be said that such a state of affairs cannot conceivably be reconciled with known historical truth. Surely no one familiar with the life of Lenin, the history of the Bolshevik movement, and the internal debates among the Russian Communist leaders over the problems presented by the Brest-Litovsk negotiations could question the reality from the Soviet standpoint of the issues at stake in the Brest-Litovsk talks or the sincerity of the discussion of them in senior Communist circles. It is not conceivable that in these moments of deepest crisis Lenin should have concealed from his associates political circumstances of highest relevance to the great questions at hand. Lenin, whatever one may think of him, was not a conspirator against the Russian Communist movement.

Similarly, from the German side, the captured German foreign office files dealing with the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, which appear to include practically all relevant material, contain nothing to indicate that any of the Germans concerned with these negotiations—including Foreign Minister Kühlmann, the German military leaders, and the kaiser himself—was aware of any such relationship to the Bolshevik leaders as that suggested by these documents.⁹ On the contrary, the captured German material contains a great deal of solid evidence that no such relationship existed at all.¹⁰

In general, neither the Sisson documents nor Sisson's own explanations afford any plausible reconciliation of the situation of complete Bolshevik subjection to Germany, as suggested by the documents, with the known facts of the tremendous political tension between the two governments that marked and accompanied the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. It is wholly absurd to suppose that the Germans, at that time absorbed in preparations for their great final offensive in the west and having most urgent need for the establishment of a clear and dependable military situation in the east, would have failed to exploit to the

utmost any such clandestine channel of authority over the Bolshevik leaders as that indicated by these documents. Yet nowhere do the documents suggest that the Germans used this extensive implied authority in Petrograd to break the recalcitrance of the Soviet negotiators at Brest.

It should also be noted here that had there existed, as between the Germans and the Bolsheviks, any such relationship as that suggested here, this situation could not have failed to become a subject of attention in the subsequent German parliamentary investigation into the causes of the German breakdown in 1918.¹¹ In this investigation the policies of the German high command with relation to the Brest-Litovsk talks were subjected to an intense and critical scrutiny, to which any clandestine channels of authority over the Bolsheviks would have been highly pertinent. Yet no mention of the Sisson documents or the situation they suggest seems ever to have been made in all this prolonged and intensive inquiry, the authors of which had access to all of the relevant secret German files.

The very suggestion that there should have been actual offices of the German General Staff in Petrograd in the winter of 1917-18 is in highest degree implausible and at variance with known historical circumstance. It is absurd to suppose that the Germans should have decided to station highly sensitive military offices, in wartime, in what was still officially enemy territory, well outside the German lines and removed from any possible prompt protection by the German army. There were, of course, two real German official missions in Petrograd at that time, headed by Count Mirbach and Admiral Keyserling. What is known of the position and treatment of these missions does not check in any way with the situation suggested by the Sisson documents. The memoirs of Zalkind, at that time Trotsky's deputy in the Soviet foreign office, reveal clearly the drastic and humiliating restrictions placed on this official German personnel by the Bolsheviks, despite Mirbach's earnest protests.¹² This situation is confirmed by the captured German documents. Clearly, such difficulties could and would have been promptly remedied had there been, in the same city, German General Staff offices with huge power over the Bolshevik authorities as the Sisson documents imply. It is further significant that when the crisis was reached in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, the German official missions in Petrograd were promptly removed, in the interests of their own safety; and the resumption of the German offensive was even delayed pending their safe arrival on German-held territory. Yet the Sisson documents show the supposed German General Staff offices as remaining peacefully in Petrograd and exercising undiminished authority over the Soviet leaders, through the entire period of resumed hostilities pending final conclusion of the treaty.

B. SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF HISTORICAL IMPLAUSIBILITY. Both individually and collectively, the documents abound in specific suggestions that are irreconcilable with historical fact. It would be redundant to attempt to list any great number of these. The following is a good example.

The Nachrichten-Bureau series are signed by a certain Colonel R. Bauer. When, at a much later date, Allied officials complained to Semenov that it had never been possible to discover in the German army lists any officer who could have played this role, Semenov explained that the signature "R. Bauer" was only a cover for one Bayermeister, whose name appears elsewhere in the Sisson documents. Semenov was undoubtedly referring, here, to Lieutenant A. Bauermeister, who was indeed a real person—a senior Russian-speaking German intelligence officer who served on the eastern front in World War I. Bauermeister's name had appeared in the Russian press in 1915 in connection with the charges advanced against the Russian officer Myasoyedov, executed in 1915 as a German spy; and it was no doubt from this episode that Semenov was familiar with it.

But the real Bauermeister's memoirs have subsequently been published;¹³ and while they are lurid and unconvincing in many details, there is no reason to doubt the main facts of Bauermeister's wartime service as related therein. These facts leave no room for any such whereabouts and activities as the Sisson documents would suggest.

At the time his memoirs were written (1933-34), Bauermeister seems to have heard of only one of the documents of this series: apparently, from his description, one not printed in the American pamphlet nor present in the American files, but plainly of this same origin. In this document it was evidently suggested that Bauermeister had conferred with the Bolshevik leaders in Kronstadt in midsummer of 1917. (The allegation that such conferences took place, with Lenin's participation, is found in Document No. 5 of the official American pamphlet; it was unquestionably false, and is another striking instance of historical implausibility.) Bauermeister, who was at that time serving as intelligence officer to the Austrian Third Army in the Carpathians, ridicules the allegation of his participation in such a conference. It is particularly significant that this is clearly all he had heard, as late as 1933-34, of the Sisson documents. A real "R. Bauer" would hardly have remained for sixteen years ignorant of the publication by the United States government of eighteen of his most important secret communications to another government.

The Sisson documents were plainly drawn up by someone who had something more than a good Petrograd-newspaper-reader's knowledge of historical fact; and an impressive effort was made to weave this fact in with the abundant fiction. The result remains nevertheless

unconvincing. At every hand one finds serious discrepancies between circumstances suggested by the documents and known historical fact.¹⁴

C. LACK OF ACCORD WITH NORMAL GOVERNMENTAL USAGE. At almost every turn, the content of these documents reveals features which do not accord in any way with the normal practices of governments. Organizations that deal with matters requiring privacy and secrecy of treatment tend not to put down on paper, and still less to preserve, data of a self-incriminating nature. It is unusual for governments to record unnecessarily in written documents, and particularly in communications to other governments, data that could be used against them, especially in wartime. Yet in the Sisson documents there are repeated instances of gratuitous and apparently wholly unnecessary inclusion of data of this nature.

The very first document, for example, purports to be a written communication from two subordinate foreign office officials to the chairman of the soviet of people's commissars, confirming that they have removed from the archives of the old tsarist ministry of justice certain items, including ". . . the order of the German Imperial Bank, No. 7433, of the second of March, 1917, for allowing money to Comrades Lenin, Zinovieff, Kameneff, Trotsky, Sumenson, Koslovsky and others. . . ." There was plainly no need here to cite the incriminating content of the documents removed; the chairman of the soviet of people's commissars would have been fully aware of it. If, as the documents suggest, he was concerned to suppress the evidence, the last thing he would have wanted would have been to have it spread out in another official document.

In a number of documents we find the German officers recording in formal communications to the Soviet government the names of German espionage agents in various parts of Russia. Anyone with the most elementary knowledge of the principles of intelligence work knows that no experienced intelligence organization, particularly in wartime, would list the names of its agents even in its internal correspondence, much less in official communications to a foreign government. To do so would be to consign those names to processes over which the respective intelligence organization could have no control. The administrative procedures of the Bolshevik authority in the early period were necessarily hastily improvised and notoriously chaotic, and the Germans were under no illusions about the personal reliability of the Bolshevik leaders in their dealings with capitalist governments. No German military intelligence officer could, in these circumstances, have committed highly classified confidential information of this nature to the Bolshevik leaders in wartime, in the manner indicated by these documents, without rendering himself subject to disciplinary action.

A further body of material is simply of such a nature that for reasons of sheer political prudence it would scarcely have been committed to intergovernmental correspondence. Document No. 7 purports to inform the commissar for foreign affairs of the names of those persons on whose re-election to the central executive committee the German General Staff "insisted." Is it conceivable that the Germans should have put such a demand in a formal communication? Or that the Soviet leaders should have accepted such a communication and put it in their files where it could be seen by others of their associates and thus become a matter of common gossip in the party?

D. TECHNICAL ASPECTS. In addition to the point of historical implausibility, the authenticity of the documents is open to question in a large number of technical aspects.

Many of these technical imperfections were described in an official German government pamphlet published in Berlin in 1919 with a foreword by the German premier, Phillip Scheidemann.¹⁵ In this pamphlet the German government formally declared the Sisson documents to be wholly fraudulent. General Groener, signing on behalf of the German army command, officially denied the existence of a number of the German officers mentioned in the Sisson documents.

The reliability of this pamphlet was rejected a priori by Sisson, as coming from a prejudiced source. But one must remember that the statements it contained bore the full authority of the German government, and it is not probable that they would have involved direct misstatements about the German official establishment. Such statements could easily have been spotted and picked up for criticism by thousands of people in Germany.

1. *Letterhead*.—It was pointed out in the German pamphlet that the letterhead of the alleged divisions of the German General Staff, as shown in the Sisson documents, was obviously false. The *Grosser Generalstab*, the name of which appeared there, had actually been abolished on August 2, 1914, and was not re-established until after the war. The General Staff organization never included a "Nachrichten-Bureau." It had had, up to the summer of 1917, a "Nachrichten-abteilung" (changed in 1917 to "Abteilung Fremder Heere"), from which the name was perhaps taken. It had no Russian division as such. These and other statements in the German pamphlet concerning the German military establishment were confirmed to the state department by the director of the military intelligence division of the war department, Colonel Mathew C. Smith, in a letter of January 17, 1921.¹⁶

In addition to these defects, it should be noted that the spelling on the letterhead (as also on the German circulars included in Appendix I to the Sisson documents) was in several respects archaic or

unusual, and would scarcely have appeared on authentic German documents in 1918 (i.e., "Bureau" instead of "Büro"; "Abtheilung" instead of "Abteilung"; "Central" instead of "Zentral").

2. *Language.*—The letters from the German officers are all written in excellent Russian. This in itself would be most unusual, particularly in Russia. Even the Russian government did not always use its own language for diplomatic communication. It would have been particularly unnecessary in the case at hand, since most of the Bolshevik leaders had a fully adequate knowledge of German. Beyond that, this would imply that, attached to their General Staff offices in Russia, the Germans had staffs of interpreters and typists for whom Russian was the first language. Such people could probably have been found in Germany; but they would have been unlikely to be ones who could be given highest security clearance; their enlistment and employment in Petrograd would not have been easy to reconcile with the extreme security precautions necessary to keep such operations secret. A curious touch in the documents is the fact that certain of the senior German officials involved, including the head of the Russian section of the General Staff, signed their names in Cyrillic characters. This would have been both unusual and unnecessary.

3. *Dating system.*—In the winter of 1917–18 the Soviet government was in a state of transition from the old Julian calendar to the western Gregorian calendar, thirteen days in advance. The change was made formally on February 1/14, 1918. Both immediately before and after, the double date was widely used as a means of avoiding confusion.

Not one of the Sisson documents, curiously enough, bears a double date or indeed anything to indicate whether the dates were in the old calendar or the new. Those relating to the last months of 1917 and January 1918 were obviously dated by the old calendar.¹⁷ This included those from the German offices. Documents from the latter part of February, on the other hand, also emanating from the German offices, were equally clearly dated by the new calendar. At some time, therefore, these German offices presumably switched from the old to the new calendar. And since they were supposed to be in correspondence with the highest offices of the Soviet government, this would presumably have been at the time the change was officially effected, i.e., February 1/14.

Now it is strange enough that a German official office should have used the Old Style date alone, in any circumstance; for this would have been at odds with all other German official usage and would have complicated the integration of the correspondence into the German governmental files. If the Germans had used the old calendar at all,

they would surely have used the double date. It is even stranger that they should have failed, at the very time of transition, to employ some device to mark the change and to indicate which system of dates they were using at any given time. But beyond this there is the most curious fact that the dating of the letters from the German offices carries right on through the dates from February 1 to 14, six documents being dated in this period. For anyone making the change from the old dating system to the new, at the time fixed by the government decree, it was impossible to have any dates in this period, since one skipped directly from January 31 to February 14 in order to catch up with the Gregorian calendar. Conceivably the Germans might have made the switch at some other time, for there *are* gaps of over thirteen days in the sequence of their dates at other periods; but had they done this, it would have been by arbitrary decision on their own part, in conflict with the official Russian usage; and it is incredible in such an event that they would not at least have employed the double date to avoid confusion.

In summary, the dating on the German documents up to the middle of February is most implausible, and could—if genuine—only have been extremely confusing to anyone receiving the communications.

4. *Form.*—The letters from the German offices are all signed both by a senior official and by a second official described as “adjutant.” This system of signature, common in Russian usage, was never employed in the German army.

5. *Seal.*—The documents purporting to emanate from the “Russian division of the German General Staff” bear no seal at all, nor do a portion of the documents from Russian offices.

The seal affixed to the letters from the “Nachrichten-Bureau” is an extremely primitive one and bears no resemblance to the official seal actually in use in the German army. It consists only of crude lettering, includes no emblem, and appears to have been made by fitting type letters into the end of a metal tube. It could only have been homemade, or made by some local Petrograd firm. That a highly sensitive German military office, concerned to keep its presence in the Russian capital a profound secret, would have ordered a seal from a local shop is scarcely conceivable.

6. *Handwriting.*—The documents purporting to emanate from the German offices bear two kinds of handwriting: the signatures of the German authors and the marginal notes of the Soviet recipients. This handwriting can be tested for the following points: (a) fluency and consistency of execution in the signatures; (b) similarity of handwriting as between signatures and the marginal notes, and as between signatures supposed to be those of different people; (c) in the case of

known historical personages, relationship of their genuine signatures to those on the documents; and (d) relationship of handwriting on the documents to that of persons known to have been involved in their origin. The last of these points will be examined in a later context. Of the first three, the following may be said.

Documents from this source were examined by a handwriting expert of the British intelligence service in 1918 and, somewhat later, by two American experts: Captain Harry Given, of the United States Army, and James B. Green, of Washington, D.C.

On the first of the above points, the British expert came to the conclusion that “. . . a careful examination of all the signatures, . . . showed very great variation. . . . Distinct traces of indecision are to be met with in some of the signatures and these point also to their being forgeries.” The British report referred particularly, in this connection, to the series of signatures by “R. Bauer,” which, it was said, “. . . show far greater discrepancies than would, in our opinion, be found in the same number of genuine signatures of the same person.”¹⁸

The American experts came to a diametrically opposite conclusion, namely, that each set of signatures appeared to stem from the same hand, and the signatures were executed with sufficient fluency and consistency to suggest genuineness. This judgment related, however, to a different set of documents, obtained at a later date. The American experts never saw the originals of the documents published in *The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy* pamphlet, where the signatures show far greater signs of uncertainty and labored execution.¹⁹ Nor do they appear to have given any attention to the published facsimiles of those documents. They also seem not to have inquired into the similarities between the signatures and the marginal notes—an omission difficult to explain in the case of trained graphologists, examining documents for evidence of fraudulence.

In the case of the signatures of real historical personages, none of the official handwriting experts had the necessary material for comparison, nor did the American ones address themselves to this question at all. Today, a considerable basis for comparison is available. The Gumberg papers, in the State Historical Society of Wisconsin at Madison, contain one authentic Dzerzhinski signature and six of Trotsky. Facsimiles of two genuine Joffe signatures, affixed to the Soviet-Latvian treaty instruments of 1920, are available in the National Archives.²⁰ None of these signatures bears any particular resemblance to the signatures and initials that appear on the Sisson documents.²¹ The differences are, in fact, so great as to preclude, in the

opinion of this writer, any possibility of a common authorship. A further and particularly flagrant discrepancy exists between the handwriting and initials of the secretary of the soviet of people's commissars, Gorbunov, as they appear on the Sisson documents, and Gorbunov's genuine signature on the original text of the decree creating the Red Army, as reproduced in the second volume (opposite p. 26) of William Henry Chamberlin's *The Russian Revolution*.²²

With regard to the relationship between the signatures and the marginal notes, and between various signatures, the British handwriting expert came to the conclusion that there were marked and abnormal similarities here. In particular, he noted that the flourishes at the end of certain of the signatures were virtually identical with those on some of the marginal notations, supposedly executed by the recipients of the documents. Actually, these resemblances are so striking as to be apparent to the most unpracticed eye. Examination of only those few documents of which facsimiles were printed in the government pamphlet will suffice to suggest that there were at the most three or four hands involved in the production of the numerous signatures and marginal notes to be found on these documents, and possibly only one.

Particularly damaging evidence in this direction is to be found in a document procured after Sisson's departure from Russia and not published in the government pamphlet but unquestionably emanating from the same source as the published ones. This communication, dated April 3, 1918, is another of the "Nachrichten-Bureau" series, and is among those held in the National Archives. Attached to it are two certificates, supposed to have been prepared in the office of the commissar for internal affairs of the "St. Petersburg Labor Commune"—by persons who, presumably, had nothing to do with the origin of any of the other Sisson documents. Yet handwriting and signatures of these certificates, including the writing of the actual text of one of them, bear an unmistakable similarity to signatures and marginal notes of the published series.

7. *Typing*.—A close examination of the typing in the main body of the documents published in the official pamphlet (all were typed) reveals quite plainly that five different machines were used in the preparation of these documents.²³

In the preparation of the eighteen documents of the "Nachrichten-Bureau" series, machines 1, 2, 3, and 4 were used, Number 1 being used most frequently. Documents from the "Russian division of the Great General Staff" were typed on machines 1 and 2. Two documents from the "General staff of the high seas fleet" were typed on Number 1. All these documents, therefore, obviously emanated from a

single center. On the other hand, three documents from a mysterious official in the "Reichsbank" were all typed on machine Number 5; and they were the only ones of the entire series typed on this machine.

