at Capitol.  June 19.1996

 

 

with Sen. JohnMc Cain

 

with Congressman Bob Barr

with General John K Singlaub

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ĐẶC BIỆT

  1. Served  In A Noble Cause

  2. Hiến Chương Liên Hiệp Quốc

  3. Văn Kiện Về Quyền Con Người

  4. Báo Cáo Tình Trạng Nhân Quyền

  5. China Reports US

  6. Liberal World Order

  7. The Heritage Constitution

  8. The Invisible Government Dan Moot

  9. The Invisible Government David Wise

  10. Montreal Protocol Hand Book

  11. Death Of A Generation

  12. Vấn Đề Tôn Gíao

  13. https://live.childrenshealthdefense.org/chd-tv/

  14. https://www.thelastamericanvagabond.com/

  15. https://nhandan.vn/

  16. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/

  17. dnews.com | News of the Palouse since 1911

  18. Legislation/Immigration and Nationality Act

  19. US Citizen Through US Military Service

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https://lens.monash.edu/@politics-society/2022/08/19/1384992/much-azov-about-nothing-how-the-ukrainian-neo-nazis-canard-fooled-the-world

 

 

with General Micheal Ryan


 


3

 

 

CENTRAL PERSONNEL AGENCIES: MANAGING  THE  BUREAUCRACY

Donald Devine, Dennis Dean Kirk, and Paul Dans

 

 

OVERVIEW

From the very first Mandate for Leadership, the “personnel is policy” theme has been the fundamental principle guiding the government’s personnel management. As the U.S. Constitution makes clear, the President’s appointment, direction, and removal author- ities are the central elements of his executive power.1 In implementing that power, the people and the President deserve the most talented and responsible workforce possible. Who the President assigns to design and implement his political policy agenda will determine whether he can carry out the responsibility given to him by the American people. The President must recognize that whoever holds a government position sets its policy. To fulfill an electoral mandate, he must therefore give per-

sonnel management his highest priority, including Cabinet-level precedence.

The federal government’s immense bureaucracy spreads into hundreds of agen- cies and thousands of units and is centered and overseen at the top by key central personnel agencies and their governing laws and regulations. The major separate personnel agencies in the national government today are:

   The Office of Personnel Management (OPM);

   The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB);

   The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA); and

   The Office of Special Counsel (OSC).


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

Title 5 of the U.S. Code charges the OPM with executing, administering, and enforcing the rules, regulations, and laws governing the civil service.2 It grants the OPM direct responsibility for activities like retirement, pay, health, training, federal unionization, suitability, and classification functions not specifically granted to other agencies by statute. The agency’s Director is charged with aiding the President, as the President may request, in preparing such civil service rules as the President pre- scribes and otherwise advising the President on actions that may be taken to promote an efficient civil service and a systematic application of the merit system principles, including recommending policies relating to the selection, promotion, transfer, per- formance, pay, conditions of service, tenure, and separation of employees.

The MSPB is the lead adjudicator for hearing and resolving cases and contro- versies for 2.2 million federal employees.3 It is required to conduct fair and neutral case adjudications, regulatory reviews, and actions and studies to improve the workforce. Its court-like adjudications investigate and hear appeals from agency actions such as furloughs, suspensions, demotions, and terminations and are appealable to the U.S. Court of Appeals.

The FLRA hears appeals of agency personnel cases involving federal labor griev- ance procedures to provide judicial review with binding decisions appealable to appeals courts.4 It interprets the rights and duties of agencies and employee labor organizations—on management rights, OPM interpretations, recognition of labor organizations, and unfair labor practices—under the general principle of bargain- ing in good faith and compelling need.

The OSC serves as the investigator, mediator, publisher, and prosecutor before the MSPB with respect to agency and employees regarding prohibited person- nel practices, Hatch Act5 politicization, Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act6 issues, and whistleblower complaints.7

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has general respon- sibility for reviewing charges of employee discrimination against all civil rights breaches. However, it also administers a government employee section that investi- gates and adjudicates federal employee complaints concerning equal employment violations as with the private sector.8 This makes the agency an additional de facto factor in government personnel management.

While not a personnel agency per se, the General Services Administration (GSA) is charged with general supervision of contracting.9 Today, there are many more contractors in government than there are civil service employees. The GSA must therefore be a part of any personnel management discussion.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

OPM: Managing the Federal Bureaucracy. At the very pinnacle of the modern progressive program to make government competent stands the ideal of professionalized, career civil service. Since the turn of the 20th century,


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

progressives have sought a system that could effectively select, train, reward, and guard from partisan influence the neutral scientific experts they believe are required to staff the national government and run the administrative state. Their

U.S. system was initiated by the Pendleton Act of 188310 and institutionalized by the 1930s New Deal to set principles and practices that were meant to ensure that expert merit rather than partisan favors or personal favoritism ruled within the federal bureaucracy. Yet, as public frustration with the civil service has grown, generating calls to “drain the swamp,” it has become clear that their project has had serious unintended consequences.

The civil service was devised to replace the amateurism and presumed corrup- tion of the old spoils system, wherein government jobs rewarded loyal partisans who might or might not have professional backgrounds. Although the system appeared to be sufficient for the nation’s first century, progressive intellectuals and activists demanded a more professionalized, scientific, and politically neutral Administration. Progressives designed a merit system to promote expertise and shield bureaucrats from partisan political pressure, but it soon began to insulate civil servants from accountability. The modern merit system increasingly made it almost impossible to fire all but the most incompetent civil servants. Complying with arcane rules regarding recruiting, rating, hiring, and firing simply replaced the goal of cultivating competence and expertise.

In the 1970s, Georgia Democratic Governor Jimmy Carter, then a political unknown, ran for President supporting New Deal programs and their Great Soci- ety expansion but opposing the way they were being administered. The policies were not actually reducing poverty, increasing prosperity, or improving the envi- ronment, he argued, and to make them work required fundamental bureaucratic reform. He correctly charged that almost all government employees were rated as “successful,” all received the same pay regardless of performance, and even the worst were impossible to fire—and he won the presidency.

President Carter fulfilled his campaign promise by hiring Syracuse University Dean Alan Campbell, who served first as Chairman of the U.S. Civil Service Com- mission and then as Director of the OPM and helped him devise and pass the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA)11 to reset the basic structure of today’s bureau- cracy. A new performance appraisal system was devised with a five rather than three distribution of rating categories and individual goals more related to agency missions and more related to employee promotion for all. Pay and benefits were based directly on improved performance appraisals (including sizable bonuses) for mid-level managers and senior executives. But time ran out on President Carter before the act could be fully executed, so it was left to President Ronald Reagan and his new OPM and agency leadership to implement.