For all the documents from the Russian offices, including such varied establishments as the Soviet foreign office, the office of the "commissar for the struggle against counterrevolution and pogroms," and "counterintelligence at headquarters" (presumably several hundred miles from Petrograd), only machines 1 and 2 were used. Thus the documents from alleged Russian sources were actually prepared in the same place as those purporting to come from the German offices—a clear indication of fraudulence.²⁴

This conclusion checks with that arrived at by the British postal censor, working on a set of documents known to include at least two of the published American series. He found that ". . . the same type-writing machine, with the same faults, must have been used to type original documents coming from different offices or sections of the same city."²⁵ The American experts, to be sure, reached precisely the opposite conclusion from the separate series of documents available to them. Yet the evidences of a single machine being used for documents of different offices even in this latter series are, again, unescapable to the unpracticed eye; and it is difficult to understand how the American experts could have arrived at such a judgment.

Why the typing on the original documents and photostats was not tested at an earlier date is one of the mysteries of their history. It is true that the originals were turned over to President Wilson soon after Harper and Jameson had completed their work on them, and they remained unavailable until the beginning of 1953. The American handwriting experts, as noted above, never saw them. The department of state appears never, at any time, to have had access to them. But they were in Sisson's personal possession throughout the summer of 1918 and were available for study until turned over to the president in November of that year.

III. The Real Origin of the Documents

In his published memoirs,²⁶ Sisson has described in some detail the circumstances of his purchase of the documents. It is clear from his account that in this operation he dealt primarily with Semenov.

Evgeni Petrovich Semenov (sometimes written as Kogan-Semenov) was a Petrograd journalist, known to the western embassies as a correspondent and, after the February Revolution, editorial associate of the evening newspaper *Vechernee Vremya*. This was one of the papers

owned and published by the well-known publisher Aleksei Sergeyich Suvorin, the main one being the morning *Novoye Vremya*. Both papers were conservative, anti-German, and anti-Semitic (a circumstance which did not prevent their using the talents of Jewish journalists whenever convenient).

Being himself both anti-German and anti-Bolshevik, Semenov became useful to the provisional government leaders when the latter, in the wake of the July disorders of 1917, made efforts to discredit the Bolsheviki as German agents by releasing material from the intelligence files suggesting that the Bolsheviki had been receiving money from the Germans. Semenov appears to have been involved in the gathering of some of this material. Soon after the November Revolution, the *Vechnyaya Vremya* having been closed down, he went to the Don Cossack country to join Kornilov. It was presumably he who brought to that region the documents that subsequently formed Appendix I to the Sisson collection and who arranged for their publication there.

Semenov returned to Petrograd in January 1918, having been commissioned on the strength of his good relations with the Allied embassies to negotiate an Allied loan for the anti-Bolshevik forces in the Don Cossack territory.²⁷ It was soon after his return to Petrograd that copies of the older documents began to come to the attention of the Allied embassies there. Plainly, if the Allied representatives could be persuaded that the Bolsheviki were German agents the chances of Allied financial support for the anti-Bolshevik forces would be enhanced.

But the effectiveness of these older documents was limited. If credited, they proved only that prior to their seizure of power in November, 1917, the Bolsheviki, still a struggling opposition group, had received funds from German sources. It was not even demonstrated that the German government itself was involved; the money might, for all these documents revealed, have come from friendly German Socialist circles. If Allied enthusiasm was to be fully aroused, it was necessary to show that the Bolsheviki not only had been, but were still, receiving official German support and that this activity was a direct projection of the German war effort. It was in the face of these circumstances that Semenov, very soon after his return—and at just the time, in fact, when sets of the older documents were being left at the Allied embassies by anonymous donors—appeared in the office of the American ambassador (as also, apparently, on the doorsteps of the British intelligence chiefs in Petrograd) with the first of the new series of documents, purporting to reflect the German-Bolshe-

vik tie as a relationship of that very moment, proceeding directly from the German General Staff.

Semenov, who escaped from Russia in the following winter and joined the emigration to western Europe, never attempted subsequently to deny his part in the procurement of the Sisson documents; but he did claim to have been only an intermediary between those supposed to have filched them from or photographed them in the Bolshevik files and the Allied embassies to which they were delivered. From Semenov's statements at the time, Sisson gathered that there were two groups of "anti-Bolshevik workers" involved in the original procurement of the documents, that these groups were "in large degree independent" of each other, though Semenov was a member of both and the "head" of one, and that the other, of which Semenov was not the head, consisted of men connected with the military and naval services, all anti-Bolshevik but continuing to serve in their old positions in order to obtain inside information. These men were engaged, Sisson relates, primarily in the delicate operation of tapping the direct telegraph circuit between the Russian delegation at Brest-Litovsk and the Soviet headquarters in the Smolny Institute.²⁸ These were usually referred to as the "wire group."

To Sisson, Semenov gave little further information about the personalities involved in the procurement of these documents, other than to name a certain "Colonel Samsonov" as head of the wire group. He does not seem to have identified to Sisson any of the members of his own group. But sometime later, after his arrival in London, Semenov had several interviews with Sir Basil Thomson, head of Scotland Yard; and to Thomson he confided that he had actually received the documents from a friend and editorial colleague on the *Vechny Vremya*, Anton Martynovich Ossendowski. In view of this confession, it becomes necessary to look more closely at Ossendowski's person and background.

Ossendowski's name is familiar to the English reading public mainly as that of the author of a number of autobiographical works, of which the best known is probably *Beasts, Men and Gods*.²⁹ These accounts are vague and confused, both as to chronology and circumstance, and they are in many respects implausible. They are thus highly unsatisfactory as historical or even autobiographical evidence.³⁰

This being the case, and since little other biographical source material is available, it is not easy to piece together anything like a dependable account of Ossendowski's life and activity. There seems no reason to doubt that he was born in Poland on May 27, 1876 and taken at a young age to Russia proper, where he was educated. But

after that the uncertainties begin. In the last years of the century, according to his own account, he was a student at the University of St. Petersburg but failed to take his degree at that time owing to the effects of the student disorders of 1899. For the period 1899–1903, as for most other periods in his adult life, he claims a bewildering plethora of occupations, positions, and adventures. He may, at this time, have been an assistant to Professor Stanislav Zaleski at the St. Petersburg University or he may have been in western Europe obtaining his doctoral title (as well as that of an “Officier d’Académie”) in Paris and traveling extensively in France and Spain; or he may, conceivably though not plausibly, have been doing all these things. In 1903, in any case, he went to Vladivostok, where he claims to have had some connection (he says as “scientific secretary”) with the oriental department of the Russian Geographical Society. He was still there when the Russo-Japanese War broke out. At some time during the war he moved to Harbin and became an employee of the Chinese Eastern Railway. One of the few relatively well-established facts in his career is that he was elected, on November 25, 1905, chairman of the strike committee of what might be called the white-collar workers of that railway.³¹ This position brought him into sharp conflict with the more radical leaders of the socialist manual labor organizations. But it was enough to make him a participant in the defiance of the authority of the Russian government in that region in the months immediately following the termination of the war. Upon the suppression of these disorders he was arrested (January 16, 1906), tried, and sentenced to eighteen months in prison. He was released in Harbin on September 23, 1907 and returned to St. Petersburg that same fall. Here, he says, he suffered three years of adversity and poverty before he was able to “batter down the continuing persecutions of the government” and find a steady job. This job, he infers, was that of research assistant at the Coillon factory in St. Petersburg, a circumstance hard to reconcile with his publisher’s assertion that he was, just before the war, “. . . a specialist in gold and platinum questions, the head of the All-Russian Bureau of the Gold and Platinum Industries, a member of the Council of Merchants and Industrialists in Petersburg . . . a collaborator of Count J. J. Witte in questions of the gold industry . . . the editor of the monthly magazine *Gold and Platinum* . . .” and the author of a number of works of fiction.

However this may be, the first war months found Ossendowski already engaged in a wholly different occupation. The outbreak of war led to the inauguration of intensive efforts by a portion of the Russian business community not only to eliminate the genuine relics of Ger-

man commercial influence in Russia but, by fanning and exploiting war hysteria, to discredit and destroy such of their Russian competitors as were vulnerable to attack by virtue of their German names or the German origin of their companies.³² Ossendowski appears, on strongest evidence, to have served these Russian business circles throughout the war years 1914–17 and possibly even earlier as a paid propagandist. The vehicle in which his efforts appeared was, primarily, the *Vechnyaya Vremya*. His efforts took the form of articles signed, almost invariably, by the pen-name “Mzura.” The manner in which these items were carried by the paper—neither as news reports nor as editorials—revealed clearly their quality as paid propaganda. There is every reason to suppose that not only Ossendowski personally but also the newspaper (widely suspected of the grossest venality) received compensation for this service. It was, of course, one which fitted well with the violently anti-German editorial line for which the paper had long been known.³³ The general tendency of the Mzura articles was to persuade the reader that Russia was still, even in the midst of the war, the victim of a tremendous “spider web” of secret German commercial intrigue.

The Mzura articles continued to appear, in considerable profusion, throughout the war years up to the revolution. At least twenty appeared in the columns of the paper during the first half of 1915 alone, in addition to other items obviously emanating from Ossendowski (some bearing his initials). They continued until the February Revolution, after which Ossendowski seems to have become, like Semenov, a regular editor of the paper.

By the late summer of 1917 Ossendowski appears to have entered, together with Semenov, into some sort of relationship with the military intelligence authorities of the provisional government, who were intensely interested in establishing a connection between the Bolsheviki and the Germans. He himself later claimed to have been involved in the “unmasking” of the Bolsheviki after the July disorders,³⁴ a government-inspired operation. He and Semenov gave briefings at military intelligence headquarters in the summer of 1917, in the capacity of anti-German propaganda experts.³⁵ They presumably received financial support from this source.

In a letter written in 1920 Ossendowski described himself as having been “. . . editor first of the *Birzhevye Vedomosti* and then, during the war, of the *Vechnyaya Vremya*, where I conducted the fight against Germany in all branches of our life, using material and monetary means placed at my disposal by N. A. Vtorov, A. I. Guchkov, Polish figures, and others.”³⁶ Vtorov was a prominent Moscow merchant. Guchkov was chairman of the War-Industry Committee of Russian

manufacturers, and, after the February Revolution, first minister of war in the provisional government. Guchkov's donations might thus have represented contributions from Russian commercial circles or, following the February Revolution, from military intelligence circles.

Who the Polish figures were is uncertain; but there is strong evidence that Polish circles were involved in the origin of the documents. Some of the members of the local Polish committee in Moscow were mentioned in connection with the delivery of later documents to the American consulate general there.³⁷ And Sir Basil Thomson gave a hint of the information the British held concerning the origin of the documents (presumably far better than that of the United States government!) when he wrote, to a state department official³⁸ on July 29, 1920, that while he knew nothing of Ossendowski, ". . . it is, of course, well known that there was a regular factory in Poland for the manufacture of bogus documents, at which the Poles are extraordinarily adept. . . ." The tendency of the documents—anti-Bolshevik and anti-German—fitted well, of course, with the views of those Poles who, like Ossendowski, laid their hopes for Poland's future on the benevolence of a non-Communist Russia.

Altogether, it is evident that for years prior to the Bolshevik revolution Ossendowski had been earning his living as a professional purveyor of anti-German propaganda material and particularly, in the summer of 1917, of material tending to incriminate the Bolsheviks as German agents. The Bolshevik seizure of power naturally terminated all open activity along this line and therewith cut off the established sources of his livelihood. It is not surprising, therefore, that we find him, immediately after the Bolshevik revolution, providing his colleague Semenov with the following document, obviously designed to be shown to Allied representatives in Russia:

Veчерnee Vremya
Editorial Office
November 13, 1917

Very honored Evgeni Petrovich:

Keep this letter as a document.

They offer me from official neutral sources abroad detailed information on the secret German intelligence work in Russia, in neutral and Allied countries, by the aid of firms, as well as the list of German spies in Russia. For all this mass of information they ask 50,000 roubles. I have not so much money, and I am addressing myself, with the offer to acquire this material, to the Allied Ambassadors.

In this manner I shall receive a copy of the information and

shall be in a position to help Russia at the moment, where the Germans are trying to put on economical chains and make us forget the splendid days of the first revolution and recognize again the Romanovs or other "Czars."

Yours,

A. OSSENDOWSKI ³⁹

The Allied representatives, Semenov later related, declined this offer. After that, Semenov says cryptically, "I organized the campaign in another manner."⁴⁰ By the time Semenov had returned from his visit to the Cossack territory, two months later, documents of precisely the nature described in Ossendowski's letter but purporting now to come from another and more exciting source, began to flow in profusion.

It now becomes necessary to invite attention, in just this connection, to certain of the Sisson documents which have particular relation to the Far East. In Document No. 9 a number of persons, allegedly residing in Vladivostok, were mentioned as German agents. While the document gives no more than their names, inquiry reveals that most of the people named either were or had been officials or employees of the well-known Siberian firm of Kunst and Albers. This was a major wholesale and retail trading company which owned department stores in several cities and other economic enterprises in several parts of the Russian Far East. Originally founded by Germans, the firm had become Russianized before the war by the naturalization of its leading officials. The head of the firm during World War I was A. Dattan, formerly honorary German consul in Vladivostok. A naturalized but evidently entirely loyal Russian, Dattan is reported to have had two sons in the war on the Russian side, one of whom died in action. Dattan was among those mentioned in Document 9 as a German agent.

Another of the persons mentioned in Document 9 as a German agent is one Panov, described only as a "retired officer of the Russian fleet." This could have been none other than V. A. Panov, who was indeed a retired naval officer, one-time mayor of Vladivostok, and for many years (since 1892) editor of the leading newspaper of the Russian Far East, the Vladivostok *Dalni Vostok*. Panov was in fact the oldest and most distinguished Russian publicist in the Far East, a man widely known and widely respected. No hint of any of this is given in Document 9.

Document 29 returns to these same suggestions. This time a sep-

arate list is enclosed of persons supposed to be German agents in the Far East, with their addresses. Again, inquiry shows that most of these named were officers and employees of the firm of Kunst and Albers (in the case of two of them, the firm is given as the address). The list includes Dattan himself and, again, Panov.

Bearing these documents in mind, let us return once more to Ossendowski's earlier activity during the war as a propagandist for Russian firms.

A striking feature of the Mzura articles was the constant recurrence of the sharpest and most vicious sort of attack on the firm of Kunst and Albers and on Dattan personally. How many such attacks flowed from Ossendowski's pen it is impossible to state. He referred to himself in one of these articles in 1915 as attacking the firm "for the hundredth time"; and this was probably no exaggeration. It is doubtful whether the history of journalism could produce any other instance of a personal vendetta more violent and more prolonged.

At what time this feud began, to what extent the newspaper and its publisher, Suvorin, and to what extent Ossendowski personally, were involved, is also obscure. Ossendowski, in conversation with Samuel N. Harper in November 1921, admitted that he had been the author of the attacks on the firm. He said that it was in 1913 that he had first come into contact with it and had noted what he believed to be its sinister aims and activities. He described his articles against the firm as having been written "before the war." Actually, they also appeared in great profusion in 1915 and 1916. There is, however, evidence that the Suvorin papers had been attacking the firm long before the war, whether or not with Ossendowski's assistance. In the volume *Peace or War East of Baikal?* by E. J. Harrison, published about 1910,⁴¹ reference is made to what the author calls a "characteristic attack" by the *Novoye Vremya* upon "Mr. Adolph Dattan, the German Consul at Vladivostok and head of the well known firm of Kunst and Albers at that port." The author quotes a passage from a *Novoye Vremya* editorial from early 1909, in which wording distinctly suggestive of Ossendowski's later attacks on the firm was employed. It may be said, in any case, that the persecution of the firm by the Suvorin papers, with or without Ossendowski's probable participation, had been in progress for at least five years before the war.

As a result, apparently, of these various attacks and intrigues, Dattan was apprehended early in the war as a politically unreliable person and sent away to "administrative exile" in Tomsk. He remained there at least until the February Revolution. But the attacks on the firm did not cease. On the contrary, Ossendowski proceeded to supple-

ment his articles with public lectures on the same theme, and is even said to have published a book on the same subject, called *The Far Eastern Spider*. In 1915, according to Panov, he began to develop a plan for the making of a motion picture, to be filmed in Vladivostok, in which the evil doings of the firm were to be depicted, and the lead was to be played by an actor made up to look like Dattan. This apparently brought things to a head. In any case, at some time in 1915 Ossendowski was sued by the firm, either for defamation or for blackmail—it is not certain which. He later claimed to Harper that the firm had offered him a bribe of 200,000 roubles to cease the attacks.⁴² In the Sisson documents file there are facsimiles of two anonymous blackmail notes, made available to the department by Dattan in the early twenties, suggesting that if an appropriate sum were to be paid to Mzura, the attacks might cease. The case dragged on during 1916, and never came to trial before the February Revolution. Dattan and other witnesses for the firm were unable to come to Petrograd to testify.

In the fall of 1916 the firm made public evidence to support its charges against Ossendowski. This material is said to have been published by the Petrograd newspaper *Den* in November and December 1916.⁴³

Dattan's friends evidently felt that either Ossendowski or the *Vechnee Vremya* enjoyed some sort of special governmental protection during the tsarist period. This does indeed seem very probable. Immediately after the fall of the tsarist government, therefore, they took the initiative in trying to have the matter thoroughly investigated, in justice to Dattan. Panov, in company with other influential figures and institutions in Vladivostok (including, incidentally, the local soviet, then still a moderate body), wired to the provisional government and urged that the matter be looked into. They asked in particular that the files of the counterintelligence office in Harbin be consulted in this respect. Presumably, these files contained some sort of material about Ossendowski which was not in the Petrograd records.