Overall, the new law seemed to work for a few years under Reagan, but the Carter– Reagan reforms were dissipated within a decade. Today, employee evaluation is back


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

to pre-reform levels with almost all rated successful or above, frustrating any rela- tion between pay and performance. An “outstanding” rating should be required for Senior Executive Service (SES) chiefs to win big bonuses, but a few years ago, when it was disclosed that the Veterans Administration executives who encouraged false reporting of waiting lists for hospital admission were rated outstanding, the Senior Executive Association justified it, telling Congress that only outstanding performers would be promoted to the SES in the first place and that precise ratings were unnec- essary.12 The Government Accountability Office (GAO), however, has reported that pay raises, within-grade pay increases, and locality pay for regular employees and executives have become automatic rather than based on performance—as a result of most employees being rated at similar appraisal levels.13

OPM: Merit Hiring in a Merit System. It should not be impossible even for a large national government to hire good people through merit selection. The government did so for years, but it has proven difficult in recent times to select personnel based on their knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) as the law dictates. Yet for the past 34 years, the U.S. civil service has been unable to distinguish con- sistently between strong and unqualified applicants for employment.

As the Carter presidency was winding down, the U.S. Department of Justice and top lawyers at the OPM contrived with plaintiffs to end civil service IQ exam- inations because of concern about their possible impact on minorities. The OPM had used the Professional and Administrative Career Examination (PACE) gen- eral intelligence exam to select college graduates for top agency employment, but Carter Administration officials—probably without the President’s informed con- currence—abolished the PACE through a legal consent court decree capitulating to demands by civil rights petitioners who contended that it was discriminatory. The judicial decree was to last only five years but still controls federal hiring and is applied to all KSA tests even today.

General ability tests like the PACE have been used successfully to assess the use- fulness and cost-effectiveness of broad intellectual qualities across many separate occupations. Courts have ruled that even without evidence of overt, intentional discrimination, such results might suggest discrimination. This doctrine of dispa- rate impact could be ended legislatively or at least narrowed through the regulatory process by a future Administration. In any event, the federal government has been denied the use of a rigorous entry examination for three decades, relying instead on self-evaluations that have forced managers to resort to subterfuge such as preselecting friends or associates that they believe are competent to obtain qual- ified employees.

In 2015, President Barack Obama’s OPM began to introduce an improved merit examination called USAHire, which it had been testing quietly since 2012 in a few agencies for a dozen job descriptions. The tests had multiple-choice questions with only one correct answer. Some questions even required essay replies: questions


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

that would change regularly to depress cheating. President Donald Trump’s OPM planned to implement such changes but was delayed because of legal concerns over possible disparate impact.

Courts have agreed to review the consent decree if the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures setting the technical requirements for sound exams are reformed. A government that is unable to select employees based on KSA-like test qualifications cannot work, and the OPM must move forward on this very basic personnel management obligation.

The Centrality of Performance Appraisal. In the meantime, the OPM must manage the workforce it has. Before they can reward or discipline federal employees, managers must first identify who their top performers are and who is performing less than adequately. In fact, as Ludwig von Mises proved in his classic Bureaucracy,14 unlike the profit-and-loss evaluation tool used in the private sector, government performance measurement depends totally on a functioning appraisal system. If they cannot be identified in the first place within a functioning appraisal system, it is impossible to reward good performance or correct poor performance. The problem is that the collegial atmosphere of a bureaucracy in a multifaceted appraisal system that is open to appeals makes this a very challenging ideal to implement successfully. The GAO reported more recently that overly high and widely spread perfor- mance ratings were again plaguing the government, with more than 99 percent of employees rated fully successful or above by their managers, a mere 0.3 percent rated as minimally successful, and 0.1 percent actually rated unacceptable.15 Why? It is human nature that no one appreciates being told that he or she is less than outstanding in every way. Informing subordinates in a closely knit bureaucracy that they are not performing well is difficult. Rating compatriots is even consid- ered rude and unprofessional. Moreover, managers can be and often are accused

of racial or sexual discrimination for a poor rating, and this discourages honesty. In 2018, President Trump issued Executive Order 1383916 requiring agen-

cies to reduce the time for employees to improve performance before corrective action could be taken; to initiate disciplinary actions against poorly performing employees more expeditiously; to reiterate that agencies are obligated to make employees improve; to reduce the time for employees to respond to allegations of poor performance; to mandate that agencies remind supervisors of expiring employee probationary periods; to prohibit agencies from entering into settlement agreements that modify an employee’s personnel record; and to reevaluate proce- dures for agencies to discipline supervisors who retaliate against whistleblowers. Unfortunately, the order was overturned by the Biden Administration,17 so it will need to be reintroduced in 2025.

The fact remains that meaningfully evaluating employees’ performance is a critical part of a manager’s job. In the Reagan appraisal process, managers were evaluated on how they themselves rated their subordinates. This is critical to


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

responsibility and improved management. It is essential that political executives build policy goals directly into employee appraisals both for mission success and for employees to know what is expected. Indistinguishable from their coworkers on paper, hard-working federal employees often go unrewarded for their efforts and are often the system’s greatest critics. Federal workers who are performing inadequately get neither the benefit of an honest appraisal nor clear guidance on how to improve. Political executives should take an active role in supervising per- formance appraisals of career staff, not unduly delegate this responsibility to senior career managers, and be willing to reward and support good performers.

Merit Pay. Performance appraisal means little to daily operations if it is not tied directly to real consequences for success as well as failure. According to a survey of major U.S. private companies—which, unlike the federal government, also have a profit-and-loss evaluation—90 percent use a system of merit pay for performance based on some type of appraisal system. Despite early efforts to institute merit pay throughout the federal government, however, compensation is still based primarily on seniority rather than merit.

Merit pay for executives and managers was part of the Carter reforms and was implemented early in the Reagan presidency. Beginning in the summer of 1982, the Reagan OPM entered 18 months of negotiations with House and Senate staff on extending merit pay to the entire workforce. Long and detailed talks between the OPM and both Democrats and Republicans in Congress ensued, and a final agreement was reached in 1983 that supposedly ensured the passage of legislation creating a new Performance Management and Recognition System (PMRS) for all, (not just management) GS-13 through GS-15 employees.

Meanwhile, the OPM issued regulations to expand the role of performance related to pay throughout the entire workforce, but congressional allies of the employee unions, led by Representative Steny Hoyer (D) of government employee– rich Maryland, stoutly resisted this extension of pay-for-performance and, with strong union support, used the congressional appropriations process to block OPM administrative pay reforms. Bonuses for SES career employees survived, but per- formance appraisals became so high and widely distributed that there was little relationship between performance and remuneration.