The Bolshevik revolution in November 1917 saved Ossendowski from this sort of an investigation. It did not, however, eliminate from the Russian Far East the persons desirous of seeing the Dattan-Ossendowski affair investigated. In the winter of 1917–18, while Semenov was delivering the documents to Sisson, Ossendowski must have had prominently in mind the continued presence of these people in the Russian Far East and their charges against him.

Ossendowski himself fled to Siberia from Petrograd in May 1918, the object obviously being to get into Allied-controlled territory. The idea of such flight must surely have occurred to him in the beginning

of March, when German seizure of Petrograd seemed likely and the Petrograd newspapers for the first time carried stories from the Allied capitals suggesting that Allied intervention in Siberia was imminent.

This being the case, it is most interesting to note that Document No. 29, dated March 9, 1918, with its list of "German agents" in the Far East, was the only one of the main series that was not handed to Sisson at the time of his departure on March 3; it was delivered soon afterward to another American representative with the request that it be sent on to Sisson. All this indicates that it was drafted in the days immediately after Sisson's departure on March 3. These were precisely the days in which the first (erroneous) reports of Allied intervention in Siberia were appearing in the Petrograd press.

It requires little stretching of the imagination to perceive that if Ossendowski was contemplating fleeing to Allied-controlled territory in Siberia (which he shortly did), he must have had in mind his vulnerability to charges by Dattan and his associates and must have realized that once he arrived in the Far East it would be much easier for the officials of the firm and for Panov to pursue such charges against him. The motive for feeding to the Allies information tending to discredit these persons in advance, as German agents, is therefore obvious.

When news of the publication of the Sisson documents first reached Panov, in late October 1918, with the report that his name had been listed in an official American publication as that of a German agent, he was dumbfounded. He made formal requests to the local American press bureau and to the American consulate for confirmation or denial of the report and for copies of the documents. Although the press bureau published, some weeks later, a summary of the documents, again mentioning his name, he received no reply of any sort from the American authorities. Not being able to see the text of the document in which his good name was impugned, he was hampered in replying to the charges. It was not until nearly a year later that he succeeded in getting access to a copy of the American pamphlet, with the facsimile of Document 29. He then promptly wrote and published a small volume pointing out the abundant evidences of fraudulence in the documents, unhesitatingly charging Ossendowski with their authorship, and complaining bitterly of the American government's part in the blackening of his own name.⁴⁴ Panov ended his account by appealing, as a Russian journalist, to his professional colleagues in the United States for vindication of his honor: "I appeal to the American press in the name of solidarity . . . to call upon the persons in the American government who are responsible for the publication of this material to fulfill their duty before the American people who are misled and

before me who by their action suffered undeserved charges reflecting on my honor and reputation.

There is no evidence that Panov's appeal ever found an echo in the American press; nor did the United States government ever give evidence of considering the information he adduced in his defense or re-examining its own part in the damaging of his reputation.

If Ossendowski had forged the Sisson documents, one would expect to find in his own handwriting evidences of similarity to the penmanship which appears on the various documents. This is, indeed, precisely what one finds—and in considerable abundance.

Panov, in writing his little book about the documents, had only two signatures of Ossendowski to go on. Even on this slender basis, he was able to construct a respectable argument for the thesis that not only were *all* the signatures and marginal notes on *all* the documents written by a single hand but that the hand was unquestionably that of A. Ossendowski. The contemporary American student is more fortunate. He has not only signatures to go on, but a four-page letter penned by Ossendowski on April 11, 1919, to the Russian Economic League in New York, as well as the facsimiles of some pages from Ossendowski's pocket notebook, reproduced in the volume put out by his Frankfort publishers, mentioned above.

It may be said without hesitation that the evidences of similarity between these authentic specimens of Ossendowski's hand and the writing that appears on documents of the Sisson document series are ubiquitous and convincing. The most ample specimen of handwriting in any item of the Sisson document series is to be found on the certificate, mentioned above, supposed to emanate from the "St. Petersburg Labor Commune." The entire text of this certificate is written in longhand. The writing is, in general character and appearance, indistinguishable from that of Ossendowski. While it is plain that deliberate efforts were made to disguise the handwriting on the main body of documents (the underline flourishes, for example, were evidently introduced for this purpose; they do not appear in Ossendowski's own hand), Ossendowski's own capital *V* in Russian (the Russian *V* is the same letter as the English *B*) is largely identical with the capital *B* in the series of "Bauer" signatures. Ossendowski's characteristic capital *A*, which appears in his signature, will be found repeated in the documents, and particularly in the supposed signature of Joffe (who actually executed his *A* quite differently). The *k*'s are identical in both places. The similarity in the execution of the date "1917" is inescapable. There is a most revealing upward slant in the mark that is made, in place of the dot, over the soft Russian *i*. This list could be prolonged; but it is hardly necessary to prolong it. Whoever wishes to

go into this more deeply will do best to take the originals of the documents, in the National Archives, and compare them directly with the photostat of the Ossendowski letter which the archives also contain.

V's from Ossendowski's Russian handwriting:

B's from the Bauer signature on the Sisson documents:



A further interesting illustration of the similarity between Ossendowski's hand and the writing on the documents is found in a comparison of the "Bauer" signature with Ossendowski's writing, in Latin characters, of the word "Bureau," containing precisely the same letters. Note the *a* and *u* as well as the *B*:



The evidences, direct and indirect, of Ossendowski's leading complicity in the concoction of these documents are thus, in their entirety, powerful and persuasive. This does not mean that he had no collaborators, for he probably did. But there is every evidence that he was the central figure in the operation and that the motivation, as well as the main burden of execution, was his.

One question remains, however, to be asked in this connection. What was the real origin and motivation of Ossendowski's prolonged activity as an anti-German propagandist, and particularly his campaign against German commercial influence in the Russian Far East?

The financial attraction is clear. Panov says that the money for the attacks on the firm of Kunst and Albers came mainly from the Kazyanov family, owners of the rival firm of Churin and Company, which likewise had a chain of wholesale and retail commercial establishments in the principal Siberian cities and was the leading competitor to the Kunst and Albers firm. All this sounds plausible enough. There was also the fact that Ossendowski was a Pole (though a very Russianized one at that time) and obviously opposed to German policies in Poland.

Perhaps this was all there was to it. But the student of Ossendowski's

dowski's affairs can hardly fail to be struck with the pronounced dearth of references to the Japanese in his works, and the decidedly pro-Japanese slant of such few references as do occur. He was, after all, in both Vladivostok and Harbin during the Russo-Japanese War; Japan could not have been far from his thoughts at that time. He was deeply involved in the political intrigues and rivalries that dominated the Harbin scene in the immediate wake of hostilities, developments from which the Japanese can scarcely have remained wholly aloof. The cause to which he subsequently devoted himself so long and so assiduously—the elimination of German commercial influence in Russia and particularly in Siberia—was one in which the Japanese were intensely interested. Yet his writings seem to contain no mention of anything along this line; nor do they show any concern for, or even awareness of, the fact that Japan might also have had commercial (and not only commercial) aspirations affecting that part of the world. One is moved to wonder why a man who found German commercial influence in Siberia so dangerous and so intolerable to Russian sensibilities was so wholly complacent about that of another great power.

While the Sisson documents were zealously peddled to the British and American representatives in Petrograd, there is no mention or evidence of their having been similarly offered to the Japanese. This is strange, for the Japanese, just then intensely preoccupied with the prospect of an early occupation of portions of eastern Siberia by their own forces, might surely have been expected to have a primary interest in such things as lists of German agents in Vladivostok. That Japanese money was available for the purchase of material of this nature, as for other clandestine operations in Russia, cannot be doubted; nor is there reason to suppose that Semenov and Ossendowski would have spurned attractive offers from that quarter. It is always possible, of course, that the Japanese did actually acquire the material in the normal manner, and that everyone concerned remained very discreet about it thereafter. It is also possible that the Japanese were too well-informed to be intrigued by Semenov's offerings and thus disinclined to buy them. But there is also the possibility that the conspicuous absence of the Japanese from this entire picture could be explained by a relationship on their part to Ossendowski and his activities more intimate, and more interested, than that of a mere detached customer.

The evidence this writer has seen is wholly inadequate to support any judgment on these questions. But further scholarly inquiry would surely shed light on some of these mysteries; and it might well serve to illuminate questions of broader import than merely the origin of the Sisson documents themselves.

IV. The Appendixes

The above discussion has been directed to the main body of the published documents.

Of the fifteen documents that make up Appendix I to *The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy* pamphlet, little needs to be said. There is no reason to suppose that Ossendowski was the author of any of them. For the seven letters no originals or photographs are available. It is plainly impossible to evaluate the authenticity of alleged translations of this nature. With the contrived and ostentatious ringing-in of the names of Lenin, Trotsky, and Gorki these letters make, it must be said, a distinctly unreliable impression. As for the circulars, as noted above, for only two of these was there available anything purporting to be an original; and the deficiencies of these documents were so glaring that even Harper and Jameson could not bring themselves to credit their authenticity.

The single document included (for no very clear reason) as Appendix II is by no means implausible (except for the last sentence, which shows every sign of having been added for greater effect). There is enough evidence of the success of the wire-tapping operation to make it wholly possible that most of this message was genuine. It is, however, ironic that the sole document in the entire collection that gives a reasonable impression of authenticity should have been one which contains no hint or mention of anything resembling a "German-Bolshevik conspiracy."

There is one reservation that should be stated with respect to the letters in Appendix I, mentioned above. If the documents in the main body of the pamphlet pointed toward a situation that was highly implausible, the same cannot be said of these letters. The question as to what sources of clandestine external support the Bolsheviki had during the spring and summer of 1917 is a complicated one, with extensive ramifications, and far surpasses the scope of this inquiry. That there was intensive communication between the Bolshevik leaders and persons in Scandinavia in these months; that this communication involved persons whose names occur in these letters; and that the communication very probably involved the transfer of funds to the Bolsheviki from *some* external sources—all this seems fairly well established. Further inquiry will have to establish whether the German government itself was behind this, or whether the moneys came only from friendly foreign socialist sources and other well-wishers abroad. In either case, there might well have been some substance behind these letters. It is quite conceivable that the texts published in the pamphlet were based on genuine letters and merely touched up, in

certain instances, by the addition of the reference to leading Communist figures.

It should be noted, in this connection, that there was nothing in the philosophy of either regime which would have inhibited the Germans from giving financial aid to the Bolsheviks *prior* to their assumption of power or the Bolsheviks from accepting it. Neither would have considered itself in any way under moral obligation to the other by virtue of such a relationship. The essential reality behind the entire controversy over the Sisson documents is that even if—as the documents do not prove but as is wholly possible—the Bolsheviks received financial support from official German sources prior to the revolution, there is no evidence that they considered themselves by consequence under any moral or political obligation to the Germans in the period following their own seizure of power or that the Germans had any illusions of this nature. In fact, there is powerful evidence to the contrary.

If the Germans financed the Bolsheviks in the spring and summer of 1917 they did so on the principle—sound in international affairs as elsewhere—that they were supporting them not for what they promised but for what they were; not for what they might undertake to do for others but for what they were likely to do for themselves. In the sweeping demoralization of the Russian armed forces that accompanied the Bolshevik political triumph in Russia, this German speculation was vindicated beyond the most optimistic dreams.

APPENDIX 2:

The Soviet and Communist Bloc Defamation Campaign

Congressman Melvin Price introduced into the *Congressional Record* for September 28, 1965, this brief study of Soviet defamation and forgery operations.

Synopsis

1. The Soviet and Communist bloc effort to defame and discredit U.S. departments and agencies that have major responsibilities for national security has been underway since 1948. A major program is aimed at the Central Intelligence Agency and has grown markedly in quantity and intensity since the establishment of the KGB Department of Disinformation in 1959. This program now produces between 350 and 400 derogatory items annually. Communist press and radio attacks against the Agency reveal an increased sophistication in recent years. In addition, many Communist-inspired books and pamphlets which attack the existence, purposes, and status of CIA, and reflect a substantial budget for this activity, have appeared throughout southeast Asia, Africa, and the Near East.

2. CIA, in its intelligence role, is feared by the Soviets for its responsibility and ability to penetrate and unmask Communist conspiracies against democratic institutions. By striking at CIA, the attack also centers on the intelligence community with particular thrust against the FBI and Mr. J. Edgar Hoover. The objective of the overall program is to achieve the destruction, break-up, and neutralization of CIA. A basic requirement of Soviet policy and a major objective of the Soviet intelligence services is the destruction of effective security collaboration among the non-Communist countries in order to carry out Soviet long-term strategic plans for subversion, political upheavals, popular fronts, and the eventual political isolation of the United States.

3. Defamation and forgery operations are conceived, directed,

and perpetrated by a single organization located outside the target areas which makes use of local Communist or pro-Communist propagandists and of co-operating Communist bloc intelligence and security services. Although such undertakings are the products of the disinformation department of the KGB, known as department D, which is headed by Gen. Ivan Ivanovich Agayants, they are reviewed and passed on by the Soviet leadership. The operations of the Soviet Disinformation Department have been successful thus far in stimulating a wide replay in Africa, southeast Asia, the Middle East, and even in the United States. CIA will continue to be the prime target of Soviet disinformation and defamation operations.

Soviet and Communist Disinformation

4. It is an established Soviet principle—now embraced by all members of the Communist bloc—that a large percentage of subversive activity be devoted to the planning and conduct of disinformation (*dezinformatsiya*) operations which mold, divide, and mislead other governments or leaders, and cause them to adopt policies and undertakings which are ultimately advantageous only to the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership has charged the Soviet State Security Service, the KGB, to place very great emphasis, both organizationally and operationally, on disinformation activity. Communist bloc services, in turn, are playing their part in this work.

5. What are disinformation operations? “*Dezinformatsiya*,” in Soviet terminology, is false, incomplete, or misleading information that is passed, fed, or confirmed to a targeted individual, group, or country. “Propaganda,” as it is defined by free world students, may be used as a support element of *dezinformatsiya*, but propaganda per se lacks the precision and bite of disinformation.

6. Soviet disinformation activity is planned and directed by a specialized department of the Soviet State Security Service. This KGB department, which was created to intensify Soviet disinformation activity, is headed by Gen. Ivan Ivanovich Agayants, a senior, professional intelligence officer with long experience and well-developed agent and political contacts in Western Europe, especially in France, where he served under the name Ivan Ivanovich Avalov. At one time in France he controlled the French spy Georges Pasques who was sentenced to life imprisonment on July 7, 1964.

7. The assignment of Agayants to take over the disinformation task indicates the high priority that the then Chairman of the Presidium, Nikita Khrushchev, gave to the campaign against American

leadership and activity. Chairman Kosygin and First Secretary Brezhnev have made no changes in that program. Department D is still directly tied into the Presidium in the planning of its work.¹

8. Agayants' department is staffed by an estimated 40 to 50 geographical and functional specialists in Moscow alone; it avails itself directly and peremptorily of the worldwide resources, manpower and operations, of the Soviet security apparatus. The purposes, broadly stated, of the disinformation department are to:

(a) Destroy the confidence of the Congress and the American public in U.S. personnel and agencies engaged in anti-Communist and cold war activity.

(b) Undermine American prestige and democratic institutions and denigrate American leadership with NATO governments and other non-Communist countries, thereby contributing directly to the breakup of the NATO alliance.

(c) Sow distrust and create grounds for subversion and revolt against the United States in the Western Hemisphere and among the new nations of Africa and Asia.

These purposes and objectives, it must be emphasized, have been established by the highest elements of party and government in the Soviet Union.

9. Personal experiences with this program have been described by officers who have left the Soviet system and are now in the United States. One of these—Alexander Kaznacheev, who served in Burma as an information officer—described the program and the process in a recent personal memoir:

"Articles were originated in KGB headquarters in Moscow—for example, about alleged American support of the Indonesian rebels, frequent American violations of Cambodia's sovereignty, subversive activity of Japan in the region, etc. The articles were received from Moscow on microfilm and reproduced as enlarged photo-copies at the Embassy. It was my job to translate them into English. Some other members of Vozny's² group would then arrange through local agents for the articles to be placed in one of the Burmese newspapers, usually pro-Communist-oriented. The newspaper would translate the article into Burmese, make slight changes in style, and sign it from 'Our special correspondent in Singapore,' for instance. Upon publication of such an article, the illegitimate creation of Soviet intelligence receives an appearance of legitimacy and becomes a sort of document.

"But the work was not yet finished. I then took the published article and checked it against the original Russian text. I noted all the changes and variations made by the newspaper, and wrote down in

Russian the final version of the article. This final version was then immediately sent back to Moscow, this time through Tass channels.

"The last stage of this grandiose forgery was under the special care of the Soviet Information Bureau, Tass, Radio-Moscow, the Soviet press, and Soviet diplomatic representatives abroad. It is their duty to see that the material is republished and distributed in all countries of the region as if they were genuine documents which had appeared in the Burmese press."³

10. Although the KGB is able to fabricate in Moscow whatever material is needed for its disinformation operations, it has been making more and more use of material published in the West, some of which had been planted there by earlier disinformation activities. An examination of the books and articles cited in any of the anti-CIA pamphlets reveals extensive use of Western source material, often taken out of context. The most recent Soviet articles on the Agency are exclusively "documented" from Western books, articles, and newspapers.

11. In the 58 pages of *CIA Over Asia*, a slanderous booklet published in Kanpur, India, in 1962, for example, American newspapers and magazines are cited 11 times, periodicals of other Western or neutral countries 15 times. The fact that some references are made to Communist organs is obscured by repeated citations from reputable American publications.

12. A study of Soviet disinformation shows that the Soviets are engaged in an impressive research project to collect and process information and speculation about American intelligence and security services that appear in Western publications and newspapers. This study also has confirmed the deep interest of the Soviet services in the development and milking of Western journalists. Americans figure prominently among these.