Ever since the original merit pay system for federal managers (GM-13 through GM-15 grade levels, just below the SES) was allowed to expire in September 1993, little to nothing has been done either to reinstate the federal merit pay program for managers or to distribute performance rating evaluations for the SES, much less to extend the program to the remainder of the workforce. A reform-friendly President and Congress might just provide the opportunity to create a more comprehensive performance plan; in the meantime, however, political executives should use exist- ing pay and especially fiscal awards strategically to reward good performance to the degree allowed by law.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

Making the Appeals Process Work. The nonmilitary government dismissal rate is well below 1 percent, and no private-sector industry employee enjoys the job security that a federal employee enjoys. Both safety and justice demand that managers learn to act strategically to hire good and fire poor performers legally. The initial paperwork required to separate poor or abusive performers (when they are infrequently identified) is not overwhelming, and managers might be motivated to act if it were not for the appeals and enforcement processes. Formal appeal in the private sector is mostly a rather simple two-step process, but government unions and associations have been able to convince politicians to support a multiple and extensive appeals and enforcement process.

As noted, there are multiple administrative appeals bodies. The FLRA, OSC, and EEOC have relatively narrow jurisdictions. Claims that an employee’s removal or disciplinary actions violate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between an agency and a union are handled by the FLRA, employees who claim their removal was the result of discrimination can appeal to the EEOC, and employ- ees who believe their firing was retribution for being a whistleblower can go to the OSC. While the MSPB specializes in abuses of direct merit system issues, it can and does hear and review almost any of the matters heard by the other agencies.

Cases involving race, gender, religion, age, pregnancy, disability, or national origin can be appealed to the EEOC or the MSPB—and in some cases to both—and to the OSC. This gives employees multiple opportunities to prove their cases, and while the EEOC, MSPB, FLRA, and OSC may all apply essentially the same burden of proof, the odds of success may be substantially different in each forum. In fact, forum shopping among them for a friendlier venue is a common practice, but fre- quent filers face no consequences for frivolous complaints. As a result, meritorious cases are frequently delayed, denying relief and justice to truly aggrieved individuals. The MSPB can and does handle all such matters, but it faces a backlog of an estimated 3,000 cases of people who were potentially wrongfully terminated or disciplined as far back as 2013. From 2017–2022 the MSPB lacked the quorum required to decide appeals. On the other hand, as of January 2023, the EEOC had

a backlog of 42,000 cases.

While federal employees win appeals relatively infrequently—MSPB adminis- trative judges have upheld agency decisions as much as 80 percent of the time—the real problem is the time and paperwork involved in the elaborate process that managers must undergo during appeals. This keeps even the best managers from bringing cases in all but the most egregious cases of poor performance or mis- conduct. As a result, the MSPB, EEOC, FLRA, and OSC likely see very few cases compared to the number of occurrences, and nonperformers continue to be paid and often are placed in nonwork positions.

Having a choice of appeals is especially unique to the government. If lower-pri- ority issues were addressed in-house, serious adverse actions would be less subject


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

to delay. With the proper limitation of labor union actions, the FLRA should have limited reason for appeals. The EEOC’s federal employee section should be transferred to the MSPB, and many of the OCS’s investigatory functions should be returned to the OPM. The MSPB could then become the main reviewer of adverse actions, greatly simplifying the burdensome appeal process.

Making Civil Service Benefits Economically and Administratively Ratio- nal. In recent years, the combined wages and benefits of the executive branch civilian workforce totaled $300 billion according to official data. But even that amount does not properly account for billions in unfunded liability for retirement and other government reporting distortions. Official data also report employment as approximately 2 million, but this ignores approximately 20 million contractors who, while not eligible for government pay and benefits, do receive them indirectly through contracting (even if they are less generous). Official data also claim that national government employees are paid less than private-sector employees are paid for similar work, but several more neutral sources demonstrate that pub- lic-sector workers make more on average than their private-sector counterparts. All of this extravagance deserves close scrutiny.

Market-Based Pay and Benefits. According to current law, federal workers are to be paid wages comparable to equivalent private-sector workers rather than compared to all private-sector employees. While the official studies claim that federal employees are underpaid relative to the private sector by 20 percent or more, a 2016 Heritage Foundation study found that federal employees received wages that were 22 percent higher than wages for similar private-sector workers; if the value of employee benefits was included, the total compensation premium for federal employees over their private-sector equivalents increased to between 30 percent and 40 percent.18 The American Enterprise Institute found a 14 percent pay premium and a 61 percent total compensation premium.19

Base salary is only one component of a federal employee’s total compensation. In addition to high starting wages, federal employees normally receive an annual cost-of-living adjustment (available to all employees) and generous scheduled raises known as step increases. Moreover, a large proportion of federal employ- ees are stationed in the Washington, D.C., area and other large cities and are entitled to steep locality pay enhancement to account for the high cost of living in these areas.

A federal employee with five years’ experience receives 20 vacation days, 13 paid sick days, and all 10 federal holidays compared to an employee at a large private company who receives 13 days of vacation and eight paid sick days. Federal health benefits are more comparable to those provided by Fortune 500 employers with the government paying 72 percent of the weighted average premiums, but this is much higher than for most private plans. Almost half of private firms do not offer any employer contributions at all.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

The obvious solution to these discrepancies is to move closer to a market model for federal pay and benefits. One need is for a neutral agency to oversee pay hiring decisions, especially for high-demand occupations. The OPM is independent of agency operations, so it can assess requirements more neutrally. For many years, with its Special Pay Rates program, the OPM evaluated claims that federal rates in an area were too low to attract competent employees and allowed agencies to offer higher pay when needed rather than increased rates for all. Ideally, the OPM should establish an initial pay schedule for every occupation and region, monitor turnover rates and applicant-to-position ratios, and adjust pay and recruitment on that basis. Most of this requires legislation, but the OPM should be an advocate for a true equality of benefits between the public and private sectors.

Reforming Federal Retirement Benefits. Career civil servants enjoy retire- ment benefits that are nearly unheard of in the private sector. Federal employees retire earlier (normally at age 55 after 30 years), enjoy richer pension annuities, and receive automatic cost-of-living adjustments based on the areas in which they retire. Defined-benefit federal pensions are fully indexed for inflation—a practice that is extremely rare in the private sector. A federal employee with a preretire- ment income of $25,000 under the older of the two federal retirement plans will receive at least $200,000 more over a 20-year period than will private-sector work- ers with the same preretirement salary under historic inflation levels.

During the early Reagan years, the OPM reformed many specific provisions of the federal pension program to save billions administratively. Under OPM pres- sure, Reagan and Congress ultimately ended the old Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) entirely for new employees, which (counting disbursements for the unfunded liability) accounted for 51.3 percent of the federal government's total payroll. The retirement system that replaced it—the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS)—reduced the cost of federal employee retirement dis- bursements to 28.5 percent of payroll (including contributions to Social Security and the employer match to the Thrift Savings Plan). More of the pension cost was shifted to the employee, but the new system was much more equitable for the 40 percent who received few or no benefits under the old system.