13. The measure and depth of department D's activity against the CIA may be judged from a single episode. A booklet attacking the former Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen W. Dulles, entitled *A Study of a Master Spy* (Allen Dulles), was printed and distributed in London during 1961, and has since been reprinted. The ostensible author was a prominent maverick Labor Member of Parliament, one Bob Edwards, who was supposedly assisted in the effort by a British journalist. It is now known that the manuscript was researched in Moscow by a senior KGB disinformation officer, Col. Vassily Sitnikov, and then served up for final polish and printing in the United Kingdom. Mr. Dulles himself discussed this episode on a TV roundtable on March 29, 1964:

"MR. HANSON BALDWIN. Well, that brings up, too, doesn't it, the question of disinformation? What kind of disinformation is being distributed by the Soviets today? Can you explain this, Allen?

"MR. DULLES. Well, I have here right in my hand—

"MR. BALDWIN. And what is disinformation, anyway?

"MR. DULLES. Well, this is it. Here's 'A Study of a Master Spy.' Here's a booklet that was written about me. Now, it bears on the outside here, you see, 'A Study of a Master Spy.' I won't give you the names of the authors, but one of them is a member of the legislature of a very great, friendly country. But the real author of this—I am the 'master spy'—I have found out recently after certain research has been done, that the real author of this pamphlet is a Colonel Sitnikov, whom I believe you know, or know of. He is the real author.

"MR. DERYABIN.⁴ Sitnikov? I used to work with Sitnikov in Vienna when he was deputy chief of the Soviet spy force, and he was the chief of an American desk, I mean, working against Americans. He was trained as an intelligence officer. One time he was a spy chief in Berlin and Potsdam, another time he was in Vienna. To my knowledge last time he was in Bonn as a counselor to the Embassy, but I mentioned him in my book and in the articles in *Life* in 1959, and it is my belief that he is at home now.

"MR. DULLES. He has a whole dossier on me. I've read some things there about myself that even I didn't know."

Continuing Attack on the DCI

14. The resignation of Mr. Allen Dulles and the appointment of Mr. John McCone necessitated a shift in the Communist attack on the Director of Central Intelligence. The Soviet propaganda transition from one Director of Central Intelligence to another was accomplished by June 1963 with the publication of a pamphlet entitled *Spy No. 1*. Issued by the State Publishing House of Political Literature in Moscow (June 1963), the substance of the book is summarized on the title page:

"John Alex McCone is the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States. Behind the exterior of a respectable gentleman is hidden the seasoned spy, the organizer of dirty political intrigues and criminal conspiracies.

"This pamphlet tells of the past of the chief of American intelligence, of the methods by which he amassed his millions and became the servant of the uncrowned kings of America, the Rockefellers, and of the influence which McCone exerts on the policies of the U.S. Government, particularly in the Cuban affair."

15. In November 1964, the Soviet newspaper *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* published a further attack on Mr. McCone entitled, "The Spy With the Slide Rule." Referring to Mr. McCone's activities as Director of CIA, the article added, "Under the leadership of McCone, the CIA was transformed from just an invisible government to a government of U.S. oil monopolies, mainly Standard Oil and its owners, the Rockefeller group. All of the military adventures in Lebanon, in south-east Asia, Aden, and Brazil, were carried out with the participation of emissaries of the man with the slide rule."

16. On December 8, 1964, Moscow domestic radio stated: "The American newspaper *New York Herald Tribune* had reported that:

"U.S. Central Intelligence Agency boss John McCone has secretly approached President Johnson with a resignation request * * * the American press prefers for the moment not to speak about the actual reason for McCone's resignation. The reason for it consists, in the first instance, in the serious collapse of American foreign policy, which, to a considerable degree, is formulated on the data provided by the CIA. Basing its activity on defense of the interests of the largest monopolistic groups based on the ideology of anticommunism and militarism, the CIA is proving incapable of a more or less objective correct appraisal of the balance of power in the world arena. * * * The American journalists, David White [sic] and Thomas Ross, drawing attention to the subversive activity of the CIA, just call it 'The Invisible Government.'⁵ * * * There is a basis to suspect, White and Ross write, that frequently the foreign policy of the United States as made public in the speeches of the State officials, acts in one direction, while secretly, through 'The Invisible Government,' it acts in the opposite direction."

17. President Johnson's appointment of Adm. William F. Raborn on April 11, 1965 gave the Soviet press another opportunity to review and renew its attack on the Director of Central Intelligence. Moscow domestic radio announced the next day that the appointment signified "the further strengthening of cooperation between the espionage apparatus and the military and military industrial monopolies."

18. An editorial published on April 14, 1965 in the Tanzanian newspaper, the *Nationalist*, which was replayed by the *New China News Agency*, claimed that Admiral Raborn's appointment implied an "attempt to save the face of the United States over accusations of interference in the internal affairs of newly independent states in particular."

19. *Krasnaya Zvezda* in Moscow asserted (April 18, 1965) that the departure of Mr. McCone and General Marshall S. Carter was

“connected with new failures in assessing those forces against which American imperialism is aiming its aggressive blows.” The article concluded, “The American imperialists probably assume that Raborn will be a more successful accomplice for them in the struggle against the peoples of the socialist countries and other freedom-loving peoples. These hopes are hardly justified, however, since in our era the course of historical events is not being determined by the Raborns and not even by their Wall Street bosses.”

20. On June 5, 1965, the Greek Communist newspaper *Avghi*, in an article entitled, “U.S. Master Spy, William Raborn,” alleged that the appointment of Admiral Raborn was intended to “lessen the enmity between the CIA and the Defense Department Intelligence Service.” The article continued, “The main reason is the fact that the key posts in the American administration are now being taken over by representatives of the top and overt forms of monopolist capital, the most reactionary force that leans toward dangerous adventurism. At least that is what the events in Indochina, Dominican Republic, Congo, and elsewhere show.”

The Communist Charges Against CIA

21. The themes exploited by the campaign of the Communist bloc against CIA, its Director, and its operations have remained generally the same since the beginning of the attack. Nevertheless, slants and replays have been constantly adjusted to changing world and regional political developments and to the vulnerabilities of target audiences and individuals, particularly in the newly emerging areas. The basic anti-CIA themes in use as of midsummer 1965 are:

(a) CIA is an instrument of American imperialism. It is racist, and a direct threat to national liberation movements.

(b) In its work against national liberation movements, CIA engages in espionage, economic and political subversion, sabotage, assassination and terrorism; it trains and supports counter-revolutionary forces.

(c) CIA is an instrument of American aggression and gathers intelligence for aggressive plans against peace-loving socialist states. Diplomats, tourists, and scientists are used by CIA for these purposes.

(d) CIA dominates and generates American foreign policy.

(e) CIA engages in psychological warfare, utilizing falsehoods to undermine the international authority of the U.S.S.R.

(f) CIA is fighting the Communist Party of the U.S.A. and the Communist and Worker Parties of other capitalist countries.

(g) CIA spies on the allies of the United States and overthrows its henchmen who are unable to suppress national liberation movements.

22. The increasing weight of the attack on CIA becomes evident when an examination is made of the periodicals *International Affairs*, *New Times*, and *Kommunist*, all three of which are issued in Moscow, the first two in English and other languages. *International Affairs* carried one major article on American intelligence in 1960 and another in 1962. Since March 1964, there have been five articles devoted to that theme. These articles have alleged in general that intelligence controls U.S. foreign policy and big business controls intelligence.⁶ The *New Times* published one article on CIA in 1961, and one in 1963.

Three articles concerning CIA were published by this multilingual magazine during 1964.⁷ In May 1965, *Kommunist* published an article with the title, "The American Intelligence Service Is a Weapon of Adventurism and Provocation."

23. The assassination of President Kennedy was the subject of a book by Joachim Joesten entitled, *Oswald—Assassin or Fall Guy?* (1964) published by Marzani and Munsell Publishers, Inc. of New York, in which Joesten states that there is no question in his mind that Oswald was a minor CIA agent. Marzani, a known Communist, was coauthor of a pamphlet, *Cuba Vs. CIA*, published in 1961. Joesten is revealed in a German Security Police memorandum, dated November 8, 1937, to have been an active member of the German Communist Party (KPD) since May 12, 1932; he was issued Communist Party membership card (Mitgliedsbuch) No. 532315.

24. A primary aim of Soviet disinformation is to sow distrust among the Western allies by discrediting the policies and motives of the United States and American methods of implementing those policies. Considerable attention is devoted to creating apprehension, uncertainty, and antagonism toward the United States among the uncommitted and underdeveloped nations. Thus, the Soviets reiterate the longstanding Communist charge that the United States is imperialistic and seeks world domination. They continually emphasize the theme that CIA is a major instrument in the execution of American policy. Two pamphlets, *CIA Over Asia* (Kanpur, 1962) and *America's Undeclared War* (Bombay, 1963), are dedicated to this theme.

25. An example of the use of the daily press and radio to mount this line of attack occurred 2 years ago in Ghana. Sufficient time has now passed to permit an evaluation of the episode. In late February and March 1963, CIA was subjected to an attack in the Ghana press and radio which attempted to tie the Agency to the death of Premier

Qassim of Iraq. This campaign was allegedly based on an article in the French paper *L'Express* which asserted that CIA was the "author of the Iraq murder." An article in the Ghana Evening News for February 28, 1963 was headlined "Neo-Colonialist Terror in Iraq Menacing Threat Against Africa." On May 15, 1965, the *Spark*, a weekly Ghanian newspaper, carried a front page story with the headline "The Secret War of CIA: The Killer at Your Door." According to the article, "This murderous game, which goes by the innocent-sounding name of 'intelligence,' has its Western-World nerve-center in America's Central Intelligence Agency, known briefly as CIA." Included in the article were eight illustrations of "spy equipment." Four of these illustrations had earlier appeared in West Berlin—The Facts, an anti-CIA tract that was published in Moscow in 1962.

26. A major theme developed principally in the uncommitted areas during the past 12 to 18 months has been the alleged interference of the United States, and especially CIA, in the internal affairs of other countries. Three recent pamphlets, *American Intelligence—This Is Your Enemy* (Cairo, April 1964), *The Truth About Komla Gbedemah* (Ghana, October 1964), and *Operation Boa Constrictor* (Colombo, 1964) develop the idea that through its intelligence and aid agencies, the United States is engaged in a conspiracy to dominate the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. The conspiracy allegedly takes the form of active efforts to overthrow anti-American governments and to gain economic control of these areas through foreign aid and economic exploitation.

Soviet Forgeries

27. One of the preferred instruments utilized by the Soviets to disseminate disinformation is the forged document. Detailed testimony on 32 U.S. forgeries attributable to the Communist bloc was given by Mr. Richard Helms of CIA on June 2, 1961, before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Fourteen new instances of forged U.S. official documents have come under scrutiny by the end of July 1965. Some of the more recent examples are still being studied. Although CIA has not been omitted from some of these spurious documents, the principal purpose of such forgeries has been to discredit U.S. policies and the representatives of other U.S. agencies overseas, such as the Department of State, USIA, the Peace Corps, the Armed Forces of the United States and American political leaders generally.

28. The Soviet defamation campaign, whatever may be its targets,

has but one objective. Defamation of CIA is only an aspect of a coherent, well-orchestrated effort to denigrate the United States and its policies before world opinion. Every department and agency of the U.S. Government is a potential target of the disinformation department when such attacks will serve Soviet interests. Whatever may be the immediate subject of any single Soviet disinformation operation—CIA, the State Department, the Peace Corps, or USIA—the ultimate objective is to isolate and destroy what the KGB designates as “Glavni Vrag” (“Main Enemy”), the United States.

Chapter 2 / The Testament of Peter the Great: From Legend to Forgery

1. B. B. Kaphengaya, *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia* (Moscow, 1955), p. 584; B. H. Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London, 1950), p. 110.

2. Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

3. For recent bibliography and a review of the controversy, see the article by Dimitry V. Lehovich, "The Testament of Peter the Great," *The American Slavic and East European Review*, VII, No. 2 (1948), to which the present author is much indebted. See also Michel Sokolnicki, "Le Testament de Pierre le Grand," *Revue des sciences politiques*, XXVII (1912), and the authoritative article on the early history and origin of the Testament by Harry Breslau, "Das Testament Peter's des Grossen," *Historische Zeitschrift*, XLI (1879), 385-409.

4. Cf. Georg Berkholz, "Napoleon I, Auteur du Testament de Pierre le Grand," published later as a separate brochure in German, "Das Testament Peters des Grossen Eine Erfindung Napoleons I," *Russische Revue*, X (1877), 1-33 (Breslau, *op. cit.*, p. 386).

5. Breslau, *op. cit.*, p. 386.

6. Gustav Hilger, *The Incompatible Allies* (New York, 1953), p. 154.

7. Breslau, *op. cit.*, pp. 406-407; Sokolnicki, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

8. Sokolnicki, *op. cit.*, p. 122, n. 1.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

10. Breslau, *op. cit.*, pp. 407-408.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 406.

12. Sokolnicki, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-98.

13. Charles Louis Lesur, *Des Progrès de la puissance russe* (Paris, 1812), p. 176, n. 1.

14. Breslau, *op. cit.*, pp. 391-392.

15. Robert Wilson, *Private Diary* (London, 1861), I, 257-258. See also Shubinsky, *Istoricheskie Ocherki i rasskazy* (St. Petersburg, 1911), p. 675.

16. Frederic Gaillardet, *Memoirs du Chevalier d'Eon* (Paris, 1836), 2 vols.

17. For a scholarly English biography, see Ernest Alfred Vizetelly, *The True Story of the Chevalier d'Eon* (London, 1895).

18. Vizetelly, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

19. The report of the panel is reproduced verbatim in Pierre Pinseau,

L'étrange destinée du Chevalier d'Eon, 1728-1810 (Paris, 1945), pp. 254-256.

20. On this point see Vizetelly, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-66.

21. Breslau, *op. cit.*, pp. 396-402, provides an exhaustive comparative analysis of the two texts of Gaillardet and Lesur and their mutual derivation from the original *Aperçu* of Sokolnicki.

22. Walter K. Kelly, *The History of Russia* (London, 1854), I, 374-376.

23. Kelly, *op. cit.*, p. 373.

24. Lehovich, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

25. Shubinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 674.

26. Walter List, *Das Politische Testament Peter des Grossen* (Leipzig, 1914), compares an alleged "political will" of Napoleon with that of Peter I.

27. Gerhart Niemeyer, *Facts on Communism*, "Vol. I, The Communist Ideology," p. 108 (86th Congress, 2nd Session, House Document No. 336, Washington, 1960). (Emphasis added.)

28. For a collection of Marx's and Engels' writings in this area see *The Russian Menace to Europe*, edited by Paul W. Blackstock and Bert F. Hoselitz (Glencoe, 1952).

29. See E. R. Goodman, *The Soviet Design for a World State* (New York, 1960) for a scholarly exposition of this thesis.

30. Lehovich, *op. cit.* p. 111.

31. Dimitry V. Lehovich, letter to the author dated June 7, 1965.

32. For examples, see two recent outstanding collections: *Communism and Revolution*, edited by C. E. Black and T. P. Thornton (Princeton, 1964), and *Russian Foreign Policy, Essays in Historical Perspective*, edited by Ivo J. Lederer (New Haven, 1962).

Chapter 3 / The Protocols of Zion

1. S. Nilus, as quoted by Count A. M. du Chayla in *Posledniya Novosti* (an emigré Russian newspaper published in Paris by the historian Paul Miliukov), May 12, 1921, p. 3.

2. S. Nilus, *Velikoe v Malom i Antikhrisť Kak Blizkaya Vozmozhnost: Zapiski Pravoslavnago* ("The Great in the Little and Antichrist as a New Political Possibility: Notes of an Orthodox Person"), 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg, 1905), p. 323. A text of the Protocols had been published two years earlier in the newspaper *Znamya* ("The Banner"), in Kishinev, August 23-September 7, 1903.

3. Vladimir Lvovich Burtsev, "*Protokoly Sionskikh Mudretsov*" *Dokazannyi Podlog* (Paris, 1938), p. 81. Against this line of reasoning Burtsev argues convincingly that like their anarchist and socialist predecessors, the Old Bolsheviks of Jewish origin such as Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Radek were internationalist and "in fact had no connection whatever with Jewish nationalism and kept away from it no less assiduously than the most reactionary anti-semites." *Op. cit.*, pp. 65-66ff.

4. Roger Lambelin, "Maurice Joly et les 'Protocoles,'" *La Revue Hebdomadaire*, No. 51 (17 December 1921), p. 320.

5. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee Report, *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, 88th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, 1964), p. 2.

6. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia* (New York, 1963), p. 437. "The sages of Zion speak his [Pobedonostev's] language on all issues, occasionally using his own words." Benjamin Segel, *Die Protokolle der Weisen Von Zion* (Berlin, 1924), p. 220.

7. Hugo Valentin, *Antisemitism Historically and Critically Examined* (London, 1936), p. 176, 177; see also Herman Bernstein, *The Truth About "The Protocols of Zion"* (New York, 1935), p. 26. The most thorough exposition of this theory is by B. Segel, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-220.

8. *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entisiklopedia*, 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1950), II, 512-513. Presumably because of their origin with the tsarist secret police, the article makes no mention whatever of the Protocols of Zion!

9. Bernstein, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

10. Burtsev, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-73; Bernstein, *op. cit.*, p. 50; Segel, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

11. Burtsev, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-106; H. J. Von Freyenwald, *Der Berner Prozess um die Protokolle der Weisen von Zion, Acten und Gutachten, Band I, Anklage und Zeugenaussagen* (Erfurt, 1939), pp. 93-94.

12. Burtsev, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-90; A. M. du Chayla, *Poslednyia Novosti*, May 13, 1921, p. 2.

13. For an English translation, see Patricia Blake and Max Hayward, *Dissonant Voices in Soviet Literature* (New York, 1961), pp. 52-60.

14. *Der Angriff*, May 14, 1944, cited in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (Washington, 1946), I, 134.

15. Cameron, a persuasive propagandist, is best remembered for his later plea (which accompanied the Sunday evening concerts on the Ford Symphony Hour) to turn back the government of the United States to those Christian men to whom God in his infinite wisdom has given control of the property interests of the country! This was a rough paraphrase of the famous statement made during the 1902 coal strike by George F. Baer, a spokesman for the operators: "The rights and interests of the laboring man will be protected and cared for—not by the labor agitators, but by the Christian men to whom God in His infinite wisdom has given the control of the property interests of the country." See Mark Sullivan, *Our Times* (New York, 1927), II, 426.

16. Cf. *The Jewish Year Book*, XXIX (1927-1928), 386-387.

17. Ralph Lord Roy, *Apostles of Discord: A Study of Organized Bigotry and Disruption on the Fringes of Protestantism* (Boston, 1953), p. 43.

18. For bibliography and analysis of both the literature and its principal protagonists, see Roy, *op. cit.*, *passim*; Nathan Zuckerman, *The Wine of Violence: An Anthology on Anti-Semitism* (New York, 1947), *passim*; and Margaret L. Hartley, "The Subliterature of Hate in America," *The Southwest Review*, XXXVII, No. 3 (Summer 1952), 177-190.

19. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1951), p. 241; Burtsev gives an estimate of two million copies by March 1934, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

20. Henri Rollin, *L'Apocalypse de Notre Temps* (Paris, 1939), p. 40; Arendt, *op. cit.*, p. 349.

21. Arendt, *op. cit.*, pp. 347-348, 350. The standard Nazi text dealing with the Protocols and offering massive "documentation" (416 pages) on their authenticity is Ulrich Fleischauer, *Gerichts-Gutachten von Berner Prozess, Die echten Protokolle der Weisen Von Zion* (Erfurt, 1935), based on the Bern trials.

22. H. L. Willet, in the Foreword to Valentin, *op. cit.*, p. 60. For bibliography, see John S. Curtiss, *An Appraisal of the Protocols of Zion* (New York, 1942), pp. 107-113. This is the standard historical evaluation, read and sponsored by a group of prominent American historians. An earlier excellent analysis by Pierre Charles, S.J., "Les Protocoles des Sages de Sion," *Nouvelle Revue Theologique*, LXV (January 1938), 56-78, was later translated with notes by William G. Ryan and published in *The Bridge*, I (1955), 159-188, by Seton Hall University Institute of Judaeo-Christian Studies.

23. Bernstein, *op. cit.*, p. xi.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.*, pp. xi-xii.

27. Burtsev, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

28. Curtiss, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-50.

29. Bernstein, *op. cit.*, p. 371.

30. U. Fleischauer, *op. cit.*, pp. 14ff.

31. Lambelin, *op. cit.*, pp. 312ff.

32. Quoted by A. M. du Chayla, *Poslednyia Novosti*, May 12, 1921, p. 3.

33. In this regard, see the interesting study, *When Prophecy Fails*, by Leon Festinger, Henry W. Brecken, and Stanley Schachter (Minneapolis, 1956).

34. Curtiss' findings are endorsed by a group of American historians, including Carl L. Becker, E. Malcolm Carroll, Sidney B. Fay, Dixon Ryan Fox, Walter P. Hall, Ralph V. Harlow, Carlton J. H. Hayes, William L. Langer, Dana G. Munro, Allan Nevins, Thad W. Riker, Gerald T. Robinson, and Bernadotte E. Schmitt. (Curtiss, *op. cit.*, pp. v-vi.)

35. The evidence presented at the Bern Trials is reviewed at length in the final chapter of Curtiss' *Appraisal* (pp. 73-93), from which the present summary of such evidence is drawn. There are two principal sources for trial testimony. The first is Von Freyenwald, *op. cit.*, which is an apparently unabridged transcript of the court proceedings plus commentary by the editor, a National Socialist. The second is V. L. Burtsev, *Protokoly Sionskikh Mudretsov* "Dokazannyi Podlog" ("The Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion"—a Proven Forgery) (Paris, 1938), which contains his trial testimony plus additional evidence, but which is not consistent in all details with the record as published in Freyenwald. See also the book written by the lawyers for the plaintiffs at the trial, Emil Raas and George Brunschvig, *Vernehmung einer Faelschung* (Zurich, 1938).

36. A. M. du Chayla, *Poslednyia Novosti*, May 12, 1921, p. 3.

37. Bernstein, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

38. A. M. du Chayla, *Poslednyia Novosti*, May 13, 1921, p. 2. Curtiss apparently regards du Chayla's testimony as reliable; see his *Appraisal*, Chap. 4, "A Visit to Nilus," especially pp. 68-72.

39. Burtsev, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96.

41. This evidence (summarized below) was challenged at the time by German anti-semites; Burtsev was charged and tried for perjury but acquitted after producing additional documentation.

42. Burtsev, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-105.

43. Richard Wraga, letter to the author dated July 7, 1965.

44. Freyenwald, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-88; Curtiss, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-83.

45. The search was made by Richard Wraga, who wrote the author: "On your behalf I examined the files which could have contained references to the Protocols, but was unable to find anything at all. Henri Bint was one of the most important agents at the Paris Okhrana Bureau and maintained, besides, direct contacts with offices in Petersburg. No trace of this material is available at Hoover." (Letter to the author dated July 7, 1965.)

46. Curtiss, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-91. Exception is apparently taken to this conclusion by Richard Wraga. Although Boris Nicolaevsky testified at the Bern trial to the effect that the Protocols were a fabrication, he is currently at Stanford, and Wraga writes that "He [Nicolaevsky] treats with great reserve the allegation that the Okhrana was the principal in the forgery. Marcel Handelsman, my history professor who was considered a first-class expert on Russian modern history and who perished at Auschwitz, was of the same opinion." (Letter to the author dated July 7, 1965.)

47. Henri Rollin, *op. cit.*, p. 32. It is significant that many of the nineteenth-century Russian anarchists and revolutionaries were fascinated by the Society of Jesus, especially Nechayev, whose "conspiracy" figures importantly in Dostoevsky's novel, *The Possessed*.

48. Arendt, *op. cit.*, p. 349, n. 43, cites as outstanding examples of the extensive literature in this field the Chevalier de Malet, *Recherches politiques et historiques qui prouvent l'existence d'une secte révolutionnaires* (1817); E. Lesueur, *La Franc-Maçonnerie Artesienne au 18^e siecle* (1914); and G. Bord, *La Franc-Maçonnerie en France des Origines a 1815* (1908).

49. F. Engels, "The Foreign Policy of Russian Czarism," in Paul W. Blackstock and Bert F. Hoselitz, eds., *The Russian Menace to Europe* (Glencoe, 1952), p. 26.

50. Valentin, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-166.

Chapter 4 / Frauds and Forgeries of the 1920's

1. Geoffrey Bailey, *The Conspirators* (New York, 1960). Geoffrey Bailey is the pen-name of a highly knowledgeable source; see also S. Wolin and R. Slasser, *The Soviet Secret Police* (New York, 1957).

2. For further details and a searching analysis of new evidence bearing on the case, see John Stanhope, *The Cato Street Conspiracy* (London, 1962), *passim*.

3. W. P. and Zelda Coates, *A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations* (London, 1945), I, 52.

4. See 138 H.C. Deb. 5S, Columns 2006 and 2043 (3 March 1921); 139 H.C. Deb. 5S, Columns 272-273 (8 March 1921) and Columns 2334-35 (22 March 1921).

5. Workers' Publications Ltd., 254 Gray's Inn Road, London, W.C.1. The same work appeared a year earlier in French and German, *Les Faussaires contre les Soviets* (Paris, 1926), and *Aus diplomatischen Faelscherwerkstaetten* (Berlin, 1926).

6. Washington, 1961.

7. For a standard work on the Comintern, see Guenther Nollau, *International Communism and World Revolution* (London, 1961).

8. *Vtoroi Kongress Kominterna* (Moscow, 1934), p. 556.

9. Jane Degras, *The Communist International, 1919-1943* (London, 1956), I, 348.
10. Gustav Hilger, *The Incompatible Allies* (New York, 1953), p. 108; E. H. Carr, *Socialism in One Country, 1924-1926* (London, 1964), III, Part 1, p. 14.
11. Hilger, *op. cit.*, p. 109.
12. George F. Kennan, *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin* (Boston, 1960), p. 185. E. H. Carr observes that "Assurances of a complete dissociation between the two institutions [the Soviet government and the Third International] were part of a diplomatic game, and were taken no more seriously by those who gave them than by those who received them." (*Socialism in One Country*, III, Part 1, p. 15.)
13. For the texts of the British and Soviet notes, see *A Section of Papers dealing with the Relations between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government*, Command 2895 (1927), pp. 14-30.
14. Command 2895 (1927), p. 18.
15. *Ibid.*
16. E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923* (London, 1953), III, 345.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 345, n. 1.
18. Command 2895 (1927), pp. 6-7.
19. See State Department Decimal File (Purport Book) 861.00 *passim* for multiple references indicating regular dispatch of this Bulletin.
20. In this connection see Paul W. Blackstock, *The Strategy of Subversion* (Chicago, 1964), pp. 121-141, 235-272, as well as recent memoirs by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Theodore Sorensen.
21. *Anti-Soviet Forgeries*, p. 62. (For an extended analysis of the Zinoviev letter affair see Chapter Six below.)
22. *New York Times*, November 21, 1924.
23. Ruth Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism* (Cambridge, 1948), p. 462.
24. Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (Princeton, 1951), II, 496.
25. *New York Times*, January 10, 1929.
26. *Chicago Tribune* and *New York Times*, February 15, 1925.
27. *Pravda*, July 12, and *Izvestia*, July 13, 1927.
28. *Berliner Tageblatt*, June 5, 1925.
29. See the unpublished article, "The Value of a Forgery," by Natalie Grant (Mrs. Richard Wraga), The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford, and an earlier study of GPU provocations directed against Trotsky entitled "A Thermidorian Amalgam," *The Russian Review*, XXII, No. 3 (July, 1963), 253-273. (The author is indebted to Mr. Wraga for a draft of the first article, enclosed in a letter dated July 7, 1965.)
30. *Izvestia*, July 13, 1927.
31. Kennan, *op. cit.*, p. 230.
32. E. H. Carr, *The Interregnum, 1923-1924* (London, 1954), pp. 251-252.
33. *London Times*, October 29, 1925; Great Britain, Foreign Office, Command No. 2682; *Communist Papers* (1926).
34. Carr, *Socialism in One Country*, III, Part I, p. 19.

35. *Anti-Soviet Forgeries*, pp. 134-137.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 137.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 81, 85, 87, 92.
38. *Pravda*, July 3, 1927.
39. *New York Times*, January 5, 1929.
40. *Ibid.*, January 10, 1929.
41. *Ibid.*
42. *Ibid.*, January 14, 1929.
43. *Ibid.*, March 3, 1929.
44. *Ibid.*, March 3, 4, 21, 24; July 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 1929.
45. *Ibid.*, August 23, 1929.

46. *Vechernaya Moskva*, No. 195, August 26, 1929, translation in State Department Decimal File No. 811.44/26.

47. *New York Times*, August 28, 1929. This fabrication was carried in *Izvestia* and *Pravda*, August 27. Translations of the relevant paragraphs are contained in an Intelligence Service report dated September 3, 1929, from Riga, Latvia, State Department Decimal File No. 811.44/26.

48. For the full text, see State Department Decimal File 811.44/27. The file also contains a complete stenographic report of the trial as recorded for the Berlin communist newspaper *Die Rote Fahne* (The Red Banner), obtained through intelligence sources! (State Department Decimal File No. 811.44/23.)

Chapter 5 / American Recognition of the USSR and the Zinoviev Instructions

1. Thomas A. Bailey, *America Faces Russia* (Ithaca, 1954), p. 248.
2. Robert K. Murray, *Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919-1920* (Minneapolis, 1955), p. 263.
3. According to a pioneer "content analysis" by Walter Lippman and Charles Merz, cited in the *New Republic*, August 11, 1920, p. 299.
4. For typical examples in the National Archives, see State Department Decimal File (Purport Book) 861.00.
5. U.S. Government, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920* (Washington, 1936), III, 463-468.
6. E. M. Carroll, *Soviet Communism and Western Opinion, 1919-1921* (Chapel Hill, 1965), p. 195.
7. E. H. Carr, *The Interregnum, 1923-1924* (London, 1954), pp. 247-248.
8. U.S. Government, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928* (Washington, 1938), II, 788-790.
9. Cited in Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 252.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 788-790.
11. *New York Times*, December 20, 1923.
12. Charles Evans Hughes to President Coolidge, letter dated December 28, 1923, in the Coolidge Papers, Library of Congress, Case File No. 156. Letters enclosing the proposed note and press release were also sent on December 18 and 19, respectively.
13. National Archives, State Department Decimal File No. 811.00 B/220.

14. Jerome Davis to President Coolidge, letter dated December 22, 1923, in the Coolidge Papers, Library of Congress, Case File No. 156A.
15. Y. Steklov, *Izvestia*, December 22, 1923.
16. *Pravda and Izvestia*, December 22, 1923.
17. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928*, II, 790-792.
18. See *Bolshevik Propaganda, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 65th Congress* (Washington, 1919), and Robins' article, "The U.S. in Relation to the European Situation," *Annals of the American Academy*, July 1926.
19. George F. Kennan, *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin* (Boston, 1960), p. 207.
20. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928*, II, 788-790.
21. *Congressional Record*, Vol. LXV, Part I (Senate), December 20, 1923, pp. 445-451.
22. Although the Hughes papers are "restricted," Mr. Lloyd A. Dunlap, Specialist in 20th Century U.S. History at the Library of Congress, was kind enough to make the search at the author's request. Nothing concerning the Zinoviev Instructions was found.
23. *New York Times*, December 20, 1923.
24. National Archives, State Department, Decimal File No. 811.00B.
25. Report No. 1746 with enclosure, dated February 1, 1924 and signed F.W.B. Coleman, National Archives, State Department Index File No. 811.00B/321.
26. The Steklov article on the Comintern, which was used by Hughes in both press releases, was translated and forwarded by Coleman to the State Department on November 27, 1922. This is the only dispatch directly relevant to the problem. State Department Decimal File 861.00/9785.
27. The State Department records on Soviet affairs for this period contain what by present security standards is an amazing mixture of confidential, secret, top secret, and sensitive material which would be handled by entirely separate agencies today.
28. Letter to the author from W. Neil Franklin, Chief Diplomatic, Legal and Fiscal Branch, GSA, National Archives and Records Service, dated September 15, 1965.
29. *Ibid.*
30. Letters from the author to J. Edgar Hoover dated September 20, October 8, and October 10, 1965.
31. Letter from the author to J. Edgar Hoover dated October 10, 1965.
32. *The Worker*, September 15, 1923.
33. Murray, *op. cit.*, p. 277.
34. Cited in William H. Irwin, *How Red Is America* (New York, 1927), p. 133.
35. Murray, *op. cit.*, p. 277. The quotation is from William A. Foster's *From Bryan to Stalin* (New York, 1927).
36. *New York World*, January 6, 1924.

Chapter 6 / The British Zinoviev Letter:**An Intelligence Evaluation**

1. George F. Kennan, *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin* (Boston, 1960), p. 238.
2. 215 H.C. Deb. 5S, column 47.
3. For two typical brief analyses, see Charles Loch Mowat, *Britain Between the Wars, 1918-1940* (London, 1955), pp. 187-194, and George F. Kennan, *op. cit.*, pp. 234-238. For a longer review of the whole affair, see Robert D. Warth, "The Mystery of the Zinoviev Letter," *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, XLIX (1950), 441-453. For a detailed pro-Soviet, anti-Conservative account, see W. P. and Zelda K. Coates, *A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations* (London, 1944), pp. 181-197.
4. Charles Mowat, *op. cit.*, p. 187.
5. Quoted by Warth, *op. cit.*, p. 441.
6. 215 H.C. Deb. 5S, columns 50-51, 56.
7. 214 H.C. Deb. 5S, column 1115.
8. 215 H.C. Deb. 5S, column 56.
9. 215 H.C. Deb. 5S, column 102.
10. 215 H.C. Deb. 5S, column 51.
11. 179 H.C. Deb. 5S, columns 690-691.
12. 179 H.C. Deb. 5S, columns 560-561.
13. 215 H.C. Deb. 5S, column 48.
14. For an account of standard operating procedures in the processing and evaluation of intelligence information, see the author's *The Strategy of Subversion* (Chicago, 1964), pp. 121-141.
15. 179 H.C. Deb. 5S, column 689.
16. 215 H.C. Deb. 5S, column 49.
17. Mowat, *op. cit.*, p. 189; Warth, *op. cit.*, p. 445; Kennan, *op. cit.*, p. 236.
18. Quoted in Warth, *op. cit.*, p. 446.
19. 215 H.C. Deb. 5S, column 104.
20. As cited by Austen Chamberlain, 215 H.C. Deb. 5S, column 65.
21. 215 H.C. Deb. 5S, column 99.
22. 215 H.C. Deb. 5S, columns 77-78.
23. 179 H.C. Deb. 5S, column 689, and 215 H.C. Deb. 5S, column 67.
24. 179 H.C. Deb. 5S, column 311.
25. 215 H.C. Deb. 5S, columns 90-91.
26. 179 H.C. Deb. 5S, column 674; Warth, *op. cit.*, p. 445; Mowat, *op. cit.*, p. 193.
27. 215 H.C. Deb. 5S, column 83—the testimony of the obviously well-informed Communist M.P., S. Saklatvala.
28. 215 H.C. Deb. 5S, column 71, for Thurn's testimony. See also Marlowe's complete account in the *London Observer*, March 4, 1928.
29. *London Observer*, March 4, 1928.
30. 215 H.C. Deb. 5S, column 83.
31. Ruth Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism* (Cambridge, 1948), p. 463.
32. 179 H.C. Deb. 5S, column 69.