By 1999, more than half of the federal workforce was covered by the new system, and the government’s per capita share of the cost (as the employer) was less than half the cost of the old system: 20.2 percent of FERS payroll vs. 44.3 percent of CSRS payroll, representing one of the largest examples of government savings anywhere. Although the government pension system has become more like private pension systems, it still remains much more generous, and other means might be considered in the future to move it even closer to private plans.

GSA: Landlord and Contractor Management. The General Services Administration is best known as the federal government’s landlord—designing, constructing, managing, and preserving government buildings and leasing and


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

managing outside commercial real estate contracting with 376.9 million square feet of space. Obviously, as its prime function, real estate expertise is key to the GSA’s success. However, the GSA is also the government’s purchasing agent, connecting federal purchasers with commercial products and services in the private sector and their personnel management functions. With contractors performing so many functions today, the GSA therefore becomes a de facto part of governmentwide personnel management. The GSA also manages the Presidential Transition Act (PTA) process, which also directly involves the OPM. A recent proposal would have incorporated the OPM and GSA (and OMB). Fortunately, this did not take place in that form, but it would make sense for GSA and OPM leadership and staff to hold regular meetings to work through matters of common interest such as moderating PTA personnel restrictions and the relationships between contract and civil service employees.

Reductions-in-Force. Reducing the number of federal employees seems an obvious way to reduce the overall expense of the civil service, and many prior Administrations have attempted to do just this. Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama began their terms, as did Ronald Reagan and Donald Trump, by mandating a freeze on the hiring of new federal employees, but these efforts did not lead to permanent and substantive reductions in the number of nondefense federal employees.

First, it is a challenge even to know which workers to cut. As mentioned, there are 2 million federal employees, but since budgets have exploded, so has the total number of personnel with nearly 10 times more federal contractors than federal employees. Contractors are less expensive because they are not entitled to high government pensions or benefits and are easier to fire and discipline. In addition, millions of state government employees work under federal grants, in effect administering federal programs; these cannot be cut directly. Cutting federal employment can be helpful and can provide a simple story to average citizens, but cutting functions, levels, funds, and grants is much more important than setting simple employment size.

Simply reducing numbers can actually increase costs. OMB instructions fol- lowing President Trump’s employment freeze told agencies to consider buyout programs, encouraging early retirements in order to shift costs from current bud- gets in agencies to the retirement system and minimize the number of personnel fired. The Environmental Protection Agency immediately implemented such a program, and OMB urged the passage of legislation to increase payout maximums from $25,000 to $40,000 to further increase spending under the “cuts.” President Clinton’s OMB had introduced a similar buyout that cost the Treasury $2.8 billion, mostly for those who were going to retire anyway. Moreover, when a new employee is hired to fill a job recently vacated in a buyout, the government for a time is paying two people to fill one job.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

What is needed at the beginning is a freeze on all top career-position hiring to prevent “burrowing-in” by outgoing political appointees. Moreover, four fac- tors determine the order in which employees are protected during layoffs: tenure, veterans’ preference, seniority, and performance in that order of importance. Despite several attempts in the House of Representatives during the Trump years to enact legislation that would modestly increase the weight given to performance over time-of-service, the fierce opposition by federal managers associations and unions representing long-serving but not necessarily well-performing constituents explains why the bills failed to advance. A determined President should insist that performance be first and be wary of costly types of reductions-in-force.

Impenetrable Bureaucracy. The GAO has identified almost a hundred actions that the executive branch or Congress could take to improve efficiency and effec- tiveness across 37 areas that span a broad range of government missions and functions. It identified 33 actions to address mission fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in the 12 areas of defense, economic development, health, homeland security, and information technology. It also identified 59 other opportunities for executive agencies or Congress to reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenue collection across 25 areas of government.20

A logical place to begin would be to identify and eliminate functions and pro- grams that are duplicated across Cabinet departments or spread across multiple agencies. Congress hoped to help this effort by passing the Government Perfor- mance and Results Act of 1993,21 which required all federal agencies to define their missions, establish goals and objectives, and measure and report their per- formance to Congress. Three decades of endless time-consuming reports later, the government continues to grow but with more paper and little change either in performance or in the number of levels between government and the people.

The Brookings Institution’s Paul Light emphasizes the importance of the increasing number of levels between the top heads of departments and the people at the bottom who receive the products of government decision-making. He esti- mates that there are perhaps 50 or more levels of impenetrable bureaucracy and no way other than imperfect performance appraisals to communicate between them.22 The Trump Administration proposed some possible consolidations, but these were not received favorably in Congress, whose approval is necessary for most such proposals. The best solution is to cut functions and budgets and devolve respon- sibilities. That is a challenge primarily for Presidents, Congress, and the entire government, but the OPM still needs to lead the way governmentwide in managing

personnel properly even in any future smaller government.

Creating a Responsible Career Management Service. The people elect a President who is charged by Article 2, Section 3 of the Constitution23 with seeing that the laws are “faithfully executed” with his political appointees democratically linked to that legitimizing responsibility. An autonomous bureaucracy has neither


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

independent constitutional status nor separate moral legitimacy. Therefore, career civil servants by themselves should not lead major policy changes and reforms.

The creation of the Senior Executive Service was the top career change intro- duced by the 1978 Carter–Campbell Civil Service Reform Act. Its aim was to professionalize the career service and make it more responsible to the democrat- ically elected commander in chief and his political appointees while respecting the rights due to career employees, very much including those in the top positions. The new SES would allow management to be more flexible in filling and reassigning executive positions and locations beyond narrow specialties for more efficient mission accomplishment and would provide pay and large bonuses to motivate career performance.

The desire to infiltrate political appointees improperly into the high career civil service has been widespread in every Administration, whether Democrat or Republican. Democratic Administrations, however, are typically more successful because they require the cooperation of careerists, who generally lean heavily to the Left. Such burrowing-in requires career job descriptions for new positions that closely mirror the functions of a political appointee; a special hiring authority that allows the bypassing of veterans’ preference as well as other preference categories; and the ability to frustrate career candidates from taking the desired position.

President Reagan’s OPM began by limiting such SES burrowing-in, arguing that the proper course was to create and fill political positions. This simultane- ously promotes the CSRA principle of political leadership of the bureaucracy and respects the professional autonomy of the career service. But this requires that career SES employees should respect political rights too. Actions such as career staff reserving excessive numbers of key policy positions as “career reserved” to deny them to noncareer SES employees frustrate CSRA intent. Another evasion is the general domination by career staff on SES personnel evaluation boards, the opposite of noncareer executives dominating these critical meeting discussions as expected in the SES. Career training also often underplays the political role in leadership and inculcates career-first policy and value viewpoints.