33. 215 H.C. Deb. 5S, column 52; see also 179 H.C. Deb. 5S, columns 741, 745.

34. Cf. *Izvestia*, September-October 1924, Harvard College Library Microfilm collection. On September 19, 1924 (not the 20th, as indicated by Chamberlain), the paper also carried a brief news report from Finland under the headline, "Finland Participates in League for Struggle with Third International." (*Ibid.*, p. 3, columns 1-2.)

35. 215 H.C. Deb. 5S, columns 62-63. Inkpin and several other Communist leaders were arrested and jailed after a raid on party headquarters in October 1925. See the *London Times*, October 29, 1925.

36. Warth, *op. cit.*, p. 451.

37. Fischer, *op. cit.*, pp. 462-463.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 461.

39. See Mowat, *op. cit.*, p. 187; Warth, *op. cit.*, p. 445; and Coates, *op. cit.*, pp. 184, 196.

40. Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (Princeton, 1951), II, 496.

41. *New York Times*, March 23, 1929.

42. Such evidence was lacking or it would almost certainly have been included in the chapter on the Zinoviev letter in *Anti-Soviet Forgeries* (see Chapter Four above).

43. P. Cambray, *Game of Politics* (London, 1932), p. 83 (cited by Mowat, *op. cit.*, p. 188).

44. Warth, *op. cit.*, p. 453.

45. Ewen Edward Samuel Montagu, *The Man Who Never Was* (Philadelphia, 1954).

Chapter 7 / Frauds and Forgeries of the Classic Cold War Period

1. Moscow, London, and New York, 1948.

2. Lewis B. Namier, *Europe in Decay: A Study in Disintegration, 1936-1940* (London, 1950), p. 206.

3. Namier, *op. cit.*, pp. 215-216.

4. See A. M. Nekrich, "Politika Anglii v. period 'Strannoi Voiny,'" *Novaya i Noveishaya Istoria*, No. 3 (1960), 55-71.

5. Department of State Publication 3023, edited by Raymond J. Sontag and James Beddie (Washington, 1948).

6. See the article by V. Mayevsky in *Pravda*, March 20, 1955, and *Neues Deutschland*, March 19, 1955.

7. *New York Times*, March 7 and 8, and July 31, 1952.

8. *London Times*, January 16, 1948; *New York Times*, January 17, 1948. An indirect summary of Plan M, indicating an advance tip-off through intelligence sources, was contained in Jack Raymond's dispatch dated January 11, Berlin, published in the *New York Times*, January 12, 1948.

9. *London Times*, January 17, 1948.

10. See the *New York Times*, October 7 and November 27, 1947.

11. *London Times*, January 19, 1948.

12. *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), Fifth Series, Vol. 446, January 21, 1948, column 187.

13. *New York Times*, April 11, 1948.

14. *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), Fifth Series, Vol. 449, April 19, 1948, pp. 1434-1435.

15. *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), Fifth Series, Vol. 450, April 26, 1948, column 16.

16. Kenneth Paul Adler, Morris Janowitz, and Douglas Waples, *Competitive Broadcasting to Germany*, p. 220. (An exhaustive content analysis project submitted to the Department of State by the Committee on Communication, University of Chicago, 1950).

17. Tables showing the reappearance of these stereotypes are included in the Appendices to Intelligence Research Project No. 6317, *Analysis of Soviet and French Communist Propaganda*, Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Washington, August 10, 1961.

18. MSS, *The Practice of Stalinism* and *The Foundations of Stalinism*, undated photostatic copies. (The author had occasion to consult with Carew Hunt during the preparation of *The Russian Menace to Europe*.)

19. A "knowledgeable source," who apparently saw both the British and American "spot" intelligence evaluations of Protocol M at the time of its acquisition, believes that its publication was "a fortuitous mistake" due simply to "the bad judgment or carelessness of British Intelligence," without any calculation of the risk of later exposure, and "with the resulting advantages far outweighing the disadvantages." According to this view, the advantages were: "First, the protocol damaged the strike movement in the Ruhr; second, the protocol forced the Western Military Governments in Germany to give high-level attention to alleviating the unrealistic work loads and ration levels in the Ruhr area; third, the protocol suggested that the Cominform was an insidious, plotting organization—like the Comintern—so that the Cominform was thereafter tainted, despite its relatively harmless propaganda functions in reality; fifth, the protocol alerted the Western powers to a forthcoming hardening of relations in Germany, which tended to convince the French, in late January 1948, that they should join in tripartite negotiations leading toward creation of a West German state; sixth, the handling of the "Protocol M" affair by H.M.G. left the impression that the British government was honest and sincere, even if, from time to time, mistaken." (Letter from source to the author dated February 7, 1966.) Even if one accepts the main thrust of this argument, it is perhaps too much to credit all the events described to a single cause. Historical events are rarely that simple, and as pointed out above, Protocol M was only one of several rumored "Cominform-inspired" plans which were highly publicized during the fall of 1947. (See Note 10 above.)

20. (OKW/1484) Abw. II/1A, Nr. 712/5.43 dated 20.4.43.

21. John C. Clews, *Communist Propaganda Techniques* (London, 1964), p. 115.

22. For an excellent description and evaluation of the bacterial warfare campaign, see the case history in Clews, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-270.

23. See Philip Selznick, *The Organizational Weapon*, Project RAND, R-201 (Santa Monica, Calif., 1952), pp. 297-308.

24. Clews, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-199.

25. Clews, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-200.

Chapter 8 / Cold War Paper Mills and Personalized Intelligence

1. Paul Leverkuehn, *German Military Intelligence* (New York, 1954), pp. 79-80.

2. In this connection, see the author's discussion of "The Problem of Reliable Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence," in *The Strategy of Subversion* (Chicago, 1964), pp. 121-142.

3. *London Times*, October 29, 1953.

4. *New York Times*, October 26, 1953.

5. *London Times*, November 4, 1953.

6. *Ibid.*, November 9, 1953.

7. Kenneth Paul Adler, Morris Janowitz, and Douglas Waples, *Competitive Broadcasting to Germany*, Mimeograph MS, Committee on Communication, University of Chicago, 1950.

8. *Who's Who 1964* (London and New York, 1964), p. 787. The biography lists "Special visit of enquiry to Mussolini, Dr. Benes, Dr. Schuschnigg, 1936; to King Boris of Bulgaria, etc., 1938; to Italy and King Boris, 1939-40." The *London Times* has reported on similar visits by de Courcy in the postwar period—to Amsterdam to visit Princess Juliana and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands (*London Times*, April 16, 1946); to France, where he was entertained at dinner by Queen Victoria of Spain (*London Times*, August 3, 1949); to Italy, where he entertained King Umberto of Italy at dinner (*London Times*, February 25, 1950).

9. *New York Times*, September 24, 1949.

10. *Ibid.*, January 6, 1950.

11. *Ibid.*, January 8, 1950.

12. *Ibid.*, January 9, 1950.

13. *Facts on File*, February 3-9, 1950, p. 42 J.

14. *Ibid.*, April 14-20, 1950, p. 125 MN.

15. Kenneth de Courcy, "Russia's Next Move," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, XVII, No. 5 (December 15, 1950), 137.

16. A Russian emigré organization, the NTS (*Narodno-Trudovogo-Soyuza*), claims to maintain a network of secret agents inside the USSR and elsewhere in Central Europe.

17. On the U.S. intelligence community, see Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (New York, 1963).

18. For coverage of these events see the *London Times* for December 14, 1963, June 20 and August 1, 1964.

19. *London Times*, July 31, 1952.

20. Boris Souvarine, *Est et Ouest*, No. 144 (January 16-31, 1956), 15-16. On the Bessedovsky school of historians, see the discussion of "Books for Idiots" below.

21. *New York Times*, November 10, 1961.

22. John Kobler, "He Runs a Private OSS," *The Saturday Evening Post*, Vol. 227 (May 21, 1955), 141.

23. Edward T. Folliard, *Washington Post*, November 16, 1953 (the second in a series of three special articles on the ISI).

24. Spencer Klaw, "International Private Eye: Adventures of Colonel Amoss," *The Reporter*, X (February 2, 1954), 30.

25. Kobler, *op. cit.*, p. 142.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*, p. 141.

Chapter 9 / Peaceful Coexistence and Political Warfare Forgeries

1. *Communist Forgeries* (Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, 1961).
2. Helms, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-20.
4. See Paul W. Blackstock, *The Strategy of Subversion* (Chicago, 1964), *passim*.
5. Helms, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.
6. *New York Times*, September 3, 1960.
7. *Ibid.*, August 19, 1961.
8. *Ibid.*, August 20, 1961.
9. Tuebingen and Stuttgart, 1960.
10. *New York Times*, January 10, 1962.
11. *Washington Post*, January 12, 1962.
12. *Christian Science Monitor*, December 26, 1964.
13. *Washington Post*, March 13, 1963.
14. *Ibid.*, June 27, 1963.
15. *Est et Ouest*, No. 195 (May 16-31, 1958), and No. 212 (March 19-31, 1959).
16. *Na Putyakh k Termidoru: Vospominanii Byvshago Sovyetskogo Diplomata* (Paris, 1931).
17. For the best account in English, see George Fischer, *Soviet Opposition to Stalin* (Cambridge, 1952). For a critical bibliographical note, see Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945, A Study of Occupation Policies* (London and New York, 1957), p. 553, n. 1.
18. Victor Kravchenko, *I Chose Freedom: The Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Official* (New York, 1946).
19. *London Times Literary Supplement*, October 12, 1951.
20. *B.E.I.P.I. (Bulletin of Associations d'Etudes et d'Informations Politiques Internationales)*, No. 57 (December 1-15, 1951); *Est et Ouest*, No. 139 (November 1-15, 1955), and No. 212 (March 16-31, 1959). (Since these journals were edited by Boris Souvarine, the evaluations cited in notes 33-40 are presumably to be attributed to Souvarine unless otherwise indicated.)
21. C. L. Sulzberger, "Forgery as a Cold War Weapon," *New York Times*, July 19, 1961.
22. *B.E.I.P.I.*, No. 22 (March 16-31, 1950).
23. "Faussaires démasqués," *Est et Ouest*, No. 212 (March 16-31, 1959).
24. *Est et Ouest*, No. 106 (March 16-31, 1954), No. 196 (June 1-15, 1958), and No. 212 (March 16-31, 1959).
25. Victor Alexandrov, *The Tukhachevsky Affair* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964).
26. See Paul W. Blackstock, *The Strategy of Subversion*, pp. 209-213, for an evaluation of Naujocks' testimony on "the Gleiwitz incident."

27. Boris Souvarine, "V. Alexandrov, An 'Historian' of the Bessedovsky School," *Est et Ouest*, No. 196 (June 1-15, 1958).
28. *The New Statesman and Nation*, July 30, 1955.
29. Maxim Litvinov, *Notes For A Journal*, Introduction by E. H. Carr, Prefatory Note by General Walter Bedell Smith (New York, 1955).
30. Litvinov, *op. cit.*, p. 258.
31. John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command* (London, 1962), pp. 331, 718, n. 19.
32. Quoted by C. L. Sulzberger, "Forgery as a Cold War Weapon," *New York Times*, July 19, 1961.
33. Quoted by Victor Zorza, *Washington Post*, November 16, 1965.
34. See *The Observer Weekend Review*, November 7, 14, and 21, 1965; *Washington Post*, October 31–November 15, 1965, daily.
35. *Washington Post*, May 16-17, 1963, and April 24, 1964.
36. Blackstock, *op. cit.*, p. 64; for a discussion of the political warfare significance of defection and re-defection see *ibid.*, pp. 61-65.
37. *Washington Post*, November 26, 1965.
38. *Washington Post*, November 15, 1965.
39. Victor Zorza, *Washington Post*, November 15, 1965 (the first section of a two-part article appearing on November 15-16, 1965).
40. Letters to the *Washington Post* by Frank Gibney ("Gibney Defends Penkovsky Papers," November 17, 1965) and Peter Deriabin ("Penkovsky Papers Defended," November 19, 1965).
41. Victor Zorza, *Washington Post*, November 15, 1965.
42. Peter Deriabin, *Washington Post*, November 19, 1965.
43. *Ibid.*
44. Victor Zorza, *Washington Post*, November 16, 1965.
45. *Ibid.*, November 15, 1965.
46. Frank Gibney, *Washington Post*, November 17, 1965.
47. Victor Zorza, *Washington Post*, November 16, 1965.
48. Peter Deriabin, *Washington Post*, November 19, 1965.
49. Victor Zorza, *Washington Post*, November 16, 1965.
50. *Ibid.*, November 15, 1965.
51. In this regard it is important to make a distinction between Soviet literary journals and newspapers or other media used as regular outlets of the KGB-inspired defamation and disinformation campaign. The latter continued unabated "in the worst traditions of the Cold War" throughout 1965. (Letter to the author from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, dated February 8, 1966.)
52. George F. Kennan, *Washington Post*, February 11, 1966.
53. Samuel Sharp, review article, *The Nation*, February 14, 1966.

Chapter 10 / The Occupation Fund Documents:

Fresh Historical Evidence

1. Charles and Barbara Jelavich, "The Occupation Fund Documents: A Diplomatic Forgery," *The American Slavic and East European Review*, XII, No. 3 (October, 1953).
2. R. Léonoff, editor (Berlin, 1893). The short title *Documents secrets*, abbreviated *D.S.*, is used hereafter.

3. B. H. Sumner and William Langer accept the documents as "probably genuine." Charles and Barbara Jelavich have published two articles, in the October 1953 and 1955 issues of *The American Slavic and East European Review*, purporting to prove the documents to be forgeries by an appeal to the dubious circumstances surrounding their origin and to selected Russian authorities. The present author published an intelligence evaluation of the collection indicating an assessment ranging from probably authentic to "almost certainly genuine" in the case of certain of the documents (*The American Slavic and East European Review*, December 1954).

4. For a statement of some of these principles, see Paul W. Blackstock, *The Strategy of Subversion* (Chicago, 1964), pp. 300-321.

5. Jelavich, *op. cit.* (1953), pp. 345-346.

6. Also see Paul W. Blackstock, "The Occupation Fund Documents: A Reassessment of 'A Crude and Ignorant Forger,'" *The American Slavic and East European Review*, XIII, No. 3 (December 1954), 535-548, for a preliminary application of communications analysis.

7. Since the case is best presented by Charles and Barbara Jelavich, their previous articles on the subject are quoted extensively with their permission and that of the publisher. (Letter to the author dated September 10, 1964.) Jelavich, *op. cit.* (1955), pp. 297-400.

8. Jelavich, *op. cit.* (1953), pp. 348-349.

9. Jelavich, *op. cit.* (1955), pp. 400-401.

10. Sofia file, March 3, 1893, p. 112, Wangenheim to Caprivi, No. 23.

11. Great Britain, Public Record Office, Political Despatches, Lowther to Rosebery, No. 128 (Sofia, September 6, 1892) as cited by Jelavich, *op. cit.* (1955), p. 399 (see above).

12. Sofia file, Wangenheim to Caprivi, No. 194, August 15, 1892, pp. 81-82.

13. Sofia file, p. 84, contains a clipping of the article dated August 18, 1892.

14. Sofia file, Wangenheim to Caprivi, August 15, 1892, No. 194, pp. 81-82.

15. Sofia file, Wangenheim to Caprivi, September 15, 1892, pp. 97-98. Included is a clipping of the article as it appeared in the *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 739, September 16, 1892.

16. Many of the same documents were also published in the Sofia *Neue Freie Presse* in mid-July 1892, and at least one of them in the *Kölnische Zeitung*. For the most part, these documents were published as made available for their news value, without reference to their original chronology, and with few exceptions without exact dates or despatch numbers. They can be identified, however, by the number assigned to them in the carefully edited chronological series which make up the later collection of *Documents secrets*, in which most of them are properly dated. The following table indicates basic publication data (as indicated by the Sofia file and the editor's notes in *Documents secrets*):

<i>Svoboda</i> Date	<i>D.S. Numbers</i>
July 9, 1892	23, 159
July 14, 1892	193, 194
July 20, 1892	163-167 and 169-171
July 27, 1892	59-62
August 2, 1892	168, 172-175 and 182

As indicated by the editor of the *Documents secrets*, R. Léonoff, the

Kölnische Zeitung published D.S. No. 171 before the entire collection was edited, and the *Sofia Neue Freie Presse*, D.S. Nos. 23, 109, 159, 163, 172, 193, and 194. (*Op. cit.*, p. vii.)

17. It has been authoritatively estimated, for example, that the notorious Polish agent, Sosnovsky, spent more money annually for his operations in Berlin in 1927 than the entire yearly budget of German military intelligence at the time. Paul Leverkuehn, *German Military Intelligence* (London, 1952), pp. 79-81.

18. The Sofia file for August 9, 1892, p. 74, contains a clipping of the article.

19. Sofia file, p. 94, contains a clipping of the *Moniteur* article.

20. S. Skazkin, *Konets Austro-russko-germanskogo Soyuz* (Moscow, 1928), p. 238.

21. V. N. Lamzdorf, *Dnevnik, 1891-92* (Moscow, 1934), p. 355.

22. The Sofia file for August — (precise date unreadable), p. 85, contains a clipping of the article.

23. *Ibid.*, September 6, 1892, p. 88.

24. *Pravda*, March 20, 1955 (article by V. Mayevsky), Radio Moscow in English, May 22, 1955, 0001 hrs. GMT.

25. *Neues Deutschland*, March 19, 1955.

26. Johannes Lipsius, *et al.*, *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914* (Berlin, 1924), VII, 135. Note that only the fragments in italics are cited by Jelavich.

27. *Op. cit.* (1955), p. 401. (Italics added.)