Frustrated with these activities by top career executives, the Trump Adminis- tration issued Executive Order 1395724 to make career professionals in positions that are not normally subject to change as a result of a presidential transition but who discharge significant duties and exercise significant discretion in formulating and implementing executive branch policy and programs an exception to the com- petitive hiring rules and examinations for career positions under a new Schedule

F. It ordered the Director of OPM and agency heads to set procedures to prepare lists of such confidential, policy-determining, policymaking, or policy-advocating positions and prepare procedures to create exceptions from civil service rules when careerists hold such positions, from which they can relocate back to the regular civil service after such service. The order was subsequently reversed by President


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

Biden25 at the demand of the civil service associations and unions. It should be reinstated, but SES responsibility should come first.

Managing Personnel in a Union Environment. Historically, unions were thought to be incompatible with government management. There is a natural limit to the bargaining power of private-sector unions, but the financial bottom line of public-sector unions is not similarly constrained. If private-sector unions push too hard a bargain, they can so harm a company or so reduce efficiency that their employer is forced to go out of business and eliminate union jobs altogether. There is no such limit in government, which cannot go out of business, so demands can be excessive without negatively affecting employee and union bottom lines.

Even Democratic President Franklin Roosevelt considered union representa- tion in the federal government to be incompatible with democracy. Striking and even threats of bargaining and delay were considered acts against the people and thus improper. It was not until President John Kennedy that union representation in the federal government was recognized—and then merely by executive order. Labor bargaining was not set in statute until the Carter Administration was forced by Congress to do so in order to pass the CSRA, although all bargaining was placed under OPM review.

The CSRA was able to maintain strong management rights for the OPM and agencies and forbade collective bargaining on pay and benefits as well as manage- ment prerogatives. Over time, OPM, FLRA, and agencies’ personnel offices and courts, especially in Democratic Administrations, narrowed management rights so that labor bargaining expanded as management rights contracted. But the man- agement rights are still in statute, have been enforced by some Administrations, and should be enforced again by any future OPM and agency managements, which should not be intimidated by union power.

Rather than being daunted, President Trump issued three executive orders:

   Executive Order 13836, encouraging agencies to renegotiate all union collective bargaining agreements to ensure consistency with the law and respect for management rights;26

   Executive Order 13837, encouraging agencies to prevent union representatives from using official time preparing or pursuing grievances or from engaging in other union activity on government time;27 and

   Executive Order 13839, encouraging agencies both to limit labor grievances on removals from service or on challenging performance appraisals and to prioritize performance over seniority when deciding who should be retained following reductions-in-force.28


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

All were revoked by the Biden Administration29 and should be reinstated by the next Administration, to include the immediate appointment of the FLRA General Counsel and reactivation of the Impasses Panel.

Congress should also consider whether public-sector unions are appropriate in the first place. The bipartisan consensus up until the middle of the 20th cen- tury held that these unions were not compatible with constitutional government.30 After more than half a century of experience with public-sector union frustrations of good government management, it is hard to avoid reaching the same conclusion. Fully Staffing the Ranks of Political Appointees. The President must rely legally on his top department and agency officials to run the government and on top White House staff employees to coordinate operations through regular Cabinet and other meetings and communications. Without this political leadership, the career civil service becomes empowered to lead the executive branch without democratic legitimacy. While many obstacles stand in his way, a President is constitutionally and statutorily required to fill the top political positions in the executive branch

both to assist him and to provide overall legitimacy.

Most Presidents have had some difficulty obtaining congressional approval of their appointees, but this has worsened recently. After the 2016 election, President Trump faced special hostility from the opposition party and the media in getting his appointees confirmed or even considered by the Senate. His early Office of Presidential Personnel (PPO) did not generally remove political appointees from the previous Administration but instead relied mostly on prior political appoin- tees and career civil servants to run the government. Such a reliance on holdovers and bureaucrats led to a lack of agency control and the absolute refusal of the Acting Attorney General from the Obama Administration to obey a direct order from the President.

Under the early PPO, the Trump Administration appointed fewer political appointees in its first few months in office than had been appointed in any recent presidency, partly because of historically high partisan congressional obstructions but also because several officials announced that they preferred fewer political appointees in the agencies as a way to cut federal spending. Whatever the reasoning, this had the effect of permanently hampering the rollout of the new President’s agenda. Thus, in those critical early years, much of the government relied on senior careerists and holdover Obama appointees to carry out the sensitive responsibili- ties that would otherwise belong to the new President’s appointees.

Fortunately, the later PPO, OPM, and Senate leadership began to cooperate to build a strong team to implement the President’s personnel appointment agenda. Any new Administration would be wise to learn that it will need a full cadre of sound political appointees from the beginning if it expects to direct this enormous federal bureaucracy. A close relationship between the PPO at the White House and the OPM, coordinating with agency assistant secretaries of administration


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

and PPO’s chosen White House Liaisons and their staff at each agency, is essential to the management of this large, multilevel, resistant, and bureaucratic challenge. If “personnel is policy” is to be our general guide, it would make sense to give the President direct supervision of the bureaucracy with the OPM Director available in his Cabinet.

 

A REFORMED BUREAUCRACY

Today, the federal government’s bureaucracy cannot even meet its own civil service ideals. The merit criteria of ability, knowledge, and skills are no longer the basis for recruitment, selection, or advancement, while pay and benefits for com- parable work are substantially above those in the private sector. Retention is not based primarily on performance, and for the most part, inadequate performance is not appraised, corrected, or punished.

The authors have made many suggestions here that, if implemented, could bring that bureaucracy more under control and enable it to work more efficiently and responsibly, which is especially required for the half of civilian government that administers its undeniable responsibilities for defense and foreign affairs. While a better administered central bureaucracy is crucial for both those and domestic responsibilities, the problem of properly running the government goes beyond simple bureaucratic administration. The specific deficiencies of the fed- eral bureaucracy—size, levels of organization, inefficiency, expense, and lack of responsiveness to political leadership—are rooted in the progressive ideology that unelected experts can and should be trusted to promote the general welfare in just about every area of social life.

The Constitution, however, reserved a few enumerated powers to the federal government while leaving the great majority of domestic activities to state, local, and private governance. As James Madison explained: “The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement and prosperity of the state.”31 Modern progressive politics has simply given the national government more to do than the complex separa- tion-of-powers Constitution allows.

That progressive system has broken down in our time, and the only real solution is for the national government to do less: to decentralize and privatize as much as possible and then ensure that the remaining bureaucracy is managed effectively along the lines of the enduring principles set out in detail here.

 


AUTHORS’ NOTE: The authors are grateful for the collaborative work of the individuals listed as contributors to this chapter for the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. The authors alone assume responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

ENDNOTES

1.                U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii#section1 (accessed February 1, 2023).

2.                5 U.S. Code §§ 1101 et seq. and 1103(a)(5), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-II/chapter-11 (accessed February 1, 2023).

3.                5 U.S. Code § 1201, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/1201 (accessed February 1, 2023).

4.                 5 U.S. Code § 7101, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/7101 (accessed February 1, 2023), and § 7117,

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/7117 (accessed February 1, 2023).

5.                S. 1871, An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, Public Law No. 76-252, August 2, 1939, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/53/STATUTE-53-Pg1147.pdf (accessed February 1, 2023).

6.                H.R. 995, Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, Public Law No. 103-353, 101st Congress, October 13, 1994, https://www.congress.gov/103/statute/STATUTE-108/STATUTE-108-Pg3149.

pdf (accessed February 1, 2023).

7.                 5 U.S. Code § 1206, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/1206 (accessed February 1, 2023).

8.                42 U.S. Code § 2000e, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/2000e (accessed February 1, 2023).

9.                40 U.S. Code § 581, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/40/581 (accessed February 1, 2023).

10.           U.S. National Archives, “Milestone Documents: Pendleton Act (1883),” last reviewed February 8, 2022, https:// www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/pendleton-act (accessed February 2, 2023).

11.           S. 2640, Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Public Law No. 95-454, 95th Congress, October 13, 1978, https://

www.congress.gov/95/statute/STATUTE-92/STATUTE-92-Pg1111.pdf (accessed February 2, 2023).

12.           Donovan Sack and Bill Theobald, “Veterans Affairs Pays $140 Million in Bonuses Amid Scandals,” USA Today, November 11, 2015, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/11/11/veterans-affairs-pays-142-

million-bonuses-amid-scandals/75537586/ (accessed March 15, 2023).

13.           U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Federal Workforce: Distribution of Performance Ratings Across the Federal Government, 2013,” GAO-16-520R, May 9, 2016, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-16-520r.pdf

(accessed March 15, 2023); U.S. Government Accountability Office, Results-Oriented Management: OPM Needs to Do More to Ensure Meaningful Distinctions Are Made in SES Ratings and Performance Awards, GAO-15-

189, January 2015, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-189.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023); U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Measuring Federal Employee Performance,” WatchBlog, posted October 18, 2016, https://www.gao.gov/blog/2016/10/18/measuring-federal-employee-performance (accessed March 15, 2023); Lisa Rein, “The Federal Workforce, Where Everyone’s Performance Gets Rave Reviews,” The Washington Post, June 13, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/06/13/heres-the-news-from-the-

federal-government-where-everyone-is-above-average-way-above/ (accessed March 15, 2023).

14.           Ludwig von Mises, Bureaucracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1944), https://ia902300.us.archive. org/17/items/mises-pdfs/1944-01-01_LudwigVonMises_Bureaucracy.pdf (accessed February 2, 2023).

15.           Figure 1, “Permanent, Non-Senior Executive Service Employee Performance Rating Outcomes (All Rating Systems, Calendar Year 2013),” in U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Federal Workforce: Distribution of Performance Ratings Across the Federal Government, 2013,” p. 6.

16.           President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13839, “Promoting Accountability and Streamlining Removal Procedures Consistent with Merit System Principles,” May 25, 2018, in Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 106 (June 1, 2018), pp. 25343–25347, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-06-01/pdf/2018-11939.pdf (accessed

February 2, 2023).

17.           President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14003, “Protecting the Federal Workforce,” January 22, 2021, in

Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 16 (January 27, 2021), pp. 7231–7233, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-

2021-01-27/pdf/2021-01924.pdf (accessed February 2, 2023).

18.           Rachel Greszler and James Sherk, “Why It Is Time to Reform Compensation for Federal Employees,” The Heritage Foundation, July 27, 2016, https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/report/why-it-time-reform- compensation-federal-employees.

19.           Andrew G. Biggs and Jason Richwine, “Comparing Federal and Private Sector Compensation,” American Enterprise Institute Working Paper No. 2011-02, revised June 2011, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/ uploads/2011/10/AEI-Working-Paper-on-Federal-Pay-May-2011.pdf?x91208 (accessed February 2, 2023).


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

20.           See Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the United States, “Government Efficiency and Effectiveness: Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Billions in Financial Benefits,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Spending Oversight, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, GAO-21-544T, May 12, 2021, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao- 21-544t.pdf (accessed February 2, 2023).

21.           S. 20, Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Public Law No. 103-62, 103rd Congress, August 3, 1993, https://www.congress.gov/103/statute/STATUTE-107/STATUTE-107-Pg285.pdf (accessed

February 2, 2023).

22.           Paul Light, “The Real Crisis in Government,” The Capital Times (Madison, Wisconsin), January 22, 2010, https:// captimes.com/news/opinion/column/paul-c-light-the-real-crisis-in-government/article_9e139318-3d00- 5898-908d-4c7aee1e105d.html (accessed March 15, 2023).

23.           U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii#section3 (accessed February 2, 2023).

24.           President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13957, “Creating Schedule F in the Excepted Service,” October 21, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 207 (October 26, 2020), pp. 67631–67635, https://www.govinfo.gov/

content/pkg/FR-2020-10-26/pdf/2020-23780.pdf (accessed February 2, 2023).

25.           See note 17, supra.

26.           President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13836, “Developing Efficient, Effective, and Cost-Reducing Approaches to Federal Sector Collective Bargaining,” May 25, 2018, in Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 106 (June 1, 2018), pp. 25329–25334, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-06-01/pdf/2018-11913.pdf (accessed

February 2, 2023).

27.           President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13837, “Ensuring Transparency, Accountability, and Efficiency in Taxpayer-Funded Union Time Use,” May 25, 2018, in Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 106 (June 1, 2018),

pp. 25335–25340, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-06-01/pdf/2018-11916.pdf (accessed February 2, 2023).

28.           See note 16, supra.

29.           See note 17, supra.

30.           Philip K. Howard, Not Accountable: Rethinking the Constitutionality of Public Employee Unions (Garden City, NY: Rodin Books, 2023).

31.           James Madison, The Federalist Papers No. 45, January 26, 1788, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/

Madison/01-10-02-0254 (accessed February 1, 2023).


 


Section Two

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

THE COMMON DEFENSE

 

 

W

 
hile the lives of Americans are affected in noteworthy ways, for better or worse, by each part of the executive branch, the inherent importance of national defense and foreign affairs makes the Departments of Defense

and State first among equals. Originating in the George Washington Administra- tion, the War Department (as it was then known) was headed by Henry Knox, America’s chief artillery officer in the Revolutionary War; Thomas Jefferson, the primary author of the Declaration of Independence, was the first Secretary of State. Despite such long and storied histories, neither department is currently living up to its standards, and the success of the next presidency will be determined in part by whether they can be significantly improved in short order.