28. The total excludes repeated citations to a given despatch and most references to private letters. The numbering systems used preclude exact totals.

29. Skazkin's fifty citations which *do* include despatch numbers are representative and indicate his principal area of interest. The largest single block of fourteen such numbered messages are those from P. A. Saburov, the Russian ambassador in Berlin, to N. K. Giers, the Russian Foreign Minister. The next largest block of eleven messages are from the special Russian diplomatic agent in Sofia, A. L. Ionin, to Giers. Information copies of these high-level reports were not sent to the Russian consulate at Rushchuk and thus do not appear in the *Documents secrets* collection. (However, it appears that Ionin kept lower-level Russian agents informed on policy matters from time to time by such confidential letters as that of November 18, 1883 to the consul-general at Rushchuk, reproduced as *Documents Secrets* No. 55.)

30. For an analysis of evidence from the Panica and Mantov files, see the present author's original article, *op. cit.*, pp. 540-545.

31. See the extended analysis in the author's original article, pp. 539-548.

Chapter 11 / The Occupation Fund Documents:

Pre-Content and Communications Analysis

1. Jelavich, *op. cit.* (1955), p. 393.

2. Two additional typographical errors in despatch numbers are found in the *Documents secrets* collection, but they do not affect the statistical patterns or analysis presented: (1) D.S. No. 71 bears the despatch number

155 instead of 154 as given in the Russian edition (*Okkupatsionnii Fond*, p. 126); (2) *D.S.* No. 152 bears the despatch number 152 instead of 159 in the Russian text (*op. cit.*, p. 187).

3. The first example is the series of messages from the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, P. A. Saburov, and the Foreign Minister, Giers, in St. Petersburg.

Berlin–St. Petersburg Messages, Saburov–Giers

<i>Date</i>	<i>Despatch No.</i>	<i>Skazkin Citation</i>
9 Apr 1880	3	p. 136, n. 1
9 Apr 1880	8	p. 138, n. 2
8 May 1880	14	p. 136, n. 1
31 Aug 1880	19	p. 140, n. 1
1 Nov 1880	29	p. 142, n. 2
16 Nov 1880	32	p. 142, n. 3
28 Dec 1880	33	p. 148, n. 1
28 Jan 1881	3	p. 152, n. 1
31 Mar 1881	20	p. 171, n. 3
25 Apr 1881	1	p. 171, n. 5
25 Apr 1881	2	p. 172, n. 1
25 Apr 1881	5	p. 91, n. 1
15 May 1881	2	p. 173, n. 1
10 Dec 1881	136	p. 182, n. 1
25 Jan 1883	2	p. 334, n. 1
25 Jan 1883	3	p. 334, n. 2

A second example drawn from Skazkin's citations is the series of messages from M. A. Khitrovo, the Russian diplomatic agent in Sofia, Bulgaria (later Ambassador in Bucharest), to Giers.

Sofia–St. Petersburg Messages, Khitrovo–Giers

<i>Date</i>	<i>Despatch No.</i>	<i>Skazkin Citation</i>
12 May 1881	60	p. 272, n. 4
19 May 1881	61	p. 245, n. 3
11 July 1881	81	p. 250, n. 1
31 July 1881	88	p. 251, n. 1
29 Dec 1881	119	p. 279, n. 3
31 Jan 1882	7	p. 280, n. 1
31 Jan 1882	8	p. 275, n. 4
31 Jan 1882	15	p. 263, n. 4
31 Jan 1882	16	pp. 273-274, n. 1
31 Jan 1882	17 *	pp. 273-274, n. 1

* The discrepancy in the despatch numbers for the messages sent on 31 Jan 1882 is probably due to the fact that the first two (Nos. 7 and 8) were sent to Giers through Foreign Office channels and the last three (Nos. 15, 16, and 17) through the Asiatic Department, and are thus located in the respective record collections of those two agencies. (See Skazkin's citations as indicated in the table.)

A third example provided by Skazkin's citations is the series of messages from the special Russian diplomatic agent in Sofia, A. S. Ionin, to Giers:

Sofia–St. Petersburg Messages, Ionin-Giers

<i>Date</i>	<i>Despatch No.</i>	<i>Skazkin Citation</i>
16 Aug 1883	1	p. 300, n. 4
19 Aug 1883	3	p. 302, n. 2
21 Aug 1883	4	p. 301, n. 1
10 Sept 1883	5	p. 307, n. 4
11 Sept 1883	6	p. 318, n. 4
12 Sept 1883	7a	p. 322, n. 4
13 Sept 1883	8	p. 322, n. 5
Oct 1883	13	p. 318, n. 1
24 Oct 1883	20	p. 236, n. 1
6 Nov 1883	21	p. 327, n. 1
25 Dec 1883	33	p. 329, n. 4

To complete the picture of Sofia–St. Petersburg communications, the table below lists additional messages originating with other Russian agents in Sofia (Lishin, Arsenyev, and Koyander):

Additional Sofia–St. Petersburg Messages

<i>Correspondents</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Despatch No.</i>	<i>Skazkin Citation</i>
Lishin–Giers	8 Nov 1880	101	p. 269, n. 3
"	16 Nov 1880	105	p. 269, n. 3
"	23 Apr 1881	49	p. 264, n. 3
Arsenyev-Giers	26 June 1882	48	p. 210, n. 2
"	16 Aug 1882	65	p. 238, n. 1
"	5 Dec 1882	149	p. 286, n. 4
Koyander-Giers	23 Oct 1884	49	p. 211, n. 1

But what of the despatch numbers cited by Skazkin for messages from the Russian Foreign Minister, Giers, to diplomatic posts abroad? Do they fall into serial patterns comparable to those found in the *Documents secrets* collection? Here again the answer is yes, although there are no single serial blocks as extensive as those found in the distribution tables shown above for the Jakobson collection. The following is a composite table of messages from St. Petersburg to various field posts with sources and addresses indicated.

St. Petersburg-Field Communications

<i>Location</i> <i>Source-Addressee</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Despatch No.</i>	<i>Skazkin Citation</i>
Sofia			
Giers-Khitrovo	17 Jan 1882	9	p. 280, n. 1
Giers-Kumany	11 Mar 1882	10	p. 238, n. 3
Giers-Arsenyev	26 June 1883	2606 *	p. 209, n. 5
Zinoviev-Ionin	30 July 1883	97	p. 282, n. 1
Zinoviev-Giers-Ionin	29 Aug 1883	110	p. 322, n. 2
Giers-Ionin	7 Oct 1883	155	p. 318, n. 2
Giers-Pr. Alexander	22 Oct 1883	14 †	p. 327, n. 1
Zinoviev-Giers-Ionin	19 Nov 1883	121	p. 329, n. 2
Vienna			
Giers-Oubril	18 Feb 1882	169	p. 209, n. 3
Giers-Fonton	5 Aug 1883		pp. 297-298, n. 1

Finally, the Skazkin citations also include a scattering of despatch numbers on messages to St. Petersburg from various Russian diplomatic representatives in Vienna, as indicated in the following table:

Vienna-St. Petersburg Messages

<i>Source-Addressee</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Despatch No.</i>	<i>Skazkin Citation</i>
Gorchakov-Novikov	20 Jan 1879	19	p. 65, n. 2
Novikov-Giers	15 Oct 1879	119	p. 90, n. 1
Shepelov-Giers	26 Feb 1881	41 ‡	p. 264, n. 2
Oubril-Giers	18 Mar 1881	58	p. 264, n. 4
Lobanov-Giers	23 Apr 1883	29	pp. 290-291, n. 1

4. The other fourteen examples of technical cross references:

1. *D.S.* No. 62 (Rushchuk to Asiatic Department), 12 May 1884, No. 146, refers to "your secret communication of the 4th of this month, No. 930." The reference is *D.S.* 61 (Asiatic Department to Rushchuk), 4 May 1884, No. 930 (see Tables 2 and 5 respectively). The reference is consistent with the serial system used for such messages (see Table 2). (Both *D.S.* 61 and 62 were originally published in *Svoboda*, 27 July 1892, without despatch serial numbers!)

* From inspection of Table 1 (St. Petersburg Circular Despatches, *Document secrets* series), it is clear that this message was either sent as one of the circular series or in the same system, another striking confirmation of the authenticity of the Jakobson collection.

† From the low message number of this despatch to Crown Prince Alexander of Battenburg, it is clear that such infrequent messages were numbered separately.

‡ Skazkin's footnote reference here is confusing: "Vienne I (*i ocoben* Vienne V) A.K.M. Vienne I dĕp. 26 fĕvr./10 mars 81, No. 110, Memorandum ad No. 41, *ibid.*, L. 112-130." Here the number "110" probably refers to the cardboard box (*papka*) number and the "41" to the despatch number, since the next Vienna-St. Petersburg despatch number of March 1881 is 58.

2. D.S. No. 69 (Sofia to Rushchuk), 25 August 1885, No. 835, refers to an enclosed enciphered letter "from the *aide-de-camp*, General Vanowski to the Minister of War in Bulgaria, Major-General Prince Kantakuzin" of 28 August 1885, No. 8027. The reference (to a very high number) is consistent with the serial system used for such military messages.
3. D.S. No. 90 (Asiatic Department to Rushchuk), 2 December 1885, No. 1283, refers to message "from the State Security Police No. 10758 of 2 December." The reference (again to a very high number) is consistent with the serial system used for such State Security Police messages.
4. D.S. No. 93 (Asiatic Department to Rushchuk), 2 April 1886, No. 435, refers to a "secret communication of 4 March 1886, No. 36" (Rushchuk to Asiatic Department). This message is *not* included in the *Documents secrets* collection, but the reference is entirely consistent with the serial system indicated in D.S. No. 92 (Rushchuk to Asiatic Department), 20 March 1885, No. 45 (see Table 5).
5. D.S. No. 105 (Asiatic Department to Rushchuk), 22 August 1886 (no despatch number given), refers to an "Asiatic Department circular of 5 May 1885, No. 1469." This circular was catalogued by *mistake* by the editors of the *Documents secrets* as D.S. No. 67 (Asiatic Department to Rushchuk), 5 May 1885, and thus appears as another anomaly (not previously analyzed) in Table 2 above. The reference is, of course, consistent.
6. D.S. 165 (Asiatic Department to Bucharest), 18 October 1887, refers to "your communication of the 10th of this month, No. 515," a correct reference to D.S. 164 (Bucharest to Asiatic Department), 10 October 1887, No. 515 (Table 4).
7. D.S. 174 (Asiatic Department to Bucharest), 10 February 1888, refers to "Secret Communication No. 67." The reference, a correct one, is to D.S. 173 (Bucharest to Asiatic Department), 23 January 1888 (see Table 4).
8. D.S. 185 (Asiatic Department to Bucharest), 13 December 1888, No. 2305, refers to "your secret communication of 7 November 1888, No. 405," again a correct reference to D.S. 184 (see Table 4).
9. D.S. 208 (Bucharest to Asiatic Department), 5 September 1889, No. 304, refers to "your secret communication of 28 August 1889, No. 1124," another correct reference to D.S. 207 (see Table 3).
10. D.S. No. 214 (Bucharest to Asiatic Department), 8 October 1889, No. 378, refers to "secret letter of 20 September 1880, No. 1253," a correct reference to D.S. 213 (see Table 3).
11. D.S. 221 (Asiatic Department to Bucharest), 31 December 1889, No. 3406, refers to "a secret communication of this month, No. 610," a correct reference to D.S. 220 (see Table 4).
12. D.S. 233 (Asiatic Department to Bucharest), 30 April 1890, refers to "a communication from the Director of the State Police of the 28th of this month, No. 4279," which is *not* included in *Documents secrets*, but the number cited (an unusually high one) is consistent with the State Security Police serial system.

13. D.S. 235 (Bucharest to Asiatic Department), 11 May 1890, refers to a "communication of the 10th of this month, No. 172," a correct reference to D.S. 234 (see Table 4).
14. D.S. No. 239 (Asiatic Department to Bucharest), 15 June 1890, No. 1358, refers to "a confidential letter of 11 May, No. 173," a correct reference to D.S. 173 (see Table 4).

Appendix 1 / The Sisson Documents

1. U.S. Committee on Public Information, George Creel (chairman), *The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy* ("War Information Series," No. 20 [Washington, October, 1918]).

2. These originals were, with one exception, all documents purporting to have originated from the German offices. For all the Russian ones, except Document No. 3 in the published series, he had only the photographs.

3. The *New York Times*, September 16, 1918, concluded from the documents that "the Bolsheviks . . . have ruled [Russia] as German valets, and are despicable."

4. *The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy*, pp. 29-30. The reference in the Harper and Jameson report to "fifty-three" documents is to be explained by the fact that one document was numbered 37A, so that the numbers of the fifty-four documents in the main series ran only to fifty-three.

5. Elizabeth Donnan and Leo F. Stark (eds.), *An Historical World: Selections from the Correspondence of John Franklin Jameson* (Philadelphia, 1956), letters of Jan. 24, 1919 to Arthur I. Andrew and of Oct. 30, 1918 to Andrew C. McLaughlin.

6. Paul V. Harper (ed.), *The Russia I Believe In: The Memoirs of Samuel N. Harper* (Chicago, 1945), p. 112.

7. Samuel N. Harper MSS, University of Chicago Library.

8. National Archives, Washington, Sisson documents file, letter, White House Secretary Tumulty to Arthur Bullard, Dec. 20, 1920.

9. See captured German foreign office documents in the National Archives, Washington; particularly microfilm reels 1123 and 1125.

10. Note for example: Ludendorff's obvious surprise on learning of the first Soviet armistice approach (*ibid.*, telegram, Nov. 21, 1917 from *Grosses Hauptquartier* to foreign office, reel 1123); Kühlmann's wire to Mirbach in Petrograd in beginning of January telling him to be prepared to leave, because negotiations might soon be broken off (*ibid.*); Kühlmann's admission in mid-January in a telegram to Zimmermann at the foreign office that he had no means of insisting on better treatment of the German Balts by the Russian Communists but would take the matter up at Brest-Litovsk as soon as he could (reel 1125); and particularly the flat rejection by the German foreign office, on January 24, 1918, of a suggestion emanating from intermediaries in Stockholm that a disguised loan to the Bolsheviks might expedite the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk (reel 9300 H, letter Erzberger to Baron v. Bergen, Jan. 22, 1918, text made available to me by a friend working on the German documents on deposit in England).

11. See published series entitled *Die Ursachen des Deutschen Zusammenbruchs im Jahre 1918*, Albrecht Philipp (ed.) (Berlin, 1925). The actual files of this investigation, containing a good deal of confidential and unpublished material, are also in the captured German foreign office documents; they, too, appear to contain no reference whatsoever to any relationship such as that suggested by the Sisson documents, and nothing that would support the thesis that such a relationship could have existed.

12. "NKID v 1917-om godu" [The Narkomindel in 1917], *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhisn*, No. 10 (1927).

13. A. Bauermeister, *Spies Break Through* (London, 1934).

14. Here are some examples:

Document 5: Lenin was not in Kronstadt in July 1917.

Document 7: Martov was not a Bolshevik, and would scarcely have been included in such a list.

Document 9: Shindler, Keberlein, and Diese, shown as German agents in Vladivostok, had all left that city years earlier.

Document 15: Trotsky's alleged statement at Brest-Litovsk is sheerest nonsense, as the official records of the negotiations show.

Document 16: Passage through Finland was at that time extremely difficult even for bona fide Allied diplomats.

Document 17: Schneur, a real person, had insinuated himself onto the first Soviet armistice delegation and had later tried to seize control at army headquarters upon Dukhonin's murder. He was at this time, and throughout most of January and February, in prison and under investigation in Petrograd.

Document 19: There was, at this time, no Japanese "occupational detachment" in Siberia.

Documents 22 and 23: Vladivostok was not yet fully in Bolshevik hands, and Allied warships were at anchor in the roadstead; the German naval command would have been extremely frivolous in ordering disassembled submarines to be sent to such a place.

Document 27: The British and French missions, as well as a large part of the American staff, actually left Petrograd for good that very day, which makes this communication rather redundant.

Document 37A: The captured German documents reveal no conversation of this nature whatsoever between General Hoffmann and Trotsky.

Document 43: This is in part simply a restatement of the German terms at Brest-Litovsk; the remainder of it is a vast oversimplification of a very complicated situation.

Document 53: That there was a division of the German General Staff in Helsinki in 1916 is on a par with the suggestion that there was such a division in Petrograd in 1918.

The above are only a few random selections. They could be matched by many more.

15. *Die Entlarvung der "Deutsch-Bolschewistischen Verschwörung" mit einem Vorwort des deutschen Ministerpräsidenten Phillip Scheidemann, Herausgegeben vom Dr. Ernst Bischoff* (Berlin, 1919).

16. Harper was greatly disturbed by Colonel Smith's letter and pointed out, in a memorandum he attached to it, that this "certainly" cast doubt on the genuineness of the documents (Sisson documents file).

17. One, dated October 25, 1917, even refers to the existence of the Soviet government, although the date of the revolution was November 7-8, New Style—or October 25-26, Old Style.

18. Report of Wilfred Mark Webb, dated Mar. 17, 1918, Sisson documents file.

19. The British experts, on the other hand, had at least two of the Sisson series, probably more. As evidence of labored execution the Bauer signature on Document No. 12 is a striking example.

20. Sisson documents file.

21. Document No. 29 contains two words and initials supposed to have been executed by Dzerzhinski; Documents 26 and 27 contain similar handwriting and initials by Trotsky. Documents 3 and 32 have signatures by Joffe.

22. New York, 1935.

23. Of the Appendix documents no typed originals or photographs appear to be available in the National Archives; hence this test could not be applied to them.