“Ever since our Founding,” former acting secretary of defense Christopher Miller writes in Chapter 4, “Americans have understood that the surest way to avoid war is to be prepared for it in peace.” Yet the Department of Defense “is a deeply troubled institution.” It has emphasized leftist politics over military readiness, “Recruiting was the worst in 2022 that it has been in two generations,” and “the Biden Admin- istration’s profoundly unserious equity agenda and vaccine mandates have taken a serious toll.” Additionally, Miller writes that “the atrophy of our defense industrial base, the impact of sequestration, and effective disarmament by many U.S. allies have exacted a high toll on America’s military.” Moreover, our military has adopted a risk-averse culture—think of masked soldiers, sailors, and airmen—rather than instilling and rewarding courage in thought and action.

The good news is that most enlisted personnel, and most officers, especially below the rank of general or admiral, continue to be patriotic defenders of liberty.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

But this is now Barack Obama’s general officer corps. That is why Russ Vought argues in Chapter 2 that the National Security Council “should rigorously review all general and flag officer promotions to prioritize the core roles and responsi- bilities of the military over social engineering and non-defense related matters, including climate change, critical race theory, manufactured extremism, and other polarizing policies that weaken our armed forces and discourage our nation’s finest men and women from enlisting.” Ensuring that many of America’s best and bright- est continue to choose military service is essential.

“By far the most significant danger” to America from abroad, Miller writes, “is China.” That communist regime “is undertaking a historic military buildup,” which “could result in a nuclear force that matches or exceeds America’s own nuclear arsenal.” Resisting Chinese expansionist aims “requires a denial defense” whereby we make “the subordination of Taiwan or other U.S. allies in Asia prohibitively difficult.” However, Miller adds that “[c]ritically, the United States must be able to do this at a level of cost and risk that Americans are willing to bear.”

The best gauge of such willingness is congressional approval. Accordingly, we must rediscover and adhere to the Founders’ wise division of war powers, whereby Congress, the most representative and deliberative branch, decides whether to go to war; and the executive, the most energetic and decisive branch, decides how to carry it out once begun. As the past 75 years have repeatedly demonstrated in different ways—from Korea, to Vietnam, to Iraq, to Afghanistan—we depart from our constitutional design at our peril.

Miller writes that we “must treat missile defense as a top priority,” ensure that more of our weapons are made in America, reform the budgeting process, and sustain “an efficient and effective counterterrorism enterprise.” Across all of our efforts, we must keep in mind that part of peace through strength is knowing when to fight. As George Washington warned nearly two centuries ago, we must con- tinue to be on guard against being drawn into conflicts that do not justify great loss of American treasure or significant shedding of American blood. At the same time, we must be prepared to defend our interests and meet challenges where and when they arise.

An effective diplomatic corps is central to defending our interests and influ- encing world events. Whereas most military personnel have had leftist priorities imposed from above, the problem at State comes largely from within. Former State Department director of policy planning Kiron Skinner writes in Chapter 6, “[L]arge swaths of the State Department’s workforce are left-wing and predis- posed to disagree with a conservative President’s policy agenda and vision.” She adds that the department possesses a “belief that it is an independent institution that knows what is best for the United States, sets its own foreign policy, and does not need direction from an elected President”—a view that does not align with the Constitution.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

The solution to this problem is strong political leadership. Skinner writes, “The next Administration must take swift and decisive steps to reforge the department into a lean and functional diplomatic machine that serves the President and, thereby, the American people.” Because the Senate has been extraordinarily lax in fulfilling its constitutional obligation to confirm presidential appointees, she recommends putting appointees into acting roles until such time as the Senate confirms them.

Skinner writes that State should also stop skirting the Constitution’s trea- ty-making requirements and stop enforcing “agreements” as treaties. It should encourage more trade with allies, particularly with Great Britain, and less with adversaries. And it should implement a “sovereign Mexico” policy, as our neighbor “has functionally lost its sovereignty to muscular criminal cartels that effectively run the country.” In Africa, Skinner writes, the U.S. “should focus on core security, economic, and human rights” rather than impose radical abortion and pro-LGBT initiatives. Divisive symbols such as the rainbow flag or the Black Lives Matter flag have no place next to the Stars and Stripes at our embassies.

When it comes to China, Skinner writes that “a policy of ‘compete where we must, but cooperate where we can’…has demonstrably failed.” The People’s Repub- lic of China’s (PRC) “aggressive behavior,” she writes, “can only be curbed through external pressure.” Efforts to protect or excuse China must stop. She observes, “[M]any were quick to dismiss even the possibility that COVID escaped from a Chinese research laboratory.” Meanwhile, Skinner writes, “[g]lobal leaders includ- ing President Joe Biden…have tried to normalize or even laud Chinese behavior.” She adds, “In some cases, these voices, like global corporate giants BlackRock and Disney”—or the National Basketball Association (NBA)—“directly benefit from doing business with Beijing.”

Former vice president of the U.S. Agency for Global Media Mora Namdar writes in Chapter 8 that we need to have people working for USAGM who actually believe in America, rather than allowing the agencies to function as anti-American, tax- payer-funded entities that parrot our adversaries’ propaganda and talking points. Former acting deputy secretary of homeland security Ken Cuccinelli says in Chap- ter 5 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a creation of the George

W. Bush era, should be closed, as it has added needless additional bureaucracy and expense without corresponding benefit. He recommends that it be replaced with a new “stand-alone border and immigration agency at the Cabinet level” and that the remaining parts of DHS be distributed among other departments.

Former chief of staff for the director of National Intelligence Dustin Carmack writes in Chapter 7 that the U.S. Intelligence Community is too inclined to look in the rearview mirror, engage in “groupthink,” and employ an “overly cautious” approach aimed at personal approval rather than at offering the most accurate, unvarnished intelligence for the benefit of the country. And in Chapter 9, former acting deputy administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development Max


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

Primorac asserts that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) must be reformed, writing, “The Biden Administration has deformed the agency by treating it as a global platform to pursue overseas a divisive political and cultural agenda that promotes abortion, climate extremism, gender radicalism, and interventions against perceived systematic racism.”

If the recommendations in the following chapters are adopted, what Skinner says about the State Department could be true for other parts of the federal gov- ernment’s national security and foreign policy apparatus: The next conservative President has the opportunity to restructure the making and execution of U.S. defense and foreign policy and reset the nation’s role in the world. The recom- mendations outlined in this section provide guidance on how the next President should use the federal government’s vast resources to do just that.


4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Christopher Miller

 

 

T

 
he Constitution requires the federal government to “provide for the common defence.”1 It assigns to Congress the authority to “raise and support Armies” and to “provide and maintain a Navy”2 and speci-

fies that the President is “commander in Chief” of America’s armed forces.3 Ever since our Founding, Americans have understood that the surest way to avoid war is to be prepared for it in peace—but when deterrence fails, we must fight and win.

The Department of Defense (DOD) is the largest part of our federal government. It has almost 3 million people serving in uniform or a civilian capacity throughout the world and consumes approximately $850 billion annually—more than 50 per- cent of our government’s discretionary spending.

The DOD is also a deeply troubled institution. Historically, the military has been one of America’s most trusted institutions, but years of sustained misuse, a two-tiered culture of accountability that shields senior officers and officials while exposing junior officers and soldiers in the field, wasteful spending, wildly shifting security policies, exceedingly poor discipline in program execution, and (most recently) the Biden Administration’s profoundly unserious equity agenda and vaccine mandates have taken a serious toll.

Our disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, our impossibly muddled China strategy, the growing involvement of senior military officers in the political arena, and deep confusion about the purpose of our military are clear signals of a disturb- ing decay and markers of a dangerous decline in our nation’s capabilities and will. Additionally, more than 100,000 Americans die annually in large measure because


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

of illicit narcotics flows—more than four times as many people in one year as we lost in our 20-year war against al-Qaeda.

We also are witnessing a transformation in the character of war. The democ- ratization of technology and the collapse of time and space require dramatic, thoughtful changes in how we defend, deter, and fight. As with any huge bureau- cracy—and the DOD is one of the world’s largest—breaking the status quo requires leadership and endurance. Technology is critical to maintaining our warfighting primacy, but we must be leery of the siren song that technology alone can protect us. More important is how new technologies are developed, tested, procured, and used, and that relies on the true competitive advantages of our people: ingenuity, common sense, and thoughtfulness grounded in a free society. Because war will continue to be the most stressful and consequential human endeavor, the most powerful weapon systems will remain the six inches between the ears of our citi- zens and the strength of their hearts and content of their souls.

Military service is the most difficult task we ask of our citizens, and our nation is enormously blessed that so many young, patriotic Americans eagerly volunteer to carry such a heavy burden. We owe them everything, and we must do better. To do better, however, means recognizing and implementing four overriding priorities:

   Priority No. 1: Reestablish a culture of command accountability, nonpoliticization, and warfighting focus.

   Priority No. 2: Transform our armed forces for maximum effectiveness in an era of great-power competition.

   Priority No. 3: Provide necessary support to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) border protection operations. Border protection is a national security issue that requires sustained attention and effort by all elements of the executive branch.

   Priority No. 4: Demand financial transparency and accountability.

This chapter offers recommendations for improving our armed forces and the civilian organizations that support and oversee them.

 

DOD POLICY

By far the most significant danger to Americans’ security, freedoms, and pros- perity is China. China is by any measure the most powerful state in the world other than the United States itself. It apparently aspires to dominate Asia and then, from that position, become globally preeminent. If Beijing could achieve this goal, it could dramatically undermine America’s core interests, including by restricting


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

U.S. access to the world’s most important market. Preventing this from happening must be the top priority for American foreign and defense policy.

Beijing presents a challenge to American interests across the domains of national power, but the military threat that it poses is especially acute and signif- icant. China is undertaking a historic military buildup that includes increasing capability for power projection not only in its own region, but also far beyond as well as a dramatic expansion of its nuclear forces that could result in a nuclear force that matches or exceeds America’s own nuclear arsenal.

The most severe immediate threat that Beijing’s military poses, however, is to Taiwan and other U.S. allies along the first island chain in the Western Pacific. If China could subordinate Taiwan or allies like the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan, it could break apart any balancing coalition that is designed to prevent Bei- jing’s hegemony over Asia. Accordingly, the United States must ensure that China does not succeed. This requires a denial defense: the ability to make the subordi- nation of Taiwan or other U.S. allies in Asia prohibitively difficult. Critically, the United States must be able to do this at a level of cost and risk that Americans are willing to bear given the relative importance of Taiwan to China and to the U.S.

The United States and its allies also face real threats from Russia, as evidenced by Vladimir Putin’s brutal war in Ukraine, as well as from Iran, North Korea, and transnational terrorism at a time when decades of ill-advised military operations in the Greater Middle East, the atrophy of our defense industrial base, the impact of sequestration, and effective disarmament by many U.S. allies have exacted a high toll on America’s military.

This is a grim landscape. The United States needs to deal with these threats forthrightly and with strength, but it also needs to be realistic. It cannot wish away these problems. Rather, it must confront them with a clear-eyed recognition of the need for choice, discipline, and adequate resources for defense.

In this light, U.S. defense strategy must identify China unequivocally as the top priority for U.S. defense planning while modernizing and expanding the

U.S. nuclear arsenal and sustaining an efficient and effective counterterrorism enterprise. U.S. allies must also step up, with some joining the United States in taking on China in Asia while others take more of a lead in dealing with threats from Russia in Europe, Iran, the Middle East, and North Korea. The reality is that achieving these goals will require more spending on defense, both by the United States and by its allies, as well as active support for reindustrialization and more support for allies’ productive capacity so that we can scale our free- world efforts together.

 

Needed Reforms

   Prioritize a denial defense against China. U.S. defense planning should focus on China and, in particular, the effective denial defense of Taiwan.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

This focus and priority for U.S. defense activities will deny China the first island chain.

1.        Require that all U.S. defense efforts, from force planning to employment and posture, focus on ensuring the ability of American forces to prevail in the pacing scenario and deny China a fait accompli against Taiwan.

2.        Prioritize the U.S. conventional force planning construct to defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan before allocating resources to other missions, such as simultaneously fighting another conflict.

   Increase allied conventional defense burden-sharing. U.S. allies must take far greater responsibility for their conventional defense. U.S. allies must play their part not only in dealing with China, but also in dealing with threats from Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

1.        Make burden-sharing a central part of U.S. defense strategy with the United States not just helping allies to step up, but strongly encouraging them to do so.

2.        Support greater spending and collaboration by Taiwan and allies in the Asia–Pacific like Japan and Australia to create a collective defense model.

3.        Transform NATO so that U.S. allies are capable of fielding the great majority of the conventional forces required to deter Russia while relying on the United States primarily for our nuclear deterrent, and select other capabilities while reducing the U.S. force posture in Europe.

4.        Sustain support for Israel even as America empowers Gulf partners to take responsibility for their own coastal, air, and missile defenses both individually and working collectively.

5.        Enable South Korea to take the lead in its conventional defense against North Korea.

   Implement nuclear modernization and expansion. The United States manifestly needs to modernize, adapt, and expand its nuclear arsenal. Russia maintains and is actively brandishing a very large nuclear arsenal, but China is also undertaking a historic nuclear breakout.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

1.        Expand and modernize the U.S. nuclear force so that it has the size, sophistication, and tailoring to deter Russia and China simultaneously.

2.        Develop a nuclear arsenal with the size, sophistication, and tailoring— including new capabilities at the theater level—to ensure that

there is no circumstance in which America is exposed to serious nuclear coercion.

   Increase allied counterterrorist burden-sharing. Transnational terrorism remains a threat to Americans even as we pivot toward Asia.

1.        Sustain the military forces needed to deter, prevent, and combat terrorism, but at a sustainable cost in concert with other elements of national power and partner efforts.

2.        Prioritize