24. The reader who has access only to the published pamphlet, *German-Bolshevik Conspiracy*, may wish to note as an example the fac-similes of Document 3 (the body, on p. 6, not the annotation), supposed to have been produced by Soviet foreign office officials, and Document 14 (p. 11), from the "Nachrichten-Bureau." Both were typed on machine Number 1, which had a tendency to blur the lower left-hand corners of the capital letters, particularly the K, and the lower portion of the letter ß.

25. James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, *Words That Won the War* (Princeton, N.J., 1939), p. 319; telegram No. 2044, Sept. 19, 1918, 10:00 P.M., from Ambassador Page in London to the department of state.

26. Edgar Sisson, *One Hundred Red Days: A Personal Chronicle of the Bolshevik Revolution* (New Haven, 1931).

27. Copies of the letters of authorization for this purpose, given to Semenov by the "provisional government of the North Caucasus," will be found in Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, the David R. Francis MSS.

28. There is some evidence that such a group did indeed exist, and that its efforts were productive. An intercept from the Brest-Litovsk telegraph channel to Petrograd, contained in the Sisson documents file, bears every evidence of authenticity. There is also some evidence that the material produced by this group was utilized in the preparation of the Sisson documents. This enabled the authors of the documents to incorporate authentic information not yet generally known and naturally served to enhance greatly the impression of authenticity, particularly when some of the items were confirmed by subsequent revelations.

29. New York, 1922. Less well-known works of this nature were: *Man and Mystery in Asia* (London, 1924); and *From President to Prison* (London, 1925).

30. In the mid-twenties, the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin sharply challenged the truthfulness of Ossendowski's account in *Beasts, Men and Gods* of his later travels in central Asia. Lively controversy ensued; and Ossendowski's German publishers replied with a special volume defending his integrity (*Um Ferdinand Ossendowski* [Frankfort on the Main, 1925]). This volume, itself a bibliographical oddity, leaves much to be desired in scholarly completeness.

31. See "Dvizhenie v Voiskakh Dalnom Vostoke" [The movement among the troops in the Far East], *Krasny Arkhiv*, XI-XII (1925), 299-386.

32. There appear to have been several associations established for this purpose, or lending themselves to it—one of them the "Obshchestvo 1914-go goda."

33. The constant attacks of the Suvorin papers on Germany had begun long before the war. By 1908 they had achieved such violence that they became the subject of German diplomatic representation. The Russian foreign minister, Izvolski, was obliged at that time to confess to the German ambassador his bewilderment at their motive and his inability to put

a stop to them (*Die grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914*, ed. J. Lepsius, A. Mendelssohn Bartholdy, F. Thimme [Berlin, 1922-27], XXVI, Part I, 315-16).

34. Sisson documents file, letter from Samuel Harper to Allen Carter, Oct. 14, 1920.

35. *Ibid.*, memorandum of Thomson's conversation with Semenov at Scotland House, London, July 17, 1920.

36. *Ibid.*, letter of Apr. 11, 1918 from Ossendowski to the Russian Economic League in New York.

37. *Ibid.*, in a telegram of May 22, 1918, to Archangel, the department of state inquired whether "Abbé Lutoslovsky, Count Poslonsky and other Poles" had left other items of the "Sisson document" series at the consulate general in Moscow.

38. *Ibid.*, letter, Thomson to Arthur Bullard.

39. *Ibid.*, enc. No. 2 to London dispatch 758, Nov. 24, 1920: "Historique prepared by Semenov. . . ."

40. *Ibid.*

41. (Yokohama), pp. 204-8.

42. Sisson documents file, "Memorandum of conversation with Mr. A. Ossendowski, November 25, 1921," signed with the initials "SNH."

43. I have not been able to find these issues of the *Den* in the incomplete holdings available to me and could not check this assertion, which is Panov's.

44. V. I. Panov, *Istoricheski Podlog: Amerikanskiye Podlozhnye Dokumenty* [Historical forgery: American forged documents] (Vladivostok, Aug. 5, 1921). The copy in the Library of Congress is the only one I have discovered in this country.

Appendix 2 / The Soviet and Communist Bloc Defamation Campaign

1. It will be recalled that Khrushchev, during his U.S. visit in September 1959, engaged in more than one discussion at the White House and during his tour designed to destroy confidence in American intelligence. His statements and remarks made during interviews, it is known, were prepared in advance in consultation with the department of disinformation.

2. Ivan Mikhailovich Vozny, a KGB officer, was head of the political intelligence section at the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon, Burma.

3. Alexander Kaznacheev, *Inside a Soviet Embassy* (New York, 1962), pp. 12-173.

4. Peter Deriabin is a former KGB officer, now in the United States. His personal memoir, *The Secret World* (New York, 1959) is probably the most authoritative public account of KGB organization and activity.

5. Reference is to the book by David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government* (New York, 1964).

6. The articles were entitled "Imperialist Intelligence and Foreign Policy" (March 1964), "CIA Intrigues in Latin America" (June 1964), "An Imperialist Spy Consortium" (September 1964), "U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Policy" (October 1964), "U.S. Intelligence and the Monopolies" (January 1965). There were short references to CIA in articles dealing with other topics in its issues of July and August 1965.

7. "American Cassandra" (January 22, 1964), "Soviet Gold," and "The Espionage Jungle" (August 12, 1964).

INDEX

- Alexander II, 35
Alexandrov, Victor, 175-177
American Mercury, 37
Amoss, Col. Ilius, 21, 159-163, 241
Anti-Soviet Forgeries, 63, 65, 68-69,
70, 71, 73-74, 75-76
Aperçu sur la Russie, 27
Apocalypse of Our Times, 54
Appraisal, 46, 47-48, 50
Arendt, Hannah, 43
Attlee, Clement, 159
Avantjury. See Occupation Fund
Documents.
- Babel, Isaac, 42
Babi Yar, 41
Bailey, Geoffrey, 57
Baldwin, Stanley, 103, 124, 125
Baumgarten, Arthur, 46-47
Bay of Pigs, 68, 105, 243
BBC, 135
Bear, and the Whale, The, 175, 177
Bernstein, Herman, 44-45, 46, 48,
78
Bessedovsky, Gregori, 171-175
Biological Warfare fraud, 146-148
"Black Hundred," 41
Blake, George, 186
"Bluebird Papers," 161-171
Borah, William, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78,
79, 80, 82, 90, 91, 97
Branigan, Robert J., 101, 102
Breslau, Harry, 29
Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 67
- Brezhnev, Leonid, 279
Bukharin, Nicolai, 39
Burns, W. J., 96, 97, 98
Burtsev, Vladimir, 51, 52, 53
Byloe, 52
- Cameron, W. C., 42
Cannon, James P., 100, 102
Carr, E. H., 67, 68, 72, 172, 177,
178-184
Cato Street Conspiracy, 58
CENTO, 168, 169
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
68, 105, 154, 161-167, 178, 187,
194, 217, 277, 278, 280, 282, 283-
286
Chamberlain, Austen, 108, 113, 114,
121, 125, 127
Chicago Tribune, 70
Chicherin, Georgi, 64, 87, 91, 93,
97, 122
Churchill, Winston, 40
Colby, Bainbridge, 82, 83
Communist Forgeries, 63, 164, 185
Conspirators, The, 57
Coolidge, Calvin, 19, 73, 83, 87,
92, 93, 98
Craft of Intelligence, The, 187
Creel, George, 18
Crowe, Sir Eyre, 104, 110, 112,
113, 117, 126, 127, 128
Curtiss, John M., 46, 47, 50
Curzon, Lord, 65, 66-67
Czech "partisan" fantasy, 152-153

- Davis, Jerome, 87
 Dean of Canterbury, 147
Dearborn Independent, 42-43
 de Courcy, Kenneth, 21, 155-159, 241
 d'Eon, Charles Geneviève, 30, 31, 34, 37
 Deriabin, Peter, 189, 191-192, 193
 Deutscher, Isaac, 172
Dialogue aux enfers entre Machiavel et Montesquieu, 45, 46, 49-50, 51
Document on Terror, 141-146; quoted, 142-144
 Documents, methods of evaluating, 23, 24
Documents secrets. See Occupation Fund Documents.
 "Donation of Constantine," 15
 Druzhelovsky, 69, 70-71, 76, 125, 126, 245
 du Chayla, Count A. M., 51
 Dulles, Allen, 186, 280-281
 Dulles, John Foster, 105
- Eisenhower, Dwight D., 219
 Engels, Friedrich, 15, 36
 Erickson, John, 185
- Farge, Yves, 147
 FBI, 20, 92, 93, 96, 97, 101, 102, 277
 Fischer, Ruth, 115, 123
 Fischer, Theodore, 50-51
 Ford, Henry, Sr., 42-43, 78
Foreign Letter, 36-37
 Forgery, defined, 14
 Fraud, fraudulent, defined, 14
- Gaillardet, Frederic, 30-31, 34, 37
German-Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars, 184
 Gibney, Frank, 189, 190, 192
 Giers, N. K., 214, 216-219
 Goebbels, Joseph, 133, 134
 Goedsche, Hermann, 44-45, 46
 Goodman, E. R., 19
 Gorshakov, A. M., 35
- GPU, 69, 70, 71, 78, 95, 115, 123
 Graves, Philip A., 44, 45, 46, 49, 51
Great in the Small, The, 51
 Gregory, J. D., 110, 112, 113, 117, 128
 Grow, Maj. Gen. Robert W., 131
- Haldane, Lord, 111, 117, 126
 Harding, Warren G., 19
 Harper, Samuel N., 249-251, 269
 Harrison, Wilson R., 22
 Hart, B. H., Liddel, 173
 Helms, Richard, 164, 165-166, 285
 Hennepin, Father, 14
 Heusinger, Gen. Adolph, 169-170
History of a Lie, The, 44
 Hitler, Adolph, 40, 43, 157, 242
 Hoax, defined, 14; hoaxes, 13.
Holiday, 187
 Hoover, J. Edgar, 277
 Hughes, Charles Evans, 19-20, 79, 83, 84, 87, 90, 92-97, 101, 102
 Hughes, Emrys, 133-134
- IKKI, 73, 74
Inform, 159-163
Intelligence Digest, 155-159
International Jew, The, 42-43
Invisible Government, The, 187
Izvestia, 80, 84, 87, 88, 121, 246
- Jakobson, Mikhail, 202, 205-219, 224, 229, 237, 239
 Jameson, J. Franklin, 249-251
 Johnson, Lyndon B., 282
 Joly, Maurice, 45-47, 49-50, 51
Journey, The, 42
- Kamenev, Lev, 39, 256
 Kelly, Walter K., 31, 34, 35-36
 Kennan, George F., 64, 91, 104, 199, 247
 Kennedy, John F., 105
 Khrushchev, Nikita, 129, 184, 198, 278
 Knickerbocker, Hubert, 78
Kölnische Zeitung, 217

- Kosygin, Alexei, 185, 279
Kurier, Der, 131
 Kurlov, Gen. P. G., 52
 La Follette, Robert M., 77
 Lambelin, Roger, 50
 Lehovich, Dimitry V., 36
Le Monde, 171
 Lenin, Nicolai, 63, 66, 67, 91, 256
 Lesur, Charles Louis, 29-30
 Leverkuehn, Paul, 150
 Ley, Robert, 42
 Litvinov, Maxim, 21, 67, 68; diary of, 177-185
London Daily Herald, 60-62
London Daily Mail, 114, 115, 116, 120, 124, 126
London Daily Mirror, 116
London Economist, 154, 155
London Morning Post, 124
London Observer, 186
London Times, 45, 46, 111, 114, 152, 153, 173
London Times Literary Supplement, 182
 Lonsdale, Gordon, 186
 Lopukhin, A. A., 52
 McCarthy, Joseph, 72, 105
 MacDonald, Ramsay, 20, 103-112, 115, 116, 117, 120, 121, 126, 127, 128, 244
 MacDougal, Curtis D., 13
 McManus, Arthur, 114, 115, 119, 120, 126
Manchester Evening Chronicle, 116
Manchester Guardian, 171
 Mao Tse-tung, 18, 171
 Marlowe, Thomas, 114, 115, 126
 Marshall Plan, 129
 Marx, Karl, 15, 25, 36
 Maxton, James, 112
 Mayhew, Christopher, 133-134
Mein Kampf, 43
Memoirs of the Chevalier d'Eon, 30
 Miliukov, Paul, 51
 Mosely, Philip, 182-183
My Uncle, Joseph Stalin, 174
 Namier, Lewis B., 130
 Napoleon Bonaparte, 26, 30
 Napoleon III, 35, 45, 46-47, 50
 National Archives, 92, 94
 NATO, 129, 130, 169, 279
Neue Freie Presse, 213, 214
Neues Deutschland, 132
 Nevins, Allan, 13, 16
New York Evening Post, 78, 249
New York Herald, 44
New York Herald Tribune Book Review, 182
New York Times, 17-18, 70, 79, 80, 81, 86, 93, 125, 132, 135, 151, 152, 167, 169
New York World, 101
News from Behind the Iron Curtain, 141
Newsweek, 160
 Nicholas II, 40-41, 42
 Nilus, Sergei, 38, 41, 46, 50, 51, 52
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 217
 Norris, George, 77, 78, 91, 97
Novy Mir, 198
Obshchee Delo, 51, 52
 Occupation Fund Documents, 22; analysis, 223-239; case against validity, 204-209; case for validity, 209-222; new evidence, 200-222; Sofia file, 204, 212, 213-222
On the Expansion of Russian Power, 29
On the Path to War, 131
Origins of Totalitarianism, The, 43
 Orlov, Vladimir, 78, 79
 Ossendowski, Anton, 264-274
Ostinformation, 66, 67, 68
 Pavlonovsky, Peter, 78, 79
Penkovskiy Papers, The, 186-199
 Penkovsky, Col. Oleg V., 186, 189, 190, 191
Pester Lloyd, 215-216, 217
 Peter the Great. *See* Testament of.
 Pobedonostev, Constantine, 40

- Ponsonby, Sir Henry, 111, 112, 117, 126
- Poslednyia Novosti*, 51
- Pravda*, 60-62, 65, 87, 217, 246
- Price, Melvin, 277
- Protocol M, 131-141, 243; intelligence evaluation, 139-141; text quoted, 135-139
- Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion*, 52
- "Protocols of Zion," 17, 38-55, 240, 241, 245; articles in *Dearborn Independent*, 42-43; articles reprinted as book, 42-43; boomeranged on Russians, 39-40; journalists revealed forgery, 44-48, 50-54; in Nazi propaganda, 40; recent American edition, 40; translated into German, French, English, 38
- Rachkovsky, Gen. P. J., 51, 52, 53, 54
- Radek, Karl, 39, 121
- Radio Free Europe, 141, 153
- Reporter, The*, 160
- Robins, Col. Raymond, 82, 90
- Rollin, Henri, 54
- Roosevelt, Franklin D., 91
- Ross, Edward A., 17
- Ross, Thomas, 187. *See also* David Wise.
- "Rountree Circular," 166-167, 168
- Rubottom Airgram, 167-168
- San Francisco Chronicle*, 174
- Saturday Evening Post*, 160
- Saturday Review*, 174
- Schnell, Silvia, 51
- Semenov, Eugene, 248, 249, 255, 262, 263, 264, 266, 270, 274
- Sisson, Edgar, 18
- Sisson Documents, 242, 247-276
- Skazkin, S., 219-221
- Smith, Gerald L. K., 43
- Smith, Gen. Walter Bedell, 177-178
- Snowden, Philip, 111
- Sokolnicki, Gen. Michel, 27-28, 34
- Sosnovski affair, 150-151
- Souvarine, Boris, 174, 176-177
- Soviet and Communist Bloc Defamation Campaign, 277-286
- Soviet High Command, The*, 185
- Soviet Marshalls Speak, The*, 173-174
- Squires, Richard, 131
- Stalin, Josef, 39, 124, 125, 129; cult of, 13
- Stalin, Vasily, 161
- Stambulov, Stefan, 199, 202, 205, 206, 207, 208, 212, 213, 224
- Stanhope, John, 58
- Stettin-Trieste line, 36
- Strategy of Subversion, The*, 186
- Sulzberger, Cyrus L., 132
- Sumner, B. H., 26
- Suspect Documents*, 22
- Svatikov, S. G., 53
- Sverdlov, Jakob, 39
- Svoboda*, 22, 200, 201, 204, 208, 214-219, 222
- Taeglischer Rundschau*, 132
- Tass, 188, 280
- Taylor, A. J. P., 181-182
- Testament of Peter the Great, 15, 17, 25, 37, 240, 245; Gaillardet's version, 30, 31; original text by Sokolnicki, 27; republished in 1949 and 1953, 37; second draft by Lesur, 29; translated text, 32-34
- Thomas, James H., 107, 111
- Thompson, Basil, 62
- Trotsky, Leon, 39, 98, 256
- Truman, Harry S., 155, 158
- Truth About the Protocols of Zion, The*, 48-49
- Tukhachevsky Affair, The*, 176-177
- "Union of the Russian People," 41
- U-2 spy plane incident, 188, 219, 243

- Valentin, Hugo, 55
 Von Dirksen, Herbert, 130
Washington Post, 170, 186, 188, 189
 Whaley-Easton Service. *See Foreign Letter.*
 Wilson, Woodrow, 82
 Wise, David, 186. *See also* Thomas Ross.
Worker, The, 98, 99, 170
 Wraga, Richard, 53
 Wynne, Greville, 186
 Yalta papers, 23
 Yevtushenko, Yevgeni, 41, 129
Yorkshire Post, 134
 Zorza, Victor, 170-171, 187, 196
 Zinoviev, Grigory, 20, 39, 69-70, 71, 78, 79, 80, 81, 86, 97, 99, 100, 102, 114, 115, 119, 120, 122, 124, 128
 Zinoviev Instructions, 81-102, 242, 243, 256; evaluation, 91-102; quoted in U.S. press release, 84-86
 Zinoviev letter, British, 103-128, 242, 243, 244; immediate evaluation problem, 118-120; post-mortem evaluation, 121-128

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